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Abstract 
This thesis explores the complex nature o f the policy process through the actions and 
intentions o f the multiplicity o f national and local actors involved in the development, 
through implementation, o f a particular initiative: direct payments for community care. 
The methodology combines both 'top down' and 'bottom up' perspectives on policy-
action (Sabatier, 1986) in a case study, using documents, personal accounts and 
observations. 
The case study follows New Labour's efforts to secure policy effectiveness while 
delegating the responsibility for implementation to local councils. The research focused 
primarily on one authority. It took place within the context o f that authority's efforts to 
'modernise' community care through pragmatism, partnership, participation and 
centralised performance management. The findings are compared to experiences in 
another authority, thereby combining the validity o f Pawson and Tilley's (1997) 
assertion that the outcomes of the ideas and opportunities offered by policy initiatives 
vary with context. This comparison illustrates the influence o f contextual features on 
policy outcomes: local politics, history, culture and the community's expectations and 
experiences o f policy developments. 
In the 'policy-action' relationship examined, ultimate objectives and the means of 
achieving them were re-defined and prioritised through negotiation and experience, as 
parts o f New Labour's own discourse were appropriated (Newman, 2001). The 
relevance o f Lindblom's (1959) classic 'muddling through' account o f the process is 
thus revealed, along with the contribution of'street level bureaucrats' in interaction 
with citizens (Lipsky, 1980), to policy development through implementation. The 
influences o f values and convictions, as well as personal experience and interests, on the 
agency o f policy actors are highlighted. 
The thesis concludes that central government wi l l only achieve the objective o f 
'promoting independence', through initiatives intended to extend choice and control to 
most service users, when and where it engages and empowers people at the level o f 
citizen-practitioner interaction. 
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Introduction and Overview 
'The problems of policy implementation therefore demand attention for good 
academic and practical reasons; a government dedicated to radical action on 
its own distinctive interpretation of the 'policy failure' of recent decades offers 
an opportunity for such research' (Webb and Wistow 1982 , 17) 
This thesis explores the complex nature of the policy process through a case study of the 
extension of 'direct payments' for community care, a project that formed part of the Blair 
Government's plan for 'modernising' social services. Direct payments were chosen because 
they feature a cluster of characteristics common to the 'New' Labour government's 
'modernising' initiatives (Dept of Health 1998a) and thus meet the criteria of a 'typical' case as 
proposed by Bryman (1988). The case study demonstrates how social policy is made and 
developed by actors at every stage in the implementation process, from national and local 
politicians to individual practitioners and citizen/ service users. It also illustrates that 
irrespective of central government's intentions to impose particular theories of social policy 
effectiveness on policy actors, individuals at every level act on the basis of their own values and 
beliefs about the means and ends of social policy, alongside their personal interests. In the 
complex policy action process however, outcomes depend on context and contingency as well 
as policy theories and ideology. 
The policy studies literature has traditionally questioned how far 'policies' are made and 
developed by those with authority from and accountability to the electorate, as well as the 
contribution of ideological convictions and social theories about the relationship between the 
means and ends of policy. The concept of the 'implementation gap' was used by Dunsire (1976) 
to describe the problems policy makers have in achieving their intended outcomes. The 
particular difficulties experienced in distinguishing policy making from implementation, when 
implementation responsibilities are delegated by one tier of government to another were 
highlighted by Hill (1981). These were illustrated by more recent research by Pearson (2000) on 
the example used in this thesis. She found that alternative discourses dominated in a Labour and 
a Conservative council and influenced the way that direct payments developed in each area, 
with a consequent impact on outcomes. Assumptions that central decision- makers are the key 
actors in the policy process therefore have long been challenged (Hjern 1982), along with the 
understanding that progress in implementation follows logically and sequentially from a policy 
decision (Lindblom 1959, Schwandt 1997). The contributions of non-elected actors have been 
identified, whether senior public servants (Niskansen 1973, Tulloch 1976, Dunleavy 1986), 
agency managers (Meier and Mc Farlane 1996), interest groups (Maloney and colleagues 1994) 
or welfare practitioners (Lipsky 1980). A synthesis of ' top down' and 'bottom up' approaches to 
policy implementation research was recommended by Sabatier (1986). The top down approach 
begins with a policy decision and focuses on the extent to which its objectives are achieved over 
time. The bottom up approach begins by identifying the network of actors and agencies 
involved in policy formulation and implementation. The synthesis combines the top downer's 
concern, about the ways in which socio-economic conditions and legal instruments constrain 
behaviour, with the bottom upper's interest in understanding the perspectives and strategies of 
the public and private actors involved with a policy problem. 
In the example of direct payments for community care, the literature highlights the role of the 
disability rights movement in policy development at both the national and local level. 
Organisations run by disabled people1 first persuaded some councils (Oliver and Barnes 1998), 
and then government (Dept of Health 1997), of the potential of direct payments as a means of 
increasing the choice, control and independence of service users and the cost effective use of 
resources (Brandon 2002, Campbell and Oliver 1996, Hasler 1999, Holman 1999, Morris 1997, 
Priestley 1999, Zarb and Nadash 1994). Participation by individual service users however, in the 
implementation of Conservative governments' community care policy generally, fell short of 
the democratic ideal promoted by Beresford and Croft (1993) and Arnstein (1971). Instead, 
Shaw (1997) suggested that the involvement of users was often restricted to the 'micro-level' of 
individual influence on the actions of front line workers with little impact on policy or decision-
making. 
The New Labour government was critical of the Conservative party's approach to the 
implementation of'community care', apparently recognising the 'implementation gap' between 
policy aims and outcomes. It blamed its predecessors' failure to realise this policy's intentions 
on lack of clear central direction, lack of consistency in objectives and lack of involvement of 
service users/ citizens (Dept. of Health 1998a). The past performance of social services 
departments was discussed in policy documents and political speeches within a 'discourse of 
failure' (Clarke and colleagues 2000). Four strands to the alternative approach promised by 
Blair's party in government can be discerned in policy statements and documents: 
1) 'Third way' pragmatism, policy action based on 'what works' rather than ideological 
commitment to either state provision or to market devices; 
2) 'Joined -up' thinking and action in policy making and implementation; 
3) Participation of citizens and service users in decision-making on the planning, development 
and delivery of services; 
4) Centralised performance management, making clear to policy actors what is expected of 
them and requiring them to account for their performance in pursuit of government 
objectives. 
' The term 'disabled people' derives from the social model of disability and is used generically when 
distinctions are not drawn between the source of particular impairments, so includes learning difficulties, 
frailty with age and mental health problems. However Shakespeare (1993,1994) and Morris (1993) 
argued that the nature of impairment is ignored at die risk of denying the reality of a significant aspect of 
human experience. 
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New Labour's approach to social policy works within, and contributes to. the renewal of civil 
society and responsible citizenry , according to Blair (1996, 2001a) and Giddens (1998), or as 
Newman (2001, 6) suggested: 
'The languages of democracy, citizenship, society, community, social inclusion, 
partnership and public participation, central to new Labour's discursive repetoire, can 
be understood as an attempt to reinstall the "social" in public and social policy.' 
Policy action is examined in this study, as already explained, through the example of a 
particular initiative within the wider policy programme of the New Labour government. It 
demonstrates how both 'top down' and 'bottom up' theories and alternative philosophical and 
ideological models of social policy can contribute to our understanding of what happens in the 
implementation process. Central government policy initiatives may begin at 'the bottom' and 
be influenced by the interests and actions of citizens and their organisations. In the case study, 
legislation responded to the campaigning efforts of the disability rights movement and research 
that demonstrated the success of 'third party' direct payment schemes, developed by some local 
authorities in partnership with voluntary organisations. Policy continued to develop during 
implementation shaped by the actions, interpretations and aspirations of individuals and groups; 
these included local politicians, public service managers and professionals and those directly 
involved in the service delivery process, both practitioners and citizens who use their services. 
In the 'policy-action' relationship examined, the ultimate objectives and the means of achieving 
them were re-defined and prioritised through negotiation and experience, as a continuing 
process. This study thus confirms the continuing relevance of Lindblom's (1959) 'muddling 
through' account of policy action. As Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993, 68) later described: 
'..policy evolves through complex and reciprocal relations among all the bureaucrats, elected 
functionaries, representatives of interest groups, and other participants.' 
The research for this thesis focused primarily on implementation within a single local authority 
here called 'Fletcherford'. It took place within the context of the authority's efforts to 
'modernise" through the promotion of the 'third way' for social care. It also drew on 
experiences of actors engaged in similar implementation processes in another local authority 
'Bigtown', also led by the party in government. The study therefore focuses on areas (Northern 
Labour councils) and organisations (social services departments) traditionally perceived as 
sympathetic to 'Labour' policies and values. It moves on from earlier research that contrasted 
alternative approaches of Conservative and Labour run councils to community care 
implementation and direct payments (Priestley 1999, Pearson 2000). 
Chapter one begins the case study by exploring the social policy theories, ideas and intentions of 
the national policy- makers responsible for public service reform and the extension of direct 
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payments. The debate about New Labour's contribution to social policy, in offering a pragmatic 
alternative to an ideological domination by either the public sector or the market, is discussed. 
The policy statements and initiatives of the Blair government are explored in this context. The 
chapter concludes with a review of the various critiques of the recent development of British 
social policy, using the framework of the key questions proposed by Driver and Martell (1998). 
Chapter two examines New Labour's approach to policy effectiveness through the particular 
initiative. The history of direct payments is outlined and the implications for implementation 
discussed. The characteristics that make the extension of direct payments typical of a 'third 
way' initiative are explained, in order to establish the appropriateness of the policy example for 
a case study. 
Chapter three reviews the literature on policy implementation and discusses its relevance to 
direct payments and community care. The research revealing the gaps between the intentions 
and outcomes of community care policy and the tensions in the roles of practitioners as 'care 
managers' is explored. The weaknesses of the community care market, as an efficient means of 
allocating resources, are examined in relation to economic theory and the research of Le Grand 
and Bartlett (1993) and Bartlett and colleagues (1998) amongst others. The concept of 'street 
level bureaucracy' theorised by Lipsky (1980) is introduced: in Lipsky's analysis, welfare 
practitioners completed the policy making process in interaction with citizens/ service users. 
The implications of these findings for the implementation of direct payments and New Labour's 
wider policy programme are considered and the research questions are introduced. 
Chapter four explains the methodology of the case study and the methods used to address the 
research questions. The methodology is informed by the work of Pawson and Tilley (1997) 
who advised that policy research needs to be theory rather than method driven. The 
'programme' studied should not be treated as a 'black box'. The researcher should not simply 
identify 'what works', but attempt to uncover how a policy initiative works: 
' ..programmes work (have successful 'outcomes') only in so far as they introduce the 
appropriate ideas and opportunities ('mechanisms') to groups in the appropriate 
social and cultural conditions ('contexts').' Pawson and Tilley (1997, 57) 
The research findings are presented in the following five chapters. Three 'elements' of the 
policy action relationship were distinguished by Barret and Fudge (1981,7): the environmental 
system from which demand arises; the political system in which decisions are made and the 
organisational system through which policy is mediated and executed. Each element is explored 
through the case study example. Chapter five is an account of the events that led to the decision 
to introduce direct payments by Fletcherford council, after they were promoted by the Blair 
government. It includes data from interviews with actors involved at the national and local level 
and policy documents, reports and records. Fletcherford was one of the last nine councils in 
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England to introduce direct payments in 2001, having 'rejected' them as a Conservative 
government initiative, following a consultation with the local community in 1997. The 
importance of the political, historical and social context to actors' perceptions of and responses 
to policy change is revealed. This account begins to illustrate how public servants and citizens 
contribute to the development of social policy. 
Chapter six presents data from a survey of practitioners' opinions and expectations of direct 
payments, early in the local implementation process, and an analysis of their implications. 
Practitioners' own explanations of their experiences of community care implementation are 
discussed with reference to the literature. The survey findings reveal that at the beginning of the 
study, in 2000, practitioners were generally in favour of the principle of introducing direct 
payments and supported the Blair government's policy programme. They were also able to 
identify potential obstacles to the success of the initiative in the local context. 
Chapter seven gives an account of the planning process for the introduction of direct payments 
in Fletcherford, based on observations, records of meetings and interviews with the actors 
involved. The council's interpretation of the Blair government's advice to involve disabled 
people in the development of local schemes and the implications of this approach are analysed. 
Despite the government's efforts to improve policy effectiveness through promoting 
participation in decision-making, this chapter shows how community and user representatives 
were marginalised. More powerful actors were able to divert the local planning process to 
alternative ends. Other aspects of the government's approach to policy effectiveness, in 
particular centralised performance management, also proved to be counter-productive. 
Chapter eight discusses the motivation and experiences of those involved, at the 'street level' of 
citizen-practitioner interactions, contrasting the potential of the initiative with its performance in 
the particular context of Fletcherford. The role of care managers, in interpreting and developing 
policy through their relationships with individual service users, is illustrated. It demonstrates 
that community care 'consumers' were not simply motivated by the instrumental rationality, on 
which classical market theory (Smith 1961) and policy initiatives that draw on its principles 
(Dept. of Health 1998a, Dept. of Health 2000a) are based. They were concerned also with issues 
of social justice. Opportunities to benefit from greater 'choice', however, were not equally 
distributed. 
Chapter nine presents data from interviews carried out in 'Bigtown'. It identifies and attempts to 
explain the similarities and differences in experiences in the two 'Labour' areas, with reference 
to the relevant literature. It illustrates that even within policy environments broadly supportive 
of central government intentions, the values, perceptions and social policy 'theories' of 
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individual actors can interact with the political, historical and social context to unintended 
effect. 
Chapter ten discusses the contribution of the case study with reference to the literature. The 
framework provided by Pawson and Tilley (1997) is used to analyse the outcomes of the 
interactions between 'contexts' and 'mechanisms' in policy action in the two authorities. The 
conclusions support the thesis that the outcomes of particular policy initiatives depend on the 
interactions of the ideas and opportunities they introduce with the political, historical and social 
conditions in particular contexts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
New Labour's Social Policy : Modern Means to Traditional Ends? 
'There is a clear road map to our destination but sometimes it can seem as if it were a 
mere technocratic exercise , well or less well managed, but with no over-riding moral 
purpose to it.' ( Blair 2002b,4) 
1.0 Introduction 
The context for a study of the policy process through the example of a particular initiative, the 
extension of direct payments by the New Labour government (Dept. of Health 2000a) is 
presented in this chapter. Direct payments are cash sums given to individuals by local authority 
social services departments, in lieu of community care services. They give people in need of 
social care both the resources and the responsibility to arrange their own services in the 
independent sector. 
The party led by Tony Blair claimed to have made a distinctive contribution to the achievement 
of social policy objectives, in offering an alternative to an ideological domination by either the 
public sector or the market. Here, the policy statements and initiatives of the Blair government 
are explored alongside the debate in the literature about the meaning and implications of New 
Labour's approach. Consideration is given to Driver and Martell's (1998) thesis that Blair's 
government was ideologically 'post -Thatcherist' alongside Powell's (1999) argument that it 
was essentially pragmatic. This chapter concludes with an examination of New Labour's 
programme of welfare reform using Driver and Martell's (1998) framework to address 'Who, 
Why and How?' questions about the development of social policy, with particular reference to 
direct payments. 
1.1 The Vision 
Blair's speeches and his government's policy documents revealed three overarching themes: 
ethics (rights and responsibilities), economic efficiency and social cohesion. These were 
inextricably linked; the achievement of each depending on the achievement of all. They 
provided the context for New Labour's policy programme within which particular initiatives can 
be considered. 
'The reform programme to improve public services is every bit as crucial to the future 
of Britain as changing Clause IVwas to the future of the Labour Party.' (Blair 200 la, 
6) 
In an early speech as party leader Blair (1994) reasserted what he called 'ethical socialism', as a 
set of values and beliefs. He distinguished ethical from 'Marxist socialism', which was based 
on notions of economic determinism and a particular view of class. 'Marxist socialism' is dead 
because it misunderstood the nature of the development of a modern market economy 'it failed 
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to recognise that the state and the public sector can become a vested interest capable of 
oppression as much as the vested interests of wealth and capital..' (3). Blair's project was as 
much about establishing new political ideas and representations of society as it was about new 
policies, institutions and practices, in Newman's (2001) analysis of New Labour's attempt to 
establish its own dominant narrative. 
Blair's critique of what Rouse and Smith (1999) call the 'public administration paradigm' 
would have found support in the 1970s, from across the political spectrum. However it was the 
New Right's analysis of the rigidities of public sector bureaucracies that gained ascendancy 
following the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. The basis of the ethical 'social-ism' 
reasserted by Blair (sic) was that individuals are socially interdependent. It is only through 
recognition of that interdependence that the collective power of all can be used for the good of 
each; ' ..it takes an enlightened view of self-interest and regards it, broadly, as inextricably 
linked to the interests of society..' (Blair 1994, 4) This seemed a stark contrast to Thatcher's 
(1987) statement that there is no such thing as society, only individuals and families. Public 
Choice theorists associated with the 'New Right' drew on classical economic theory that 
predicted that by each person pursuing his self-interest in a free market, the welfare of all would 
be maximised and the optimum allocation of resources achieved (Smith 1961). In the above 
interview, Thatcher also observed that there can be no entitlement without obligation. Novak 
(1998, 2) asserted that the Thatcher government's reforms provided a foundation on which the 
Blair government has been able to build: 
'By launching Great Britain on a trajectory of growth and opportunity ...the Iron Lady 
weaned New Labour from a sterile and punitive redistributionism, on the one hand, and 
from the ennervating Nanny State on the other.' 
The call from Novak for the renewal of civil society and individual, responsible citizenry 
through the devolution of power from state bureaucracies to citizens elicited a response from 
Giddens (1998b). He observed that 'Thatcherism' was 'the enemy of devolution' draining power 
from the local to the central state. There is a distinction between the citizen as consumer, 
consulted about and expected to take greater responsibility for decisions that affect his or her 
life in the private sphere and the citizen exercising power in the public sphere. This distinction 
will be discussed further in the context of direct payments for community- care. 
1.1.1. Citizenship and New Labour 
One question raised by the literature is, does New Labour's social policy simply enhance the 
role of the user as consumer in a market for services, developed in the Conservative 
governments' public sector 'reforms'? Alternatively, does the concept of the user as citizen 
mean more with New Labour than extending purchasing power, choices and 'participation' 
through limited consultation as a form of market research (Hunter 2001). 
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Citizenship is a fundamentally contested concept. Two traditions in the understanding of 
citizenship are identified by Dean (1999). The individual model is rooted in classical liberal 
theory, which understands citizenship as a contractual relationship between the individual and 
the state. The social model is based on the classical ideal of 'civic republicanism', which 
subordinates the sovereignty of the state to solidarity and the need for social integration and 
cohesion. The New Right's critique of social policy, and the changes it inspired in Britain in 
the 1980s and 90s, were based on the individual/ contractarian model and in some respects 
represented an attempt to 'privatise' citizenship. Welfare transactions were perceived as akin to 
market contracts. The 'consumerist' approach found some expression in the policy realm of 
community care during the Major administration and service users were given 'consumer rights' 
through the 'Citizen's Charter' (Prime Minister's Office 1991). Users were given the right to be 
consulted on decisions but not to veto or contribute directly to decision-making. They were 
given the right to choose between the state and independent sector provision but not to 
participate in the development of services or in the processes of establishing priorities and 
allocating resources. Users were given the right to complain when the promised standards were 
not met, but not to have a direct role in setting those standards. Cowen (1998) maintained that 
New Right advocates of individual consumer rights rewrote discourses on citizenship. 
Another slant on the consumerism/ empowerment debate was discernible in the work of Gilliatt 
and colleagues (2000). They argued that the concept of the 'responsible consumer' has emerged 
in public sector managerial consciousness. There has been a shift in the balance between what is 
normal for services managers to do and what it is expected users should do for themselves. 
Organisations achieve more flexibility as users increasingly share responsibility for rationing 
scarce resources. Consequently it is the producer rather than the consumer that is empowered. 
This analysis is relevant to the debate on the development of direct payments that gave service 
users responsibilities for managing individual community care budget allocations. 
Major's contribution did not resolve the tensions inherent in Thatcherism, an orthodoxy that 
simultaneously promoted both a free market economy and a strong central state. 
' Major's Citizen's Charter was -and still is- a much mocked policy. But it recognised-
and by recognising exacerbated- the conflict between individual rights and collective 
provision.' (Timmins 2001, 5). 
Alongside the promotion of 'active citizenship' intended to free people to give voluntarily to 
those worse off, the social security system has become more coercive and punitive to some 
'users', the unemployed and single parents (DSS1998). This apparent concern with promoting 
responsible behaviour was shared by the Conservative and New Labour governments. Dean 
(1999) suggested that New Labour's revised 'clause 4' drew on contradictory notions of 
citizenship, in the commitment to the creation of a community: ' . . . where the rights we enjoy 
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reflect the duties we owe, and where we live together freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance 
and respect' (Labour Party, 1995). 
The 'new contract between citizen and state' (DSS 1998) made rights to collective support 
conditional upon behaviour. Thus, the first focus of New Labour's Social Exclusion Unit was 
not on the potentially disadvantaged generally but on particular groups, identified as 'at risk' of 
social exclusion by their behaviour. Rather than using the unconditional language of social 
justice, New Labour's policy statements on the labour market, family life and housing show a 
concern with promoting 'responsible' behaviour by individuals (Powell 1999). 
' ...as the Labour Party became New Labour, its notion of causation moved from the 
structural to focus on individual character as shaped by personal circumstance..' (Lund 
1999, 448). 
The ideal of an altruistic welfare state, facilitating social cohesion through collective discharge 
of responsibilities and the rights of welfare citizenship, was exemplified in the work of Titmuss 
(1974). Lund (1999) suggested the ideal is associated with old Labour social policy, developed 
in the forties and consolidated in the sixties. 'Universal altruism' was criticised by those Lund 
called 'New Labour gurus', because it failed to establish 'specific' obligations and a 
motivational force strong enough to sustain the welfare state. New Labour used the language of 
social problems in its discussion of social policy change. Lister (2001) argued that causal agents 
were thus individualised. The systemic issues of structural divisions that were the traditional 
concern of Labour governments were denied. 
1.1.2.Motivation and Morality 
There has been a revival of interest in agency. Deacon and Mann (1998) discuss the work of 
moral thinkers like Etzioni and Field who advised that motivation and the meaningfulness of 
choice should be taken into account in policy making. Their influence on New Labour's social 
policy has been reflected in attempts to restructure welfare to encourage responsible behaviour. 
The theoretical foundation for 'third way' approaches to social policy can be found in the work 
of Giddens in the U.K. (1998a, 2000) and in the concept of the reflexive citizen, to be discussed 
in chapter two. 
Beliefs about human nature underpin welfare strategies. Taylor-Gooby (1999) highlighted the 
continuing influence of 'rational choice theory' in New Labour policies in the assumption that 
those who receive, provide and pay for welfare are motivated instrumentally. Murray (1994) 
argued that welfare programmes reward the immoral and anti-social behaviour of an 
'underclass' of rational actors. Novak's (1998) critique also argued that the welfare state has 
been a source of moral corruption in the West, creating a 'spiritual crisis' that presented a 
greater threat than financial crises. Gidden's (1998b, 29) responded that there was no correlation 
between welfare expenditure and family breakdown across western societies. He nevertheless 
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asserted that welfare systems should encourage a spirit of entrepreneurialism, risk taking and 
resilience in the face of economic and social changes. In the third way, individual character is as 
much a topic of concern for social policy as social structure. The idea that rights can turn people 
into passive recipients was not solely the province of the New Right. Lister (2001) observed that 
New Labour embraced the concept of 'welfare dependency', using the example of Blair 
heralding 'the end of the somethingfor nothing welfare state' (Daily Mail, February 10, 1999). 
An understanding of human motivation became crucial to ensuring the effectiveness of social 
policy. Le Grand (1997) explored how faith in the altruistic, honourable 'knight- providers' and 
passive, disinterested 'pawn - recipients' of welfare has been replaced by a view of selfish and 
potentially dishonest 'knaves'. Therefore, actors must be constrained in their pursuit of self-
interest by market discipline and a carefully managed structure of rewards and penalties. Policy 
changes included measures intended to ensure that the institutions and public servants 
responsible for policy implementation were motivated to realise government objectives. New 
Labour's performance management initiatives did not leave the motivation of councillors, 
bureaucrats and professionals to the discipline of market forces alone. Instead they reinforced 
the promise of greater financial rewards and status with the threat of loss of funding and power 
i f outcomes were not achieved. The government's efforts to ally providers' interests with the 
pursuit of policy objectives include league tables, 'special measures' for poor performers, 
specific grants and 'earned autonomy' (Dept of Health 2000c, Hale 2001, Newman 2001) The 
government's concern with the motivation and behaviour of welfare recipients will be explored 
further later. 
The similarities between New Labour's social policy and that of the 'progressive alliance' of 
Christian socialists, Fabians and new Liberals in the early twentieth century (before the party 
was committed to public ownership), were explained by Blair: 
'The Third Way is not an attempt to split the difference between Right and Left. It is 
about traditional values in a changed world.. . uniting the two great strengths of left of 
centre thought- democratic socialism and liberalism-whose divorce this century did 
much to weaken progressive politics... Liberals asserted the primacy of individual 
liberty in the market economy: social democrats promoted social justice with the state 
as its main agent. ' (Blair 1998, 1) 
1.1.3. Modernisation and Social Justice 
New Labour's approach was concerned with 'modernising' rather than rejecting social 
democracy (Blair 200Id). Labour struggled to reconcile economic and social priorities from the 
1950s, according to Cowen (1998) and Lund (1999). The revisionary course led to Callaghan's 
confrontation in 1977 with 'hard and irreducible economic facts' and the separation of growth 
as a policy issue from any commitment to welfare expenditure (Driver and Martell 1998, Ellison 
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1997). The old objectives were re-defined rather than abandoned by New Labour, argued 
Powell (1999). The egalitarian aims of some of its policy changes (increased targeting of tax 
and benefit incentives) achieved 'redistribution by stealth'. The party's laudable commitment to 
end child poverty in Britain by 2019 was referred to in only one speech by Gordon Brown in the 
2001 election campaign and was 'buried' on page 27 of its manifesto (Dean 2001b, 7). For New 
Labour, taxpayers are no longer the altruistic 'knights' in Titmuss's (1974) ideal of a welfare 
society. The government's reluctance to publicise the redistributing effects of some of its social 
policy initiatives, was attributed to a 'populism' that could ultimately undermine its 
achievements in addressing traditional Labour concerns: 
' What we see here is a reading of public opinion as conservative and reactionary, 
which needs to be pandered to rather than challenged. This acts as a brake on the 
government's progressive policies...' Lister (2001, 429) 
Blair nevertheless maintained that New Labour's policies employ modern means to achieve 
traditional ends. 
'The values have not changed and will not change. They are based on the core belief in 
society, in community, in solidarity, the idea that we help each other as we help 
ourselves; and that this, not some laissez-faire individualism is the way to greater 
prosperity and a more fair and just society.' (Blair 2001a, 3) 
The 'core value' that remains unchanged is that of social justice. 
In his influential work on the 'third way', Giddens (1998a, 2000) maintained that there was a 
new recognition that the concept of 'equality' is relative and contextual. Still, it was a 
continuing concern with social justice that distinguished the policies of the 'left' from those of 
right of centre parties. Giddens argued that it was commonly accepted that there was no 
alternative to capitalism and differences are about ' ..how far, and in what ways, capitalism 
should be regulated.' (1998, 44), although no Labour Government ever proposed to do more 
than regulate capitalism. The history of the revisionist trend in Labour politics, the party's 
'.. courageous attempts to maintain its abiding welfare collectivist ethic' and to reconcile 
economic and social objectives were described by Ellison (1997,45). He observed that it was 
when the Commission for Social Justice, appointed by John Smith, reported on the concept 
(social justice) as a hierarchy of ideas, that Labour began to distance itself from its traditional 
concerns with equality of outcomes, through redistribution across social classes. It began openly 
to pursue equality of opportunity and promoted the acceptance that not all inequalities are 
unjust. Blair's party in government has carried this forward. 
'..New Labour has adjusted previous normative assumptions to endorse a conception of 
social justice as 'equity' rather than equality..'(Ellison 1998, 44) 
Or as the prime minister was later to explain; 
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'The reason for the changes we are making is not for their own sake but because they 
are the means to a fairer society, where aspirations and opportunity are open to all, 
...At the root of it all is a simple belief in fairness.' (Blair 2002b, 4) 
The implication for social policy is help for those who help themselves. In this context even the 
mildly egalitarian effects of the minimum wage and income subsidies to working parents, can 
be explained by a New Labour concern with increasing labour market participation rather than 
old Labour's traditional concern with the relief of poverty. Thus the Blair government's policy 
on charging for community care services by local authorities, exempted income from 
employment but not disability benefits from means testing (Dept of Health, 2002a). 
New Labour's move from universal to more targeted, selective benefits had a re-distributional 
effect, rather than raising standards generally for whole demographic groups irrespective of 
income. The significant impact of New Labour's efforts to eradicate child poverty has been 
assessed (Tonybee 2000, Tonybee and Walker 2001), i f under- reported (Dean 2001b, 7). Lister 
(1998, 215) discussed what she called a paradigm shift in New Labour's minking on the welfare 
state encapsulated by the expression 'from equality to social inclusion'. The increasing use of 
means testing and 'targeting' income replacement benefits has obscured a ' fundamental shift 
further towards a residual safety net model'. (Lister 2001, 434) 
The universal -residual debate goes beyond the distribution of cash benefits. Within the public 
sector, there has also been a longstanding distinction between services provided for the 
population as a whole, irrespective of means, and the provision of a 'safety net' of services for 
those who cannot afford to make their own arrangements. In 1948 the National Health Service 
was founded on universal values, with services free at the point of use. The 1948 National 
Assistance Act repealed the Poor Law and separated responsibilities for the financial from the 
non-financial welfare of the poor, and the latter were allocated to local authorities. The personal 
social services relied on a 'residual', selective model and means testing for residential services 
from their beginning in the legislation. How this distinction between the highly regarded N.H.S 
and the stigmatised personal social services continued to impact upon contemporary social 
policy developments is explored in this case study. It is however worthy of note that when New 
Labour sought a popular mandate for its proposals for the reform of public services in a second 
term, the personal social services did not merit a direct mention (Labour Party Manifesto 2001, 
Blair 2001a+b). 
Financial pressures and increasing responsibilities from the Conservative governments, during 
the 1992 to 97 period, led to tightening of eligibility criteria and extending charges in the 
personal social services (LGA/ ADSS 1998). The increasing significance of charges for 
community care services, in local authority finance was confirmed by the Audit Commission 
(2000) and identified as an obstacle to 'joined -up' action locally by health and social services 
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around individual need rather than bureaucratic boundaries. This was despite the exhortations of 
the Blair government to health and social services to work in partnership (Dept. of Health 
1998a). 
1.2 Globalisation and Social Inclusion 
In New Labour's modernising agenda, economic and social policies are inextricable, because 
the world has changed. Jessop's (1994) model of the 'Schumpeterian workfare state' described 
two key transformations in advanced capitalist states, with the global trend to 'post- Fordist' 
strategic perspectives and discourses. A tendential shift from Keynesian demand side strategies 
to supply side 'workfare' initiatives and a 'hollowing out' of the nation state occurred. Jessop's 
thesis is that the Fordist state was an earlier phase in the development of international 
capitalism. New Labour accepted that national governments are constrained in the extent to 
which they can resist or ameliorate global trends and that the welfare state they recovered from 
the Tories had failed to keep up with economic and social change (D.S .S. 1998). Blair 
government's rejection of 'tax and spend' social policies in its first term and its concern with 
increasing the availablity, quality and flexibility of the labour supply fit Jessop's model. 
For New Labour, the globalisation of world markets, the mobility of capital and the changing 
nature of work and family life meant that public ownership, Keynesian demand management 
and the universal provision of the welfare were no longer effective options (Jordan 1999). 
Instead it concentrated on supply side strategies and creating a stable, low inflation economy 
with investment in skills and flexibility in the workforce. Blair's government was constrained to 
focus in this way, not only by global, economic and social changes but also by the apparent 
conviction that redistributive policies were no longer acceptable to the electorate. The decision 
to increase national insurance contributions, was presented in the 2002 budget as a measure to 
increase investment in a collective 'good', the national health service. Access is based on 
universal principles and so is unlikely to disproportionately benefit the poor or 'working class' 
(Le Grand and Winter 1987). 
The concept of inclusion, as an objective of social policy, originated in Europe (European 
Commission 1994, Wessels 1999). New Labour however shifted the focus in Britain from a 
balance between the economic and relational (social) aspects of exclusion to bringing the 
potentially excluded into the labour market (DSS 1998). As Lister (2001, 432) put it, 'paid work 
is fetishised as the citizenship responsibility..' New Labour's strategies for assisting the young, 
the long- term unemployed, single parents, older and disabled people off benefits and into work 
reflect this concentration on supply side initiatives. 
1.3 Participation, Responsibility and Social Cohesion, 
New Labour's aspirations for an inclusive society and the renewal of communities extended 
beyond the economic sphere. They were reflected in attempts to make institutions more 
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democratic, to involve citizens more in decision-making, to increase the accountability of local 
politicians and officials and to share civic responsibility alongside civil rights. For Blair (1996, 
64) 'community' could no longer be another word for state or government: 
'.. we should aim to decentralise power to people, to allow them to make important 
decisions that effect them... above all however we must create a society based on a 
notion of mutual rights and responsibilities..' 
The goal of decentralising power was perceptible in the referenda that led to the establishment 
of the Scottish, Welsh and London assemblies and changes in local government accountability 
(DETR 1998). Restoring trust in government, leading to a more widespread willingness to 
participate remained an aspiration, given the low turnout at elections after 1997. Beetham 
(1996) argued that an extension of 'participation' could only be judged as democratic i f it 
contributed to securing greater popular control over collective decision-making and greater 
equality in its exercise. Representative democracy requires that citizens are active in the 
exercise of their rights and have access to and control over the government. An alternative view 
is discussed by Ellison (1999), in an attempt to move on from the 'universalist - particularist 
divide' in contemporary welfare theory. Ellison explored the possibilities for increasing social 
inclusion through decentralised, deliberative conceptions of democracy and social justice, by 
enabling social groups to participate in framing and pursuing policy proposals relevant to their 
particular 'communities' of interest. In this case study the relevant interest group would be the 
'disabled community' and the introduction of direct payments the policy proposal. 
New Labour did not renounce the separation of policy and management, introduced by 
Thatcher's government. Instead the centralised performance management ethos became more 
pronounced and was at variance with communitarian philosophy that promotes local 
accountability. However in New Labour's efforts to account to and engage those it represented, 
the emphasis was on communities rather than on atomised consumers. As Stewart (1995, 290) 
observed, citizen's wants are not the same as citizen's needs and the 'collective' good is more 
than the sum total of individual interests '..consumer responsiveness is no substitute for public 
accountability...' New Labour tried to overcome other elements of the Tory legacy of 
accountability widely perceived as deficient and damaging: fragmentation, secrecy, the decline 
of democratic control and dogmatic commitment to market principles in the delivery of welfare 
(Rouse and Smith 1999). Blair's government also distinguished itself from Conservative 
administrations by its stress on collaboration, for example in its admission of 'outsiders' to 
government in the multiplicity of review groups that scrutinised policy. The stakeholder concept 
associated with Hutton (1995) found expression in Blair's (1996) 'Faith in the City' speech and 
New Labour's policy on social inclusion. However before Blair came into office Hutton (1997) 
prophesized: 
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' Unless an ascendant body of ideas can be assembled, underpinned by a political 
philosophy that incorporates a different world view and policy direction, Labour will 
find that in office it governs, in essence as a nicer group of Tories' (17) 
It was not apparent that New Labour's third way was underpinned by a political philosophy that 
incorporated a distinctive world view and policy direction. Instead, by trying to introduce, to the 
mixed economy in welfare, values, social stability and cohesion it appeared to confront the 
obsession with individual freedom and the pursuit of naked self-interest of the neo- liberalism 
associated with Thatcher. In so doing New Labour addressed traditional Conservative concerns. 
Alternatively, in recognising the role of 'reflexivity' or psychological factors, the need for social 
order and an ethic of trust for markets to work effectively, New Labour seemed to offer a more 
sophisticated version of Thatcherism. 
New Labour maintained the link between welfare benefits and prices rather than average 
earnings. For social policy, this implied a concern to relieve absolute poverty, rather than to 
counter the divisive effects of 'relative deprivation'. The social dimension of poverty was 
revealed by Townsend's (1979) research a generation ago. The contemporary impact of the 
concept of relative deprivation on popular consciousness and discourse is demonstrated in the 
research reported by Dean (1999) that revealed people fear poverty more than they desire 
wealth. Doyal and Gough (1991) postulated a universalisable definition of human need. They 
argued that an evaluation of social policy required a distinction to be drawn between the 
principle that deprivation is relative and an acceptance that all needs beyond those of physical 
survival are subjective. 
The roots of the stakeholder concept and New Labour's proposals for a reformed welfare 
system, within a moral framework of self- help and responsibility, were uncovered by Heron 
and Dwyer (1999). They identified their origins in 19th century neo-liberalism rather than 
earlier twentieth century versions of social democracy. New Labour's 'welfare to work' 
initiatives included 'workfare' aspects that made benefits conditional on co-operation (Ellison 
1998, Driver and Martell 1998). Meanwhile the government relied on the voluntary co-
operation of business in strategies for rebuilding communities and achieving inclusion. 
Therefore, according to one influential analysis, New Labour developed the concept of 
'communitarianism' to make it more morally prescriptive than rights based, more individually 
than collectively focused and more concerned with the responsibilities of those at the bottom 
than at the top (Driver and Martell 1999). Or as Hutton (1996, 106) suggested : 
' ..there is a dangerous tendency for obligations , to search for work, to save for 
pensions and so on to be imposed upon the poor, while rights,-to enjoy low marginal 
rates of tax, to opt out into privileged private education are voluntarily exercised by the 
rich.' 
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Centre left policies should not be confused with 'moderacy' according to Giddens (1998). The 
third way's concern with 'life politics' replaced classical social democracy's focus on 
'emancipatory politics' and required radical responses. The questions of life politics are about 
identity, quality of life, the private sphere and civil society. Giddens asserted that divisions 
between the old left and the 'neo-liberaF right, belonged to a bi-polar world that no longer 
exists. Blair's (1998) claims that New Labour occupied the radical centre and transcended, 
rather than bridged, the traditional divisions with its third way approach were discussed by 
Driver and Martell (1998). They argued that New Labour did not reconcile the old tensions 
between individual autonomy and communal responsibility, but found a new way to manage 
them that was essentially 'post-Thatcherist'. Class loyalties and redistributive aims were no 
longer relevant to a global capitalism. New Labour accommodated to the shift to the right in 
politics that Thatcher engineered but reacted against it through communitarianism, an inclusive 
'one nation' outlook. Driver and Martell concluded that this was not just a matter of technical 
adaptation but of ideology. 
The third way is defined by what it is not, according to an alternative analysis offered by Powell 
(2000). The term does not have a coherent and consistent meaning, has internal contradictions 
and is not applied uniformly in all sectors. The 'third way' was not based on a clear ideology or 
'big idea'. It was pragmatic, concerned with, as the New Labour government claimed 
elsewhere, 'what works' (Dept of Health 1998a, 1.7). Powell argued that New Labour felt 
limited in the options available not only by global trends and the belief that the electorate is 
unwilling to pay higher taxes. It was also constrained by the legacy of the Conservative 
government's radical programme: 
Labour inherited a political landscape not of its making. Its pragmatic response was 
to accept or modify the reforms that appeared to work and reject those that did not.' 
(Powell 1999, 298) 
A central part of the Blair government's inheritance was the 'unfinished business' of welfare 
reform in Clarke and colleagues' (2000) account. That is a complex set of tensions, ambiguities 
and contradictions to which New Labour responded. The development of this discussion will 
focus more on the case study policy initiative in subsequent chapters and will consider whether 
the 'unfinished business' idea is discernible in New Labour's approach to the last Conservative 
government's legacy of reform, with respect to direct payments for community care. 
1.4 The 'Who. Why and How' of social policy 
This introduction to New Labour's approach concludes with a review of the various critiques of 
the recent development of British social policy using the framework of the key questions 
proposed by Driver and Martell (1998). Attention is drawn to their relevance to New Labour's 
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policy on direct payments. This discussion will lead to the consideration in chapter two of this 
particular initiative as a 'third way' social policy reform. 
1.4.1 Who pays for and who benefits from the welfare state? 
A post war 'consensus' on the welfare state amongst policy makers, survived until the Thatcher 
government demonstrated that radical change was not the sole province of the Left. The New 
Right critique of the financing of public services and social security concerned itself particularly 
with the way that 'high' taxes curbed the freedom of the better off and undermined charitable 
endeavors. Meanwhile 'welfare' expenditure removed the incentives for the worse off to work, 
save and provide for themselves and nurtured a 'dependency culture', together with an 
irresponsible attitude to family life (De Jasay 1992, Green 1999, Laing 1991, Murray 1996). 
The state, which had been conceptualised as the embodiment of the collective interest, was 
redefined as at best a constraint on individuals, a domineering and over-protective parent 
substitute. From the 1970s concerns about the 'nanny-state' gained ascendance in the British 
mass media and to some extent in popular consciousness, in a way that the critique of the 
welfare state from the intellectual left did not. Pearson (2000) identified the influence of what 
she called 'scroungerphobia' on decisions made in the introduction of direct payments for 
community care services in the late 1990s. Her research highlighted how procedures introduced 
by one council to prevent abuse of the 'system' by disabled people undermined the empowering 
qualities of this policy initiative. 
The universalist ideal of the welfare state, and many of its institutions and benefits, were 
perceived by earlier social policy academics and politicians as promoting social cohesion and a 
sense of community (Titmuss 1974, Marshall 1996). Nevertheless condemnation of the effects 
of the collectivist model of welfare on motivation and behaviour was made during the 
'consensus' period (Hayek 1960). The regressive impact of fiscal and occupational welfare on 
the distribution of disposable income within post war society was observed even earlier 
(Titmuss 1958). In the 1980s research by Le Grand (1982), fuelled criticism from the Left that 
most of the redistribution engineered by British social policy happened across individual life 
cycles and within rather than between social classes. 
Criticism of the version of social justice institutionalised in the narrow contribution based 
entitlements of social insurance systems came from a feminist standpoint (discussed by Jordan 
1999, Pierson 1998). Based on the Beveridgean 'male- breadwinner' model, the welfare state 
not only failed to keep pace with changes in family life, it maintained the stigma historically 
associated with a residual, selective system for those who had not 'earned' their 'rights' through 
the traditional labour market. 
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'..on the one side stands the universalist plea for greater social justice and equality, a 
'fairer' allocation of goods to mitigate the inegalitarian effects of the market and to 
generate social cohesion; on the other demands for the recognition of diversity and 
'difference' sustain the view that universalism can, paradoxically be socially 
exclusive.: (Ellison 1999, p.59) 
New Labour targeted benefits more selectively, cut income tax allowances that benefited the 
middle classes, and supplemented the earnings of non class based demographic groups 
vulnerable to social exclusion, including single parents and disabled people. It claimed its social 
policies encouraged responsible behaviour. However Heron and Dwyer (1999) highlighted 
similarities between the conditions attached to the rights of citizenship through the 'new 
contract between citizen and state' fundamental to New Labour's social policy (D.S.S. 1998) 
and the principle of 'less eligibility' that underpinned the 19th century Poor Law. Consistent 
with this analysis was Dwyer's (1998) observation of a process whereby welfare provisions 
once regarded as rights were evolving into market commodities. 
The following chapter discusses how Major government empowered councils to give direct 
payments to some disabled people to arrange their own care through individual market 
transactions. New Labour attempted to extend the availability of direct payments for 
community care to a much wider constituency of service users than were eligible in the 
Conservative version of the initiative. However direct payments were not rights based, and 
under New Labour continued to be made according to the eligibility criteria of particular 
councils, subject to the assessment of individual applicants by professionals. One implication 
was that some social groups continued to experience greater barriers to access than others2, 
underlining the 'who benefits?' question. The lifestyle, standard of living and quality of life for 
some British citizens was thus dependent upon where they lived, with consequent limitations on 
choice, control and geographical mobility. The part played by local policy and decision-makers, 
in deterrnining eligibility for and the allocation of resources to those in need of assistance in 
their particular communities, mimicked the role of the pre- 1948 Poor Law Guardians. 
The ascription of need by welfare state agencies and professional experts was said to actively 
disempower disabled people, in contemporary British literature on disability (Oliver and Barnes 
1998). This 'orthodoxy' was challenged by Handley (2000) who suggested that the rights based 
approach to promoting the interests and inclusion of disabled people had two major weaknesses. 
The concepts of 'rights' and 'self-defined' needs have been under- theorised and the conflict 
between the competing claims generated by the pursuit of rights based on self defined, rather 
than ascribed, need were given insufficient consideration. There was a debate within the 
disability rights literature about whether direct payments, within the British social policy 
2 For example Witcher and colleagues's 2000 research found no-one from an ethnic minority in receipt of 
a direct payment in Scotland. 
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context, progressed or compromised the cause of disabled people, in their struggle against 
oppression and exclusion. Alternative interpretations of 'need', 'rights' and the empowering and 
disempowering qualities of the relationship between users and providers of welfare services, are 
therefore relevant to the case study initiative. 
1.4.2 Why do we have welfare provision? 
New Labour's social policy attempted to combine, rather than reconcile, economic and social 
objectives. It focused not on collective interests but on the individual as a member of a 
community and on promoting social cohesion by making rights conditional upon the fulfillment 
of responsibilities, in the sense of Aristotilean 'civic duties', as well financial obligations 
(Jordan 1999). 
'..no society can ever prosper economically or socially, unless we use the talents and 
energies of all the people rather than just the few, unless we live up to the ambition to 
create a society where the community works for the good of every individual and 
everyone works for the good of the community.' (Blair 1996, vi) 
Contradictory notions of citizenship are identified by Powell (1999) in New Labour's ideas on 
social inclusion and its symbolic revision of 'clause 4'. Jordan (1999) suggested there is 
confusion in policy discussions between the interactional code of reciprocity and the market 
place rules of fair exchange. He warned that to attempt to extrapolate from intimate associations 
(family, friends and neighbours) to large scale impersonal ones requires coercion because the 
moral sanctions needed for voluntary reciprocity are not available. 
New Labour's declared aspirations were not egalitarian. It planned to reduce the inequalities of 
opportunity and access because they wasted resources and talent. It intended to create one 
nation of stakeholders because of the costs of social exclusion and the threat it presented to 
social order. For even the most vulnerable and economically inactive, it aimed to promote 
independence from welfare service provision. 
'.. the guiding principle of adult social services should be that they provide the support 
needed by someone to make the most of their own capacity and potential..' (Dept. of 
Health 1998a, 2.5). 
Direct payments were amongst the measures promoted for the achievement of policy objectives: 
'..direct payments are giving service users new freedom and independence in 
running their own lives and we want more people to benefit from them..' (Dept. of 
Health 1998a, 2.15) 
In New Labour's 'modernising' programme for public services, tensions between objectives 
were masked by the deployment of a managerial discourse. Newman (2000) asserted that this 
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managerial discourse also neutralised and displaced the conflict between the requirements of 
different stakeholders including government, citizens, users and 'communities'. 
1.4.3 How are welfare services to be delivered? 
The portrayal of the self-serving, expenditure maximising state official, in Niskansen's (1973) 
and Tulloch's (1976), critiques of public services echoed earlier neo-liberal critiques of the 
welfare state (van Hayek 1960) and was supported by other analyses from the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (De Jasay 1992). This right wing view of inefficiency and ineffectiveness was 
credited with inspiring the introduction of quasi- market structures and competitive discipline 
into the institutions of public services from the late 1980s (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). 
The 'public choice model' of bureaucracy was challenged by Dunleavy (1986). He offered a 
radical alternative to the 'budget-maximising' theory that predicted an inherent tendency in 
public services to over provision, beyond the point at which benefits match the costs incurred. 
Instead, Dunleavy explained the apparent ease with which 'privatisation' was achieved during 
Thatcher's administration. His 'bureau-shaping' model of the motivation of self interested, 
senior officials predicted that they would pursue privatisation beyond the point of efficiency, 
facilitated by an under estimate of the social costs (negative externalities) of reducing the size of 
the public sector. The costs of excessive (in economic terms) privatisation are borne not by 
senior bureaucrats but by rank and file state workers and service users/ citizens. The findings of 
later research into the heavily privatised social care market offered empirical support for 
Dunleavy's thesis (Ford, Quilgars and Rugg 1998, Henwood 2001). Nevertheless, from an 
alternative standpoint, recipients of welfare had often complained about the inflexibility and 
unresponsiveness of public services and the oppressive and disabling attitudes and practices of 
those delivering them (Barnes 1997, Morris 1993, Oliver 1991). Hence Giddens (1998) could 
argue that some welfare institutions are '..bureaucratic, alienating and inefficient.'(113) 
There was therefore a broad base of support for the principle of reducing the power of 
professionals and the alleged dominance of provider interests in the welfare system. However 
the organisational changes that took place under the Conservative governments shifted power 
from professional providers and bureaucratic administrators to new public managers and budget 
holders rather than to those who use welfare services. New Labour's contribution has been a 
'pragmatic' approach to who delivers; 
'.. The last government's devotion to privatisation of care provision put dogma before 
users' interests and threatened a fragmentation of vital services. But it is also true that 
the near-monopoly local authority provision that used to be a feature of social care led 
to a 'one size fits all'' approach where users were expected to accommodate themselves 
to the services that existed Our third way for social care moves the focus away from 
who provides the care, and places it firmly on the quality of services experienced by, 
and outcomes achieved for, individuals and their carers and families.' (Dept. of Health 
1998, 1.7) 
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Blair's (1998) account of the third way was criticised as caricaturing the Left and Right and in 
so doing omitting some striking features of each (Clarke and colleagues 2000). The association 
of the 'Old Left' and collective approaches with ' statist' provision ignored the 'New Left' 
critique of the oppressive and discriminatory nature of the institutions of the welfare state and 
the influence of the new social movements on that critique (Andrews 1999). The challenge of 
the disabled people's movement, to the legitimacy of professional knowledge and power in the 
design and delivery of social care services, could be explained from this perspective. One 
manifestation of this was the demands made by disabled people for control over the resources 
they require to achieve and exercise their rights and responsibilities as citizens, through direct 
payments. 
A post war mixed economy in public service delivery continued through changes in the party in 
power, including the administrations of Thatcher and Major. Earlier Labour governments sought 
to use state ownership and collectivist provision to ameliorate the inegalitarian effects of 
capitalism, while protecting individuals when needed through their own life cycles. The 
traditions of 'municipal socialism' were resilient during the long Conservative rule, with Labour 
controlled councils preserving their role as major providers of jobs and services in social care. 
The implementation of government policy on direct payments before the New Labour's White 
Paper on social services (Dept. of Health 1998a) occurred largely outside of traditional Labour 
strongholds. New Labour demanded that even personal social services be subjected to the 
competitive pressures of 'best value' testing (D.E.T.R. 1998). It attempted to bolster the role of 
the user as consumer in community care further than even its pro- market predecessors, by 
promoting the extension of individual purchasing power through direct payments, (Dept.of 
Health 1998a, Dept. of Health 2000a, Dept of Health 2001). Langan (2000) argued that New 
Labour tried to establish that its own 'third way' version of the mixed economy was something 
new and above all something 'modern'. 
In the field of personal social services, it was important for the government to establish that 
existing arrangements had proved a failure to prepare the way for its 'reform' programme. New 
Labour's White Paper (Dept. of Health 1998a) made repeated references to poor services, 
widespread inefficiency and low standards: 
'There is an implicit assumption that local agencies are viewed as guilty of 
incompetence before being proved innocent' (Hunter 2001, 55) 
The implied criticism of existing resource allocation systems in the first guidance on direct 
payments issued by New Labour (Dept. of Health 2000a) presented the individual service user 
as more able and motivated to manage the resources s/he needs efficiently than social services 
decision-makers (3, para 2). Blair's account of the resistance of public service workers to his 
programme of welfare reform will be discussed in chapter three. 
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New Labour recognised that leaving the delivery of welfare to the market created the potential 
for fragmentation, duplication, resource waste and lack of accountability. It claimed to promote 
partnerships and 'joined up thinking' by all those with responsibilities for service delivery. This 
meant adopting a strategic approach to meeting objectives set by both central government and 
local communities and the use of competition as just one of the tools for achieving 'best value' 
(D.E.T.R. 1998). Blair's government may however have been remedying design flaws to 
advance the reform of the state beyond the New Right's efforts. Clarke and colleagues (2000) 
asserted that New Labour was simply addressing some of the fragmenting effects of the 
organisational changes in public services that occurred with Conservative governments, through 
conceptions of'joined up government' and 'partnerships'. Clarke and Glendinning (2002) 
argued that partnership is a word of 'obvious virtue' and Blair's government was not the first to 
promote it as a means to achieving policy ends. Nevertheless New Labour's efforts to encourage 
and ultimately impose partnerships went further than previous attempts. 
Despite the similarities between the Conservatives' 'new public management' and New 
Labour's 'modern management', Newman (2000, 60) argued that the latter attempted to 
transcend the fragmentation and limitations of consumerist and client-based models by 
promoting user-participation. In recommending how direct payments were to be developed and 
delivered by individual councils, the government promoted partnerships with local voluntary 
groups and the involvement of service users, whilst simultaneously advising that direct 
payments should be assimilated into wider corporate and inter -agency strategies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Direct Payments :A Third Way Approach to Community Care? 
'Developing the potential of our people is our goal; and everything else is a means to it. 
So there is no predisposition towards public or private in the pursuit of our aims or of 
Government or state for its own sake.' (Blair 2001a, 1) 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter one outlined the academic debate on New Labour's social policy. The contribution of 
Blair's governments to policy making and implementation, in offering an alternative to an 
ideological domination by either the public sector or the market was discussed. This chapter 
begins to explore the implications of New Labour's approach to policy effectiveness through a 
particular case study example. The historical and political context for the extension of direct 
payments by Blair's government is outlined, along with the characteristics that make this typical 
of a 'third way' initiative. 
2.1 Community Care and Direct Payments 
Direct Payments are cash sums given to individuals by local authority social services 
departments, in lieu of community care services, based on an assessment of the person's care 
needs. The literature usually traces their origins to the struggles of disabled people against 
oppressive institutions and environments. Morris (1997), Campbell and Oliver (1996) described 
how disabled people demanded control over the resources they require to enjoy the 
opportunities and experiences most people expect, to enable them to achieve self -determination 
and independence. During the 1980s the work of Brandon and Towe (1989) in Britain and 
Salisbury and colleagues (1987) in Canada gained prominence, arguing the case for 'service 
brokerage' as an empowering alternative to service systems, dominated by professional interests 
and discourses. 
In the nineties the Conservative government initiated its 'community care' policy, implemented 
within a mixed economy (Griffiths 1988). Market discipline was introduced into the service 
infrastructure with the objective of widening consumer choice and achieving 'value for money' 
(D.H.S.S. 1989, 5). Councils were not compelled to tender competitively for social care 
provision, but were obliged to spend eighty five per cent of a new central government grant for 
community care services in the independent sector. The intention was to reduce the role local 
authorities had played as the major providers of social care services, since the repeal of the Poor 
Law in the 1948 National Assistance Act. Late in the Major administration, 'direct payments' to 
users of community care services were introduced by legislation, following two failed Private 
Member's Bills (Dept of Health 1996) and the campaigning efforts of disabled people. As 
campaigner and academic Oliver (1998, 87) put it: 
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'The 1996 Act is by no means perfect... but it does represent a major step forward in 
disabled people's ongoing struggle for inclusion into the mainstream of British society. ' 
Others have questioned whether the Conservative government's promotion of direct payments 
was another 'consumerist strategy', based on a narrow interpretation and a half-hearted 
application of the principles of independent living (Barnes and Prior 1995, Barnes and 
colleagues 1999, Priestley 1999). Councils were given the leeway to draw on an individual, 
rather than a social, model in implementation. It was argued that direct payments might 
disempower disabled people by dividing the interests of service users from others, including 
those who provided the assistance they need (Ungerson 1997). Nevertheless, research 
highlighted the benefits for the relatively small numbers of users who received direct payments, 
despite the problems they sometimes experienced due to inappropriate support and monitoring 
systems and inadequate resources (Glendinning and colleagues 2000a, +b, Kestenbaum 1999, 
Maglajic, Brandon and Given 2000). As one person explained: 'The quality and flexibility I now 
have is. ... worth every second of any stress' (from Evans and Carmichael 2002, 4). Pearson 
(2000) contrasted the approaches of a Conservative and a Labour council to using their powers 
under the 1996 Act. Alternative discourses (market or social justice) dominated and influenced 
the development of direct payments. The impact of each discourse was to restrict the potential 
benefits to social care users from direct payments 
The New Labour government expressed its determination to ensure that direct payments were 
extended, and recommended the involvement of disabled people in the development and 
management of local schemes (Dept. of Health 1998a, 2000a). The case study of direct 
payments thus offered an opportunity to explore the implementation of a 'third way' policy 
initiative. The objectives of the initiative were to promote independence and inclusion through 
the engagement and empowerment of service users as active citizens, rather than atomised 
consumers, and appeared to draw on a social model of disability (Morris 1993, Oliver 1998). 
2.1.1. Background to direct payments and community care policy 
Councils were given the power to give cash to users of social care services, by the Community 
Care (Direct Payments) Act of 1996. However some authorities were already giving people 
money to buy their own care services, through grants to independent organisations. These 'third 
parties' then passed care funds on to individuals. The history of individuals being given public 
money in recognition of their care needs is longer and reflects the campaigning efforts of 
disabled people. It features the introduction of the Attendance Allowance (later developed with 
the Disability Living Allowance) as a non- means tested, non- contributory benefit for disabled 
people from 1971. The Independent Living Fund was a Trust established by central government 
in 1988, to make means tested direct payments to individuals to buy their own services. 
However the 1996 Act left the decision to make direct payments for community care to each 
local authority. 
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The principle of disabled people managing their own care arrangements and budgets was 
strongly advocated by the disabled peoples' rights movement as: '..the most empowering 
commissioning system yet devised..'' (Holman 1998, 20) The research suggested that direct 
payments gave choice and control to the user as purchaser of services (Holman 1998, Zarb and 
Nadash 1994). In the 1996 Act, policy followed practice in the relationships between some 
disabled people and some local councils. 
Williams (2001, 470) asserted that; 
7« so far as this move to direct payments has also been... the consequence of demands 
from the disability movement, then it indicates ...a challenge to the assumed, all-
encompassing dependency of the "cared for" in care relations and practices.' 
Direct payments as a purchasing method, could also lay claim to the support of New Right 
commentators. For example economists of the Institute of Economic Affairs suggested that the 
introduction of market relationships into the traditional structure of welfare provision by the 
1990 NHS and Community Care Act would not meet the demands of the public choice model of 
empowerment (Laing 1991). Spending and decision-making power remained with council 
bureaucrats rather than with the end user of services in the social care 'market'. The principle 
of reducing the role of public servants in public spending decisions had ideological and 
theoretical support from the 'neo-liberal' strand of thinking about the welfare state (Giddens 
1998, 12). It was promoted by the disability rights movement associated with the 'New Left"', 
from the standpoint of a non-class based group who also experienced the universal and 
collective provision of state welfare as oppressive (Oliver and Barnes 1998, Shakespeare 1993). 
'To support a system in which the individual who needs the help has the power to 
determine how that help is delivered is not to support a right wing individualist agenda. 
Rather it is about promoting collective responsibility for protecting individual rights. 
Direct payments are one way of doing this? Morris (1997, 59) 
Economic theorists evaluating the 'market reforms' in the public sector recognised that the 
'invisible hand' of market forces had not been fully uncuffed3 (Bartlett and colleagues 1998, Le 
Grand and Bartlett 1994). The policy changes meant the substitution of administrative with 
contractual arrangements, and introduced the principle of competition and budget control on the 
supply side of 'quasi markets'. However because purchasing budgets and decisions were not 
passed on to service users, the demand side of the market did not feature numerous competing 
purchasers able to pursue their own interests and the efficient use of resources. Instead these 
markets lacked 'conditions for success', that is the characteristics identified as necessary for the 
efficient allocation of resources and cost effective service delivery. 
There was a broad base of support for individualised purchasing but most councils did not 
immediately use the new powers granted by the 1996 Act (Dept of Health 1998a, 2.14). 
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Research, comparing both user satisfaction and the costs of providing services or making direct 
payments through third party schemes, had demonstrated the potential gains to be made on both 
outcome measures (Zarb and Nadash 1994). Nevertheless the Major government gave councils 
discretionary powers rather than duties and thus did not seem concerned to oblige non-
responsive social services departments to create a market in community care, with real paying 
customers. This was despite his avowed concern with accountability to individual citizens. 
Major's apparent interest in promoting a 'customer service' culture in the public sector, 
however, was distinct from his predecessor's focus. The original 'community care' policy, 
seemed more concerned with the shift of power between interest groups by the attempted 
introduction of private sector values and practices into public services, through the 'New Public 
Management' (Dunleavy and Hood 1994, Langan 2000). 
So to go back a step further, the new public management and contract culture, introduced by 
Thatcher's community care programme (D.H.S.S. 1989), had stopped short of following the 
logic of the market to the point of giving individual citizen/ customers budgets to manage. 
Individualised purchasing power was not allowed to subject social care services to the discipline 
of a market where users could have, in principle, chosen where and what to buy. In education, 
however, the principle of parental choice linking funding with pupil numbers had effectively 
created a 'voucher' system to buy school places. Cutler and Waine (1997), contrasting the 
characteristics of markets in health and education, suggested the reasons for the reluctance to 
introduce individualised purchasing to the NHS were political rather than economic. The 
reluctance of politicians to subject health services to the market pressures of consumer 
preference, continued in the initial exclusion of health care from direct payments. 
There were some aspects of the Conservative governments' community care policy that 
withdrew purchasing power from individuals. The NHS and Community Care Act removed the 
right of income support claimants to buy residential care directly in the independent sector from 
1993. Instead funds were transferred to social services departments who became almost 
'monopsonistic' purchasers in local community care markets. User access was made conditional 
upon professional assessment and on the discretion and budgets of individual councils. Access 
to the Independent Living Fund direct payments became similarly restricted. Although 
consumer 'choice' was intended to empower service users (D.H.S.S. 1989 1.8), these two 
developments represented a redress in the power balance from users back to local politicians 
and professionals. The transfer of the control of these funds to the administration of local 
authorities recreated the parochial, residence based arrangements of the pre-1948 Poor Law, 
which were to be reinforced by the Blair government. 4 
3 To develop Adam Smith's (1961) metaphor. 
4 The Health and Social Care Act 2001 transferred the 'preserved rights' benefits enjoyed by pre- 1993 
residential care users to local authorities. 
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Councils' powers to make direct payments for community care did not become effective until 
April 1997, just before New Labour's 'landslide' into government. Direct payments continued 
to spread slowly during the next two years, when implementation was based on the policy and 
practice guidance left by the Conservatives. In December 1998 Blair's government presented its 
proposals for 'Modernising Social Services' (Dept. of Health 1998a). The government 
expressed support for direct payments and its intention to extend their availability to the 
majority of community care users. New Labour's community care policy therefore appeared to 
extend the logic of the market reforms and the consumerist philosophy further than either the 
Thatcher or Major governments attempted to. It created the potential for large numbers of 
individual citizen/ purchasers to exercise consumer choice, rather than leaving the demand side 
of the market to professional and political decision-makers in local authorities. 
2.2 New Labour's Policy Programme 
Direct payments have characteristics typical of New Labour's social policy and its proposals for 
'Modernising Social Services' (Dept. of Health 1998a 1.4). The recurrent themes in the 
speeches, statements, consultation documents issued by the 1997 Labour government heralded a 
framework of policy reforms. The concept of 'joined up thinking' emphasised the need for a 
coherent, consistent and collaborative approach to implementation. The White Paper proposed a 
'third way' between the last government's ideological commitment to privatisation (said to have 
put dogma before user interests and to have threatened the fragmentation of care services) and 
the historical 'near monopoly' of local authority provision (note the market terminology). The 
latter led to a 'one size Jits all' approach (Dept of Health 1998a 1.7). 
The promise to allow no dogma or vested interest to stand in the way of the government's plans 
for change was applied to the whole public sector in New Labour's second term. In one of 
several major speeches on public services in which social services did not merit a direct 
reference, the prime- minister asserted: 
'It is not just investment that has held back reform. We have also been held back by 
ideological clashes, going back decades, which have distracted from the real challenge 
of improving our public services.'' (Blair 2001b, 3) 
The characterisation of 'New Right' and 'Old Left' approaches to social services is relevant to 
the differences revealed by Pearson (2000) between the discourses prevailing in the approaches 
to direct payments of a Conservative and a traditional Labour authority. However the polarised 
imagery promoted by 'third way' thinkers has been criticised as caricaturing and over 
simplifying the variety of political and theoretical influences on critiques of the welfare state 
(Andrews 1999, Clarke and colleagues 2000) including the contribution of the 'New Left' social 
movements. 
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The third way appeared to offer a change of emphasis rather than of overall direction (Dept, of 
Health 1998a 1.7). Taylor-Gooby (1999) discussed how the objectives of the Conservative's 
community care policy had New Labour's support. However, the obstacles identified by the 
Audit Commission (1992, 1997a, b+c), to inter agency working, user involvement, efficiency 
and effectiveness, were to be overcome through a more pragmatic response. For councils this 
meant acceleration in the drive towards a competitive market in community care. Under Major, 
social services (unlike other council provision) had not been subject to compulsory competitive 
tendering, a system that obliged councils to buy goods and services from the lowest bidder in 
the marketplace. However they were not to be exempt from the New Labour alternative 'best 
value' testing (D.E.T.R. 1998,7.5). The 'best value' project demanded that councils look beyond 
price, to the quality and cost effectiveness of services and to consult the public. 
The government announced its determination to see the use of direct payments extended. The 
Health and Social Care Act 2001 introduced the promised obligation from April 2003, yet 
councils were left with the discretion to judge which individuals would be eligible for these cash 
payments and how much would be paid. 
2.2.1. Independence. Inclusion and the Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship 
Direct payments provide an appropriate case study to explore the policy action process because 
they exemplify New Labour's proposals for 'modernisation' and '..welfare reform and social 
inclusion by promoting independence.. ' (Dept of Health 1998a, 2). Blair's government claimed 
that the Conservative government fostered: '.. .a culture of dependency rather than one of 
enablement..' (Dept. of Health 1998a 2.9 ). 
Therefore: 
'..one way to give people greater control over their lives is to give them money and let 
them make their own decisions about how their care is delivered.'(Dept. of Health 
1998a 2.13) 
Direct payments also 
'...promote independence, and they aid social inclusion by offering opportunities for 
rehabilitation, for education, leisure and employment for people in need of community 
care.' (Dept. of Health 2000 3, para 1) 
The extension of direct payments was also explained in terms of the objective of economic 
efficiency based on the rational decision-making of individual purchasers/ users, 
'Day to day control of the money and care passes to the person who has the strongest 
incentive to ensure that it is spent properly on the necessary services and who is best 
placed to judge how to match available resources to needs..' (Dept. of Health 2000a, 
3, para 2.) 
The reasoning behind this statement is consistent with market theory (Le Grand and Bartlett 
1993). The individual is enabled to optimise her individual welfare by the freedom to use 
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available money in a way that ensures that the marginal benefit derived is equal to the marginal 
cost. The 'marginal utility function' means that the individual balances cost against quality 
according to personal preferences. Through large numbers of unconnected individuals 
competing to get the best deals they can for themselves from available funds, social welfare is 
maximised by the optimum use of resources overall. 
The example of direct payments illustrates the role advanced for the market within the 
government's policy programme, as a means rather than an end in itself. It appears to be one of 
the measures through which New Labour intended to make the market work for the people and 
not vice versa. Giving users choice, in how they use their direct payments, could assist councils 
in satisfying the overarching policy imperative that all commitments of public funds were tested 
for 'best value' (D.E.T.R. 1998 p.3, para. 19). This recognition of the value of users' knowledge 
and experience, of course, represents a challenge to the power base of professional expertise. It 
is one that was being made by the disabled people's movement before the 'consumerism' of the 
1990s (Campbell and Oliver 1996) when 'empowerment' was redefined by the Conservative 
government (Dept of Health 1991,7). 
The symbiotic relationship between social rights and responsibilities was central to the 
modernisation programme and particular initiatives: 
'..At the heart of the modern welfare state will be a new contract between the citizen 
and the government. ...To help all individuals and families to realise their full potential 
and live a dignified life, by promoting economic independence through work, relieving 
poverty where it can not be prevented and by building a strong and cohesive society 
where rights are matched by responsibilities' (D.S.S. 1998, 80 ) 
Hence direct payments : 
'... give users greater control and independence, but this increased freedom is 
inevitably accompanied by increased responsibilities..7 (Dept. of Health 2000a, 7) 
In keeping with the wider welfare reform agenda, one objective of direct payments as a service 
strategy was to enable community care users and carers to enter employment (Dept. of Health 
2000a) and earned income was therefore exempt from charges (Dept. of Health 2002a). 
In the spirit of 'social inclusion' that characterised New Labour policy initiatives, the revised 
guidance extended eligibility to previously excluded groups of users. From February 2000, 
people over sixty-five could not be refused a direct payment on the grounds of age. The 
stringent 'able and willing' test, that allowed councils to exclude all but the most articulate, 
informed and assertive users from eligibility for direct payments, was removed. Instead 
potential users were to be assessed as 'able and willing with assistance'. A role for trusts was 
introduced for those who could not manage the detailed aspects of their care packages and 
budgets, but wanted to have control of their lives. Councils were instructed not to prejudge the 
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appropriateness of direct payments to whole user groups, but to assess each applicant's case on 
its merits. 
'Choice' for New Labour, however, was not just about efficient use of resources (D.E.T.R. 
1998). Similarly best value was not just about competition facilitated by individual 'exit' 
strategies, where individuals can take their custom elsewhere (Servian 1996). The Blair 
government's view of the responsible stakeholding citizen also involved empowerment through 
the decentralisation of decision m a k i n g : . we should aim to decentralise power to people, to 
allow them to make important decisions that effect them. '(Blair 1996, 64) Meanwhile, 
researchers identified the empowering qualities of direct payments for disabled people (Evans 
1998, Holman 1999). Blair continued to express his government's commitment to New 
Labour's ideals of empowerment as he launched his campaign for re-election: 
' We are not crypto-Thatcherites. We are not old- style socialists... We believe in 
empowering all our people.' (Blair 2001a, 5) 
An intellectual underpinning for the 'third way' approach to welfare and in particular to the 
model of the 'active citizen' was provided by Gidden's (1989, 1998 and 2000) analysis. Risk 
society theory offered an idealist rather than a material account of social change. Giddens 
argued that cultural mobilisation, the development of a post- traditional social order and a 
'social reflexivity' has made people increasingly aware of themselves as social actors. They are 
more confident about their own capacity to make choices and handle risks and have less 
confidence in the traditional welfare state and its institutions. 
A note of caution has been introduced about using 'risk society' theory as the basis for third 
way approaches to policy effectiveness. Drawing on Le Grand's (1997) analysis of the 
increasing dominance of rational actor theories of behaviour in political science, policy analysis 
and the understanding of motivation, Taylor-Gooby (2001) observed that differences in the 
impact of social change and its associated risks on different groups were largely unaddressed by 
Giddens. This was in contrast with social policy's traditional concern with inequalities and the 
conflicts of interest between social groups. He attempted to subject the risk society thesis to 
empirical scrutiny through examining the experiences and attitudes of different social groups to 
risk. He found that the experience of risk was not uniform across society, that the effect of 
disadvantage was cumulative and that social changes were increasing inequality. Hence, while 
middle class respondents perceived increased choice as positive, working class respondents 
associated it with greater insecurity. Taylor- Gooby (2001, 210) therefore concluded: 
'It would be unfortunate if... the Third Way became an ideology serving the interests of 
the more privileged classes by denying the continuing importance of class divisions in 
vulnerability.' 
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Or as Brandon and Brandon (2002, 17) observed, in the particular context of social care; 
'In this great tide towards user involvement in service provision there are immense 
dangers. One major problem lies in the drift towards the "dictatorship of the 
articulate"....' 
A psycho-social approach to welfare research that considers the interplay of internal and 
external, subjective and objective factors and their relevance to 'refiexivity' and agency was 
advocated by Hoggett (2001). He contended that Gidden's account of the active welfare subject 
was not robust enough to confront the real experiences of powerlessness and psychic injury that 
can result from injustice and oppression. The attack on the 'dependency culture' in Blair's 
social policies under the cloak of social inclusion: '..reveals a hatred of the very idea of 
dependency and a refusal, to accept that some people need continuing support to cope with 
their lives.' (Hoggett 2001, 44). Hoggett identified weaknesses in Deacon and Mann's (1999) 
definition of agency as actions, decisions and behaviours that represent some measure of 
meaningful choice. Their definition excluded non-reflexive action and so did not address 
situations in which people act impulsively, against their better judgement. Hoggett also 
distinguished first and second order agency amongst welfare actors. In the first, the agency 
available to actors is limited to 'working the system' whereby individuals get the most from 
what is available, possibly at the expense of others. The second is where actors challenge and 
succeed in changing the system. Hoggett concluded that welfare policy that aims to enable 
people to take responsibility and to make rational choices will not succeed unless it can confront 
both the effects of negative emotional capabilities and the reality of experience. Greener (2002) 
married the model of agency offered by Hoggett with Bourdieu's social theory (in particular the 
concepts of 'habitus' and 'capital') to challenge the assumptions made about agency in New 
Labour's social policy. The framework offered by Greener is relevant to the community care 
context and Bourdieu's metaphor of agency as a game can be used to explore the interactions 
between welfare bureaucracies and service users. Public servants implementing community care 
policy hold economic capital (public budgets), cultural capital (expert knowledge) and symbolic 
capital (professional status). The habitus5 of the user may elicit a more responsive service where 
her social status is recognised (symbolic capital). Users must play the system to get the best care 
possible through acquiring knowledge of what and how services are potentially available. 
The concepts of first and second order agency, together with differential access amongst social 
groups to the means to manage the risks they confront and the confidence to take greater 
responsibility for their own 'welfare', are relevant to expectations and experiences of direct 
payments. When the rules applied to direct payments are not generally known and transparent 
there is a danger that those with the correct 'habitus' and 'capital' may gain favour at the 
expense of others. This would be an example of the 'first order agency' identified by Hoggett 
5 A set of dispositions that incline agents to act and react in certain ways. 
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(2001). The struggle of the disabled peoples' movement to achieve legislative changes obliging 
councils to offer direct payments to all community care users (Dept. of Health 2002) is an 
example of second order agency. However the government's expectation that this policy 
prescription will lead to the widespread use of direct payments assumes a 'reflexive, actor as 
subject' model of agency (Hoggett 2001, 47). This model may not be appropriate to many 
community care users. 
2.2.2. Direct payments and 'joined up thinking' 
The phrase 'joined up thinking' is associated with New Labour's programme. Direct payments 
are intended to support the wider objectives of the coherent, consistent strategies expected of the 
responsible authorities (Dept. of Health 2000a). Blair's government attempted to address the 
fragmenting effects of the Conservative welfare reforms, without fundamentally changing the 
organisational arrangements, through promoting partnerships rather than competition and the 
participation of the user/ citizen. In Newman's (2001) analysis 'partnership' was integral to 
New Labour's discourse through which it attempted to transcend the vertical, departmental 
structures of government. 
'... the government is fostering a new spirit ofpartnership working. The government 
will play its part in helping this partnership approach by removing legal and other 
obstacles to joint working and by adopting the same principle ofpartnership and joint 
working in policy making as we expect from those who are delivering the services at the 
local level. '(Dept of Health 1998a 6.3) 
Despite these proud boasts about the government's good intentions for policy effectiveness, the 
extension of direct payments illustrates some of the difficulties experienced locally in 
developing and implementing coherent joint strategies. These difficulties arose from an apparent 
slowness in 'joined up thinking' centrally. The relationship between direct payments and other 
policy initiatives based on partnerships and participation is explored next. 
2.2.2.1 Health 
The Blair government was intent on removing the remaining obstacles to joint working between 
health and social services and integrated health and social care provision (Dept of Health, 
1998b). However the legislation that allowed joint health and social care commissioning bodies 
left their development to local arrangements between health and social services (Health and 
Social Care Act 2001). Councils were encouraged to include direct payments in their joint 
strategies and to think imaginatively '... about how direct payments can be assimilated into 
preventive and rehabilitative strategies. '(Dept. of Health 2000a, 3,). 
Research supported the use of direct payments for integrated health and social care packages, to 
extend user choice (Maglajlic, Brandon and Given 2000, Glendinning and colleagues 2000a). 
Nevertheless the use of direct payments for health care continued to be unlawful in New 
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Labour's initial policy guidance (Dept of Health 2000a). This meant potential problems for the 
practitioner responsible for assessing individual needs holistically and for the user responsible 
for managing a pure social care budget and package within an integrated care plan (Glendinning 
2000a). There appeared to be a continuing reluctance on the part of the Blair administration to 
put a price on health care need at the point of delivery. This may be accounted for through 
Cutler and Waine's (1997) analysis of the special protection given to health services from the 
discipline of market forces, within the contract culture of the Conservative government's social 
policy. 
The requirement to distinguish between individuals' health and social care needs, within 
integrated community care packages, had implications for implementation during the first three 
years of New Labour's efforts to extend the role of direct payments in community care. This 
was despite the Department of Health's (1998a, 2) criticism of the system in need of reform ; 
'..sometimes various agencies put more effort into arguing with one another than into 
looking after people in need Everyone needs to be treated as an individual and have 
the system geared to their needs and not vice versa.' 
New Labour renewed its commitment to ensure that health services were available to all on the 
basis of need rather than ability to pay (The Labour Party 2001, Blair 2001b). However it 
promoted the development of clear eligibility criteria and means tested charging policies by 
local social services departments (Dept of Health 2002a). Health care continued to be based on 
the universal principles that underpinned the foundation of the National Health Service, despite 
the increasing but 'pragmatic' use of the private sector. Social care in contrast was still 
delivered selectively to those who could not afford to make their own provision. It was thus 
based on a residual rather than a rights- based model of welfare. The evidence from research 
and consultation with user organisations eventually led to a relaxing of the prohibition against 
the use of direct payments for health care (Dept of Health 2002b). However practitioners would 
be required to continue to draw a distinction for charging purposes. 
The integrative potential of a taxation-funded service, used by almost, everyone was identified 
by Titmuss (1974). Users and practitioners in health care do not endure the stigma and 
'discourse of failure' (Langan 2000) endured by personal social services clients and staff. 
' While attempts to develop alternative welfare strategies based on social divisions of a 
non-class nature (which reject the need for state collectivism) are not without merit, 
there is a real risk that disengagement from the defence and promotion ofprogressive 
forms of state welfarism, will lead to an increased level of inequality.' (Page 2001, 515) 
2.2.2.2 Carers 
The New Left critique of the welfare state and the Conservative governments' 'reforms', 
included research into 'informal care' particularly from a feminist standpoint. Williams (2001) 
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observed that the concept of care as oppressed labour and the political demands for the 
recognition of carers were central to the early work. From the eighties attention shifted to an 
interest in and celebration of the meanings of care for women, but these studies were limited in 
their gender focus. 
It was perhaps in the exclusion of payments to relatives that one of the apparent contradictions 
in New Labour's social policy could be perceived. It appeared that New Labour was in favour 
of giving ' the unsung heroes of British life' (Prescott 1999) every support, apart from payment 
for their services. The value of carers' labour was estimated at £34 billion annually (Wellard 
1999). This restriction on user choice was not consistent with market theory or the practice in 
other European welfare systems with more established traditions of direct payments. It was 
nevertheless supported by the National Centre for Independent Living 6. Their concern about 
distorting the nature of 'informal' relationships and diverting attention from the needs of 
disabled people themselves, reflected the tensions in constructing 'care' as a commodity within 
the market place of the 'community'. This restriction acknowledged the potential power 
imbalance between users and carers, revealed by research into efforts to engage users in the 
development, and management of services (Barnes and Wistow 1994, Servian 1996). The 
Carers and Disabled Children's Act (2000) gave councils the power to make direct payments to 
carers to purchase services to meet their own needs for 'support' to continue caring. Councils 
were required to distinguish between the assessed need of the user, from that of the carer, to 
make respective payments from available resources. 
Carers were therefore constructed as a quasi-client group in the Blair government's social policy 
programme (Lloyd 2000). The provision of support for those who care, to enable them to 
continuing caring at little cost to the public purse, represented a cost- effective strategy 
consistent with a 'modern' or third way approach to combining public and private resources. 
This offered particularly good value because New Labour's policy on charging for community 
care services encouraged councils to require carers to contribute to the cost of any support they 
receive. 
The concept of an 'ideology of caring' was exposed by Morris (1993) as another source of 
oppression of disabled people. She criticised feminist writers who, in decrying the situation of 
female informal carers, ignored the experience of disabled women A focus on partners and 
relatives justified the under funding of the support that disabled people themselves need to live 
as equal citizens. It also compounded the misrepresentation of abled-bodied people as uniquely 
self reliant, by denying the reality of interdependence and reciprocity that exists in informal 
6 A major campaigning organisation run by and for disabled people and funded by the government to 
assist with the development of direct payments. 
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relationships. Empirical support for Morris's argument was provided by Walmsley's (1993) 
research. She found that it was frequently impossible to draw a distinction between 'carer' and 
'dependent', because in the relationship both parties give and receive. However in the ideology 
of caring, disabled people are not just a burden on society but a burden on their families. New 
Labour therefore recognised this by requiring councils to offer carers support to continue with 
the tasks of caring, ideally while participating in the labour market. 
'There exists a fundamental tension between the practical acknowledgement of care and the 
political privileging of the labour market.' (Williams 2001, 474) 
2.2.2.3 Users 
The centrality of users to the implementation of direct payments exemplifies some of the 
tensions identified in the literature on New Labour's programme, as well as the issue of the 
prioritising of economic objectives as a prerequisite of achieving social goals. Taylor-Gooby 
(1999) argued that New Labour's approach, in relying on individuals pursuing their own self 
interest for the efficient allocation of resources through a market mechanism, was consistent 
with the conceptual framework of 'instrumental rationality', dominant in the Conservative 
governments' social policy. This was illustrated by the revised guidance on direct payments 
(Dept of Health 2000a, para. 3). 
Alternative models of user involvement and motivation were identified by research as 
underpinning the direct payment schemes developed in Conservative and Labour led authorities 
before 1997, that is 'individual' versus 'collective' (Priestley 1999). Research by Pearson 
(2000) also contrasted the influence of either a 'market' or 'social justice' discourse on the 
implementation of direct payments in other authorities, similarly distinguished by 'right' or 
'left' party political control. In the Conservative authority, users were subject to rigorous 
monitoring procedures, which undermined the liberating potential of direct payments. In the 
Labour authority direct payments were not offered to day service users because they threatened 
public sector jobs. 
Disabled people were coming together to campaign for 'inclusion' in the normal life of society, 
to take control of their own lives and to challenge the 'expert' status of professional knowledge 
before the conceptualisation of the user as consumer. Barnes' (1997) research revealed that the 
experience of collective action has been, of itself, a means of empowering and encouraging the 
participation of previously excluded people as 'active citizens'. Direct payments to users 
introduced the potential for increasing the competitive individualism amongst these paying 
customers, to create the conditions in which a market in social care can thrive. Barnes suggested 
that this development could be to the disadvantage of some people. Those least able to negotiate 
the role of employer, those whose support needs are not related to physical assistance and those 
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who already suffer greater exclusion than other community care 'users' because of their legal 
status would be disadvantaged. Barnes' arguments are relevant to the analyses of Greener 
(2002), Hoggett (2001) and Taylor-Gooby (2001) discussed above (2.2.1). 
There are tensions within the conceptualisation of the responsible citizen and the model of the 
informed individual consumer. The former actively participates in democracy and calls 
politicians and public servants to account, the latter engages in market exchanges in pursuit of 
self interest to optimise personal 'welfare' through 'trading o f f cost and quality considerations. 
These tensions are illustrated by Barnes' (1997) work. Writing about what they constructed as 
the ideological basis for involving users in community care development under the Conservative 
governments of the 1990s, Croft and Beresford (1990) suggested that the 'consumerist' 
approach begins with the service providers' needs while the 'democratic' approach is essentially 
citizen- led. Dividing and transforming dis-empowered users into consumers will not overcome 
their oppression because the politics of liberation do not necessarily sit easily with those of the 
market place. 
The consumerism of the Major years allowed services to be less accountable according to 
research reported by Cowen (1998). This suggested that the separation of users from each other 
and from providers in a market place, together with a spirit of entrepreneurialism, would not 
encourage user participation. The achievements of 'communities of interest' as well as very 
local community groups, described in the literature on social inclusion and participation, could 
be problematic because of the fundamental tension between the principles of competition and 
co-operation. 
The ownership and control of social policy, as both a political process and an academic 
discipline, play a key role in determining its regressive or liberatory potential argued Beresford 
(2001,495). The emergence of service users and their movements as new participants in social 
policy began to impact on the provider -led policy and provision, where developments were the 
result of negotiations among interest groups in the local and central state. The 'rhetoric of 
empowerment' was discussed by Shaw (1997), who suggested that the participation and 
involvement of users is often restricted to the 'micro-level' of individual influence on the 
actions of front line workers with little impact on policy or decision making. However in one 
important analysis to be discussed in the next chapter (Lipsky 1980), it is at the 'micro' level of 
interaction between individual users/ citizens and public sector workers that crucial policy 
decisions are actually made. Nevertheless, the amount of influence the individual user can exert 
over the outcome of those decision-making processes will be affected by his or her social status 
(Lipsky 1980) or symbolic capital (Greener 2001). 
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2.2.2.4. Communities 
The ideal of active citizenship is found in the traditions of Aristotle and Rousseau. Full 
membership of a political community implies an exclusive system of co-operation, in which 
members contribute to the common good and refrain from mutually harmful conflict. Jordan 
(1999) argues that the 'exclusivity' of the association is based on the principles of contribution 
and collective responsibility. Much of the appeal of communitarianism, for New Labour 
appeared to be in its assertion of the need to re-establish the connections between individual 
choice and collective responsibility. The seminal essay of T.H. Marshall (1992,8) described the 
building up of the rights granted by the state to the individual through legal then political to 
social rights in the creation of the 'welfare state'. The communitarian value base offers support 
for the third tier of social rights in the altered economic, political and social landscape fifty 
years on. With 'New Labour' the link was emphasised between the individual's responsibilities 
and inclusion in the 'exclusive association' from which s/he is granted social rights to 'welfare': 
'/4 responsibility from us all to provide help; a responsibility on us all to use that help 
to help ourselves., (Blair 2000a, 5) 
Principles of co-operation again conflict with the concept of the 'invisible hand' steering 
individuals towards the fullest realisation of their preferences, through competition. Jordan 
(1999) maintains that current political thought is characterised by 'muddles' including the 
'confusion' between the interactional code of reciprocity and the market place rules of fair 
exchange. The former relies on the bonds of personal obligation as characterised by 
interpersonal relationships between family members, neighbours and friends. These bonds are 
absent in market transactions, where resources can be allocated efficiently without reference to 
sentiment. The attempt to exclude relatives from payment for providing care in New Labour's 
social policy recognised this distinction identified by Jordan, which seems blurred elsewhere in 
the often vague notion of the 'community' as a source of 'care'. The 'muddle' continued with 
the extrapolation from intimate associations to large scale impersonal ones. Jordan challenged 
the idea that labour contributions are an efficient means of eliminating 'free riding' in the latter. 
The conditions conducive to effective use of moral sanction, face-to-face contacts, are absent so 
coercion is required. Ellison (1998) also identified the potential threat of coercion in the 
prioritisation of economic objectives in welfare policies. 
2.3. The Labour Market. Social Inclusion and Citizenship 
In the new orthodoxy, associated with Blair's Government, social justice and economic 
efficiency could be reconciled. A focus on the labour market in the design of social institutions 
was intended to provide a culture of opportunity and employability for all citizens. In the U.K.'s 
official definition of social exclusion the emphasis was on unemployment and low incomes, and 
did not include the absence of interpersonal relationships, which characterised European 
definitions. The British research tradition has concerned itself with the distributional aspects of 
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social exclusion (with the exception of Townsend's (1979) work, acknowledged by the 
European Commission 1993). Direct payments were identified as having an important role to 
play in enabling disabled people and carers to work, contribute economically and in so doing 
become 'included' (Dept of Health 2000a). Nevertheless commentators like Hutton (1995) have 
discussed both the relational and the distributional aspects of exclusion and their complex and 
compounding effects. Combating exclusion is not just about economic involvement and 
contribution, but has social and inter- relational dimensions. 
Users coming together for collective purposes might fu l f i l obligations of citizenship (Prior and 
colleagues 1995), consistent with the classical notion of the citizen as public actor. However 
official discussions of direct payments under New Labour emphasised issues of individual 
control, increasing independence, responsibility and work incentives rather than opportunities 
for participation, collective action and interpersonal development. Research describing 
opportunities taken by users to contribute to the planning and management of services, to the 
training of professionals and the education of the wider public, was collated by Barnes and 
Warren (1999). These experiences have advanced users' own personal and 'community' 
development and have been identified in collective action and the new culture of participation in 
welfare services. Both Barnes (1997) and Cowen (1998) expressed concern that those 
opportunities may be lost in consumerist policies and market- oriented strategies, which divide 
users and individualise their problems and the potential solutions. 
'The messianic promotion ofpaid work as the salvation of all and as the key to social 
inclusion and citizenship responsibility... is seen by many as devaluing unpaid work in 
the home and the community.' (Lister 2001, 439) 
There are recipients of welfare who can not hope to win the right to 'inclusion' through the 
labour market, because of illness, age, frailty, impairment or caring responsibilities. The 
prioritisation of paid employment over all other roles as a means through which citizenship can 
be expressed and experienced denies the value of other types of contributions and excludes 
those for whom 'work' is not an option. 
2.3.Conclusion: Direct Payment Users. Consumers or Citizens? 
Direct payments are an example of an ideal 'third way' policy because in principle they cannot 
be done 'to' the individuals but require active co-operation (Dept of Health 2000a). The nature 
of that active co-operation is contested. 
'Consuming.., communicates an entirely different outcome than ...participation as a 
producer. There is a striking parallel between consumers of services and consumers of 
commodities: both are out of control of what they consume; both stand outside the 
determinants of the process ofproduction; both act in response to a definition of their 
needs outside of their conscious control; and both are recipients of the interaction 
which reproduces existing power relations..' (Rose and Black 1985, 37) 
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Disabled people, including people with learning difficulties or mental health problems and the 
frail elderly have demonstrated that they have experience and expertise to offer to service 
development and the potential to contribute to the life of the community (Barnes and Warren 
1999). The distinction drawn by Beresford and Croft (1993) between a consumerist model of 
participation and a democratic model can be explored through the example of direct payment 
schemes. They suggested that consumerism in social care accompanies the ideology of welfare 
markets in which needs and services are commodities to be traded and regulated through the 
forces of supply and demand. Through the exercise of consumer power, services may become 
more responsive to end user preference but remain owned and controlled by the organisation 
and professional providers. The limitations on the exercise of power by 'consumers' in welfare 
markets include inequality in the distribution of resources, status and political power in society 
generally. These are compounded in community care by the control exerted by local eligibility 
criteria, budget constraints and professional dominance of the assessment and care planning 
processes, along with uneven access to information. In contrast the democratic model of 
participation extends the influence of users to policy making, resource allocation and the 
development and management of services. Exercise of power in these spheres means 
reconceptualising the user as a citizen. However this implies a rights rather than a needs based 
model of involvement in services and recognition of the damaging effects of oppression and 
exclusion on individuals and social groups, i f the ideal of active citizenship is to be realised. 
The implementation of the Blair government's instruction to councils to involve users in the 
development of direct payment schemes can be analysed using Arnstein's (1971) model of the 
ladder of power- sharing. The rungs on the ladder descend from citizen control, through 
delegated power, partnership, placation, consultation, information and therapy to manipulation. 
Priestley's research (1999) showed how a group of disabled people, asserting their rights as 
citizens collectively, won funding from a Labour council to develop and manage a personal 
assistance scheme. In Priestley's study this example of collective control of a service, by 
disabled people, was threatened by the implementation of the Conservative government's 
community care policy. The impact of the ideology of welfare markets, contracts and 
competition for scarce resources threatened to change the nature of user involvement, from 
collective control to individual consumerism. 
A study of several councils' attempt to engage citizen participation in the piloting of New 
Labour initiatives, by Martin and Boaz (2000), drew a distinction between user-focused and 
user- led services. The former approach was akin to the consumerism promoted by Conservative 
governments. The latter offered local people an active role in the design and delivery of 
services. They also found an uneven distribution of 'capacity and appetite for participation', 
with people at greatest risk of social exclusion least inclined to active engagement (51). The 
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work of Taylor-Gooby (2001), Hoggett (2001) and Greener (2002), suggested that opportunities 
to participate and take greater individual and social responsibility in the context of 'community 
care' may not equally distributed because of the reality of differences in experience and 
expectation. Barron (2001) found that the granting of 'rights' to disabled people in Sweden 
operated as a mechanism for both 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' depending on the social situation 
and the nature of the relationships experienced by the individuals interviewed. For those able to 
assert their rights to have choice and control over the personal assistance they required, the 
reform meant greater autonomy and participation. For others, specified individual rights had 
little bearing on their lives or on their ability to secure the support they needed. 
Involvement in the planning, development and delivery of direct payments appears to offer one 
way that disabled people at risk of exclusion can be given the opportunity to contribute through 
public service and the exercise of both the rights and duties of citizenship. However this 
depends on how far politicians and professionals are willing to seek and support their 
participation. 
In this chapter the debate about the history of the development of direct payments has been 
outlined. Their introduction was examined as a 'consumerist strategy' within the market 
oriented community care policy of the last Conservative government. The roots of direct 
payments in the struggles of disabled people for independence were exposed. Alternative views 
on whether the original empowering objectives were being achieved or compromised by 
Major's approach were discussed. The relevance and role of the extension of direct payments as 
a 'third way' initiative within the Blair government's policy programme and possible 
implications for implementation were outlined. The policy implementation literature will be 
discussed next, followed by the context for the implementation of the particular initiative. This 
includes the changing roles of social workers, the tensions between professional and 
organisational cultures in the implementation of community care policy and their implications 
for the promotion or obstruction of individual and collective participation though direct 
payments 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Direct Payments as a Case Study in Policy Implementation 
'Government either seems unable to put its policy into effect as intended, or 
finds that its interventions and actions have unexpected or counter-productive 
outcomes.' (Barret and Fudge 1981, 3) 
3.0 Introduction 
In chapter one the literature on New Labour's policy approach and its claims to be following a 
non- ideologically based 'third way' in pursuit of its objectives was discussed. The third way 
renounced both the last Conservative government's confidence in laissez- faire individualism 
and previous Labour governments' commitment to collective purposes and provision, in favour 
of a pragmatic use of the market as a means rather than an end. In chapter two the current 
government's approach to 'direct payments', as an initiative with characteristics typical of the 
'third way', was introduced. The debate in the literature about whether direct payments had 
originated as another 'consumerist' strategy within the Conservative government's community 
care policy or whether it had been an initiative with genuine empowering potential, was 
explored and consideration was given to research that identified how the nature and outcomes of 
direct payment schemes in different local authorities had been influenced by the ideological 
positions of their political leaders (Pearson 2000, Priestley 1999). Alternative models had 
advantages and weaknesses in achieving the various objectives ascribed to direct payments. 
New Labour presented the third way as a pragmatic approach with the potential to overcome the 
disadvantages of polarised ideologically based initiatives. This chapter discusses the literature 
on policy implementation and examines research that reveals the gaps between the objectives 
and outcomes of community care policy and the contribution of social workers, as care 
managers. 
Blair's government recognised the weaknesses of previous administrations' approach to 
ensuring policy effectiveness: 
'One big trouble social services have suffered from is that up to now no Government 
has spelled out exactly what people can expect or what the staff are expected to do. Nor 
have any clear standards of performance been laid down. This Government is to change 
all that.' Frank Dobson, Secretary of State, in the introduction to Modernising Social 
Services (Dept of Health 1998a i ) 
3.1 The Gap between Policy Intentions and Outcomes 
The literature recognised that the intentions of policy- makers are not always achieved in policy 
outcomes. The concept of the 'implementation gap' was identified by Dunsire (1976). He 
explained that the inability of governments to achieve their policy intentions can create demands 
for further policy change. Dunsire's conclusions seem relevant to the discussion in 
'Modernising Social Services' about the failure of Conservative governments to achieve the 
objectives of 'community care' policy, through the organisational and cultural changes initiated 
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in social services (Dept of Health 1998a ch. 1). The policy itself was not challenged. Instead the 
Conservative governments' lack of clarity in setting objectives and standards and providing 
consistency across its overall policy framework was highlighted. Deficiencies in leadership and 
direction at the policy making level (along with a dogmatic commitment to privatisation) were 
blamed for the implementation failures of social services. 
The literature challenges the assumption that central decision- makers are the key actors in the 
policy process. Hjern (1982) identified 'policy sub-systems' arguing that it is inadequate to use 
'top down' approaches to implementation research because they neglect the strategies of public 
servants to divert policy to their own ends. He found no real distinction between policy 
formation and implementation. Hjern and Porter (1997) advocated a 'bottom- up' approach to 
understanding policy action, exploring the network of actors and agencies involved. While 
conceding many of the criticisms of top down approaches, Sabatier (1997) warned that blurring 
the distinction between policy making and implementation makes it difficult to distinguish the 
relative influence of elected officials (democratic accountability) and public servants 
(bureaucratic discretion). Identification of decision points facilitates both policy evaluation and 
analysis of policy change. The decisions of national politicians are important, that is why 
interest groups try to influence them. 
Recent policy research in Britain appears to have been largely based on the concerns of central 
government with securing compliance with its objectives. Schwandt (1997) suggested that 
evaluation in this context assumes that policy is linear, reasoned and purposive action directed 
towards clear goals. It is situated within a 'modernist paradigm', within which rationality is a 
matter of correct procedure. An emphasis on method rather than theory as the basis of 
evaluation has been encouraged alongside concern with defining intended outcomes in 
measurable ways. Less attention has been given to explaining the links and interactions between 
policy interventions and the cumulative impact of policy change. The motivation of individual 
actors and the influence of institutional regimes should not be neglected because policies are 
usually underpinned by theories of how both can be changed (for example that market discipline 
would lead to greater efficiency in public services). Sanderson (2000) described how a renewed 
focus on the role of institutions in mediating policy implementation has emphasised the 
complexity of policy systems. 
It is particularly difficult to distinguish between the policy making and implementation 
processes, where discretionary powers are given by one tier of government to another in 
furtherance of its objectives (Hill 1981). Alternative approaches taken by Labour and 
Conservative controlled councils to their duties under community care policy, illustrated how 
ideological differences between central and local government can affect the implementation 
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process. Three 'elements' of the policy action relationship were distinguished by Barret and 
Fudge (1981,7): the environmental system from which demand arises; the political system in 
which decisions are made and the organisational system through which policy is mediated and 
executed. Within community care policy each of these 'elements' represented a complex 
interaction of national and local issues, interests and constraints. The introduction and extension 
of direct payments in the U.K. reflected a broad range of influences and the interests. The aims 
of the policy, and the appropriate means of achieving them, have been debated. Direct payments 
can be constructed within alternative 'discourses', can be developed from apparently opposing 
value bases and attract both the support and resistance of a variety of interests involved in 
implementation. These tensions can be manifest in each of the three elements of the policy 
action relationship. 
Local authority powers to make direct payments entered the statute book as The Community 
Care (Direct Payments) Act. The parentheses clarify the subordinate position of one policy 
initiative to the other. The history of direct payments as an aspiration of the disabled peoples' 
movement preceded the introduction of the Thatcher / Major version of 'community care'. 
However it was in the environmental, political and organisational landscape created by the 1990 
National Health Service and Community Care Act that councils were permitted to make direct 
payments. Therefore the implementation process occurred in that context. Research into the 
impact of the introduction of a 'mixed-economy', to be discussed next (3.1.1.), suggested that 
some of the overt objectives of community care policy were undermined rather than promoted 
by the use of 'market' devices. 
3.1.1. Markets in community care: the objectives and outcomes of policy 
New Labour advocated the use of the market as a pragmatic means to achieve the objectives of 
social policy rather than as an ideological end in itself (Dept of Health 1998a). The strategy was 
apparently based on the premise of neo-classical economic theory that the market is the efficient 
means of allocating scarce resources to optimise the benefit or 'welfare' to be derived from 
them. Individuals competing freely in pursuit of their own self-interest will ensure that goods 
and services are provided at the most satisfactory quantity, quality and price. 
' It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest. ' (Smith 1961, 15) 
Purchasers are expected to balance price and quality considerations, choosing the amount of 
each good to be purchased on the basis of the amount of 'utility' it confers. The model assumes 
that the purchaser has immense capabilities in the collecting and processing of information 
necessary to make a choice. 
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The weaknesses of 'quasi-markets' in public services were identified (Flynn 1999, Le Grand 
1993, Bartlett 1998). They lacked the 'conditions for success' prescribed by neo- classical 
economic theory, largely because the public servants who managed purchasing budgets and 
contracted for services were not the people who need the services or experience how they are 
delivered. Quasi-markets were characterised by potential principal- agent conflict because the 
interests of professional decision- makers (agents) are not the same as their clients/service users 
(principals). Efficient resource allocation was limited by information asymmetry, between 
bureaucratic purchasers and service providers, with distant purchasers unable to judge the 
quality of and need for the service provided. There were opportunities for moral hazard (for 
example providing poorer quality services than specified in the contract) and 'cream skimming' 
(choosing the least costly users). There were also potential market entry problems. These 
characteristics were found in studies of particular community care markets and the behaviour of 
social services staff (.Knapp, Hardy and Forder 2001, Lapsley and Llewellyn 1998, Mannion 
and Smith 1998, Taylor-Gooby 1999). 
The production of care is interactive. It is produced and consumed simultaneously and involves 
intimacies between producer and consumer not generally associated with the market place 
(Twigg 1997, Henwood 1998, 2001). Welfare services also have public as well as private good 
characteristics (that is they provide social benefits), which cost and quality 'trade-offs', based 
on the preferences of individual users or priorities of particular budget holders, may not address. 
Unlike central purchasers, the practitioner 'care managers' observed by Knapp and colleagues 
(2001) were well placed to identify and respond to individual needs and preferences. They 
required time, information, skill, autonomy, devolved spending power and incentives to 
commission cost effectively. However care managers were not budget holders or part of a 
purchasing team in most authorities studied. Knapp and colleagues concluded that despite the 
trend to concentration of social care provision in a reducing number of providers, the biggest 
threat to free competition (that 'text book' economics suggests is the key to efficient resource 
allocation) is the monopsonistic power wielded by dominant local authority purchasers. 
Economic psychology suggests that the assumption that actors in welfare markets are motivated 
by the instrumental rationality, upon which market theory is based, is not necessarily valid 
(Taylor-Gooby 1999). Mannion and Smith (1998) drew on the account offered by economic 
sociology, in their study of community care purchasing decisions. This stressed that economic 
decisions are taken within a social setting and so choices could not be understood in isolation 
from the setting in which they occur. Social relations between the actors involved and their 
social networks were important. Front line practitioners were central to the purchasing decision-
making in all the authorities Mannion and Smith (1998) studied, although Knapp (2001) found 
that were rarely budget holders. Rather than 'trading-off cost and quality as in the neo-classical 
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model, care managers were unwilling to accept reduced 'quality' as compensation for lower 
prices. Mannion and Smith attributed this partly to the conflict between the professional ethos of 
the typical practitioner and the managerial ethic on which the market reforms were based. Also 
relevant were the care manager's private goals (job preservation and career advancement) which 
may have conflicted with the interests of users but which were likely to make her, in terms of 
economic theory, 'risk averse'. Banks' (2002) research suggested that the tendency to risk 
aversion is increasing. Mannion and Smith found that budget pressures meant that scarce 
resources were directed to those with highest care needs, to the detriment of other people, whose 
longer term independence might have been promoted by cheaper care packages with a 
preventative focus. This outcome of market discipline and cash limited budgets was therefore in 
conflict with the wider policy objectives, including achieving 'value for money' (D.H.S.S. 
1989) or in New Labour parlance 'best value' (D.E.T.R. 1998). Blair's government criticised 
this pattern of rationing scarce resources, which had become widespread, in the face of budget 
constraints. The use of increasingly stringent eligibility criteria for community care diverted 
resources from short term interventions focussed on prevention and rehabilitation, that is from 
promoting independence at the risk of prolonging dependence (Dept. of Health 1998a, 2 .6). 
'Quality' was perceived as an elusive concept in the community care markets studied by 
Mannion and Smith (1998), while price was generally unambiguous. They found that purchasers 
frequently invoked 'colloquial' and 'common sense' notions of quality as decision-making 
criteria. However they relied largely on informal information, status, trust and reputation to 
determine which provider was awarded the contract. New Labour's approach to the mixed 
economy of care promoted the development of partnerships between statutory and independent 
sector agencies, encouraging collaboration rather than competition (Dept of Health 2001c). 
Knapp and colleagues (2001) found that relationships based on trust between local authority 
commissioners and independent sector providers were only beginning to develop. 
An 'ethic of trust' was identified as a valuable legacy from the traditional welfare state to the 
new mixed economy by Taylor-Gooby (1999). Similarly Lyons and Mehta (1997) asserted that 
policy- makers should be aware of the interdependence and continuing interplay between 
organisational structures and agents. Trust is unstable and susceptible to manipulation; policy 
pressures can undermine traditional patterns and disrupt long-term relationships. Given the 
reliance on trust by agent-purchasers revealed by their study, Mannion and Smith (1998) 
questioned whether, despite policy objectives, community- care markets could ever be truly 
competitive. 
Trust sounds like a 'good' thing. Trust between the public and private sectors may reduce the 
'transaction costs' of both specifying and policing contracts. However the objective of efficient 
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resource allocation through the market may not be achieved by 'collaboration'. Resources are 
wasted i f purchasers use proxies for quality that are irrelevant to users, i f providers avoid 
delivering to the standards and amount required and i f both collude in ways that do not satisfy 
user needs and preferences. For efficiency, the priorities and concerns of individuals who use 
the services should be reflected in the contract requirements and users should be involved in the 
monitoring of their delivery. 
Social service purchasers took little interest in detailed cost information in Lapsley and 
Llewellyn's (1998) research. They took the level of wages as an indicator of quality and 
focussed on the aspects of care delivery concerned with social work 'clan values', expressed as 
client choice, dignity, needs and preference. Senior managers were reluctant to delegate budget 
control to practitioners to avoid compromising the traditional social work values of client 
advocacy and intruding on the casework relationship. The exploration of older people's views 
carried out by Henwood (1998) however revealed a consensus and clarity about the components 
of a 'quality' domiciliary care service, lacking amongst professionals. These components 
featured the users' experience of the process of service delivery and interaction with care staff, 
rather than the financial stability and policies and procedures of the organisation that concern 
council contracts officers. The consultation exercise reported by Turner (2000), the views of 
different groups of service users highlighted by Harding and Beresford (1996) and the Raynes' 
(2001) survey of older peoples' aspirations, yielded similar conclusions. 
It therefore seems that 'principals' (users) do not perceive the issue of quality to be the vague 
and elusive concept that 'agents' (care managers) in the community care market do. Research 
has consistently highlighted high levels of satisfaction amongst the users of direct payments, 
from the early study by Zarb and Nadash (1994) to the more recent work of Dawson, 
Glendinning, Magliajic, Pearson and Witcher (all published in 2000), Evans and Carmichael 
(2002) . These studies have all shown that people choosing 'cash for care' have achieved those 
components of a quality service identified by users in the above studies, by managing their own 
care arrangements. The research on community care markets has implications for the 
implementation of direct payments. It suggested that users may be more able and willing to 
trade off price and quality in a utility function than their 'agents' the social service purchasers, 
for example to decide they would benefit more from less hours of service of higher quality or 
vice versa. However not all councils allowed users to exercise that particular choice and instead 
specified in detail how the direct payment must be spent. 
Following the above discussion about the difficulties in realising policy objectives through 
market mechanisms, the implications of the literature for another aspect of the Blair 
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government's approach to securing policy outcomes, centralised performance management will 
be considered.. 
3.1.2. The Limitations of Political and Management Control 
'A huge industry has been created around targets, performance indicators and 
performance management systems all of which are derived from a mistrust of managers 
and professionals.' (Hunter 2001, 57) 
The inability of 'top level' actors to control the actions of lower level actors has been explained 
only partially by the tensions between central and local politicians working from different value 
bases (Pearson 2000, Priestley 1999). Williamson (1975) used the concept of'bounded 
rationality' to explain how the control exercised by actors in positions of authority in complex 
organisations was limited by their information processing capacities. Lindblom and Woodhouse 
(1993) endorsed this with reference to public policy. Johnson (1975) studied a U.S. social work 
agency in a policy context where the Federal and state governments were trying to control the 
behaviour of public welfare organisations. He found that their efforts were often ineffective and 
sometimes counter- productive. Thus Hudson (1989, 386) suggested 
'the broad problem confronting policy-makers is that policy is rarely applied directly to 
the external world, but is mediated through other institutions and actors. Policy impact 
is therefore at risk of distortion by these mediators' 
The collective term 'street level bureaucrats' was developed by Lipsky (1980). Public servants, 
who directly interact with individual citizens, often exercise substantial discretion in carrying 
out their duties. The concept encompasses a broad range of public servants but is particularly 
relevant to the role of social services practitioners. Lipsky suggested that the poorer people are 
the greater the power exercised over them by 'street level bureaucrats', because the delegation 
of responsibility for addressing irremediable social problems, through practitioner discretion, 
serves the interests of politicians. 
'Through street level bureaucracies the society organises the control, restriction and 
maintenance of relatively powerless groups. Antagonism is directed towards the agents 
of social services and control and away from the political forces that ultimately account 
for the distribution of social and material values. (Lipsky 1980 , 191) 
The concept of street level bureaucracy is relevant to contemporary U.K. social work where 
direct work with clients is not subject to outside scrutiny or managerial control (Myers and 
McDonald, 1996). Wells (1997, 333) described how mental health practitioners expect 
autonomy in their work and managers have to achieve outcomes and manage resources within a 
complex and sometimes contradictory policy context. They may therefore try to influence but 
not direct practice, '..managers and policy makers may have a vested interest in not scrutinizing 
practitioners' implementation ofpolicy too vigorously as a way of deflecting responsibility for 
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its consequences.'. The character of client treatment by street level bureaucrats reflected and 
reinforced class and ethnic divisions in Lipsky's work. Research in Britain showed that black 
people were not only over-represented in mental health services, but were more likely to be 
identified as 'dangerous' and so subject to greater controls through the 'Care Programme 
Approach' than white people (Rose 2001). Social disadvantage was compounded by 
professional judgement. With regard to direct payments, differential expectations and 
consequent treatment of particular user groups may influence their experiences. 
Community care services are provided selectively by local authorities for those not affluent 
enough to make their own arrangements based on practitioners' assessments and interpretations 
of eligibility criteria (1948 National Assistance Act, Dept of Health 2002a). Interactions 
between social workers and clients, during the assessment process, were observed by Stanley 
(1999). She concluded that the culture of community care embodied 'consumer choice' rather 
than 'user choice', with those able to express their needs forcefully exercising more 'choice' 
than those who could not. A direct payment may be presented and perceived as no more than 
another 'option' in the range of packages on offer to meet care needs, or as an opportunity for 
self determination and empowerment. Taylor-Gooby's (2001) empirical testing of the 'risk 
society thesis' suggests that people from more privileged circumstances perceive increased 
choice positively where those less privileged perceive it more negatively. Therefore, whether or 
however the choice is offered, those on the receiving end of this extra option may perceive it as 
a threat rather than an opportunity. This supports Lipsky's account of the power wielded by 
street level bureaucrats and the importance of the interaction between citizen and public servant 
in policy implementation. 
There are variations in the 'take-up' of direct payments between local authorities, user groups 
and the case- loads of individual social workers within a particular area (Bright and Drake 1999, 
Ryan 1999,Valios 2000, Witcher and colleagues 2000). Access to information has been 
identified as crucial to the success of particular initiatives, in both the literature on markets (Le 
Grand and Bartlett 1993) and empowerment (Maglajic 2000, Servian 1996). Bewley (2000) and 
Evans and Carmichael (2002) have described the key role of practitioners in promoting direct 
payments, alongside that of well-organised and informed user interest groups identified by other 
researchers (Maglajilic and colleagues 2000, Hasler 1999, Priestley 1999). The Social Services 
Inspectorate's research (2000) associated care management staffs' ambivalence and lack of 
knowledge with low take up of direct payments. Witcher and colleagues's (2000) survey of 
direct payment schemes in Scotland and Dawson's (2000) evaluation of the Norfolk pilot 
scheme confirmed the importance of social workers as 'gatekeepers' for direct payments. 
Dawson also identified the support and time commitment of senior staff as significant. 
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The actions of practitioners further down the organisational hierarchy may be even more 
influential than that of managers and professionals, for some users. Care staff develop 
relationships with people receiving domiciliary, day and even respite services. Pearson (2000) 
found that in a Labour controlled authority, users of council services were denied access to 
direct payments, which were promoted for others, because of the perceived threat to public 
sector jobs. Brandon and Brandon (2002) provided socio-organisational analysis of services 
used by disabled people. This exposed how 'service forum incoherency' arises from a disparity 
between the 'posture' of the organisation (authority structures and goals) and its (informal) 
culture. The latter can mould staff into working practices that conflict with official objectives. 
'Consumerism' in social care was distinguished from 'empowerment' by Jordan (2000). With 
consumerism users are allowed to choose between pre-selected or off the shelf care packages 
not tailored to individual needs and preferences. Empowerment means the user is central to the 
design and development of the package. The responsibility and judgement exercised by councils 
and social workers, in facilitating access to direct payments, could crucially influence whether 
they are limited to extending consumer choice or whether their empowering potential is realised, 
through enhancing the individual's control and self determination. 
Centralised performance management systems set criteria against which a public service's 
performance in the achievement of policy objectives is judged. The strong leadership and clear 
direction promised in the White Paper (Dept of Health 1998a) may not be enough to secure 
success so defined. Personal interests and attitudes, professional values, occupational 
allegiances and organisational cultures all have a part to play in the realisation of official goals. 
In addition, public servants may have opinions and beliefs that support or reject the ideology 
they perceive as underpinning the policies they are expected to implement. 
3.1.3. Public service staff and New Labour's social policies 
The interests of public sector workers were conventionally perceived as best served by Labour 
governments. However Blair (1999) attributed resistance to his policy programme to the 
persistent forces of conservatism amongst public sector workers. He distingushed 'small c 
conservatives'' from those co-operating with reform in public services (Blair 2002a, 5). 
Nevertheless the implementation of the policy of extending direct payments was left to social 
services departments, through the care management function of individual practitioners. 
Early in its second term Blair's government announced its intention to extend the role of the 
private sector in the management and delivery of public services (Queen's Speech 2001). Blair's 
(2001c, 4) speech for the T.U.C. conference was intended to defuse the opposition of organised 
labour to his latest round of 'third way' reforms. 'Public services are the clearest symbol of 
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community, solidarity, what we provide together as a society. For millions, they are social 
justice made real.'. He omitted to mention the personal social services in his roll of honour of 
valued public services, or the role of social care in meeting individual or community needs. 
The resistance Blair perceived amongst public sector staff could be accounted for by their 
failure to accept the 'new individualism' of the third way approach to social policy. A 
comparative survey of public servants' views on the role of the welfare state and structural 
inequalities showed that salaried staff endorsed 'Old Labour' type welfare policies directed at 
systematic structural divisions in society (Taylor-Gooby 2000). From a 'collectivism perspective 
the empowering qualities of consumerist devices like direct payments to individuals may be 
limited or undermined by their experience of structural inequality, social deprivation and 
division. The findings of Barron's (2001) research in Sweden were that an ideological shift in 
focus from equality and solidarity to freedom of choice benefited some disabled people but was 
to the detriment of others. Therefore, support for or opposition to direct payments amongst 
social service staff may warrant a fuller account than the self- interest motivating the 'knaves' 
who receive and provide contemporary welfare services, discussed in Le Grand's (1997) 
analysis of changing perceptions of public service workers and users. The third way leaves 
public service practitioners facing dilemmas in reconciling the tensions between universal and 
selective welfare models through decisions made in their day-to-day work with individuals. 
These dilemmas are illustrated by the examples of charges for community care and the 
distinctions between health and social services. 
The 1948 National Assistance Act repealed the Poor Law and placed a duty on councils to 
provide accommodation for people in need of care and attention because of age, illness or 
disability 'which is not otherwise available to them' (Part I I I , S 21, Ss la). The principle was 
thus enshrined in law that while the National Health Service was there for all, publicly funded 
'social care' was only for those who could not afford to make their own arrangements. However 
when the Blair government came to power in 1997 Britain had become the 'property owning 
democracy' of Thatcher's vision, with the majority of the electorate aspiring to own their own 
homes. 
' A key problem politically has been the attempt to reconcile the much- lauded virtues of 
saving and inheritance with the desire of the treasury to access the value of owner 
occupied housing vacated by care home residents.' (Fimister 2000, 165) 
Lawyers and social workers with roles in the charging system for care homes were surveyed by 
Bradley and colleagues (2000). Eighty per cent of care managers said they experienced ethical 
dilemmas in carrying out financial assessments on behalf of the local authority and two-thirds 
experience stress. In contrast lawyers, who focussed on the interests of their clients, experienced 
less conflict. The charging regulations for residential care were set by government and have 
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been applied since the 1948 Act. Nevertheless practitioners experienced the rules as unclear, 
and felt they lacked adequate training and support in administering them. Actors at all levels in 
the authorities studied, including politicians of different parties, acknowledged the potential for 
the exercise of discretion, inconsistency and disregarding charge avoidance. 
The New Labour government recognised the unpopularity of a historically rooted charging 
system. Charges left older people ending their lives on means tested benefits, after a life time's 
contribution through taxation and service, while depriving their children of their expected 
inheritance. However the recommendations made by the Royal Commission, that personal care 
should be provided free, were not accepted for England (Sutherland 1999). Instead only the 
'nursing' element of care received a rights based (non- means tested) subsidy. This, together 
with case law intended to clarify policy intentions for those responsible for implementation7, 
placed additional responsibilities on practitioners. As well as assessing the individual's ability to 
pay, they were obliged to judge whether the person receiving residential care should receive a 
subsidy because there was a nursing element to the service. Practitioners also assessed whether 
the level and intensity of the care provided was such that it met the 'continuing care' criteria to 
trigger funding from the health service. These decisions were made within the context of local 
financial limitations, rationing devices and direct accountability to budget holders. 
The level of discretion allowed in charging policies for non-residential services was much 
greater, as councils were empowered to introduce their own rules and rates for user 
contributions. Charges increased dramatically in the 1990s, along with their importance to 
community care budgets, funding twelve per cent of costs in 2000 compared with eight per cent 
in 1993/94. In 1992/3, 72% of councils charged for domiciliary care with the highest charge at 
£15 per week. By 2000 half the authorities imposed a weekly charge on some users of over £50 
(Wright 2000). Reports by the Audit Commission (1999, 2000) revealed wide variation in the 
level and rules of charging across authorities and complexity and confusion leading to 
inconsistency in practice within them. Some users, including people living on income support, 
were being subject to multiple charging systems for different services. The Blair government 
introduced new guidance on charging for community care services (Dept of Health 2002a), as 
part of its 'Fair Access to Care' project and made income from earnings exempt from means 
tests. Councils retained significant discretion as to how far they choose to use their powers to 
exact contributions from users. It was 'front line' staff who continued to play a major part in 
implementing those policies. Furthermore the differences between the legal, political and 
financial significance of charges in health and social care persisted in New Labour's policy 
framework. 
7 See R v N and E Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan 1999 
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With direct payments, the issue of user charges became more explicit. The conversion of the 
value of services into a cash sum, net of the assessed charge, highlighted the proportion of the 
costs of services being met by users. Over a decade of policy statements by successive 
governments espoused the objective of creating 'seamless' or fully integrated health and social 
care services in the community (D.H.S.S. 1989, Dept. of Health 1998a, Dept. of Health 2000b). 
However the economic imperative for councils to generate income through charges and the 
political imperative for the national government to ensure that health care was free at the point 
of demand (Bruce and Falconer 1999) continued. 
Alternative charging rules, alongside variations in the benefit entitlement of those receiving 
health and /or social care in different settings, obstructed and diverted the process of community 
care policy implementation from the stated objectives. They created perverse incentives in 
favour of particular service models that have not worked in either users' nor tax-payers' 
interests (Audit Commission 1997, 1999, 2000). Case law developed supposedly clarifying the 
respective responsibilities of health and local authorities left ambivalent by statute. What 
appeared to be cost- shunting exercises between statutory authorities and respective budget 
managers, facilitated by lack of clarity in the wording or intention of government policy 
guidance, had an impact on peoples' lives at the point of service delivery. They created 
dilemmas for practitioners attempting to reconcile the interests of their managers and public 
paymasters with those of their citizen- clients. 
The cumulative consequences of community care policies resulted in a move from 'universal' 
access to N H S. provision to discretionary access to residual local authority services. Rummery 
and Glendinning's (1999) research, into the impact of this trend on the lives of older and 
disabled people, found that traditional professional gate keeping activities (like the medic's 
decision whether to admit a particular patient to hospital) have been augmented by a range of 
new obstacles. They defined 'managerial gate keeping' as the structures and processes agreed 
by managers, which direct the functioning of care management teams, including eligibility 
criteria. They define 'bureaucratic gate keeping' procedures, as those used by receptionists and 
duty social workers in their first engagement with potential service users. Rummery and 
Glendinning found, for example, that social workers raised the prospect of charges to deter 
potential applicants for services before commencing a ful l assessment of need. 
The Coughlan judgement (R v N and E Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan 1999) 
and consequent Department of Health circulars confirmed that the boundary between health and 
social care shifts. The boundary is moved by political and judicial decision makers, rather than 
professional expertise. This ruling threatened to further compromise the situation of individuals 
with high levels of care needs requesting re-assessment to access direct payments. Those re-
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designated as 'continuing care' patients within a community context became the sole funding 
responsibility of health purchasers. The direct payment option could be withheld i f social 
services were relieved of funding responsibilities for the individual. The 'right to buy' in 
community care appeared to be inextricably linked with the 'responsibility to pay'. 
In New Labour's first policy documents on the extension of direct payments, the distinction 
between health and social care was drawn again. Cash payments were not to be made in lieu of 
health services in the community (Dept of Health, 2000a) despite evidence that direct payment 
users prefer to have their health and social care services delivered in an integrated way, often by 
the same personal assistant (Glendinning and colleagues 2000a). The practitioner responsible 
for the assessing the individual was therefore required to separate health and social care needs in 
the care plan. Only services that addressed the latter could be converted into a direct payment. 
The Health and Social Care Act (2001) threatened the imposition of Care Trusts on local 
authorities, to be responsible for both health and social care in the area. At the local political and 
managerial level, the Local Government Association and the Association of Directors of Social 
Services expressed concern about the implications of the new legislation (Rickford 2001). The 
1999 Health Act, had already permitted closer local partnerships between health and social 
services. Dean (2001) argued that the granting of commissioning responsibilities to new 'health' 
bodies (the Care Trusts) threatened to fragment community services. Rather than facilitating 
'joined-up' services, the potential separation of responsibilities for 'community care' provision 
from that of supported housing, for example, appeared to conflict with other objectives of 
central government's policy (Dept. of Health 1998c). The New Labour policy of promoting 
Care Trusts appeared to subject the needs of the people who depend on community care services 
to an individual or 'medical model'. Some feared this threatened the hard won achievements of 
the disabled peoples' rights movements in gaining widespread acceptance of a 'social model' of 
disability. Henwood (2001, 58) reported the concerns of users that social care is to be 'taken 
over' by the N.H.S. 'which is seen as 10-15years behind in its attitudes to disability'. The 
social model is an approach to needs that recognises the disabling nature of environmental and 
social factors and the way in which they exacerbate the effects of individual impairment, illness 
and age8. 
3 .1.4. Individual and group involvement, co-operation and conflict in implementation 
The extension of direct payments, both geographically and in terms of numbers and user groups, 
required the confidence and co-operation of a multiplicity of stakeholders, with potentially 
divergent interests, what Hjern and Porter (1997) called 'implementation structures.' These 
That is notwithstanding the criticism from Tom Shakespeare (1994) that the social model neglects 
important aspects of the experience of being disabled. 
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ranged from the Department of Health to local politicians, from managers to practitioners, from 
council solicitors to accountants and auditors, from large and small voluntary organisations to 
individuals and carers. It potentially involved a shift in the balance of power from both local to 
central government and from those who provide the services to those who use them. 
Despite the slow start (Dept of Health 1998a, Wellard 1999), research indicated that all but one 
of the 171 local authorities in England and Wales would introduce, direct payments before 
being obliged to by a Labour government (Jones 2000). However actual take up continued to 
vary widely across the country, within regions, between client and ethnic groups and individual 
caseloads. Councils were encouraged to 'involve' service users in the planning, development 
and management of local schemes (Dept of Health 2000a). 
Lack of clarity in guidance from central government and apparent inconsistencies within the 
overall policy framework can affect the development of direct payments. In the implementation 
context they leave 'space' for a number of different interests and interest groups to interact, 
negotiate and promote alternative interpretations of contested concepts like participation (Clarke 
2000), care (Morris 1997), inclusion (Lister 1998) and community (Levitas 2000). Jordan 
(1999) argued that the notions of common interests and shared values are contingent upon the 
nature of the collectivity under consideration, from a single household, through a 
neighbourhood to a nation state and the global economy. Levitas (2000) observed that 
communities of interest cut across geographical boundaries and local economies, as well as 
social classes. The actions, experiences and attitudes of'street level bureaucrats' and the 
influence and interaction of interest groups are two of the ways in which central government's 
policy intentions are mediated during the implementation process. 
3.1.5. Interest groups and statutory coherence 
The implementation research literature was reviewed by Sabatier (1986). He concluded that the 
following factors influence the success of policy implementation, each of which may be relevant 
to community care policy implementation. They are causal adequacy (that is whether the theory 
on which the initiative is based predicts the conditions for success); political and interest group 
support; legal powers and constraints; financial resources; official / bureaucratic commitment 
and the social and economic environment. The issue of 'causal adequacy' was discussed earlier 
with reference to the validity and relevance of the assumption s of neo-classical economic 
theory to community care markets and direct payments. 
The growing importance of consultation in policy making during the Thatcher aaministration 
was discussed by Maloney and colleagues (1994). They argued that some interest groups come 
to exercise influence, through sharing political and technical knowledge with civil servants, at 
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the cost of compromising their more radical objectives. Fragmentation within 'the state' means 
parts of the civil service bureaucracy define their goals in terms of satisfying 'group clienteles'. 
The relevant departments have expectations imposed on them that limit their discretion because 
of the 'clientelistic tendencies in the fragmented state' (Maloney and colleagues 1994, 23). 
Maloney's account may shed light on the debate described earlier. This questions whether the 
initial conferring of powers, rather than duties, to local authorities to make direct payments for 
community care represented a victory or a compromise in the struggle of disabled people for the 
right to self determination and a decent lifestyle. The idea of the fragmented state helps explain 
how central government can produce policy initiatives that appear to impose contradictory 
expectations on lower level authorities responsible for implementation. 
A 'statutory coherence' hypothesis was proposed by Meier and Mc Farlane (1996) from their 
policy implementation case study. Coherent statutes, with precise goals, supported by an 
adequate causal theory, with clear administrative responsibilities and implementation rules, 
assigned to committed agencies, are most likely to have their intended impact. They concluded 
that the success of policy implementation is to a large extent a function of how it is 'crafted', 
including the language used in writing legislation. The effect of 'statutory coherence' persisted 
through the 'third stage' of implementation, to the actual policy outcomes. The Blair 
government promised clarity in its objectives and expectations of local authorities in its 
'modernisation' proposals as a way of ensuring their success: 
' Up to now, neither users, carers, the public, nor social services staff and managers 
have had a clear idea of which services are or should be provided this lack of clarity 
of objectives means on the one hand that social services can not be easily held to 
account and on the other hand that they can be blamed for anything that goes 
wrong. .'(Dept. of Health, 1998a, page 2) 
New Labour also promised 'joined up' thinking and action in the drafting (or 'crafting') of 
policy. The impact of community care policy and new public management on social work and 
the potential relevance of the research to the case study is discussed next. 
3.2 Community Care. Social Work and Direct Payments 
'It is a very considerable understatement to talk of the inherent tensions between the 
various social work roles- as agents of the state, counsellors and advocates..' (Brandon 
and Brandon 2002, 49) 
Issues raised by radical changes in organisational arrangements, social work practice and the 
relationships between welfare agencies and users of services may influence the progress of 
direct payments. The changes, began in the implementation of the community care policy of the 
1990s, and continued with the Blair government's modernisation programme for social services 
(Dept. of Health 1998a). 
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'Foremost amongst these changes has been the division between providing and 
purchasing roles, the consequent growth of independent sector providers, the growing 
emphasis upon 'partnership', the changing role of social work as a profession, the 
shifting balance between central and local government, and the emergence of users and 
carers from the role ofpassive recipients' (Hudson 2000,7- 8) 
The development of the role of service user as purchaser through direct payments seemed, from 
a consumerist perspective, a natural progression in the implementation of community care 
policy and the development of care markets. However the transformation of social workers into 
care managers followed a less direct route. Social work was separated from the administration 
of financial assistance for the first time in 1948. The National Assistance Act, in repealing the 
Poor Law, created a national system for the payment of cash benefits to the 'poor' and left the 
provision of welfare services to local authorities. Although most people using the personal 
social services have received social security benefits, this distinction was perceived as 
progressive in detaching social workers' clients from the stigma of the Poor Law. It has been 
used to explain some of the reported reluctance of social workers to embrace their potential role 
in the implementation of direct payments. Glasby and Littlechild (2002, 8) suggest that 'the 
involvement of social workers in making cash payments to disabled people represents a 
fundamental shift in the nature of the profession, turning the clock back fifty years.' However in 
their role in the implementation of charging policies, discussed earlier, social workers have had 
an impact on the disposable resources left available to some social care users since 1948. 
The research discussed earlier suggests that the evolution of the 'mixed economy' from the 
1990s neither enabled nor motivated social workers to develop their market power, to promote 
competition and 'efficiency', as representatives of both the end users and public funders of 
services. One study carried out during the early implementation of community care found that 
practitioners used traditional casework methods to complement their new responsibilities. 
Despite frustrations with increased demands for 'paper work', social workers approached their 
care management duties creatively to promote user choice and advocacy (Hardiker and Barker 
1999). Later studies, however, suggested that the growth of care management undermined the 
social worker's traditional role. The experience of social workers in primary health care teams, 
following the implementation of 'community care', was explored by Hudson and colleagues 
(1997). They found that despite expectations of a clash between the medical/ individual and 
social model, attachment to a general practice allowed practitioners to return to social work 
approaches, based on relationships with individuals and communities, instead of the quick 
turnover, 'client processing' requirements of care management. Four issues that have impacted 
on the nature of social work practice were identified by Postle's (2001) study. They were: the 
introduction of a 'market' in social care; constant policy change leading to unintended 
consequences; restricted resources with associated rationing procedures and the growth of 
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managerialism reducing the role of professional supervision. Practitioners struggled to retain 
elements of what they understood to be 'social work' in their care management practice. 
Increased focus on turnover and 'gate keeping' resources was at the cost of the traditional 'use 
of self in relationship based work, with a 'tick box' approach replacing holistic assessment. 
The introduction of a 'competency based' approach, in social work and training, was discussed 
by Dominelli (1996, 172). This occurred under Conservative governments and, did not happen 
in response to user need or professional aspirations, but rather to an 'ephemeral and 
unaccountable market'. The result was a shift in power from social workers to managers and 
budget holders who have no contact with clients and the reality of their lives. Practitioners and 
service users were excluded from the process of defining the roles and requirements of social 
workers. Holistic approaches to understanding the needs of individuals in their social and 
political context, and relationships between individual workers, clients and their communities 
were undervalued. The government was able to use a technicist, 'competency based' focus to 
establish , '. .forms of intervention which further disempower users whilst clothing their 
activities in the rhetoric of citizenship and empowerment.' (Dominelli 1996, 172). 
For Newman (2001), the dominant line of tension in the Conservative government's attempts to 
control the behaviour of public servants was between managerial forms of power and self-
regulation. The tension has continued as New Labour has attempted to extend control over both 
the outputs and the processes of professional work in the public sector. Newman used the failure 
of Blair's government to engage the teaching profession with its modernisation plans, as one 
example of how New Labour's programme both sought collaboration and threatened coercion. 
From another perspective, McKevitt and Lawton (1996) interviewed middle managers from 
various public services. They found that performance targets imposed centrally did not lead to 
users' needs being met but to officer disenchantment, with ambiguous operational objectives 
creating opportunities for internal politics and goal displacement. Performance measurement 
systems designed by politicians and senior managers, without regard to the realities of 
implementation or the voices of citizens, were being used routinely to demonstrate compliance 
with external stakeholders. McKevitt and Lawton suggested that in the conflict between 
professional and managerial goals in public services, the interests of users may be protected and 
promoted through the alliances of weaker stakeholders. 
The case that New Labour's 'modernisation' programme for public services carried forward the 
process of change initiated by Conservative governments was supported by Hunter (2001, 57): 
'...the government has maintained a greater degree of continuity that its rhetoric would 
suggest. It remains wedded to 'new public management' precepts when it comes to its 
management style.' 
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New Labour emphasised managerialist solutions to social problems, that is 'joined up 
government' and 'what works' pragmatism. Lister (2001) argued that this neglected political 
responses to structural divisions when they were also needed. The Blair government also 
distanced itself from ideological commitments to market devices through the narratives of 
performance management, partnership and participation. 
The values and aims of practitioners and those of the new public management conflicted. 
Newman (2001) suggested that the 'identity- based trust' between staff and their employers 
traditionally based on shared public service values was eroded by the latter. Flynn (1999) 
argued that managerialism replaced the teamwork, leadership and professional support and 
supervision that characterised traditional social work practice. Managers' concern with 
organisational objectives, including budget control and quantifiable performance indicators, 
contrasted with the individual client orientation of practitioners. Procedurally led, rule bound 
practice marginalised professional values and undermined efforts to promote user 
empowerment. New Labour's reliance on the tools of performance management in its 
programme for 'modernising' social services (Dept of Health 1998a) threatened to exacerbate, 
rather than resolve, that conflict between managerial and professional values. 
In an analysis of the relationship between social work and 'third way' social policies, Jordan 
(2000) discussed the nature of the changing demands on social workers during the Thatcher/ 
Major years and their legacy under the Blair administration. 'Tough love' encapsulated New 
Labour's expectations. Social work became increasingly legalistic, procedural and at arms 
length, concerned with rationing resources and controlling risk. Jordan (2000, 9) argued that in 
approaching 'third way' initiatives, social workers faced a 'classical' dilemma that has always 
'haunted' the profession: 
'Should they seek to make third way policies more 'user friendly ' for citizens 
(reformism) or should they try to mobilise resistance to its oppressive features?...In 
practice social work nearly always combines these two elements and is therefore an 
ambiguous, ambivalent activity. ' 
Social workers had key roles in the implementation of direct payments, informing clients of 
their 'rights', applying rationing criteria to their 'needs' and assessing their 'suitability' to 
manage their own care arrangements (Bewley 2000, Evans and Carmichael 2002, S.S.I. 2000). 
Two broad approaches to the exercise power by practitioners, inherent in their roles and 
relationships with disabled people, were distinguished by Barron (2001). 'Professional support' 
focussed on enabling service users to assert their rights and achieve self- determination. In 
contrast 'professional control' emphasised gate-keeping resources and restricting life style 
choices. Examples of the first approach were practitioners who disregarded budget constraints 
to enable clients to achieve the quality of life they desired and who encouraged them to 
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challenge adverse organisational decisions. Examples of the second were a practitioner who cut 
the number of hours of support a user received because they were being used to facilitate social 
outings, and another who prevented a user seeking a partner through a 'personal' column. 
The tensions that characterised the changes in the duties of social workers, with the 
development of care management within community care policy, were brought into sharp focus 
by direct payments. The role of advocate of individual autonomy was combined with the role of 
gatekeeper of needed care and support services. In the 'third way', it is where individual rights 
must be reconciled with social responsibilities or where 'tough love' is expressed through the 
assessment of who is deemed trustworthy to manage their own care. The social worker's efforts 
to reconcile these conflicting pressures in the context of a 'discourse of failure' perpetuated in 
New Labour's plan for modernising social services (Dept. of Health 1998a) could not be simply 
understood as self interest or self- preservation. 
'..as the 'community' became the solution to every problem in the 1980s and 1990s, 
those burdened with the responsibility of turning political rhetoric into the reality of 
services on the ground for those in need- without additional resources- also carried the 
burden of the inevitable ensuing disappointments.' (Langan 2000, 156) 
The motives of another group of practitioners were explored by Taylor- Gooby and colleagues 
(2000). Dentists left the NHS, in response to government attempts to alter the focus of their 
interventions with patients. The study concluded that efforts to motivate professionals to pursue 
government policy objectives must take into account social factors, including professional 
cultures which influence how practitioners perceive their own and their clients' interests. 
"Third way' social policies have features in common with the 'new orthodoxy' of evidence 
based practice in social work according to Jordan (2000). Both represent a 'top down' social 
engineering approach to social intervention based on an instrumental conception of technical 
rationality and utilitarian motivation. Jordan identified a 'counter- movement' of diverse 
elements within the social work practice. The interactionist tradition understands how meaning, 
identity and order are constructed through face-to-face communication and achieved co-
operatively rather then being part of a structure through which individuals follow rules and 
procedures. The emancipatory agenda acknowledges issues of power because to ignore them 
would be to covertly side against the oppressed. 'Anti-oppressive practice' supports individuals 
in challenging the sources and consequences of discrimination. The tradition of community work 
and community development0 pursues the empowerment of the disadvantaged through collective 
action and demands that services are accountable to local people. The newer notion of the 
9 Ascendant in the seventies and now mainly in the work of Bob Holman (1998) 
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'reflexive practitioner' revalues judgement, experience and learning by doing, rather than just 
the rigorous application of research-based knowledge and competence based training. 
Local authorities were among the main centres of resistance to 'Thatcherite ideas and 
institutions' in the 1990s and so were attacked by ministers and villified by the 'Tory press' 
(Jordan 2000, 74). The Blair government's focus on performance management indicated a 
concern that its own policy reforms should not be subverted by those responsible for their 
implementation. The Audit Commission and Social Services Inspectorate's (2001) overview 
revealed that one third of the authorities inspected through the 'Joint Review' process (which 
tests councils' performance against centrally set criteria) had uncertain or poor prospects with 
only eight per cent achieving 'excellence'. Jordan (2000) argued that the modernising 
programme was intended to control the behaviour of both social service staff and service users 
(Dept of Health 1998a) giving resonance to Le Grand's (1997) thesis about the growing distrust 
of the motives of public servants. Therefore despite the official aims of improving training and 
raising standards, under New Labour social work was being deskilled, made more mechanical 
and administrative, with reduced scope for judgement and interpretation. Nevertheless. 'Those 
who give and receive social services obstinately refuse to interpret their work or describe their 
tasks in the way that law, policy and guidance require. '(Jordan 2000, 38) 
The 'forces of conservatism' amongst public service workers (Blair 1999) may prove to have 
been the force of resistance that Blair feared (Taylor- Gooby 2000). 
The change in focus in social work from professional accountability (to the service user) to 
public accountability (to the employer and wider public) was revealed in the accounts of social 
workers reported by Banks (2002). They described a growing concern with assessment of risk 
and associated defensive practices in supervision and recording, together with bureaucratic, 
procedurally led practice. Professionalism was criticised in the 1970s and 80s by politicians and 
academics as concerned with self interested, defensive practices. Aldridge (1996,180) explained 
how professionalism was also rejected by the radical social work movement: 
'For them, to be a professional, as opposed to a trade unionist, was simultaneously to 
perpetuate mystiflcatory and individualistic therapeutic methods of work and the 
controlling functions of state social work.' 
Social work has not enjoyed the recognition or professional status of other qualification based 
occupations. Aldridge (1996) attributed this to its dominance by women, the low status of its 
client group and the residualist stigma from the Poor Law origins of the personal social services. 
She observed that social work was similar to other 'professional' occupations, like general 
practitioner or minister of religion, in requiring a range of technical, bureaucratic and inter 
personal knowledge and skill rather than a distinct cognitive base. The difference was that the 
1 0 see Martyn (2000) 
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social work portfolio was determined by the government of the day, in an environment where 
members of the profession had little influence over policy making. Aldridge suggested that 
social work struggled with and survived Thatcherism but with the focus of practice significantly 
altered from direct work with clients to the organisation of care packages. Nevertheless social 
workers had considerable 'operating space', even within state bureaucracies, because of the 
privacy of the one to one encounter and their steady flow of clients. Attempts to shift the 
framework of analysis from a social to an individual model threatened the long-standing efforts 
of social workers to enable their clients to address the social injustices that they experience as 
personal problems. Roberts (2001, 23) criticised Blair's government's efforts to recruit to the 
profession with the campaign slogan that social work is 'all about people' rather than politics 
and power. New Labour created the General Social Care Council, to regulate training, set 
standards and register practitioners without granting social workers the professional status, 
control over entry and the self-regulatory powers of the professional associations of health 
practitioners. It has therefore been described as lyet another example of centralised control and 
monitoring' (Hudson 2000, 233) 
The implications of the development of community care policy and its impact on social work/ 
'care management' practice and the relevance of contested concepts discussed in the literature is 
explored in this study through the example of direct payments. 
3.3 Conclusions from the Literature and Research Questions 
The policy studies literature and studies of community care implementation support the thesis 
that policy action cannot be understood from only a top down or a bottom up perspective. My 
research explored these theoretical issues and their relevance to the Blair government's 
approach to policy implementation through the example of direct payments. 
The literature suggests that policy 'made' by the party in power in pursuit of its objectives is 
formulated in negotiation with interests and interest groups. The New Labour government was 
determined to 'modernise' public services. It intended to achieve its objectives through a clear 
leadership, characterised by 'joined-up 'thinking, pragmatism and user participation in policy 
implementation and centralised performance management. My first question therefore asked: 
Was central government's approach to policy making clear and coherent within its 
modernisation programme and what were the implications for implementation? 
The literature highlighted the complexity of policy action when implementation responsibilities 
are delegated by one tier of government to another (Hill 1981, Hjern 1982), so I asked : 
What were the implications of central government's approach to achieving its policy 
objectives by delegating responsibility for implementation to local authorities? 
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The work of Pearson (2000) and Priestley (1999) suggested that local authorities have not been 
neutral actors in the policy implementation process. I therefore asked next: 
How did political ideology, interests and alliances shape policy formulation and 
implementation at the local authority level and how were tensions between policy objectives 
reconciled? 
Policy continues to develop through the actions and interactions of actors in the implementation 
process, including front line public servants and the citizens (Lindblom 1959, Scwandt 1997). 
How people carry out their implementation responsibilities is influenced by how they 
understand the policy's objectives and its theoretical and ideological underpinnings, as well as 
their personal interests (Taylor-Gooby 2000). They may deliberately or inadvertently advance or 
subvert progress towards the achievement of central government objectives through their 
contributions to the policy- action process. Research has highlighted the significance of 'street 
level' policy making by practitioners (Lipsky 1980, Wells 1997). The role of public servants in 
assisting or obstructing the policy implementation cause political concern (Blair 1999, 2001b). 
My next question was: 
How did practitioners understand central government policy objectives and what were the 
influences on their actions in policy implementation? 
The Blair government expected that service users and citizens should be 'involved' in the policy 
implementation process (Dept of Health 1998, 2000). I therefore asked: 
What part did service users/citizens play in the policy implementation process and how did 
they understand their participation? 
The 'third way' emphasised on the role of the 'reflexive citizen' taking individual responsibility 
for decisions previously left to politicians and professionals (Giddens 1998, 2000). New Labour 
in government stressed the importance of user choice and control as both a means to and 
outcome of effective policy implementation (Dept. of Health 1998). Because the guidance on 
direct payments also made assumptions about the motivation of service users (Dept of Health 
2000, 2002), I asked: 
Why do some community care service users want to manage their care arrangements through 
direct payments and how does the implementation process assist or obstruct them in realising 
their personal objectives? 
Finally, because the national figures (Dept. o f Health returns 1998 to 2002) showed the 
modest extent and expansion o f the use o f direct payments by community care service 
users, I asked : 
How does a study of the policy- action process help explain the lack of 'success' of this 
initiative in engaging most disabled people in the management of their own care 
arrangements through direct payments? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Methodology 
'The case study approach is appropriate when the researcher wants to : define topics 
broadly and not narrowly; cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of 
study; and rely on multiple not singular sources of evidence.' Yin (1993,11) 
4.0 Introduction 
The case study explored the policy-action process through the example of direct payments. This 
chapter introduces the research approach in general terms and then gives a more detailed 
account of the methods used. The overall approach was informed by the work of Sabatier (1986) 
and Pawson and Tilley (1997). This research illustrated that policy making and implementation 
do not proceed in a single direction just as Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993, 11) asserted. The 
findings are consistent with a generative rather than a successionist model of causation in the 
policy field as promoted by Pawson and Tilley. The metaphor of the policy-action 'chain' is 
therefore used as an alternative to linear or hierarchical symbolism. 
A synthesis of the 'best' features of both 'top down' and 'bottom up' approaches to policy 
implementation research was recommended by Sabatier (1986). The synthesis approach focuses 
on the 1) effects of socio-economic (and other) changes external to the policy network/sub-
system on actors' resources and strategies; 2) attempts by actors to manipulate the legal 
attributes of governmental programmes to achieve their objectives over time; and 3) actors' 
efforts to improve their understanding of the magnitude and factors affecting the problem, as 
well as the impacts of various policy instruments, as they learn from experience. Sabatier's 
synthesis began with the 'bottom uppers' concern with understanding the perspectives and 
strategies of the public and private actors involved with a policy problem. This was combined 
with the 'top downers' interest in the ways in which socio-economic conditions and legal 
instruments constrain behaviour. In terms of the study of policy change the case study fieldwork 
took place over a relatively short period (two years). Sabatier (1986, 39) suggests 'a decade or 
more' is needed to encompass opportunities for policy- oriented learning by the actors involved. 
This issue was addressed in the case study by a consideration of the development of one policy 
initiative (direct payments) within the context of the experience of and opportunities for policy-
oriented learning by, the actors in the implementation of the wider social policy programme 
(community care) over a longer period. 
In designing and implementing this case study I drew on the advice of Pawson and Tilley 
(1997, 71) that realistic investigation needs to be theory rather method driven and therefore that 
the 'programme' studied should not be treated as a 'black box'. In evaluation research this 
means not simply identifying 'what works', but attempting to uncover how a policy initiative 
works. Explanation should take the form of positing some underlying 'mechanism', what it is 
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about an initiative that makes it work. This involves propositions about the interplay between 
structure and agency. Explanation should also include an investigation of how the working of 
such mechanisms are contingent and conditional and only fired in particular local, historical or 
institutional contexts. 
The case study was not an evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular policy initiative in the 
terms of Pawson and Tilley's description of a project that asked how, in what circumstances, 
were specific policy outcomes achieved. It explored the policy making- implementation process 
in action, through the Blair government's approach to achieving policy effectiveness (Dept of 
Health 1998a). It therefore considered how, to what extent and in what circumstances, were the 
ends and means desired by policy makers clear to policy actors and whether the 'means' and 
intermediate objectives of policy implementation were used to indicate and in so doing replaced 
the ultimate 'goals'. In the case of direct payments the inspiration for policy change was an 
earlier evaluation (Zarb and Nadash 1994) that identified positive outcomes of increased user 
satisfaction and cost effectiveness. The ultimate objectives identified by the Blair government 
(Dept of Health 1998a and 2000a) were independence, choice and control for community care 
service users and cost effective use of resources in achieving user priorities. It was therefore an 
investigation or 'evaluation' of the effectiveness policy-action process through a case study. 
4.1 The case study approach 
The research was concerned with the process of implementing a particular initiative within a 
programme of policy change. The extension of direct payments was the key unit of analysis 
embedded within the wider unit of the Labour government's social policy programme. It drew 
on an in depth study of one social services department and the actors, groups and agencies it 
engaged with in implementation. The focus on one authority provided the opportunity to explore 
in depth the complex interactions and interrelationships between actors, organisations and 
events in the policy- action process and how they effect the progress and outcomes of 
implementation. The objective was to include all relevant stakeholders, as Sanderson (2002, 
449) advocated, recognising, their interest in the policy and to understand their perspectives, 
theories of change, arguments and actions in relation to their organisational, institutional and 
social context. 
The issue of generalisation from a case study was addressed by Bryman (1988). He 
recommended using a case that is 'typical' of a certain cluster of characteristics. Direct 
payments were chosen as the case because it had the typical characteristics of both a 'third way' 
initiative within Labour's 'modernisation' of social services and a community care policy. It 
was an example of implementation that involved the use of discretion in decision- making at the 
local political level (enacted initially by 'permissive legislation') and the exercise of judgement 
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by practitioners. It had characteristics typical of public policies discussed in the literature 
reviewed earlier. Direct payments were an initiative that could not be imposed on individual 
citizens, but required their 'active' participation consistent with the 'third way' ideal. 
The issue of the wider relevance of a case study is one of generalisability to theoretical 
propositions rather than to populations or universes. Therefore what is crucial is that the 
experiences of the actors involved are typical of the broad class of phenomena, the complexity 
of social policy implementation. Bryman (1988) suggested that concern about generalisability as 
a 'problem' of case study research is based on a misconception, arising from a tendency to 
approach a case study 'as if it were a sample of one drawn from a universes of such cases 
(90/ Instead within a case study a range of different people and examples are studied, so that 
the approach is not entirely different from the 'survey sample', particularly as samples are often 
drawn from a geographical locality. Within this case study, I interviewed people engaged in a 
variety of activities, many who had experience from a variety of roles, locations, services and 
sectors in the receipt or delivery of community care. Informants reflected on their experiences 
through their roles as both 'expert witnesses' and 'native informants' (Strong and Robinson 
1992). Pawson and Tilley (1997) refine the issue of'generalisability' further, recommending 
that within individual 'cases' attention is given to testing theories about way that 'mechanisms' 
and 'contexts' interact to produce regularities and outcomes. In their examples from crime 
prevention studies, they specify the particular circumstances in which interventions work by 
introducing the appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to the appropriate social and 
cultural conditions (contexts). The aim is therefore specification of what happens to whom in a 
set of given circumstances rather than unconditional or unqualified generalisation. However 
Pawson and Tilley (1997, 150) caution that the social world is in continuous flux and even 
where it may be possible to specify local contextual conditions for mechanisms to be triggered, 
ensuring that those circumstances are stable will often be impossible. 
Because the policy of extending direct payments for community care is the 'unit of analysis', 
the experience of implementation in another area were drawn on to place my observations of 
one social services department in a comparative perspective. Comparison showed how the 
interaction of mechanisms and alternative contexts might produce different or similar results. 
Bryman (1988, 88) described another field study where there was concern that observations 
made in a single location were in some way 'untypical' and therefore limited in their 
contribution to wider theoretical developments. He referred to Skolnicks's study of the police 
through participation observation of officers in one US city ('Westville') was supplemented 
with a shorter study of another police department ('Eastville'), enabling him to place his 
observations of Westville in perspective and to develop a number of contrasts between the two 
forces. Bryman (1988) discussed how comparison with experiences in another area allowed 
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some exploration of the wider relevance of the specific instances explored in depth in one 
historical and geographical context. 
4.1.1. Participant observation, access and the role of the research student 
Participant observation has been described by Lofland (1984, 12) as a process through which an 
investigator establishes a many-sided and relatively long term relationship with a human 
association in its natural setting. Pawson and Tilley (1997, 64) discussed the stratified nature of 
social reality and argued that all human action is embedded within a wider range of social 
processes and in built assumptions about a wider set of rules and social institutions. Participant 
observation offered an opportunity to understand processes operating at the institutional and 
individual levels of analysis. Burgess (1991, 79) suggested that participant observation provides 
an opportunity to collect rich detailed data, to obtain accounts of situations in the language of 
the subjects, to gain access to the concepts used in everyday life and to collect the different 
versions of events that are available. 
My fieldwork was carried out over two years and involved spending an average of two days a 
week observing and talking to actors involved in community care and particularly in the 
planning and introduction of direct payments. It therefore continued for a fairly long time period 
and in a reasonably flexible manner as the literature advocated. This meant that the 'regularities 
and rituals of everyday life' in a social services department could surface in a natural fashion 
(Van Maanen, Dabbs and Faulkner 1982). The multiple methods described were employed 
mainly in my role as 'participant- observer' (Burgess 1991, Johnson 1975). The following 
account of my role as a participant observer illustrates the context in which I used the particular 
research methods. 
To explore the various 'links' or points of interaction at which policy action occurs, I needed 
access to the range of actors involved in the process over a prolonged period, equivalent to the 
time scale prescribed by central government policy directives. I sought to understand the 
implementation context, in particular the political and historical development of community 
care and to have access to the relevant national and local policy documents. I therefore carried 
out my fieldwork as a research student located with one social services department serving one 
community. As well as facilitating access to key actors within the authority, I had the 
opportunity to engage with representatives of other organisations in the public and voluntary 
sector and with individuals who used services. My role included assistance with the introduction 
of direct payments. I provided mformation based on the development of similar schemes in 
other areas and sought advice and guidance both from the National Centre for Independent 
Living, "and with responsible civil servants. 
1 1 funded by the Department of Health to help local authorities with implementation issues 
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I observed meetings, interviewed individuals and talked to groups about their understanding and 
experiences. I also observed and participated in informal conversations relevant to the research 
questions and tested out my understanding of my observations as they were occurring. 
Irrespective of ethical issues discussed below, for practical reasons my role as researcher could 
not be covert. The actors understood that I was 'placed' in the authority to assist with the 
introduction of direct payments through providing information. They were however aware that 
my own research interests were in the policy development and implementation processes, 
phenomena that interested and affected them. 
The literature on participant observation (Bryman 1988, Burgess 1991, Johnson 1975) 
suggested that the point of access to a setting can influence the subjects' perception and 
acceptance of the researcher. Access to the local authority was negotiated between senior 
managers in the social services department and the University of Durham. In exchange for their 
participation in my research, I offered staff lower down the social services hierarchy as well as 
service users a channel of communication. Staff were able to ask me for information, to which 
they did not have easy access, about planning and decision-making processes that impacted on 
their work. They could also express their views and concerns to senior management, without 
identifying themselves individually. Service users, carers and voluntary sector workers were 
also given a 'voice' in decision-making forums where their insights would not otherwise have 
been represented, but I clarified that I could not ensure that it would be listened to. 
I found that my presence seemed to be accepted by workers and service users across the 
authority, unlike the experience of Johnson (1975). His role as a Ph.D. student in a U.S. social 
services agency was regarded initially with suspicion by staff, who feared he was an 
'undercover' investigator following the arrest of a colleague. Public service organisations 
routinely provide training placements for a variety of 'students'. My role as a participant and/or 
an observer across a range of activities and situations was not regarded as exceptional, nor were 
my requests to read policy documents, procedures and reports considered problematic. 
Furthermore my independence from the council and the other local agencies had advantages for 
the collection of the data I sought on personal experience and understanding of policy in action. 
My role offered an opportunity for actors to express their views and reflect on their experiences 
with someone perceived as having some insight and concern, without a vested interest. Robson 
(1999,160) asserted that the case study approach relies on the effectiveness of the 'human 
instrument' rather than the data collection techniques per se and that familiarity with the 
phenomena and setting under study are an advantage for the researcher. He acknowledged that 
such familiarity is not advocated universally. I would argue that familiarity with the 
organisational and policy context and the language and meanings of many of the actors, from 
personal experience of the policy action process within social services departments, enhanced 
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the effectiveness of the human instrument in this study. With regard to my personal 
characteristics, I match the stereotype of the 'typical social worker' identified by Seebohm 
(1968), 'the middle aged, middle class, white woman'. In the local authority I studied seventy 
five percent of the care management staff and more than half the social services team and senior 
managers were white women. Ninety percent of the direct care staff were white women, there 
were no male home care workers for example. I also have a northern accent. Notwithstanding 
my independent status, I am the sort of person people are used to seeing around and talking to. 
4.1.2. Ethical issues 
I followed the BASW code of ethics and BSA guidelines in designing and conducting this 
research and paid attention to the 'ten questionable practices' in social research identified by 
Robson (1999, 33). I found no reason to employ any of these practices or potential benefits to be 
derived from their use. I was aware that working to ethical codes can provide a false sense of 
security and dull the researcher's sensibilities to the issues of research in contexts where power 
is unevenly distributed. I did not need to involve people without their consent, or to deceive 
them about the nature of my research. Instead it was essential to my approach that they 
understood that I was trying to explain the policy implementation process and sought their 
experiences and theories of policy change. However I was conscious that some of the 
experiences described by users, carers and practitioners could be painful and took this into 
consideration. I recognised and respected the contributions of all the informants and tried to 
give them equal weight in my reporting and analysis, irrespective of the particular nature of 
their careers and relationships with welfare and community- care services. May (1997, 61) 
asserts that knowing about the ethical issues is not a sufficient basis on which to conduct 
research. Consistent with his advice, ethical considerations formed part of the research process 
itself and decisions in the design of the case study (described below) were made on that basis. 
4 .2 Stages in the Design of the Case Study 
Robson (1999, 150) advised that case study design is a continuing process through the course of 
the study. A major strength of the approach was that it enabled me to respond flexibly to the 
complexity of the policy-action process, unraveling the policy-action chain as links, breaks and 
tensions became noticeable. The main features of a case study and their presumed relationships 
are covered by the conceptual framework, from which according to Robson (1999) research 
questions are formulated. 
4.2.1 The conceptual framework 
My conceptual framework drew on the general policy studies literature and more focused work 
on New Labour's approach to policy implementation, research into the experience and 
effectiveness of the implementation of community care policy and the history and development 
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of the particular initiative. I identified features and the relationships that were likely to be 
important, bearing in mind that complexity theory (Pawson and Tilley 1997, Sanderson 2002) 
predicts that in a particular set of circumstances or initial conditions the interaction of 
'variables' can have consequences disproportionate to their apparent significance individually. 
The features identified were : the historical context, the background to the development and 
implementation of the initiative nationally and locally and the legacy of the Conservative 
governments' reforms; the policy context: community care policy and the New Labour 
'modernisation' programme for public services; the political context : New Labour's 'third 
way' and the conflict with 'Old Labour interests', the local response and the power struggles 
between decision makers; and the actions and motivation of the various 'stakeholders' in the 
initiative, including their experiences and expectations of policy change, their understanding of 
the particular policy initiative and their values and objectives. 
'The realistic explanation ofprogrammes involves an understanding of their 
mechanisms, contexts and outcomes, and so requires asking questions about the 
reasoning and resources of those involved in the initiative, the social and cultural 
conditions necessary to sustain change and the extent to which one behavioural 
regularity is exchanged for another.' (Pawson and Tilley 1997, 154) 
4.2.2.The research questions 
The research questions are followed by a description in broad terms of how they were 
addressed. A more detailed account of the methods used is then given. 
1. Was the central government's approach to policy making clear and coherent within its 
modernisation programme and what were the implications for implementation? 
2. What were the implications of central government's approach to achieving its policy 
objectives by delegating responsibility for implementation to local authorities? 
The methods used to address these question were: 
Documentary analysis of central government guidance and policy directives. 
Participant observation at conferences and seminars held to discuss and promote the policy 
programme or the particular initiative and conversations with other particpants. 
Semi structured interviews and conversations with actors at the national level contributing to 
the development and communication of policy during the study period :the responsible 
minister, department of health civil servants, a co-director and the information officer of the 
National Centre for Independent Living, (a voluntary organisation developed, run by and 
employing disabled people) and actors at the local level responsible for interpreting and 
implementing the initiative :senior councillors, senior officers, planning , contracts and 
management information staff, social work managers and practitioners. 
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3. How did political ideology, interests and alliances shape policy formulation and 
implementation at the local authority level and how were tensions between policy objectives 
reconciled? 
The methods used to address this question were: 
Documentary analysis of local policies and records of the outcomes of decision 
making processes (committee reports); minutes of meetings and written accounts of 
consultation processes and research reports. 
Semi structured interviews with individual actors involved in the local policy making and 
planning processes : leading councillors, senior officers and policy and planning staff, social 
work managers and practitioners. 
Group discussion with the then controlling Labour group of councillors. 
Participant observation of : meetings of senior managers at which recommendations 
to political decision makers were discussed and agreed; formal and informal meetings between 
those involved in planning the implementation of direct payments 
4. How did practitioners understand central government policy objectives and what were the 
influences on their actions in policy implementation? 
5 What part did service users/ citizens play in the policy implementation process and how did 
they understand their participation? 
The methods used to address these questions were: 
Participant observation of and informal discussions with the actors involved in :the planning 
groups responsible for planning the implementation of the initiative and 
consultation events organised by the social services department 
A survey of practitioners (care managers and care providers) between April and June 2000 
before the planning stage of the implementation process ; 
Semi structured interviews with :key practitioners involved in the implementation of direct 
payments; the first service users and carers to express an interest in the initiative; with citizens 
involved in the planning and implementation processes and with staff employed by local 
voluntary organisations with responsibilities for helping to facilitate citizen participation. 
Group interviews with : community care service users attending a day centre ;practitioners 
from other agencies (housing and health) who have day to day contact with social care service 
users and carers. 
6. Why do some community care service users want to manage their care arrangements through 
direct payments and how does the implementation process assist or obstruct them in realising 
their personal objectives? 
7. How does a study of the policy- action process help explain the lack of 'success' of this 
initiative in engaging most disabled people in the management of their own care arrangements 
through direct payments? 
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The methods used to address these questions were: 
Interviews with :users and carers who expressed an interest in direct payments; 
care management practitioners, management and advocacy staff in voluntary sector 
organisations. 
Group discussions: with sheltered housing wardens and day service users 
4.2.3. The sampling strategy 
Policy programmes, according to Pawson and Tilley (1997, 160), are complex social 
organisations. They argue that understanding them demands that investigators are mindful of 
both micro and macro processes, individual and institutional influences and causal powers 
emanating from both reasoning and resources. Policy initiatives involve a division of labour and 
a division of 'expertise'. Hjern and Porter (1981, 211) suggested that a 'universal' finding in 
studies of policy implementation is that clusters of public and private actors are involved. 
Consistent with the 'realist approach' advocated by Pawson and Tilley (1997, 158) I adopted a 
theory driven strategy. The theories explored were the subject matter of the interviews and the 
informants and survey sample were therefore selected on the basis of their potential ability to 
confirm, falsify or refine the relevant theories. They were initially drawn from the literature, 
discussed in chapters one, two and three. As I collected data on the history of community care 
and personal experiences of policy implementation in each authority I studied, I began to 
develop and test out my own theories about the relationship between 'context' and 'mechanism' 
in each area. The actors identified were involved in the implementation of community care 
policy and the particular initiative, within the context of the Blair government's 'modernisation' 
programme in their public or professional lives actors or as private citizens. They were 
politicians, national interest groups, central government civil servants, councillors, senior 
officers in a local authority social services department, corporate experts, social services 
strategic managers, planning and contracts staff, operational managers, practitioners, 
citizens/service users, staff and members of local voluntary organisations and 'partner' 
agencies. To explore the experiences of and relationships between these groups of actors and 
institutions, I used a 'networking' approach to identifying potential informants and 'witnesses' 
advocated by Sabatier (1986). I located the actors involved in policy action in one local 
authority area and asked them about their goals, strategies, activities and contacts. Their 
contacts helped identify the local, regional and national actors involved in the planning and 
execution of the relevant programme. This was a purposive sample. Actors were selected on the 
basis of their characteristics as potential 'key informants' or 'expert witnesses', their ability to 
understand the overall conceptual structure and to explore its relevance to their own 
understanding and experiences and in so doing contribute to its refinement. 
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Certain individuals were identified on the basis of their relevant individual attributes, 
knowledge and experience. Their roles was sufficiently singular that their views and knowledge 
could not be compared with that of a group of peers; these included the minister, leading figures 
from the department of health nationally and regionally and the co-director of NCIL. Others had 
the status of 'expert witnesses' by virtue of their substantial experience of and a personal 
interest in social policy implementation generally, and of community care in particular. All had 
reflected on their experiences and interests throughout their 'careers' whether as politicians, 
paid workers, volunteers or end users. 
As I carried out my fieldwork within a particular authority, I attempted to interview all the 
actors identified through the local planning processes as contributing to or expressing an 
opinion or interest in the case study initiative. I interviewed all the social services managers and 
planning staff, most care management practitioners and members of the key local voluntary 
organisations. I carried out a series of interviews with the early 'pioneers', service users who 
expressed an interest in direct payments. The interviews were dialogues through which to 
explore their expectations and experiences of direct payments and the other developments in 
community care policy and to develop a shared understanding of their relevance to the 
conceptual framework. These informants selected themselves in that they enquired about direct 
payments and on hearing about my research agreed to meet me. 
The data I sought were personal accounts with explanations placed in the context of experience. 
It was an exercise most people were willing to engage in (with an occasional 'don't quote me' 
proviso, unfortunately). People often distinguished their 'knowledge' from their opinions, and 
the latter by those based on direct experience from those influenced by 'hear say' and the 
accounts of others. They often disclaimed 'expertise' on particular topics under discussion. 
However they were all interested in exploring and developing 'theories' about the meaning, 
impact and implications of the policy reform programme and the particular case of direct 
payments and were not reluctant to challenge what they perceived to be incomplete or erroneous 
explanations 
For the survey (described below), I identified practitioners in the council's own services who 
could be both affected by the introduction of direct payments and affect their impact, through 
their influence on local politicians and service users. I selected my subjects through 'stratified 
purposeful sampling' identifying practitioners from day, domiciliary and community support 
services (the range of the council's social care provision at the time). The domiciliary service 
had the largest staff group, I therefore stratified the sample further, interviewing at least three 
staff from teams working in each of three geographical 'patches' to ensure that they were as 
representative as possible of the total population. 
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I also studied all the national and local policy documents referring to the implementation of the 
particular initiative or the wider policy programme produced during the period of the study. 
4.2.4 Data collection 
A major advantage of the case study approach is its flexibility and responsiveness to the 
circumstances and opportunities as they present themselves (Robson 1999). The choice of 
methods was largely determined by the nature of the subject matter studied and the research 
questions. However practical considerations were important that is the availability and 
accessibility of the respondents. I was able to interview some 'national' figures only once. I 
therefore followed a fairly structured interview guide to ensure that the key points were covered 
before using a more flexible approach to encouraging respondents to explore the issues that 
were most important to them. When I knew the time the subject gave me was limited and could 
not be supplemented by later telephone calls or informal conversations for further information 
and clarification, I taped the interviews and transcribed them in ful l . In contrast when I 
interviewed other actors, whether public servants, voluntary sector representatives or citizens, 
who discussed their personal experiences and expectations in greater depth, I wrote down their 
words verbatim during the interview. This helped me in the management and analysis of the 
masses of data I collected from many hours of interviews. It enabled me to clarify my 
understanding of the meaning of people's language, phrases and overall accounts with them at 
the time. People seemed pleased to share their own 'theories' about policy development and 
implementation. Helping me to record what was agreed kept the discussion of the personal 
impact of policy issues at the level of thought rather than feeling. My understanding of the 
usefulness of contemporaneous note-taking, my awareness of the risks of allowing an 
'investigative' interview to develop into a counselling encounter and my concern about the 
ethics of delving into potentially painful emotions without offering any help in their resolution, 
all owed much to my social work background. 
Cost, time and distance meant I was only able to interview some national actors by telephone. 
However I managed to interview the minister and the Department of Health lead officer in 
person. I also visited all the respondents in the authority I studied for comparative purposes. 
4.2.4.1 Understanding history : written and oral 
I researched the local history of the implementation of 'community care'. This helped develop 
my understanding of the attitudes and expectations of local authority actors when presented with 
'direct payments' for community care as a Conservative government policy initiative and if, and 
in what way, the local response changed as it was adopted and extended by the New Labour 
government. Martin 1999, and May 1997 both describe how the reminiscences of actors 
involved in historical events and processes can help explain their contemporary significance. In 
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Fletcherford I sought to understand the contribution of earlier experiences of policy 
implementation, and the local policy context, to the later actions of people involved in the 
implementation of the initiative. 
In this recently established unitary authority the lack of documented policies and procedures, 
emerged as both a cause and effect of the history and practice of community care, from which 
the new policy programme was to develop. I found that some 'policies' were not written in 
council reports or procedures, but were 'taken for granted' and implemented as remembered by 
actors who had transferred from the previous authority (for example policies on charging and 
resource rationing). I therefore supplemented my reading of written texts, reports et cetera with 
the 'oral history' accounts of actors who had lived through the development of community care. 
These included leading local politicians, the first director of social services, managers, 
practitioners and service users. 
4.2.4.2. Being there and taking part 
May (1997) suggests that fieldwork is a continual process of reflection and alteration of the 
focus of observations and questions in accordance with analytic developments. During the first 
year of my fieldwork I attended all the planning meetings concerned with the introduction of 
direct payments and made notes. My contribution was usually to provide information on what 
other authorities were doing, with what results, and to seek answers to particular questions, 
sometimes by contacting the NCIL, the relevant policy officer at the Department of Health or 
reading policy documents and reports from elsewhere. 
I observed the discussion of direct payments in internal management and team meetings, multi 
agency planning and implementation groups. I attended meetings on issues of wider relevance 
to the development of community care and the impact of the government's programme. I also 
engaged in spontaneous discussions with staff on policy issues, at the time they arose in the 
course of their work. They were therefore willing to explore and theorise about the relevance of 
their experiences to their understanding of the means and ends of social policy. In the open plan 
offices I could overtly listen in to routine conversations between staff, following up my 
observations with questions that sometimes initiated an informal group discussion amongst the 
staff around at the time. In these situations, I relayed my understanding of their accounts to the 
people concerned and this encouraged further reflection and clarification. In the same way, 
following an interview with a leading councillor, I was invited to join him in the members' 
lounge. I initiated an informal discussion with a group of long serving Labour councillors on the 
meaning of the 'third way' and the Blair government's 'modernisation' programme. The 
purpose was to explore how local policy makers understood and drew on these concepts in their 
own decision-making and action. 
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Whyte (1984, 96) proposed that observation guides the researcher to some of the important 
questions we want to ask the respondents and interviewing helps her to interpret the significance 
of what she observes. 
4.2 A.3.Interviews 
The interviews were structured with broad themes relating to the development, communication 
and implementation of community care policy and direct payments. Individuals were also 
invited to describe and reflect on their own experiences. For example the transition from social 
services to independent sector home care was described from a different viewpoint by the 
director of social services, the home care manager and the user representative to the planning 
groups although the factual details were consistent across these accounts (triangulation). These 
'facts' were validated by quantitative information on the changes in the numbers employed in 
home care, the cost to the local authority, the number of users served and the size of individual 
care packages. These events had different meanings to each person. Their interpretation of the 
decisions made and the choices available differed with their own experiences. Along with their 
reflections on the wider significance of the development of the mixed economy in domiciliary 
care, these interviews provided data on the actions, reactions and motivation of key actors and 
their interactions in the policy implementation process. 
The focus of my interest developed over the course of the fieldwork on the basis of insights 
gained from participant observation and earlier interviews, and with ongoing policy 
developments After interviews with most of the informants from within the authority area, 
further discussions were possible as well as single questions for clarification and casual 
conversations. In most of the interviews with 'local' informants I allowed them to take the lead 
in deciding which topics, from my list, they felt were important enough or that they knew 
enough about to talk about in greatest depth. Their preference and the links they made between 
direct payments, community care and policy developments provided further insights in to the 
'layering' of social policies. As with conversations and group discussions, I relayed my 
perceptions of the accounts given, to the informants during the course of the interviews. This 
was a way of both checking my own understanding and providing them with the opportunity for 
further clarification and reflection. Occasionally we would spend a few minutes discussing the 
exact words to represent properly their opinions, explanations and experiences. 
A2.AA.The Survey 
The best source of knowledge of the inner working of a policy programme according to Pawson 
and Tilley (1967,107) are very often the practitioners 'who have seen it all before.' Early in my 
fieldwork I surveyed the opinions and expectations of practitioners whose primary roles were 
either 'care managers' or 'care providers' in the community care arrangements. All had daily 
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contact with the public and their services were delivered through their relationships with 
individuals. This population matched the characteristics of 'street level bureaucrats' as defined 
by Lipsky (1980,3). I used a quantitative approach to data collection because of the number of 
actors involved in each category and the opportunity it provided for statistical analysis. I piloted 
the survey instrument which was in two parts. One was a structured interview schedule with 
'open' questions inviting interviewees to describe, as generally or in as much detail as they 
chose, their understanding of the policy initiative, their expectations and concerns. The second 
was a series of 32 opinion statements to which they gave 'agree', disagree' or 'don't know' 
responses and clarifying comments. The overall structure of the 'opinion' statements marked 
out the area in which the practitioners would make decisions, while revealing what the 
significant choices and preferences might be. Most were drawn from the debates in the literature 
representing alternative perspectives on the meaning, purpose and implications of the particular 
policy initiative, its relevance to the local context and the wider policy programme. Others were 
taken from the conclusions of a consultation that had been held in the authority three years 
earlier, which were presented as reporting the views of local people. The informants usually 
sought clarification and discussed the meaning of the statements, sometimes supplementing or 
offering an alternative interpretation to those provided by the literature. 
The issue of internal validity: the impact of the researcher, the researcher's expectations and the 
wording of interview questions on the responses elicited was discussed by Burgess (1991, 143). 
This suggested that practitioners might be wary of discussing their views and experiences i f they 
felt they could be interpreted as hostile to prevalent service philosophies and professional values 
or revealing ignorance about current social policy. I encouraged them to explore the meaning of 
these concepts in their own experience and reflect on their own practice, and often recording 
their deliberations as qualifying comments, before they responded to the opinion statements. For 
each statement I had illustrative examples that could support a positive or negative response, 
without revealing the respondent to be either ill informed or 'politically incorrect'. 
Furthermore the respondents were aware that the survey was not only for academic purposes. It 
gave them opportunities to express their concerns anonymously, on a range of policy and 
practice issues to senior managers in the hope of informing the decision- making processes in 
the development of direct payments locally. It was therefore not in the respondents' interests to 
be reticent. . Many already held strong views, based on their considerable experience of 
community care and reflections on the issues raised, and were keen to express and illustrate 
them irrespective of any consideration of pleasing or dismaying the interviewer or conforming 
to management, peer or professional expectations. 
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4.2.4.5.The Evaluation 
I concluded a formative 'evaluation' of the direct payment scheme on behalf of the local 
authority by the end of the first year of the implementation period. In May 2002 I presented a 
report to the planning group responsible for the development of the scheme and recommended 
changes that the authority could implement before a forthcoming 'joint review' (by the S.S.I, 
and Audit Commission). Practitioners from the new 'integrated care management' teams were 
interviewed in November and December 2001. The interview schedule included questions about 
practitioners' experiences of direct payments and of the implementation of the Modernising 
Social Services White Paper. 
4.3. Data Analysis 
4.3.1. Triangulation 
The meanings of triangulation are described by Robson 1999 (290). Triangulation was used in 
the ongoing analysis of evidence from different sources and methods to establish the validity of 
the accounts of the actors and my interpretation of their meaning and motivations. 
I considered the perspectives of different actors on particular events and processes (for example 
accounts of the history of community care in Fletcherford). Subjective accounts were 
supplemented with numerical data (statistics showing trends in the respective roles of the public 
and independent sector in domiciliary care with the experiences of the staff and users). I 
compared my own notes taken in meetings with formal minutes (which revealed not only the 
priority given to particular issues and decisions, but also to the respective contributions of 
different participants). I also clarified my understanding of data collected in my observations of 
meetings with informal conversations. 
4.3.2. The survey (quantitative data) 
The possible responses to the opinion statements were pre-coded using a statistical package 
(SPSS) to analyse the results. Differences between the two groups in responses from the 
expected frequencies were tested using the Chi- square test. This was to establish whether any 
apparent differences in the responses of the two groups to the statements (whether they agreed 
or disagreed) were significant at the 5% level of probability. The frequency of responses was 
counted to assess the strength of support for alternative perspectives on and interpretations of 
various aspects of community care policy and expectations of the particular initiative. The 
narrative data elicited by the interview questions was explored and themes were identified. 
Categories of data were coded for the purpose of statistical analysis. The differences in the 
responses of the two groups were again tested for significance and counted the frequency with 
which the themes occurred. 
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4.3.3. Documents 
The content analysis of documents is described by Robson (1999, 272) as an 'unobtrusive 
measure' in that the nature of the document is not affected by the process of enquiry. He advises 
that 'documents' usually have a purpose, have not been structured with the needs of the 
researcher in mind and that the purpose is important in understanding and interpreting the 
results of the analysis. The purposes of the documents I analysed were to explain the objectives 
of particular initiatives (ends), the reasoning underpinning them (theory) and to provide 
instructions for implementation (means). Some documents suggested how policy effectiveness 
would be judged (performance indicators). 
I explored central government policy documents and guidance for coherence with the wider 
policy programme, for instances of lack of clarity and inconsistency in the direction given and 
for use of theoretical language and concepts. Their relevance to the actions and decision making 
of individuals and interest groups was considered. The objectives and imperatives presented by 
central government were identified and compared with the interpretations and priority given by 
the various actors in the implementation process. 
4.3.4. Interviews and group discussions 
Thematic analysis (Robson 1999, Silverman 2000) involves organising interview material in 
relation to specific research questions and to the issues of informants. I word processed my 
transcribed tapes and handwritten notes at the earliest opportunity, gradually developing and 
refining categories to identify the relationship between features of the historical, policy and 
political context and the actions, reactions and understanding of individual actors. I analysed the 
themes identified in terms of their relevance to the conceptual framework and whether they 
confirmed or refuted theoretical propositions. 
I began by familiarising myself by reading and re-reading the data. I 'immersed' myself in the 
data and in order to organise it into categories, classified it on the basis of themes, concepts and 
similarities. The relationships between concepts were identified. Categories were assigned to 
data through increasingly refined coding and related categories to each other from the context in 
which they occurred. Coding categories of data involved identifying bits of meaning and 
breaking up the data in analytically relevant ways. Silverman (2000) described four flows of 
activity in data analysis. The first, data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing 
simplifying abstracting and transforming raw data. My raw data was organised through the 
method of data collection (for example answers to interview questions). The second flow refers 
to 'displaying' data that is assembling it visually to clarify the main direction and missing links 
in the analysis. This was done through the use of matrices and flow charts relating the data to 
wider concepts, linking categories to each other and possible explanations in theory. The first 
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two flows of activity informed further data collection, suggesting themes, issues and apparent 
relationships between variables that needed further exploration. 
When I initially typed up interview notes, I did not have pre-defined categories. I trawled 
through the data exploring for patterns, critical terms and key events. I indexed and organised 
all the data in this way as I collected it. Therefore when returned to the accumulating data and 
eventually explored all the data collected, an initial set of categories existed. Through more 
focused reading of the data I located additional categories and sub categories. Changes to 
existing codes emerged during the ongoing data collection process. Core themes emerged. 
Finally I scanned the data and existing codes for illustrative examples, making comparisons and 
contrasts. Themes linked categories as I became completely familiar with the data, both relating 
to the research questions and emerging from the data. I compared my findings to established 
theories about policy action and individual agency (elaborated in chapters one, two and three), 
to compare themes to key analytical concepts and to look for similarities, differences and 
absences in the data. I reworked relationships between categories and refined and developed 
themes gradually testing out explanations for my findings. 
4.3.5. Observations of planning groups, meetings, and informal discussions 
I took notes making memos in context. As recommended by Silverman (2000), I typed them up 
immediately placing the content in broad categories. I returned to these notes to modify and 
develop the categories as their wider relevance to other data was confirmed. In all these 
situations, key issues and tensions were highlighted. Firmer explanations of the way in which 
decisions were made, conflict between objectives was reconciled and the ends and means of 
policy were re-negotiated by actors as the implementation process gradually developed. 
4.3.6. Drawing conclusions 
The third flow of activity described by Silverman (2000) is drawing conclusions. This involved 
proposing meanings and noting regularities, patterns and explanations. The fourth activity is 
verification, testing provisional conclusions for their plausibility, confirmability and validity. 
This included bringing in data from a second local authority to the analysis to confirm the 
validity of my conclusions. Al l the above data was analysed, noting themes relevant to 
theoretical propositions and relating these to the research questions. I developed my account of 
the complexity of the implementation process, interpreting the themes I identified with 
reference to the theories and research findings reported in the literature and showing how they 
interacted in the case under study in two different local authority contexts. 
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4.4 Discussion 
My research was concerned with evaluating an approach to securing policy success, while 
revealing some aspects of the complexity of the policy process. This contributes to knowledge 
about the limitations of policy evaluation research that attempts to inform action and improve 
policy 'effectiveness' without opening the 'black box' to discover what might work for whom 
and in what circumstances. However my fieldwork used an ethnographic approach to witnessing 
and engaging with the lives of research subjects. The advantage of this was to bring me closer to 
the reality of how formal laws, rules and procedures interact with informal values, norms and 
beliefs to influence behaviour in organisations. My fieldwork in the 'real world' situation of 
those engaged in and affected by policy action provided me with data on how constraints on 
behaviour were mediated through official and unofficial power structures. Explanations were 
sought of the 'real engine for change in social programs' identified by Pawson and Tilley 
(1997, 46). That is the process of differently resourced subjects making choices amongst the 
range of opportunities provided. 
The now classic 'muddling through' explanation of the policy making provided by Lindblom 
(1959) asserted that the means and ends of policy are often chosen simultaneously, during the 
execution process. Therefore Smith and May (1980) suggested that the presence or lack of a 
sequential relationship between means and ends may become more apparent when several 
stages of the implementation process are examined together and overall. Being present during 
the planning and early implementation process enabled me to observe the relationship between 
the policy objectives set and the ways identified for achieving them, how 'means' and 'ends' 
were interchanged in practice and how those involved understood and explained the decisions 
made. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Policy Making. Politicians and People 
1 want to renew faith in politics by being honest about the last 18 years. Some things 
the Conservatives got right. We will not change them. It is where they got things wrong 
that we will make change.' (The Labour Party Manifesto 1997, 1) 
5.0 Introduction 
An account of the process that led to the policy decision to introduce direct payments in the 
northern town of Fletcherford begins the empirical exploration of the 'links and interactions 
between policy interventions, the cumulative impact ofpolicies and the influence of institutional 
regimes' (Sanderson 2000, 439). The process began with the permissive legislation of Major's 
government (Community Care [Direct payments] Act 1996) that empowered councils to make 
direct payments from 1997. It culminated three years later in Fletcherford council's decision to 
use that power in response to the promotion of the initiative by Blair's government (Dept of 
Health, 2000a). From an alternative perspective, this process began with the campaigning 
efforts of disabled people who persuaded some local councils to make 'direct payments' 
through third parties. The 1996 Act responded to the success of these schemes in achieving the 
outcomes of user satisfaction and cost-effectiveness (Zarb and Nadash 1994), by containing 
direct payments within the parameters of community care policy. The attitudes of Fletcherford 
people (politicians, workers in the public and voluntary sector and service users and carers) to 
direct payments are explained within the context of their beliefs about 'community care' and 
their experience of its implementation as a Conservative policy. 
Direct payments, as a Major government initiative, were rejected in 1997 by Fletcherford's 
Labour council, following a consultation with local people. With the endorsement of the Blair 
government, direct payments eventually became part of Fletcherford council's own 
modernisation programme. In this account, the reasons for this change in a local authority's 
policy are revealed as more complex than filial loyalty to the party in government. The 
interactions between 'top-down' (central government) and 'bottom-up' (local staff and service 
users) influences are described. These influences were mediated through the opinions of local 
politicians, their beliefs about the ideological objectives of national policy makers and about the 
expectations and motivation of service users. Public servants played a key role in presenting and 
interpreting the messages from 'above' (the government) and 'below' (the people) to local 
policy makers. 
A description of Fletcherford locates the introduction of direct payments in a historical and 
political context. Because it was a 'new unitary' authority Craig and Manthorpe's (1999) 
research into the impact of local government re-organisation on the work of social services is 
referred to, where it is relevant to policy implementation in Fletcherford. 
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The findings presented in this chapter are based on the following: 
Table 5.1 Data sources and contribution to policy- action process 
Source Contribution Methods and dates 
National 
Central government 
policy documents and 
directives 
Guidance on central government 
policy and implementation 
Documentary Analysis 
Sept. 1999 to Aug. 2002 
John Hutton Health Minister responsible for the 
extension of direct payments 
Interview 
June 2002 
Lead officer (seconded) 
for direct payments . 
Department of health (national) Interview 
April 2001 
Frances Hasler, Co-
director of the National 
Centre for Independent 
Living 
Voluntary organisation funded by 
the Department of health to support 
the development of local direct 
payment schemes 
Interview 
June 2001 
3 senior staff in the 
Department of Health. 
Civil Servants with lead 
responsibilities for developing 
policy and practice guidance 
Telephone discussions 
Feb. 2000, May + June 
2001 
Information staff at the 
N.C.I.L 
See above Telephone discussions 
March, April, June + 
Sept. 2000 
Regional Inspector 
(Performance) 
Department of health/ SSI officer Interview 
April 2001 
Fletcherford 
Policy statements, 
council reports, meeting 
minutes, consultation 
records. 
Reports informing and recording 
outcomes of local decision making 
processes in implementation of 
direct payments 
Documentary Analysis 
Feb. 2000 to May 2002 
Deputy Leader Local politician (Labour group) Interview 
March 2000 
Board member for 
social services 
Local politician (Labour group) Interviews 
April and May 2000 
Former vice chair of 
social services 
Local politician (Labour group) Interviews 
Feb.+ March 2000 
Chair of Scrutiny Local politician (Labour group) Interview 
April 2000 
Labour councillors Local politicians (Labour group) Group discussions 
April 2000 
Senior management 
team social services 
Meetings to discuss reports to 
councillors 
Observation 
Feb. to May 2000 
Management 
Information Team 
Officers responsible for central 
performance monitoring returns 
Group discussions 
April to July 2001 
Former assistant 
director (SSD) 
Led the first consultation on direct 
payments. 
Interview 
October 1999 
Director (SSD) Fletcherford Chief Officer Interviews 
April + Aug. 2000 
Chair of day service 
user group 
Involved in initial consultation on 
direct payments 
Interview 
July 2000 
Day service users Involved in initial consultation Group discussion 
July 2000 
62 practitioners Community care staff Survey 
April to Aug 2000 
Planning, review + 
policy managers 
Social services officers with policy 
implementation responsibilities 
Conversations 
Feb to August 2000 
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5.1 Background. Community Care Policy in Fletcher ford 
Fletcherford is a unitary authority created in 1997 .With a declining population of just over 
90,000, the proportion of older people has been increasing. Less than one per cent was from 
minority ethnic groups. There were relatively high levels of disadvantage, reflected in health 
and social care needs. Fletcherford was a geographically 'isolated' urban area. Fletcherford 
council enjoyed some of the advantages of the change to unitary status identified by Craig and 
Manthorpe (1999), along with the financial pressures associated with lost economies of scale 
and formula based central government funding. Strong popular identification with the town 
meant that people understood which authority served them, without the confusion reported 
elsewhere. The abolition of the county tier reinforced 'natural' boundaries and community 
affiliations. As a smaller authority it had more potential for reducing bureaucracy and improving 
communication and accountability, from and to local councillors. 
Fletcherford had several voluntary groups for disabled people supported by an umbrella 
organisation and a Voluntary Sector Development Agency. These groups were focused on 
representing and supporting their very local membership rather than providing community care 
services. They may have had difficulty broadening their membership beyond rather narrow 
'communities of interest' for representational purposes (Barnes 1999). However these small 
organisations seem not to have experienced the conflict of business and user interests suffered 
by locally 'grown' voluntary/ interest groups identified by Priestley (1999) in the post 1993 
'contract culture'. 
The new authority developed a 'pragmatic approach' to the market for community care. This 
began in its first year of administration. A rebellion within the Labour group of councillors 
appeared to symbolise the tensions between New Labour's policy on the mixed economy and 
the 'Old' Labour commitment to collective provision and the protection of jobs and services, 
found for example in Pearson's (2000) study. Fletcherford council began with a budget deficit 
for social services. Its own residential homes, facing independent sector competition, were 
costly to run. A report to the politicians recommended exploring alternatives to the authority 
continuing to provide residential care. Some Labour councillors argued that action should be 
postponed until the recently appointed commission on the funding of long term care reported 
(Sutherland 1999). They predicted (correctly) that Blair's government would remove the 
perverse funding incentives in the benefit system that disadvantaged public sector provision. A 
minority defied the 'whip', voting against the proposal to consider 'contracting out' residential 
care. The rebels were suspended temporarily from the Labour group. Nevertheless the majority 
ultimately decided that the council should withdraw from the provision of residential services, 
an apparent victory of pragmatism over ideology. 
84 
Other developments in community care provision in Fletcherford reflected trends in policy 
implementation nationally and influenced the expectations of future policy change expressed by 
Fletcherford councillors, service users and practitioners. These included the introduction of 
means tested charges for non-residential services, the reduction in the council's home care 
provision; the expanded role of the independent sector and the gradual dismantling of centre 
based day care. 
5.2 Fletcherford's response to direct payments as a Conservative government policy 
In April 1997 local authorities were given powers, but not duties, to make cash payments for 
community care by the Conservative government12. By November 1998, when the New Labour 
government published the White Paper Modernising Social Services, only 31 councils were 
using those powers to make direct payments and only one thousand people were receiving them 
(Dept of Health 1998a, 2 .14). In 1998 Fletcherford was one of the authorities with no plans to 
introduce direct payments, and would be one of the last nine English councils to do so. 
5.2.1. The 1997 consultation 
In the summer of 1997, policy and planning staff in Fletcherford social services embarked on a 
consultation exercise to explore local interest in direct payments. My fieldwork began with a 
review of the data collected and the conclusions drawn from this consultation, as reported to the 
social services committee. Officers and users who had participated and five councillors to whom 
the director of social services had reported were interviewed. The former Assistant Director who 
had led the consultation and a planning officer who had been involved provided accounts. 
Operational staff who had been in post in 1997, but were not consulted, were also interviewed. 
I reviewed a list of forty local voluntary groups that had been sent a questionnaire, seeking their 
opinions on direct payments, and thirty-one completed questionnaires. Seven basic questions 
were asked with a possibility of a "yes", "no" or "not sure" response. There was no evidence 
that supporting information had been provided and so it was unclear how informed the opinions 
expressed were by knowledge about direct payments. The questionnaires did not ascertain 
whether the respondents needed or used community care services, or whether they sought the 
views of the membership of their respective organisations. Fifteen of the respondents indicated 
that they did not think that direct payments were a good idea. Because of the 'tick box' nature of 
the questionnaire, there was no room designated for comments. Nevertheless seven of the 
'negative' respondents added that they agreed with the principle of direct payments i f support 
was available, although they would not personally use them. 
1 2 The Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996 
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Alongside this small survey, there were notes of two consultation meetings. One took place at a 
day centre for people with physical disabilities, attended mainly by people too old to meet the 
original age criteria for direct payments13. Only ten service users attended, from a potential 
population of over eighty . The notes taken suggest that the users expressed concern about the 
responsibilities involved in direct payments and were also keen to inform senior social service 
managers how much they valued the day centre. My later discussions, with eight of the people 
consulted at this meeting, revealed that they had perceived direct payments as a potential threat 
to the day centre. This was because other council run centres were either closing or changing 
their function. Users suspected that senior officers 'from the civic centre' were trying to 
promote direct payments as a way of breaking down the collective nature of existing provision 
and to undermine the strength of potential resistance from users united as a group. 
The users involved told me how, following the meeting, they approached the staff and asked i f 
they would be willing to form a co-operative to take over the centre i f the council decided to 
close it. The users' idea was that they could then pool their direct payments to fund the service: 
7 would continue to come here [day centre] if I got direct payments.. So this could be 
run as a co-operative. At the consultation meeting we expressed very strongly the 
importance of the social aspect along with welfare to work. For me, coming here means 
I am contributing, helping to organise events... ' Chair of the day centre users' 
committee 
However the day centre staff told me that they declined this proposal from users, preferring to 
await the outcome of a service review before making any commitment to change. They were 
reluctant to jeopardise their rights to severance payments based on continuous service with the 
council 
The findings of the consultation with day service users were summarised as follows: 
'Consensus that system onerous and recipients' responsibilities a burden. Likely to 
appeal to those who are dissatisfied with mainstream social services.' (Report of 
Director to Social Services committee, October 1997) 
There were notes of a second forum attended by parents of disabled children, who were not 
eligible for direct payments under the original criteria. These parents took the opportunity to 
raise their concerns about the lack of a day service for younger disabled people in Fletcherford. 
The results were summarised thus: 
'Consensus that Direct Payments would only be applicable for a very small number of 
people in Fletcherford. Not appropriate for most of group members' dependents.' 
(Notes of the consultation meeting) 
1 3 18 to 65 years 
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The assistant director who chaired these meetings suggested that the discussion reflected the 
'paternalistic culture' in Fletcherford. He reasoned that people trusted the authority to arrange 
their care and were concerned to protect traditional services. However the planning officer's 
impression was that the councillors did not want direct payments and that as officers they were 
just 'going through the motions'. In her view 'the members did not want it and we did not want 
it, so we decided to keep it low key'. That is they did not attempt to raise general awareness of 
the possibility of direct payments. 
In October 1997 the outcome of the consultation was reported to councillors. The report stressed 
lack of interest amongst service users and their concern about the 'onerous' responsibilities of 
managing direct payments. The recommendation, that the matter should be shelved to be 
reconsidered in 1998 the light of national developments, was accepted. Two leading councillors 
remembered that when they were advised that nobody wanted direct payments this had 
confirmed their expectations. One felt that people would be deterred by the paperwork involved; 
the other feared that there would be opportunities for abuse and misuse of the money. They both 
worried about the potential effect on in- house 'home care' provision, because direct payments 
could not be used to buy council services. This concern about the threat of 'back door 
privatisation', expressed by 'Old Labour' councillors, was to re-emerge when the issue of direct 
payments was raised again in New Labour policy documents (Dept of Health 1998a, 2000a). 
5.2.2 Comments on the 1997 consultation 
The consultation was carried out by planning staff. They had no background in social work, or 
direct contact with users of community care services. Operational managers were made aware of 
the new legislation and that a consultation was taking place, but were not involved. One 
fieldwork manager confided that he felt that operational staff had breathed a 'sigh of relief at 
the decision to postpone action on direct payments, because of their uncertainty about the 
impact on their work of an initiative being considered without their input. 
Almost half the responses to the postal questionnaire were positive, which i f taken as an 
indicator of potential take up would have been high relative to the national picture. However 
there was no indication that the respondents to the postal survey were representative of the 
eligible population. Both consultation meetings were targeted on groups where the majority 
would not be eligible for direct payments under prevailing rules. Those community care users 
who were consulted used the exercise primarily as an opportunity to express their satisfaction 
with existing provision to senior managers, believing they were protecting jobs as well as the 
centre-based service. 
A more relevant indicator of potential demand for direct payments locally would have been use 
of the Independent Living Fund, the trust established by the Government in 1988 to make direct 
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payments for care to disabled people. Take up levels for direct payments from the I.L.F. in 
Fletcherford were significantly higher than the national average. For the original 'Extension 
Fund' it was 19.1 per hundred thousand population compared to 11.5 average for England 
between 1988 and 1993. For the '1993 Fund' it was 15.7 per hundred thousand population 
compared to the 10.9 average, between 1993 and 1998. There was therefore no reason to 
presume that Fletcherford people would not be interested in direct payments from social 
services. Community care practitioners were aware that the Independent Living Fund was 
already making direct payments to local disabled people. However they were not consulted, 
despite their regular contact with users. One social worker reported that she had received 
requests for direct payments since 1997. She had repeatedly informed managers about this 
interest but had been told that there were no plans to introduce direct payments. Only four of the 
62 practitioners I interviewed were aware that this consultation had taken place. 
Analysis of the documentary evidence (the data collected and official reports of the outcome), 
along with discussions with social service staff, suggests that the 1997 consultation was a token 
exercise. It was undertaken by planning officers, who expected political and managerial 
resistance to the initiative and so made minimal efforts to establish whether there would be any 
local demand. Nevertheless the council solicitor who was aware of the consultation, felt able to 
say, when the direct payments issue was raised again in 2000, that local people had "rejected" 
the option. Councillors had been relieved to learn that local people were not interested in the 
latest Conservative government community care initiative. Service users who were aware that a 
consultation had taken place were similarly convinced; 'To be fair they did a consultation and 
got a luke warm reception so yon can't blame the local authority.. ' (User representative to 
direct payments planning group). The result of the 'low key' approach to consultation taken in 
1997, was to reinforce the impression that direct payments were a marginal issue in 
Fletcherford. 
5.2.3. Discussion 
Councillors seem to have accepted the conclusions of the consultation report because it fitted 
their preconceptions about the views of users. Officers presumed the Labour council would not 
support this Conservative government initiative, so they carried out a very modest consultation 
(largely consulting people who seemed unlikely to be affected) and reported what they 
perceived would be the preferred outcome. 
Councillors expressed three objections to direct payments as a policy initiative introduced by 
the Conservative government. The first concern was that service users generally would be 
deterred by the prospect of keeping records. This could be explained by what has been described 
in the literature as the 'care discourse', which understands disabled people as dependent and 
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unable or unwilling to manage their own affairs (Morris 1997, Oliver 1991, Priestley 1999). The 
second concern about the risks of abuse could be associated with what Pearson (2000) described 
as a 'market discourse' and 'scroungerphobia' which she found prevailed in a Conservative led 
council during the implementation of direct payments. The third issue raised by councillors was 
the potential impact of direct payments on the demand for m-house home care provision. This is 
relevant to Pearson's analysis of the 'social justice discourse' prevailing in the 'Old Labour' 
authority she studied, where direct payments were not available when they appeared to threaten 
council jobs and services. The views expressed by the local politicians can also be explained by 
the 'knights, knaves and pawns' theories of human agency in welfare services discussed by Le 
Grand (1997). Some councillors perceived community care users as passive 'pawns', 
vulnerable to exploitation by dishonest 'knaves' in the social care market place and so in need 
of the continuing protection of the honourable 'knights' in public services. 
The people who attended the consultation meetings in 1997, overtly opposed the idea of direct 
payments, as it was presented to them as an 'individualist' service model that threatened the 
collective provision of day services. However some users perceived their potential as a means of 
defending a collective service, i f their use was based on co-operation between day centre users 
and staff. Rather than pursuing the option of direct payments as a consumerist strategy that 
would give them purchasing power to arrange individual care packages through the community 
care market, they appear to have taken the initiative as the 'reflexive citizens' of Giddens (1998, 
2000) thesis. They sought to challenge the council's power to close their day centre, with their 
own judgement as to the appropriateness of the service to their needs. They approached centre 
staff with a proposal to use direct payments to secure the future funding of the service. It was 
the staffs preference for remaining in local authority employment that deterred them from 
pursuing this proposal further. 
5.3 New Labour and Direct Payments 
5.3.1 From the top, down? Central government's approach 
The Labour government presented its plans for 'Modernising Social Services' (Dept.of Health 
1998a, 2.14 to 2.17), late in its second year of office. The White Paper expressed the 
government's support for direct payments and its determination to ensure their expansion. Cash 
for care was no longer just a Conservative policy associated with the ideological, rather than 
pragmatic, use of the market and imposed economies in public services. 
John Hutton, the minister with responsibilities for direct payments between 1998 and 2001, 
explained why the New Labour government adopted this policy initiative of the Conservative 
government: 
89 
It looked to be an effective way of transferring power and responsibility to people who 
needed to use social services.... I think the basic structure of direct payments and the 
way they operate looked much more in tune with modern society than the 'take it or 
leave it' monopoly, monolithic nature of much publicly provided social services. It puts 
the boot onto the other foot. ' (John Hutton, in interview June 2002) 
Hutton explained that his own primary objective was to ensure that disabled people enjoyed an 
improvement in the quality of service. 
'What matters to me is the quality of service they get. I am fundamentally not interested 
in preserving bureaucracies and organisational structures.' (June 2002) 
The minister did not regard direct payments as a way of saving public money through reducing 
the pay and working conditions of care staff. However he recognised that unions might be 
concerned about the implications of people moving from public sector employment to work for 
private individuals. 
I am not about to engineer things so that terms and conditions of support workers go 
through the floor, and people get ripped off and so on... 
but at the end of the day it is the needs of the disabled person that must always come out 
on top, not the needs of any organisation, trade union or vested interest of any sort. It 
has to be the needs of the person themselves.' (June 2002) 
The minister also acknowledged the influence of disabled people on the development of his own 
views on direct payments: 
7 think the disability movement itself is going to be a very important advocate for 
change here. I was always struck by how strongly in support of direct payments 
disabled people are. That is where a lot of the drive will come from for more progress. I 
hope governments will continue to listen to those concerns and to act upon them.' (June 
2002) 
Frances Hasler co-director of the National Centre for Independent Living described how the 
government had provided funding for this organisation run by disabled people to support local 
user groups and councils in developing direct payment schemes across the country. Her 
perception of the minister's attitude to direct payments, and his approach to consulting disabled 
people, supported his own account: 
'John Hutton is very for direct payments and enthusiastic. He is convinced by the 
arguments.... He is interested in what we had to say, genuinely sees it as part of 
modernising and getting away from monolithic local authority provision. ', (Frances 
Hasler in interview June 2001) 
However not even the views of disabled people had yet convinced the minister that the choice of 
a direct payment should be extended to health care. Equality took priority over individuality. 
7 know some, many people in the disability movement like the idea of direct payments 
coming over to health services, of being able to shop around... I think there are 
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different issues with health, I think we need to be quite careful about that. We have to 
treat everyone equally first.' (John Hutton, in interview June 2002) 
The Labour government's first proposals for extending direct payments, were heralded in draft 
in September 1999 and effective from February 200014. The guidance continued to exclude 
powers to make direct payments for health care. When this led to requests for clarification from 
care managers responding to requests for direct payments for people with both health and social 
care needs, a department of health civil servant explained : 
'The ministers were asked it they wanted to allow pooling funds for health and social 
care to be used as direct payments. They did not want that, they thought it would be the 
"thin end of the wedge ". The issue from my point of view is not charging for health 
care. It is the principle of the collective versus the individual and equity in the National 
Health Service. Ministers were concerned about NHS money going into an individual 
and private relationship..., outside of the NHS. I think in a year's time it may change.' 
(Civil servant Dept. of Health 'health care group' June 2001) 
The new guidance announced the extension of the eligibility criteria for direct payments to 
almost all adults with assessed needs for social care services.15 It confirmed the government's 
intention to ensure that this option was extended nationally. Local authorities were obliged to 
assess individual applications for direct payments. They could no longer refuse requests on the 
grounds that they did not 'do' direct payments, whether or not they actually ran a 'scheme'. By 
the time new guidance was issued, 80% of local authorities said that they intended to introduce 
direct payments (JRF 2000). Councils without plans to implement the initiative appeared to be 
considering the implications of New Labour's approach. This was in response to the perceived 
pressure from government and the bolstered role of the Social Services Inspectorate in 
monitoring performance against government objectives: 
'Government gradually became firmer in terms of its expectations ... exhortation by 
ministers and asking us to lean on them.' (Social Services Inspector, in interview, April 
2001) 
In 2001 The Carers and Disabled Children's Act extended the powers of councils to make direct 
payments to carers and to the parents of disabled children. The Health and Social Care Act 
2001, effective from April 2002, consolidated existing legislation16, extended eligibility further 
and made the provision of direct payments mandatory. Direct payments were included in the 
central performance assessment framework from the autumn of 1999, as one of the measures 
through which the Department of Health Social Services Inspectorate reported on the 
14 Community Care (Direct Payments) Act Policy and Practice Guidance, 
1 5 Who are willing and able 'with assistance' to make their own care arrangements. 
1 6 The same statute developed the themes of the 1998 White Papers and the 1999 Health Act, promoting 
effective partnerships between health and local authorities, removing legal obstacles to joint working and 
demanding that citizens enjoy fair access to 'seamless' health and social care. 
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achievements of individual councils (Referrals, Assessment and Packages of Care Returns). 
However councils were left with the power to decide eligibility in individual cases and whether, 
and how, they would provide support for people receiving direct payments. 
Early in 2001 an officer from a London borough, with experience of direct payments, was 
seconded to the Department of Health to assist the civil servant head of the Social Care Group 
in promoting implementation. To that end, they both travelled North to run seminars for local 
authorities in March 2001. The mere offer of this extra 'help' from the Department of Health 
appeared to have the desired effect: 
' North East and North West regions [were targeted] only. This was purely on take up 
and the number of local authorities without schemes. In the North East more councils 
were saying they had not yet got schemes up and running than North West. By the time 
of the events, none were still saying that they were not intending to do it.'' (Dept of 
Health lead on direct payments) 
The Department of Health continued to fund the National Centre for Independent Living to 
assist both councils and local support services in developing and extending the use of direct 
payments: 
'As pioneers we were being asked to support others. We already had a design for a 
National Centre for Independent Living, then we had a member on the technical 
advisory group. We asked the Department of Health to fund the work.... They wanted to 
support local authorities, NCIL wanted to support the disabled people's movement. Our 
role in a broad sense is to support Independent Living, specifically to provide support, 
consultancy and training' (Co-director of NCIL, in interview June 2001) 
Alongside other disabled people's organisations, NCIL was invited to help in the development 
of guidance material. 
' We tried with the new guidance, with the wording, to make it easier for people to get 
direct payments, we consulted with users' groups' (John Hutton, June 2002) 
5.3.2. Discussion 
The minister used third way 'modernising' language to explain his government's promotion of 
direct payments. He endorsed the objectives of both empowerment and choice through 
competition (in his rejection of 'monopoly' in service provision). He acknowledged social 
justice issues in insisting that the government's intention in promoting direct payments was not 
to undermine the pay or conditions of care staff. Nevertheless, the minister prioritised the rights 
of disabled people before the interests of public services and staff, which showed a preference 
for the 'individual' over the 'collective' in the social care field. However he would not accept an 
individualist model in health services. Instead social justice considerations, ensuring equality in 
access and treatment, came before the choices and empowerment of individuals. That was 
despite the minister's own declared commitment to heeding the wishes of disabled people and 
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the efforts made by the national government to collaborate with the independent living 
movement in the development of the initiative. 
5.3.3 Direct payments in Fletcherford under New Labour 
The chair of the Fletcherford day service user group explained how community care policy had 
been regarded suspiciously by local disabled people before the Blair government endorsed it: 
'For the Conservative government, community care was a way of privatising health and 
controlling the costs of social care through pushing them back to local government. The 
split [between health and social care] is political rather than practical. A Utopian ideal 
of independent living would have worked if they had given enough support. But under 
Tories the move from hospital/ health to community/social care was about cutting 
costs.' (Interview December 2000) 
The issue of direct payments was not brought back to the social services committee in the 
summer of 1998, as recommended in the 1997 report to councillors. However it re-emerged 
following the publication of the White Paper (Dept of Health 1998a). By early 1999 senior 
managers in Fletcherford social services were considering how they should resurrect the issue of 
direct payments and had begun discussions with the Centre for Applied Social Studies at 
Durham University about commissioning independent assistance with implementation. There 
were changes in key personnel in the division responsible for planning. A new assistant director 
was recruited from the Department of Health and was particularly interested in policy 
implementation and the council's performance in achieving centrally set objectives. A new 
planning manager came with experience of and a particular interest in direct payments and user 
involvement. 
Under New Labour councils in the North were expected to co-operate: 
'In1999 my colleague did an inspection of services ...in a neighbouring town. They 
were not doing anything on direct payments. We got heavy with them, told them to 
introduce direct payments as part of a strategy for empowerment. By Autumn 20001 
monitored and found that 17 people had approached asking for direct payments. So that 
showed there is an appetite for direct payments in this area, any differences were down 
to politicians and managers.'' (Social Services Inspector, in interview, April 2001) 
Fletcherford social services also found that there was renewed interest from the SSI inspector: 
7 saw the director of Fletcherford and said it was not acceptable. Other areas were not 
moving fast but were trying. I had to be more influential than the legal department, 
empowering him to go to committee My criticism was in support of the director. 
Before then there was not the will power.' (April 2001) 
The SSI inspector said that central government was trying to secure commitment to its 
objectives through the monitoring of performance against objectives. He believed that the fear 
of publicising poor 'results' had more effect on behaviour of local authorities than the threat of 
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the secretary of state removing the powers of under achieving authorities to continue to run their 
own services, 
'The Health and Social Care Bill, gives secretary of state powers to step in. But the role 
of secretary of state is not as powerful as it seems... It would be very difficult in 
practice to divest a council of its powers. ' (April 2001) 
When direct payments were raised again with councillors in Fletcherford, they were rejected but 
a detailed report was requested. There was some debate between the assistant director, the 
strategic manager and the planning manager about how local politicians should be persuaded to 
agree to the introduction of direct payments. The senior officers prepared arguments to convince 
Labour politicians of the merits of the initiative. The strategic manager offered the position that 
that this was no longer a Conservative policy, 'not back door privatisation'. The assistant 
director argued that it was something the authority would ultimately be compelled to do and that 
it was already under pressure from the SSI. The planning manager preferred to stress that direct 
payments were a policy initiative with roots in the disabled peoples' rights movement. 
(Observation of discussion, March 2000) 
The director presented the report to the council and attempted to "sell" direct payments with the 
assurance that their impact would be marginal, 'I told them only ten mental health service users 
in the country are actually getting direct payments' (Interview, April 2000). There was no 
further consultation with local people. Nevertheless a minority of Labour councillors continued 
to oppose the initiative. Within the Labour group, they argued that direct payments represented 
a step towards the local authority relinquishing its responsibilities to make collective provision 
for those in need of care and support. One councillor described it as the 'thin end of the wedge' 
(March 2000). The opponents, who were ultimately outvoted, explained their reasons in 
interviews (April 2000). The deputy board member for social services likened it to the 'Tory 
idea of nursery vouchers'. The chair of the scrutiny committee voiced concerns about the 
'ideology of consumerism' and 'the second class status of social service clients' in the social 
care market. He foresaw that people receiving direct payments would not feel empowered 
because they would not be free to spend their care budgets as they wished. They would 
therefore feel stigmatised by social services budget limits, charges and monitoring procedures, 
unlike people who could afford pay for their own care without undergoing a means test or 
accounting to the council for spending decisions. Another councillor argued that the 
introduction of direct payments was intended to undermine public services, particularly home 
care, because users could only use their spending power in the independent sector. He drew a 
parallel with the introduction of the 'mixed economy' with the implementation of community 
care policy in 1993, when councils were obliged by the Conservative government to spend 85% 
of their community care budgets in the independent sector. 
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I led a discussion with a group of leading Labour councillors on the topic of New Labour's 
plans for 'modernising' public services (April 2000). Most said that they already accepted that 
the requirement that councils test their spending for 'best value' (DETR 1998) would lead to a 
major rationalisation of in-house home care. Private sector agencies would take over most 
general work. They argued that the council would be powerless to resist this because of 
financial problems inherited when Fletcherford became a unitary authority. Just as when they 
had made the decision to 'externalise' residential care services, the majority of the Labour group 
took a pragmatic approach to the market. They accepted that securing the amount of provision 
required through the private sector would be achieved at the expense of the quality of service 
experienced by users. None expressed any doubt that council 'home care' staff were better paid, 
trained, vetted and managed and provided higher quality services than their private sector 
competitors. Al l the Labour councillors interviewed asserted that social care service users, i f 
given the choice, would prefer to continue to receive the council's own home care provision. 
However, all but three, felt that this would not be an option the authority could continue to offer. 
That was because the pay rates and conditions of service enjoyed by council workers were 
above national minimum levels and so would make private sector domiciliary care cheaper and 
appear to be the 'best value'. They presented anecdotal evidence of the poor quality of services 
provided by private sector agencies and of the dissatisfaction expressed by people they 
represented. They believed that the government's 'modernising' initiatives prevented them from 
terminating contracts with private sector agencies on the grounds of quality considerations. 
One leading member, who said he supported the principles of user participation in decision-
making and individual empowerment, nevertheless opposed the introduction of direct payments. 
He explained that this was because he did not think these objectives would be achieved within 
the constraints of the central government's rules and criteria for direct payments. He was also 
sceptical about professionally managed consultation and planning exercises genuinely 
informing and empowering people. An initiative imposed by central government and 
implemented by professionals was not likely to engage and enthuse local people. 
7'm worried about element of tokenism and 'voodo professionalism', the use of 
professionalism to hide the truth and bamboozle. .. People learn and grow through 
participation. There is capacity within people, with encouragement, to become 
community leaders and service developers within their communities'. 
(Scrutiny Committee Chair, in interview, April 2000). 
The majority of Labour councillors were in favour of the introduction of direct payments by 
2000. They justified this initiative as a way of 'compensating' users dissatisfied with poor 
quality independent sector services. They felt that money would give users the option of 
rejecting private agencies and employing staff of their choice instead. Nevertheless the belief 
that people would not want the extra work involved in keeping records and worries about abuse 
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and misuse persisted. Opposition continued from key figures in the Labour group. Their 
concerns were expressed at interview, as the need to balance the two imperatives of 
empowering users while protecting collective provision. Morality and motivation in a social 
care market continued to be their main concerns rather than individual empowerment, although 
they recognised the lack of choice and control experienced by users identified by their fellow 
councillors. Despite the misgivings of the minority of Labour members, there was ultimately no 
open rebellion. In April 2000 the council accepted the recommendations of the Director of 
Social Services that the development of a direct payments scheme for Fletcherford should be 
delegated to planning groups involving a range of potential users. 
In the election of May 2000 no political party won overall control and, til l 2002, policy 
implementation continued through the decisions of a 'hung' council. Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives formed a coalition. The director of social services' view was: 
'They have been naive, they have no policies, they did not think they were going to win. 
They will Just go with the existing strategy. I think pragmatism will rule, I am not aware 
of any deep malaise at the political level. They will all work well with officers' (May 
2000) 
He lamented the move to cabinet style executive that meant that only three councillors remained 
involved with policy decisions in social services, one from each of the three major parties: 
'The down side of Modernising Local Government is the loss of committees, now only a 
handful of members know anything about social services and they lack of awareness of 
the modernisation agenda, it is not how it was with community care.' 
5.3.4. Discussion 
The issue of direct payments was resurrected in Fletcherford after the Blair government 
promised to extend their availability (Dept. of Health 1998a). This 'top down' pressure 
coincided with the appointment of individuals with interests in the implementation of this 
initiative to key posts in Fletcherford. Officers anticipated and addressed councillors' continuing 
ideological objections. The language of the mixed economy was avoided in reports to members 
(competition, choice, care market, potential for cutting costs) although these concepts were 
regularly used in discussions amongst senior managers. References were frequently made in 
informal conversations amongst officers to the pressures of reconciling central performance 
objectives, political allegiances and users' attachment to collective provision and values. 
Councillors were also encouraged to expect that there would be little interest in direct payments 
locally. In 1997 consultation appeared to have been used to justify inaction. In 2000 the decision 
was made to introduce direct payments and demonstrate commitment to a New Labour 
initiative, without further attempts to establish opinions or potential interest amongst local 
community care users. 
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Direct payments were sold to the Labour council in Fletcherford as a 'New Labour' initiative 
with a history predating Tory policy, and roots in the disability rights' movement. Despite the 
continuing commitment to both collectivist values and municipal paternalism amongst Labour 
councillors, direct payments were accepted as a pragmatic necessity. Councillors also saw them 
as a way of giving social care users, denied high quality public services, the opportunity to 
arrange their own care rather than relying on private sector providers motivated to pursue profit 
rather than social justice. For local politicians the pragmatic use of the market in community 
care advocated by New Labour (Dept. of Health 1998a) did not mean what worked for users but 
what was affordable for the public. Rather than supporting New Labour policy objectives, they 
felt unable to resist them. As public purchasers (agents) these councillors believed they were 
obliged to decide on the basis of price. This exposed the weaknesses of the market as a 
mechanism for efficient resource allocation in social care. Politicians were aware that private 
sector domiciliary care was not meeting user need to a satisfactory standard. However the 
interests of the agents /public funders took priority over the interests of the principals/ end-
users. 
One leading Labour councillor, who continued to oppose the introduction of direct payments, 
advocated an alternative model of empowerment, through collective activity rather than 
individual choice and consultation. He argued that the government's approach was not likely to 
achieve wider objectives of empowerment and that users do not have sufficient knowledge to 
exercise real choice and control. This seasoned politician's analysis of alternative approaches to 
involving and empowering users was based on his own experience of policy implementation. It 
seemed similar to the distinction drawn by Beresford and Croft (1993) between consumerist and 
democratic models of participation. 
The conviction that there would be little local interest and the impact would be insignificant was 
reinforced by discussions between councillors and officers. It appeared to be a 'self fulfilling 
prophecy', implying that there was no need to make a major resource commitment to either 
promoting the scheme or to funding a support service. A poorly funded scheme would not have 
enough resources to generate demand or the capacity to support large numbers of people. 
When the local election of May 2000 returned a 'hung council' in Fletcherford, 
the director of social services predicted that inexperience and lack of policies in the ruling 
coalition would mean that the real decision making power would pass to senior officers. This 
seems to have heralded the end of the influence of 'party politics' on policy development for a 
while and removed the potential for either obstruction or strong support at the political level in 
the implementation of direct payments. 
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The user representative supported community -care for disabled people as an 'idealistically 
correct' policy. However he believed that its potential had not been achieved during the Major 
administration because that government's aim to reduce spending through public services had 
meant implementation was inadequately funded. In his view the distinction between health and 
social care was a social construct, used by Conservative governments to legitimate cuts in 
public spending. His support for the extension of direct payments as a New Labour policy 
initiative however was unequivocal. 
5.3.5. Room at the bottom? Central Government's approach 
The Blair government gave direct payments its increasingly firm endorsement, from the first 
promise to extend eligibility and take up in the White Paper (Dept of Health 1998a) to the 
introduction of compulsion in the 2001 Health and Social Care Act. The government's initial 
support seems to have been influenced by the lobbying of the disability rights movement and 
complaints about the weaknesses of the community care system. So to that extent New Labour 
was responding to 'bottom up' pressures for policy change that complemented its own 'third 
way' objectives for social care. At the national level the policy therefore was developed 
incrementally with direct payment schemes gradually spreading into traditional Labour 
strongholds as the government seemed determined to overcome the lingering resistance in some 
authorities. 
The minister explained this approach in interview : 
'The gradual evolution and extension of the scheme was partly driven by a sense of 
slow progress in implementation. We wanted to try and signal, in the way that 
governments do, that we desired change we have got it in the social services 
performance assessment framework, with a clear emphasis on numbers and the 
proportion of people getting direct payments. We chose the legislative route as one of 
the ways that governments signal the priority and importance that we attach to a 
particular policy. We have changed the basis of the scheme to get what we wanted 
from a permissive to a mandatory scheme.' (John Hutton,, June 2002) 
Despite the influence of disabled people no attempt was made by government to make direct 
payments a universal, rights- based provision. The principle of selectivity through local 
authority decision-making remained: 
' There is a problem that we can only do so much with legislation.... what we did not 
want to do was substitute our judgement for those of local social services departments. 
The legislation sets the overall framework and individual councils necessarily have to 
make the decisions in individual cases . We want to tip the balance as far as we can in 
favour of the individual who is making the application. But the decision in individual 
cases needs to be taken by the people on the ground, and I think that is right, there is no 
other system that can work.' (John Hutton, June 2002) 
The co-director of NCIL recognised that this approach from central government presented 
problems for those struggling with implementation issues at the fieldwork level. Some of this 
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struggle was because of prevarication and conflict between those with policy and decision-
making authority and some because of the distance between those with power locally and those 
with knowledge of users' needs and preferences. 
''The government wants local grass roots action and practitioners are asking for clearer 
guidance.' [Interview, June 2001] 
5.4. Concluding.Discussion 
The Conservative government gave local authorities the power to make direct payments within 
their statutory duties in implementing community care policy (1990 National Health Service and 
Community Care Act). Those duties in turn were a legacy of the 1948 National Assistance Act 
which, in repealing the Poor Law, placed publicly funded social care within a selective/ residual 
model of welfare and outside of the provision of the universal rights- based health service. The 
New Labour government decided to adopt and promote direct payments within this policy 
legacy. Councils were left with responsibilities for rationing resources and resolving capacity 
issues despite the governments concern with 'fairness' (Dept. of Health 1998a, 2.25). The 
problem of distinguishing the health and social care elements of the services needed by disabled 
people was left to be resolved during implementation, despite the government's wider policy 
objectives of ensuring that users experienced seamless services (Dept of Health, 1998a, 6.3). 
The minister's explanation of the government's approach to securing implementation was 
framed within an individualist model of direct payments. There seems to have been no 
consideration of an alternative collective model with the introduction and management of direct 
payment schemes by users, although this was how some of the earlier schemes had developed, 
and achieved the successful outcomes that led to 1996 Act (Zarb and Nadash, 1994). 
The literature suggests that there is potential for policy making to continue during the 
implementation process and that the efforts of policy makers may have unintended effects. This 
is particularly the case where: discretionary powers are given by one tier of government to 
another (Hill 1981): where they are not administered by 'committed' agencies (Meier and Mc 
Farlane 1996) and where discretion in decision making is exercised by practitioners in 
interaction with citizens (Lipsky 1980, Hudson 1989, Wells 1997). Policy initiatives that are not 
integrated within a coherent programme, without precise goals, without clear implementation 
rules, are less likely to have their intended impact (Meier and Mc Farlane 1996). 
New Labour's guidance on extending direct payments and their inclusion in performance 
monitoring mechanisms obliged local authorities to show willing in their approach to this 
initiative. However lack of prescriptive direction left local councils considerable discretion in 
the design of local schemes over the next two years. It appeared that in drafting the guidance the 
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government intended to leave the potential for policy to continue to be made through decisions 
made in implementation at the local level. 
Chapters one, two and three outlined the historical, political and philosophical context for the 
development of central government policy on direct payments as an initiative embedded within 
the development of community care policy. This chapter has begun the case study of policy 
implementation, by considering the interactions between and the cumulative impact of policy 
interventions in the historical context of community care implementation in Fletcherford. Three 
elements of the 'policy-action process' as distinguished by Barret and Fudge (1981,7) have been 
explored : the environmental system from which policy demand arises, which in this case was 
the disabled peoples' rights movement at the national level and the local community, formal and 
informal interest groups and users of community care services; the political system in which 
decisions are made, the New Labour Government and a Labour controlled council; and the 
organisational system through which policy is mediated and executed: the Department of 
Health, the Social Services Inspectorate, the local authority and social services department and 
independent sector organisations under contract to the council. The following three chapters will 
continue to explore these factors in the context of the implementation of direct payments. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Practitioners . Opinions and Expectations of Direct Payments in 2000 
'The implementation process is influenced by professionals and managers as social 
actors making sense of the changing policy environment and learning to navigate the 
tensions between centralisation and decentralisation, empowerment and control' 
Newman (2001, 99) 
6.0 Introduction 
The results of a survey of Fletcherford practitioners' views carried out in 2000, early in the 
planning phase of the implementation of direct payments, are presented next. The practitioners 
were care managers, whose roles were primarily to assess need and arrange care packages, or 
direct care providers. The introduction of direct payments implied extra responsibilities for care 
managers and new areas of discretion in judgement and decision-making. In contrast care 
providers' roles and responsibilities as employees of the major provider of social care (the 
council) had been undermined by competition from the independent sector. Direct payments 
threatened to reduce further both the demand for their services and the control and discretion 
they exercised in their work. 
Most practitioners were initially positive about proposals to introduce direct payments, 
irrespective of the impact on their personal and group interests. However they were concerned 
that the potential benefits for local people would be limited by the implementation of the 
initiative within the context of community care arrangements and resource limitations. 
Practitioners generally supported the policy objectives of Blair's government. 
Practitioners explored the validity of social policy theories within the context of their own 
experience of community care implementation, through the stimulus of a series of statements. 
The relevance and implications of the literature to their accounts is considered in the final 
discussion. 
6.1 Sample 
Care Managers : 
I contacted all thirty-six practitioners from six care management teams and interviewed thirty-
two. 
Care Providers: 
I interviewed 30 practitioners from day, domiciliary and community support services (the range 
of the council's social care provision). Practitioners from each of the client specialisms 
participated. Because of the large numbers of staff involved and the practical difficulties taking 
time out of work for interview, the response rate was lower for providers. 
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Table 6.1 Response Rate 
Total Care Care managers Total Care Care providers 
Managers Interviewed providers Interviewed 
Older and disabled 19 16 (85%) 90 18 (20%) 
people 
Generic 1 1 (100%) 0 0 
Learning disability 8 7 (88%) 30 6 (20%) 
Mental health 8 8 (100%) 18 6 (33.3%) 
36 32 (90%) 138 30 (22%) 
6.2 Where 'Purchasers' and "Providers' agreed 
Practitioners were presented with opinion statements drawn from the literature, reports of the 
1997 consultation and the views expressed by senior managers in initial discussions about direct 
payments. Their responses are shown below, together with selected illustrative comments. 
Differences between the two groups from the expected frequencies were tested using the Chi-
square test. In this section any apparent differences were not significant at the 5% level of 
probability and are therefore not reported. 
Table 6.2 
1. 'Direct payments are about giving people money and leaving them to get on with it' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree (9.5%) 
Don't know (3.5%) 
Disagree 27 27 54 (87%) 
The majority disagreed, commenting that users should be offered support and information : 
'You've got to give them advice to be fully informed... with a new system people have to 
learn how to use it' CM 19 
'It is about giving people control over their lives, but putting support in if that is 
needed' CP 10 
Six people agreed. 
Table 6.3 
2.'Direct payments are about giving users control over the services they get' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 31 28 59 (95%) 
Disagree 1 (5%) 
Those who agreed had alternative interpretations of what 'control' might mean for service users: 
'Because services are limited by lack of market competition, it is difficult to give control 
when we have so few [good providers] who work in an enabling way.' CP 10 
' A lot ofpeople go to bed when home care can fit them into the schedule, they might 
not want to go at seven o 'clock at night.' CP20 
One saw user control as an opportunity for personal development 
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'Agree, it would give them more confidence.' CM31 
Three people disagreed, suggesting that direct payments would extend choices but not really 
give users control. 
'... you can not say that they have got control over the whole service, just some control 
over their own package, some choice? CP9 
'Control over what they pay for, times, days control over their care package, but not 
over the services... ' CP24 
Table 6.4 
3.' Direct payments are about enabling users to become employers' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 22 23 45 (72.5%) 
Don't know 4 1 5 (8%) 
Disagree 6 6 12 (19.5%) 
Practitioners who disagreed said that users should have the option of buying services from 
independent sector organisations, to exercise purchasing power and choice, without the 
responsibility and additional stress of being employers. One suggested that users with 
purchasing power might stimulate the development of the social care market, with the 
opportunities and risks implied: 
It may not be staff, it may be something else. A number of day care places may open 
up... .but they may go out of business and leave people with no service, that is a worry. ' 
CM 29 
Table 6.5 
4. 'Direct payments are about turning clients into consumers' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 17 23 40 (65%) 
Don't know 1 0 1 (1.5%) 
Disagree 14 7 21 (34%) 
Most who agreed regarded the initiative as an extension of the move to consumerism in 
community care policy: 
' I've mixed feelings about the ethos of the market place, it was devalued by 
Thatcherism. But anything, which gives dis-empoweredpeople more control, I would be 
in favour of, even if called 'consumerism.' CM 27 
Some disagreed. 
'lThey are more to do with freeing a person, giving a disabled person a chance to live 
their life in a normal way, whatever "normal" is. ' C P U 
Others commented that a care relationship should not be commodified: 
'That sounds as if they are buying you, a care worker. I do not like the sound of that, as 
if a person is for sale.' CP 16 
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5. 7 have known people who would have benefited from direct payments' 
Although eight practitioners said that they had not known anyone who would have benefited 
from direct payments, only four said that they expected that hardly any users would benefit from 
direct payments. 
6. 'People here won't be interested in direct payments' 
The vast majority of practitioners (56 or 90%), disagreed with this statement. In contrast, the 
opinion expressed at the time by senior managers, professional advisers and politicians was that 
there would not be much interest in direct payments from local people. However they had been 
encouraged to expect a low take up (see chapter V): 
'The more people are educated about what direct payments entail, the more likely they 
are to use them. Once someone does it and it is successful it will have a snowball 
effect. ' C P U 
'Disagree, provided it's promoted and done properly ... Workers should be going out 
and selling it to individuals.' CM 15 
Two who agreed said that was based on their experience with older people only. 
Table 6.6 
7. 'Direct payments will probably be best for younger people' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 16 (26%) 
Don't know (3.5%) 
Disagree 23 21 44 (71%) 
This statement reflected views expressed by managers of services for older people, as well as 
the 1997 Consultation Report. 
Some practitioners, who agreed, explained that many older people lived alone and were too frail 
to manage direct payments without family help. They were also said to fear change: 
' With the council's home care, you get a service user who has had someone for Jive 
years and they do not want to change. I had one crying today because she does not want 
to upset me. She said she likes me, but she would rather have her usual worker.' CP26 
However most practitioners disagreed. They said that older people had vast knowledge and 
experience to draw on in managing care arrangements and would be particularly adept at getting 
value for money: 
7 can think of some older people that are quite capable, still going on with their lives 
and looking to try new things.' CP 19 
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Table 6.7 
8.'Direct payments are for people who are dissatisfied with the services we offer' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 8 11 (18%) 
Don't know (5%) 
Disagree 26 22 48 (78%) 
Most practitioners preferred to explain users' desire for direct payments in a more positive way. 
Users would want to be able to arrange their own care to suit their personal preferences and 
circumstances: 
'People can be satisfied but still want to take control. A greater degree of self-
determination and more choice.' CM 27 
''Some people do not use services because of the stigma.'' CP 18 
Some agreed: 
'Maybe they think it is a way that they can get what they want, which is right they 
should have what they want, but it is not that easy to arrange.' CP 20 
Table 6.8 
9. 'Direct payments should be about people setting together to run their own services 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 17 13 30 (49%) 
Don't know (6.5%) 
Disagree 11 17 28 (45.5%) 
Almost half agreed, but usually qualified their response with the comment that this would be the 
'ideal' and not necessary for successful outcomes for everyone: 
' Yes in an ideal world, but some people could fall through the net, not be part of the 
group: CM 19 
Slightly fewer disagreed, some of whom talked about the practical problems of disabled people 
'getting together': 
' / can see it for a small group but not for most people. Older people who are 
housebound, people who are isolated from each other, only see us and their families: 
CP19 
Others stressed the 'individualist' aspect: 
''They are about accessing the services the person feels are appropriate and having 
control, individual choice.'' CM9 
iYou would cause World War 3. Most regard finances as very private and it's a 
personal matter to most of them, the care they get: CP 28 
I can not see older people discussing private things. They do not like other people 
knowing their business.' CP 29 
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Table 6.9 
0. 'Service users might use direct payments for the wrong things' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 24 19 43 (70%) 
Disagree 8 11 19 (30%) 
Senior staff involved in planning the introduction of direct payments raised this issue. The 
majority of practitioners who agreed usually said that it applied to very few people: 
'There is always a risk with a minority' CP 19 
For most practitioners, this risk did not dampen their enthusiasm for the initiative. They 
suggested that support would help people to use their payments effectively. They also stressed 
that community care users were no less responsible than any other section of society. 
Those who disagreed generally commented that direct payments were intended to allow users to 
make choices and prioritise. One asked : 
'Who decides what's the wrong thing?' CM22 
Community care eligibility criteria had removed housework from the list of domiciliary services 
the council provided. The home care practitioners generally agreed that many people would 
prefer to have their homes clean and tidy than be bathed or cooked a meal. One suggested. 
'Clean windows are as good as anti-depressants for anyone stuck in the house all day. ' 
CP21 
Table 6.10 
11. 'Direct payments are a threat to in-house services' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 13 13 26 (42%) 
Don't know 3 0 3 (5%) 
Disagree 16 17 33 (53%) 
Just over half disagreed, often commenting that council services had been under threat since the 
early implementation of community care policy and the introduction of price based competition. 
In-house provision had been rationalised to such an extent that demand exceeded supply, 
irrespective of alternatives: 
iMost people would rather have us [home care] but we are not taking on new cases' 
CP19 
Although it was the 'care providers' whose jobs were potentially threatened by competition, 
they were not more inclined to agree with this statement than care managers. 
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Most who agreed commented that concerns about the future of in house services should not 
influence decision-making in the implementation of initiatives that would improve the lives of 
service users and the flexibility of their care arrangements: 
' We are restricted in what we can do. If our users hear that on direct payments they 
can direct what care staff do they may go over .' CP21 
'Users are happy with home care but we can not be flexible.' CP 22 
However four people commented that direct payments were the latest stage in a process of 
privatisation of social care and undermining public services. 
' We are losing our jobs anyway. With girls'7relying on wages for paying mortgages, we 
are bound to see it as a threat.' CP27 
Table 6.11 
12. 'People who get direct payments will probably use agencies' 
Agree 
Don't know 
Disagree 
Care Manager 
14 
11 
Care Provider 
11 
19 
Total 
25 (40%) 
(6.5%) 
30 (48%) 
A significant minority of practitioners said that some users would choose to use domiciliary 
agencies so that they could organise their care arrangements without too much extra 
responsibility. Also users may want to use agencies in emergencies. Almost half disagreed, 
predicting that users would prefer to pay someone of their own choice for care rather than use 
agencies: 
'The opposite, they will get the money to avoid using the agencies' CP30 
Practitioners suggested that users might chose to recruit staff they knew to secure the 
consistency in personnel that agencies do not offer: 
' If they do not get the choice to use our home care, they will either go to friends or ask 
someone they have had through an agency to work for them directly.' CP28 
' / do not think they would use agencies if they had the choice. They might ask one of 
our girls or an agency girl, someone they trusted.' CP29 
13 / Most people will need a lot of support if they are going to get direct payments' 
Most (89%) agreed and usually commented that users will probably need help when they first 
receive direct payments: 
'Initially but not long term, it's not rocket science.' CM 15 
1 7 Home care practitioners referred to themselves and workers in similar roles in the independent sector as 
'girls', although all the people I interviewed had between ten and thirty years service. Most drew on years 
of unwaged experience of caring for children and elderly relatives. 
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Those who disagreed all said that the need for support would vary between individuals and that 
many would manage unaided. 
Table 6.12 
14. 'Direct payments could mean a lot of work for social workers' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 13 18 31 (50%) 
Don't know 4 0 4 (6.5%) 
Disagree 15 12 27 (43.5%) 
Whether or not practitioners agreed with this statement, the general comments were to the effect 
that the impact on the workload of social workers was irrelevant. They 
must adapt to change and implement policy initiatives in the course of their work: 
'Jobs change all the time. We all have to change.' CP20 
Table 6.13 
15. 'There's a risk that people will be exploited if they are given the money to buy their own 
care'. 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 26 22 48 (77%) 
Disagree 6 8 14 (23%) 
The majority agreed, irrespective of client specialism. Some practitioners commented that direct 
service users were sometimes exploited and the risks would not increase with direct payments: 
'Agree, but it is up to the local authority to make sure it does not happen. They are 
already being exploited by the system.' CM 15 
'Disagree, there will be no more risk than there is at the moment.'' CM 14 
Some of those who disagreed said that users would be less vulnerable to exploitation i f they 
were in control of their care packages and budgets. 
Table 6.14 
16. 'If our services were good enough people would not want direct payments' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 8 6 14 (22.5%) 
Don't know 2 0 2 (3.5%) 
Disagree 22 24 46 (74%) 
Most were keen to stress that however 'good' services are, some individuals would prefer to 
manage their own care. Lack of flexibility and responsiveness to the wide range of needs were 
mentioned as more relevant: 
'Good enough is not it. We have got good services. What we have not got is the 
flexibility and the funding to support people with complex needs who want to live in the 
community. We have a very lean and mean ' spread thinly' culture, that works for 
some.' CM25 
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17.'People should be able to use direct payments for more than just personal care' 
The power to make choices according to personal preferences was perceived as a major 
advantage for almost all the practitioners (95%). They considered that people have 'social 
needs' as important to their well being as the need for personal care. However rationing 
measures implemented with community care policy meant that social needs were often not 
addressed, particularly with older people: 
Practitioners working with older people, however, were just as likely to agree with this 
statement and to recognise the importance of social needs: 
'Agree, anything that benefits their well-being, within reason.' CP 19 
Only two people disagreed. 
Table 6.15 
18. People already have a lot of choice over services here' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 10 11 21 (33.5%) 
Don't know (3.5%) 
Disagree 20 19 39 (63%) 
Most disagreed: 
iOn paper it looks good when you see all the agencies, but the private sector are 
generally rubbish.... They are not getting a choice when they are sent to the private 
sector instead of social services home care.'' CP 19 
However the third who agreed said that they were aware that there were a number of 
independent providers in the community care market locally, but they also expressed concern 
about the quality of services: 
''There are quite a few agencies, but there is a need for "decent" care. Two are 
specialist agencies. Cheaper agencies provide poorer services.' CM 1 
Table 6.16 
19. 'People should be allowed to use direct payments to buy community health services ' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 12 12 24 (38.5%) 
Don't know (6.5%) 
Disagree 16 34 (55%) 
Although statements that advocated that users should be able to choose how to spend their direct 
payment usually elicited agreement, over half argued that health is different. Disagreement was 
based on principles of social justice and the collective values of a taxation funded, rights based 
system. Money seemed to be perceived as a potentially negative influence in health care 
delivery rather than a source of empowerment: 
'Health care should be free at the point of contact, money is used to jump queues, 
money gives choices.' CM2 
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'Not if it is the NHS, patients have paid into that' CP3 
'The health authority have a duty to provide health care. ' CM 24 
'When it comes to health care, money should not change hands' CP 17 
One practitioner defended the NHS as the last bastion of the welfare state: 
''Keep the health service separate. Do not start privatising that or there will be nothing 
left: CP27 
Only one suggested that clinical judgement and professional expertise were more important than 
personal preference in health care. 
Over a third agreed, usually saying that direct payments for health care would be consistent with 
the policy trend towards integration and that users would be able to overcome problems of 
fragmentation in packages delivered by separate agencies: 
' We work in partnership now, health and social care should come as a package if 
needed: CM25 
Table 6.17 
20. 'There's not enough money to pay for all the services that people want, direct payments 
mean users must decide what to do without. ' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 20 18 38 (61.5%) 
Don't know 4 0 4 (6.5%) 
Disagree 8 12 20 (32%) 
Most agreed but usually said that given that resources are limited, users should be allowed to 
decide their own priorities: 
'To say users must decide what to do without is putting it in a negative way. It should 
be, service users deciding what they need most. None of us can have exactly what we 
want.' CM4 
'In one way [the council] are "passing the buck" but it might be a good thing for users 
to take responsibility.' CP2 
'It would help them to prioritise what is most important to them' CM11 
Not all who agreed foresaw any advantage for users: 
'It is going to help them understand where we are coming from, but it is not necessarily 
going to help them.' CM28 
Almost a third disagreed, some argued that resources could be used more cost effectively by 
users themselves. 
'It is a question of managing resources and encouraging natural supports and 
community involvement, which are free. Inclusion is free. You need initial input to build 
networks, short term input for huge savings in the long term: CM 15 
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' They should not have to do without. Users could shop around and get a better deal 
with support.' CM32 
21. "Direct payments will only work for people who do not need a lot of care' 
Only three people agreed with this statement: 
'It is choice, whether they get a lot or a little care. More care, more money, more 
choice: CP24 
Table 6.18 
22. Direct payments could have a big impact on community care here in the future. 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 21 22 43 (70%) 
Don't know 4 0 4 (6%) 
Disagree | 7 | 8 15 (24%) 
Most responded optimistically: 'Hopefully for the better' CM9 
However one person who agreed with this statement did not foresee the introduction of direct 
payments as having a positive outcome for services users: 
'On business, they will generate entrepreneurial growth. Where there is money there is 
growth and greed. We are already in conflict with agencies touting for business and 
encouraging people to drop our services' CM20 
Most of those who disagreed explained that they nevertheless expected that direct payments 
would create an extra option that could have a big impact on some individuals' lives. 
Table 6.19 
23. 'We are only talking about introducing direct payments here because the government says 
we must.' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 17 16 33 (53%) 
Don't know 5 0 5 (8%) 
Disagree 10 14 24 (39%) 
Despite the general support for direct payments, more than half the practitioners were not 
convinced that their employers would be implementing the initiative without top-down pressure 
from government: 
'Probably a bit of that and a bit of trying to get what is best for everybody. ' CM 12 
One less enthusiastic practitioner interpreted this statement as a way of attributing blame rather 
than credit: 
'This has come from the government. Tony Blair has a lot to answer for. As far as I am 
concerned he is just another Tory.' CP27 
Those who disagreed usually explained that the introduction of direct payments was consistent 
with the council's own 'modernising' agenda: 
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' We have been very pioneering in lots of ways. I think we have not done it until now 
because of lack of demand and lack of information.' CP 13 
Table 6.20 
24. 'People here are generally happy with the services on offer' 
Care manager Care provider Total 
Agree 22 25 47 (76%) 
Don't know 1 (1-5%) 
Disagree 14 (22.5%) 
The majority agreed but suggested that it should not be assumed that users' satisfaction meant 
services were good: 
' People here generally have low expectations, they are generally happy with services. 
You only tend to get objections when you change something.' CM 14 
'Agree, but they have not got a choice. If we were offering direct payments, then you 
would see. But at the moment they have only one choice.'CMll 
Those who disagreed talked about unmet needs and peoples' experiences of using independent 
sector provision: 
'Disagree, from my experience there are gaps in the care offered.' CM27 
'They are happy with social services and home care but not the private agencies. They 
put up with them because there is no choice.' CP 19 
6.3. Where 'purchasers' and 'providers' differed 
Only nine of the statements provoked a statistically significant difference in the responses of 
practitioners with 'purchasing' or 'providing' roles. 
Table 6.21 
25. 'Direct Payments have come from a policy of the last Conservative government' 
Care Manager Care 
Provider 
Total 
Agree 16 (50%) 9 (30%) 25 (40%) 
Don't know 12 (38%) 1 (3%) 13 (21%) 
Disagree 4 (12.5%) 20 (66%) 24 (39%) 
Chi square test X 2 = 21.9 P< 0.001 
Half the care managers felt that direct payments had come from a Conservative government 
policy, whereas two thirds of the care providers did not. Although practitioners suggested that 
consumerism and the social care market originated in Conservative government policies, most 
care providers who supported direct payments were reluctant to give any party credit for the 
initiative: 
' / think it would have happened irrespective of who was in government. Progress and 
pressure groups would have brought it about.' CP 10 
'.. but direct payments are something that evolved, it makes no difference who made the 
policy.' CPU 
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' / think disabled people would have asked for it whatever government it was.' CP 12 
Practitioners who had reservations about direct payments were more inclined to explain their 
origins in party political or ideological terms: 
''They were probably brought in with privatisation in mind. One of the users said three 
yeas ago that it was a way of closing down the day centre and getting rid ofjobs.' CP 17 
Table 6.22 
26. 'Directpayments are not very different from other schemes that have been around for 
years.' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 16 (50%) 6 (20%) 22 (35%) 
Don't know 1 (1.5%) 1 (1.5%) 2 (3.5%) 
Disagree 15 (48%) 23 (76%) 38 (62%) 
Chi square test X 2=6.2 P<0.05 
Care providers were more likely than care managers to perceive direct payments as a departure 
from established ways of arranging community care services. However one care provider 
recounted how her mother's generation was providing care and support to elderly and disabled 
neighbours, before community care policy was developed: 
'Direct payments are not a new thing, they are an old thing brought back: CP 19 
Over half the care managers but less than a quarter of the care providers had experience of the 
Independent Living Fund. This may account for half the care managers agreeing. 
Table 6.23 
21 .'Many service users would worry about the responsibility of getting a direct payment' 
Care Manager Care 
Provider 
Total 
Agree 20 (63%) 27 (90%) 47 (76%) 
Don't know 1 (1.5%) 0 1 (1.5%) 
Disagree 11 (34%) 3 (10%) 14 (22.5%) 
Chi square test A* =6.5 P< 0.05 
The vast majority of providers agreed : 
'Yes, until they have tried it. But as long as they know they can go back [to direct 
services] they may have a go: CP20 
A third of the care managers disagreed: 
'Most of mine would love it.' CM 31 
'Not if it is done properly, being supported. Loads of service users would be able to 
manage fine.' CM32 
Client specialism was not significant in the analysis of whether practitioners agreed with this 
statement. 
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Table 6.24 
28. 'Third party schemes employing personal assistants on behalf of users would do the same as 
Care Manager Care 
Provider 
Total 
Agree 4 (12.5%) 12 (40%) 16 (26%) 
Don't know 9 (28%) 0 9 (4%) 
Disagree 19 (30.5%) 18 (60%) 37 (60%) 
Chi square test X 2=13.0 P<0.01 
Most practitioners disagreed, but the idea of third party schemes was clearly more acceptable to 
providers than care managers, possibly because more of them felt that service users would 
worry about the responsibility of getting a direct payment: 
'Some people would need the third party for guidance and to have control, that is with 
support and relief of responsibility they would be more able to exercise control.' CP 19 
Nevertheless most care providers also disagreed: 
'The difference is you can not be in control. You can not just change things to suit 
yourself. Direct payments are negotiable on a one- to- one basis between user and 
worker directly.' CP 11 
'I would think that is just like social services doing it. I would not agree that it is safer 
for the person for a third party to be involved.' CP 12 
Again client specialism was not significant in the responses to the statement that 'third party 
schemes' would do the same as direct payments. In particular practitioners working with people 
with learning disabilities did not support this view more than other staff. However the 
government's proposal to introduce 'indirect payments' (Dept of Health 2002) is intended to 
extend the 'take up' by people with learning disabilities. 
Table 6.25 
29. 'People should get direct payments through the normal assessment processes' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 23 (72%) 16 (53%) 39 (63%) 
Don't know 4 (12.5%) 0 4 (6%) 
Disagree 5 ( 15.5%) 14 (47%) 19 (31%) 
Chi square test X1 = 9.5 P<0.01 
Care providers had less confidence than care managers in established assessment processes. 
Those who were critical of care management assessments said that they tended to overestimate 
users' needs and to offer more care than users wanted or could cope with: 
' It depends on the social worker too much. We get referrals that paint picture of people 
with needs so great we think "this is not the same person ". The social worker goes in 
during a crisis, once that is over it is a different picture.' CP 15 
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'They are assessed for the wrong things. A service user will sit there and Just say yes to 
what the social worker says. A lady was assessed as needing personal care and 
breakfast. When I got there she was dressed and fed and wanted me to hoover and go 
shopping: CP21 
' A lot of cases we go and see for ourselves and think "What are we doing here ". They 
say "I don't need that, I only wanted the windows doing"..' CP22 
One day centre worker explained how individuals' needs are influenced by their social situation 
and emotional state: 
' There are people who come here and the referral says that they can not do this or that 
and we think "They must have been having a bad day when they were assessed. ". But 
what can the social worker do? Sometimes this place is like Lourdes, they rise up out of 
their wheelchairs at the Christmas party.' CP20 
Another suggested that care managers can manipulate eligibility criteria to get funding to meet 
an individual's preferences, rather than just basic needs, i f they know the person well enough: 
'Assessments are going to have to be really in depth, based on a relationship, not a one-
off visit. As they stand at the moment they are not enough. But people should be able to 
apply for direct payments without a re-assessment. It makes social workers gatekeepers 
again, but they can channel wants through needs. ' CP 10 
Care providers also commented that care management assessments of older people and people 
with physical impairments were based on very limited contact with the person, possibly in 
crisis, whereas their own knowledge of user needs and family circumstances was based on a 
longer term relationship. One provider however was concerned that additional assessments 
could be used as a way of obstructing access to direct payments: 
' We should not make people jump through too many hoops' CP 14 
Care managers were generally concerned that people who requested direct payments should not 
be subject to a more rigorous assessment process than those willing to accept direct services. 
Four care managers said that, without experience of enabling users to access direct payments, 
they did not know whether established processes would be appropriate. Five said that they felt a 
more thorough assessment would be demanded because of the capacity and consent issues. Most 
care managers maintained that current assessments were already based on users' own views: 
'Assessments are based on what the care manager is told by users and carers. If the 
information needs to be double- checked, it is a time consuming process: CM24 
Some care providers agreed: 
'People can tell the social worker what they want. Some exaggerate and others will not 
acknowledge their needs. 'CP 17 
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In contrast one care manager expressed concern that the use of established assessment processes 
would undermine the empowering potential of direct payments: 
' It is back to the power thing. If we decide, it is another corporate tool. It is supposed 
to be for people to have more control over their lives: CM 15 
Another was concerned that current assessments were more concerned with eligibility and 
availability of resources rather than need : 
'Are they going to be finance led as with current assessments? Is need going to be 
assessed regardless of benefits or capital? Are direct payments for everybody or will 
they discriminate against people with savings?' CM 19 
In the semi- structured part of the interview, care managers acknowledged that they sometimes 
over estimated users' needs (and therefore resource requirements). They did not do this because 
they were over protective of their clients or themselves (although 'risk aversion' was an issue 
discussed in other contexts). They explained that in the competition for scarce resources, they 
were more likely to secure the necessary budget allocation i f they asked for more than was 
required. 
Table 6.26 
30. 'There are other ways of empowering users without giving them cash' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 25 (78%) 16 (53%) 41 (66%) 
Don't know 2 (7%) 0 (3%) 
Disagree 5 (15%) 14 (47%) 19 (31%) 
Chi square test J f =8.2 P< 0.05 
Almost half the care providers, but only 15% of care managers, considered that giving users the 
control over their own care budgets was more empowering than alternatives. 
A majority overall could identify effective alternatives based on involving users in decision-
making processes. 
' We are trying to empower users all the time within the care packages. That is what the 
job is all about... ' CM 31 
'It does not have to be about cash. It is about not being restricted and not being stuck 
with what you are not happy with. Cash is one way.' CP23 
Nevertheless they did not always express confidence in the alternatives: 
'Yes but in a materialistic cash oriented world, there is a lot ofpower in having pounds 
in you pocket. It may make the user feel enabled to say "1 am paying for this" ..' CM7 
'There are, but for them to be totally empowered they need to be choosing who provides 
their services. They become employers rather than having the stigma of social services 
providing for them.' CM 24 
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'If they had the cash they would feel more in charge, better for their self esteem: CP 25 
Some practitioners suggested that some users are more assertive and therefore get more say 
than others: 
' You can give choice without money. People who are meek and timid, and do not shout, 
do not get.' CP22 
One care provider who agreed had reservations about the 'empowering' potential of choice: 
'If they shout loud enough and threaten to go to the papers they get what they want. 
Sometimes they can be given too much choice; it can be confusing rather than 
empowering: CP21 
One provider suggested that direct payments could be used to counter the negative impact of 
unsatisfactory services. She elaborated on the disempowering effects of the experience of 
poor quality, unreliable private sector domiciliary services: 
iIt is not the cash as such. It is choice, trust, continuity and reliability that are more 
important and that give the person confidence. It is little things like someone coming in 
wearing an overall so they know who they are. In the private sector they wear jeans and 
T shirts.... Knowing what to expect makes people feel less powerless than when they do 
not know what is happening or who is turning up next. If money gives them control then 
great, but they should not have to get a direct payment to feel safe and confident that 
their needs will be met. They are afraid of change because they are used to things 
getting worse not better. Trust is important and some of that has been lost.' CP 28 
Table 6.27 
31If I needed community care services I would want a direct payment' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 26 (82%) 30 (100%) 56 (90%) 
Don't know 2 (6.5%) 0 2 (3.5%) 
Disagree 4 (12.5%) 0 4 (6.5%) 
Chi square test X2 =6.2 P< 0.05 
All the providers were confident that they could make more satisfactory arrangements for 
themselves than direct services would offer: 
'I would want to be in control, to do what I need or want to do, at the time I want to do 
it. Being in bed waiting for someone to get you up must be horrendous.' CP 10 
'It is about the control aspect. Being better informed, having power to feel people 
responded to what I needed rather than what other people required of them. Holding 
cash would be important, because of the ability to change rapidly if dissatisfied and 
avoid long [bureaucratic] processes.' CP 4 
' Now, knowing what I do, I would choose to pick my own [personal assistant] and 
employ her... ' CP 29 
However four of the care managers said that they would prefer not to have the responsibility of 
organising their own care. Two others said that it would depend on the nature of their needs. 
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Table 6.28 
32.It is difficult to get good care staff heref_ 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 19 (60%) 10 (33.3%) 29 (47%) 
Don't know 5 (15%) 0 5 (8%) 
Disagree 8 (25%) 20 (66.7%) 28 (45%) 
Chi square test X 2=12.4 P<0.01 
Care managers were quicker to identify recruitment and retention problems in the labour market 
for care staff: 
'Agencies seem to have problems recruiting experienced staff, probably because they 
pay the minimum wage.' CM1 
£ They wander from agency to agency. If they get one awkward customer they think 
"I'm not putting up with this " and go on to another one. They all pay the same low 
rate. The specialist agencies tend to keep their staff. They pay more but they charge 
more, but provide excellent services.' CM 26 
Care providers did not criticise other care workers. They commented on the problems of poor 
pay and conditions and lack of training and support in the independent sector: 
'Agency staff have to pay for their own training, ours do NVQs... We try to keep our 
staff local so they know the patch and the people. They get sent from one end of town to 
another: CP24 
Both care managers and providers commented that users may be able to recruit people from 
their own communities willing to care for a known individual, but not to work for an 
organisation: 
'There are a lot of caring people but not necessarily with the qualifications 
organisations seem to require now: CP 9 
'Direct payments come into their own, employing someone who gives care rather than a 
care worker.' CM 14 
'It may not be difficult to get caring people who do not have to sign up to our policies 
and procedures. Our staff feel very restricted by the parameters they have to work 
within.' CP 14 
Only one practitioner (a man) mentioned gender as a staff recruitment issue, although the 
overwhelming majority of care staff were 'girls' : 
'It is difficult particularly to get a male carer. Some users do not mind if it is male or 
female but a lot of men would prefer a male worker: CP 17 
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Table 6.29 
33.'The cash to buy their own care is what users have wanted for years' 
Care Manager Care Provider Total 
Agree 5 (15%) 3 (10%) 8 (13%) 
Don't know 6 ( 19%) 0 6 (9%) 
Disagree 21 (66%) 27 (90%) 48 (78%) 
Chi square test X2 =7.2 P< 0.05 
The majority disagreed but providers did so more frequently. The comments commonly made 
were to the effect that local users would not have imagined that direct payments could ever be 
an option and until recently had 'taken for granted' that the local authority would always be the 
provider of social care: 
'They have not known about it or thought about it, social services have always been at 
the end of a line to sort things out for them.' CP2 
'I don't think people have known about direct payments... .we have intentionally or 
unintentionally kept the information to ourselves.' CM 15 
One provider recognised that disabled people had campaigned nationally for the introduction of 
direct payments. 
'Not so much in this area but in other areas, down in Hampshire for example' CP1 
Differences between client specialisms were not significant. 
6.4 Practitioners' Expectations 
Practitioners were asked i f they could foresee potential benefits for service users in the 
introduction of direct payments to Fletcherford. The majority (forty six) thought that direct 
payments would benefit more than a small minority of community care services users. The chi 
square test of significance found that differences in expectations were not accounted for by 
different roles in the community care 'market'. Eligibility for direct payments had been limited 
by government guidance to particular user groups (to give the schemes the chance to show 
success without being overwhelmed by applicants). Since the relaxation of the 'able and willing 
test' and the extension to older people in 2000, the take up between different user groups 
continued to vary nationally. However there were no significant differences between 
practitioners from different client specialisms in their expectations of user benefits. Practitioners 
were also asked i f they had any worries about the introduction of direct payments. Just over half 
the practitioners (thirty six) had few or no worries about direct payments and again there was no 
significance in the differences in the responses between the two groups or between client 
specialisms. Therefore most practitioners had on balance positive expectations of direct 
payments, although they did not contemplate the implementation of this initiative without any 
concerns. Only five people had no worries about direct payments and only four thought that 
hardly any users would benefit from their introduction. 
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6.5 Themes from interviews with care managers and care providers 
Themes from interviews with care managers and care providers were cross tabulated with roles 
and tested for significance. In the course of the interviews the following themes emerged. 
6.5 .1 . Outcomes and benefits 
Practitioners elaborated on the specific benefits/ outcomes for service users they expected from 
direct payments. Eleven benefits were identified. 
Table 6.30 Potential Benefits for Users 
Benefits Identified Care managers Care 
Providers 
Total identifying 
this benefit 
1. Choices and flexibility 23 (69%) 23 (76.5%) 46 (75%) 
2.Control, autonomy, responsibility, 
freedom 
26 (81%) 20 (67%) 46 (75%) 
3.Promote independence 9 (28%) 17 (57%) 26 (42.5%) 
4.1ndividually tailored services not 
based on bureaucratic rules 
9 (28%) 11 (37%) 20 (32%) 
5.Relationships, consistency and 
compatibility of staff 
4 (12.5%) 13 (44%) 17 (27.5%) 
6.Better value, users get more for the 
money 
6 (19%) 11 (37%) 17 (27.5%) 
7.Empowerment, rights, citizenship 11 (34%) 5 (17%) 16 (26%) 
8.Self esteem, capacity, confidence, 
dignity 
5 (18.5%) 9 (30%) 14 (22.5%) 
9.Inclusion, non-stigmatising, normal 
life 
5 (18.5%) 6 (20%) 11 (18%) 
10 . Joined up services, holistic, meet all 
needs, no gaps 
0 3 (10%) 3 (5%) 
11. Collective identification, community 
development 
1 (3%) 2 (6.5%) 3 (5%) 
Two kinds of positive outcomes were most commonly identified. They were choice and 
flexibilty, benefits associated with 'consumerist' approaches and control, autonomy, 
responsibility and freedom associated with New Labour's 'third way' terminology or 
modernising discourse. The next most commonly identified outcomes, promoting independence 
and individually tailored services, could have been taken straight from the White Paper (Dept of 
Health 1998a) although it was not quoted directly. 
The outcome of relationships with consistent and compatible care staff was mentioned by 
seventeen practitioners. As many suggested that users would get better value from scarce 
resources, an intended outcome described in the policy guidance on direct payments (Dept of 
Health 2000a), consistent with the rationale of market theory. The 'third way' objectives of 
empowerment, rights and citizenship were the next most frequently mentioned. Direct payments 
were also discussed as a means of enhancing personal development. 
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A minority identified direct payments as a means to social inclusion for disabled people, 
although this is a 'third way' objective promoted in relevant policy documents. The New 
Labour idea of 'joined up' health and social care services occurred to only three practitioners. 
This could be partially explained by the strong support expressed for a 'collectivism approach to 
health care, based on universal rights and principles (above). 
Practitioners seemed to perceive the benefits of direct payments, in terms of an 'individualist' 
model. Similarly only three referred to the benefits of users identifying collectively with each 
other and the potential stimulus to 'community development'. 
6.5.2 Worries 
Practitioners discussed their own worries about the implications of the introduction of direct 
payments. Thirteen themes emerged. 
Table 6.31 Specific Worries 
Worries identified Care 
managers 
Care 
providers 
Total expressing 
this worry 
l.Poor quality care, inappropriate use of 
money 
14 (43.5%) 17 (57%) 31 (50%) 
2.Risks of abuse 16 (50%) 9 (30%) 25 (40%) 
3. Threats of the market, profit motive, 
market weaknesses 
9 (28.%) 14 (47%) 23 (37%) 
4.Risk of users being exploited 7 (22%) 10 (33%) 17 (27.5%) 
5.Extra burden, more responsibilities for 
users 
10 (32%) 6 (20%) 16 (26%) 
6.User acquiescence, reluctance to 
complain 
5 (18.5%) 4 
(13%) 
9 (15%) 
7.Inadequate or inappropriate support 2 (6%) 6 (20%) 8 (13%) 
8 . Worry i f support service not local 6 (19%) 1 (3%) 7 (11%) 
9.What will happen in emergencies, 
crises 
1 (3%) 5 (17%) 6 (9.5%) 
10.Recruitment and retention problems 
for users 
0 3 (10%) 3 (5%) 
11. Conditions of services of personal 
assistants, pay and security 
0 3 (10%) 3 (5%) 
12. Direct payments may prolong or 
encourage dependence 
3 (9.5%) 0 3 (5%) 
13 .Isolation of users loss of social 
contact 
0 2 (6.5%) 2 (3.5%) 
The most common concern was that the quality of the care might deteriorate i f an individual 
opted out of direct services. This could be explained within a 'care discourse' that understands 
social care users as incapable of managing their own affairs as effectively as professionals. The 
second was that direct payments could be abused. While the risks of abuse were frequently 
mentioned, they were usually qualified by an opinion that they would only be present in a 
minority of cases. 
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Dangers associated with the inappropriate application of market principles to the social care 
situation perturbed some practitioners, suggesting an 'Old Labour' perspective. They expressed 
the opinion that social care organizations run as 'businesses' would develop, with proprietors 
primarily motivated by profit rather than the interests of disabled people. The fear was that 
unscrupulous providers could exploit more vulnerable people, i f they were without the 
protection of local authority contracting arrangements. Some were worried that disabled people 
and their families would experience managing direct payments as an extra burden of 
responsibility. The fear that service users' tendency to acquiescence would mean they would 
accept sub-standard services and abuse without complaint, troubled some practitioners. 
Concerns were expressed about the appropriateness of the support service. Nine practitioners 
worried that it may not be adequately resourced to meet the needs of direct payment users. Eight 
suggested that only i f support were provided by a local organisation would it be 'owned' and 
trusted by users. 
Practitioners were worried about users being left to deal with emergencies without the 'safety 
net' of social services infrastructure. They also foresaw problems arising for disabled people 
employing their care staff directly. Three providers were afraid that users would have difficulty 
recruiting and retaining staff in competition with larger employers. They feared that individuals 
with very limited purchasing power would be relatively powerless in the community care 
market. Three providers were also concerned about the pay and security of staff employed by 
private individuals. Three care managers said they were worried that direct payments could 
prolong dependency. They suggested that users would be reluctant to reduce the hours of their 
personal assistants, once they had established a relationship with them, even i f their needs 
reduced. 
Two care providers feared that people opting out of congregated day and respite services could 
become isolated. 
6.5.3 Obstacles to Success 
Practitioners identified fifteen potential obstacles to the successful spread of of direct payments, 
beyond a small group of pioneering community care service users. There were statistically 
significant differences between the two groups of practitioners in the responses marked in Table 
6.32 (below). 
As with the identification of potential benefits and worries shown in Table 6.31 (above), some 
practitioners foresaw more than one obstacle to expansion. 
122 
Table 6.32 Obstacles 
Obstacles Identified Care manager Care 
Provider 
Total 
l .Lack of Information and Publicity 1 20 (63%) 26 (87%) 46 (75%) 
2.Uncertainty about implications, lack of 
clear rules and criteria, 
unanswered questions. 
9 (28%) 14 (47%) 23 (37%) 
3 . Fear of change 9 (28%) 14 (47%) 23 (37%) 
4. Inadequate funding 8 (25%) 6 (20%) 14 (22.5%) 
5. Dependency culture, paternalism, trust 
in public services 
10 (31%) 4 (13%) 14 (22.5%) 
6. Management resistance, tokenistic 
response 
9 (28%) 5 (17%) 14 (22.5%) 
7.Distrust of council's motives, suspicion 
2 
2 (6%) 9 (30%) 11 (18%) 
8 . Care manager attitudes 3 10(31%) 1 (3%) 11 (18%) 
9. Charging issues 3 (9.5%) 7 (23%) 10 (16%) 
10. Capacity and competency issues 6 (18.5%) 2 (7%) 8 (13%) 
11 .Work pressures on social services staff 2 (6%) 5 (17%) 7 (11%) 
12.Lack of confidence in support 
available4 
5 (15.5%) 0 5 (9.5%) 
13.Lack of clear guidance, or lead from 
Dept of Health5 
4 (13%) 0 4 (6.5%) 
14.Ideological, fashion, change for its 
own sake 
2 (6%) 2 (7%) 4 (6.5%) 
15. Lack of political will , political 
objections 
1 (3%) 2 (7%) 3 (5%) 
\.X2 = 4.7 P< 0.05 
2.X2 = 6.0 P< 0.05 
3.X2 = 8.3 P< 0.01 
4.X2 = 5.2 P< 0.05 
5.X2 = 4.0 P< 0.05 
Most practitioners suggested that lack of general awareness about direct payments would be the 
major obstacle to the expansion of direct payments. This was also the reason often given for the 
lack of 'bottom up' pressure for the introduction of the initiative locally. 'Uncertainty', due to 
lack of reassuring answers to users' questions and lack of clear procedures for practitioners to 
follow, was perceived as a potential obstacle. Fear of change was identified and usually related 
to uncertainty. The local culture in Fletcherford was identified as a potential obstacle to the 
spread of direct payments. Some practitioners spoke positively about the trust that local people 
have in public services, others suggested that there was institutionalised paternalism in the 
relationship between the council and the community. 
A minority was cynical about the motives of management in the implementation process, 
suggesting that responses to 'top down' pressures from government were tokenistic gestures. 
They suspected that covert resistance to making direct payments an attractive, easily accessible 
option for disabled people would restrict their expansion beyond a few determined, well-
informed individuals. Significantly more providers than purchasers suggested that people would 
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be reluctant to ask for direct payments because they suspected the motives of the local authority. 
Care providers claimed that the council had justified the move from congregated day and 
residential services on the grounds of promoting community integration. However many users 
and carers had experienced the changes as reductions in the resources available. Another 
example given for users' mistrust of change was the withdrawal of 'housework' from the range 
of domiciliary services on offer. Practitioners suggested that direct payments would appear less 
attractive to users obliged to contribute on a means tested basis because charges were not 
applied consistently across all types of service. Practitioners acknowledged that they 
manipulated inconsistencies and used discretion to minimise the charges users paid. 
Practitioners speculated that the pressures of work on care managers would limit their 
opportunities to develop confidence in enabling users to access direct payments. Over-worked 
staff, might feel stressed by their inability to respond to peoples' needs in a timely and holistic 
way. They would be reluctant to spend time promoting initiatives that could imply increased 
demands on their time and knowledge base. More practitioners in purchasing roles said that the 
attitudes of care managers could obstruct the growth of direct payments. The key role of 
practitioners as ambassadors for policy initiatives was recognised generally. 
It was care managers who predicted that lack of clear guidance and a firm lead from the 
Department of Health (top down pressure) would mean that those who wanted to subvert the 
objectives of the government's policy would be able to do so. Three people suggested that lack 
of strong support from local politicians for direct payments, would mean that other obstacles 
would be difficult to overcome. Fourteen practitioners predicted that inadequate funding would 
limit the impact of the initiative. 
Four practitioners argued that direct payments would not spread beyond a few experimental 
subjects because it would become apparent that the initiative has no real value for service users 
and that it was being promoted for ideological reasons. These two 'purchasers' and two 
'providers' had maintained a consistent cynicism about the reasoning behind the introduction of 
direct payments, and believed that hardly any users would benefit. 
6.6. Summary of findings from the survey of practitioners' views in 2000 
At the outset, practitioners were generally optimistic about being involved in the introduction of 
direct payments and about the outcomes for service users. They did not share the reservations 
expressed by some senior officers but were not unduly idealistic. They recognised the possible 
problems, but felt that the potential benefits outweighed the risks. The majority expected that 
there would be a lot of local interest and that direct payments could benefit more than a small 
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minority of service users. They also foresaw that local people and voluntary groups would have 
a positive contribution to make to the development and management of a support service. 
Practitioners were enthusiastic and keen to co-operate in making a success of the initiative. This 
was largely irrespective of whether they thought it could have a detrimental effect on them 
personally, either by threatening their job security or increasing their work- load of 
responsibilities in implementing policy changes. They were generally critical of the community 
care policy of the Conservative governments, both in terms of what they perceived as its 
ideological underpinnings and its impact on public services and those who used them. Most 
practitioners identified direct payments as a way of users overcoming the negative consequences 
of the introduction of a market in community care. Only four practitioners did not think that 
New Labour was motivated at least to some extent by the aspiration of 'empowering' users as 
consumers, in extending entitlement to direct payments within the mixed economy. They saw 
New Labour's support for the policy as the Blair government adopting and pursuing the 
Conservative governments' privatisation objectives. There were practitioners who expressed 
some cynicism about the motivation and ability of Fletcherford council to implement the 
initiative effectively. Most identified potential obstacles to the spread of direct payments, which 
might arise in the planning and implementation processes within the authority. Publicity, clear 
information and straightforward procedures were seen as crucial to success. 
The findings of this survey were circulated within the authority and reported to those 
responsible for the implementation of direct payments. Planners and decision-makers were thus 
informed about the views of frontline staff on the potential of direct payments and made aware 
of the issues identified by practitioners as likely obstacles to their success and expansion. 
6.7 Discussion 
The initial comparison between the two groups was made to establish whether practitioners' 
experience and understanding of community care and direct payments varied significantly with 
their personal and professional interests. This was to establish i f there was any evidence, for 
example, of the 'knavish' behaviour and motivation assumed in contemporary welfare strategies 
(Le Grand 1997) or to support Tulloch's (1986) 'bureau maximisation' thesis, that public 
servants will seek to extend their areas of responsibility beyond the limits of efficiency. 
Practitioners participated believing, as I did, that this was an opportunity to influence the local 
response to the government's policy on direct payments. They therefore had no reason to 
disguise their concerns. There was no evidence in their responses and comments that they were 
motivated by self- interest. However Dunleavy's (1986) 'bureau shaping' theory that predicts 
senior bureaucrats will pursue privatisation, beyond the limits of cost effective resource use 
(discussed in chapter one), found support in practitioners' accounts of the local care market. As 
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in Dunleavy's model, the costs of excessive (in economic terms) privatisation in Fletcherford 
were borne not by senior bureaucrats but by rank and file workers and service users/ citizens. 
Research has shown that social workers have a key role in the implementation of direct 
payments, informing clients of their 'rights', applying rationing criteria to their 'needs' and 
assessing their 'suitability' to exercise control over their own care packages and budgets 
(Bewley 2000, Dawson 2000, Evans and Carmichael 2002). There was no evidence that social 
workers in Fletcherford in 2000 saw their involvement in the administration of cash for care as a 
backward step, reminiscent of welfare arrangements before 1948, as Glasby and Littlechild 
(2002) suggested. Practitioners were aware of official policy objectives and the majority thought 
that offering users the opportunity to manage their own care arrangements would assist progress 
towards the achievement of independence, choice and control. Their concerns were whether 
direct payments would be introduced in Fletcherford in a way that would facilitate the 
achievement of these objectives. However practitioners' accounts of the effects of the transition 
from case work to care management confirmed the analysis in the literature (Dominelli 1996, 
Hudson 2000, Postle 2001). They suggested that implementation of any initiative that was 
complicated or time-consuming could be problematic within a care management workload. 
Practitioners accepted the role of the 'market' in the context of direct payments pragmatically, 
as a means to the end of improving the care arrangements for individuals, while generally 
disagreeing with the principles of competition upon which the market reforms in community 
care were based. Like local politicians, they suggested that users would want to use direct 
payments to overcome the service deficiencies they attributed to the mixed economy. 
Practitioners' responses to the statement about resource rationing suggested that users would get 
better value for money than council purchasers, through behaviour consistent with market 
theory. This included users as purchasers prioritising the use of available resources to maximise 
their own utility, attracting new entrants to the social care labour market from their own 
communities and being able to negotiate for better value, free of the constraints on bureaucratic 
purchasers of council contracting procedures. Whether or not practitioners believed that 
community care policy was inherently under-funded, there was general agreement that 
individual service users /principals would have the skill and knowledge to make informed 
purchasing decisions i f given the freedom to manage their own care budgets. This contrasts with 
the weaknesses in community care type markets predicted in the work of Le Grand (1993) and 
Barlett and colleagues (1998) and outlined in chapter two. Practitioners' accounts supported the 
suggestion that bureaucratic purchasers/ agents are unable to judge the quality and 
appropriateness of services provided through council contracts. 
Practitioners had few expectations of 'knavish' behaviour from users or their carers (Le Grand 
1997), which is arguably the premise on which market theory rests, that is that individuals will 
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pursue their own self interests to the exclusion of others to maximise utility (Greener 2002). In 
2000 over a quarter of the practitioners predicted that users would improve the quality of their 
care by establishing relationships with staff. The consistency and compatibility of care staff 
have been identified by research into service users' views as important indicators of quality 
services. Local authority contracting arrangements nationally were generally failing to secure 
them. (Henwood 1998 and 2001, Turner 2000). 
Care managers in Fletcherford who arranged care for individuals were generally not permitted 
to trade off cost and quality considerations in purchasing decisions because they were obliged to 
commission services through the council's contract, which set an hourly rate for domiciliary 
care. Where practitioners had the authority to use specialist providers they were informed by 
reputation like their peers in Mannion and Smith's (1998) research, but reputation in this social 
context was based on users' accounts of their experiences. Practitioners felt that users would be 
able to trade off cost and quality considerations i f empowered to do so through direct payments. 
In contrast to the social workers in Lapsley and Llewellyn's (1998) research, Fletcherford 
practitioners did not use wage levels offered by independent sector providers as a crude 
indicator of quality. Rather they drew entirely on users' opinions and did not challenge the 
appropriateness of the criteria users' employed (consistency, reliability and attitude of staff). 
Even the four practitioners who had reservations about the potential outcomes of direct 
payments for service users, did not question that users were the best judges of the quality of the 
services they personally received. Practitioners used low wages to explain the recruitment and 
retention problems experienced by independent sector agencies, which they in turn blamed on 
the council's budgeting and contracting practices, as well as the profit motives of providers. 
Like the care managers observed by Knapp, Hardy and Forder (2001), it seemed that 
practitioners in Fletcherford were well placed not only to identify and respond to individual 
needs but to make judgements about the cost and quality of alternative services. However, as in 
most councils Knapp and colleagues studied, they were not budget holders and, like service 
users whose opinions they promoted, they appeared to have little influence over contracting 
decisions. 
Practitioners' regarded direct payments as an individualist model of service provision and there 
was little mention or consideration of any potential value in collective terms. Most practitioners 
expressed support for direct payments and many were enthusiastic at the prospect of being 
involved in their introduction. However their aspirations were fairly modest and couched in 
terms of improving the quality of life of individuals rather than shifting the balance of power 
from political and bureaucratic decision- makers to local disabled people. Some practitioners 
drew a distinction between the additional choice and control that users could exercise over their 
own care arrangements as 'paying customers' and the power that having real influence over 
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local policy development and services strategies would imply. This resonated with Jordan's 
(1999) distinction between consumerism and empowerment. A quarter used the language of 
individual rights and citizenship, together with the concept of empowerment. Practitioners did 
not think that most users seeking direct payments, would want to combine with others to run 
their own services. Nevertheless they felt that there were articulate individuals and users 
running local voluntary groups that could, and should, be involved in the development and 
delivery of support for direct payment users. They thus distinguished that there are levels of 
participation (Arnstein, 1971) as well as alternative models of participation, consumerist versus 
democratic (Beresford and Croft, 1993) appropriate to different individuals. 
Practitioners recognised that the degree to which individuals would welcome greater 
involvement in the decision-making that affected their lives would vary with their circumstances 
and experiences. They distinguished potential 'active' from 'passive' citizens and were 
concerned about the 'pawn'- like acquiescence of a minority of service users and their 
vulnerability to abuse by instrumentally motivated 'knaves' (Le Grand 1997). They were also 
worried that people may be deterred from requesting direct payments if, in addition to managing 
their care budget and organising their care, they would be required to assume the responsibilities 
of being employers. This concern was not usually framed within a 'care discourse' that 
describes service users as irresponsible or unable to manage their own affairs. Instead they 
suggested that this reluctance would be because users and carers were already overwhelmed 
with the stress of coping with illness, pain and impairment along with lack of relevant 
experience, rather than lack of competence. Thus those who said that they would choose to have 
a direct payment to meet their own care needs explained that their employment experience 
would have privileged them with appropriate knowledge and confidence. Direct payments were 
also discussed as a means of enhancing personal development. Fletcherford practitioners 
therefore supported the implications of the work of Taylor-Gooby (2001), Barron (2001), 
Hoggett (2001) and Greener (2002) that users' ability and inclination to take greater 
responsibility for their care arrangements would depend on their past experiences. 
Like the health minister (quoted in chapter five), the practitioners who did not agree that users 
should be able to get direct payments in lieu of health care, prioritised the collective value of 
equality over individual choice and control over service delivery. Money in lieu of services was 
generally regarded as a potential source of empowerment and improvement in social care, re-
dressing social injustice brought about through the commodification of care relationships into 
hourly units through the mixed economy. However cash for health care was perceived as having 
negative implications for services, causing social injustice by undermining collective values and 
provision. 
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The government intends to increase 'choice' for service users in its overall plan for modernising 
social services (Dept of health 1998a 2 .62). Choice is promoted as a desirable policy outcome 
and the weight it is given in policy guidance on direct payments is increased in the most recent 
version: 
'The government's aim in promoting direct payments is to increase users' independence 
and choice by giving them control over the way the services they receive are delivered. ' 
(Dept of Health 2002, para 7) 
This echoes the original community care guidance issued by the Thatcher government: 
'Promoting choice and independence underlies all the government's proposals' (D.H.S.S. 1989, 
1.8) 
It is not always clear whether choice in the context of community care policy is promoted as a 
means or an end. Choice in the Conservative's approach appeared to be an essential element of 
a consumerist strategy intended to impose market discipline on providers, obliging them to offer 
the service customers wanted at the price they were willing to pay, or risk losing their custom to 
competitors. Choice may be a pragmatic means to the end of ensuring that users can specify the 
service they want rather than be obliged to accept what is available, the 'one size fits all' 
approach condemned by Blair's government (Dept of Health 1998a, 1.7) 
In Fletcherford three quarters of the practitioners saw 'choice' as one of the potential benefits to 
be gained by users opting for direct payments, but in their responses choice was associated with 
flexibility. Choice would be the means to the modest outcome for users of being able to 
determine when and how their care is delivered and by which individuals, and to change their 
care arrangements to suit their personal circumstances. The benefit of choice for users would 
not be achieved by 'shopping around' for alternatives or individual 'exit' strategies, but by 
securing the 'best fit' to their preferences from the service arrangements they already 
experienced. 
Practitioners recognised the limitations of choice in the context of the community care market 
and their views gave validity to one critique of choice in the literature. Barnes and Prior (1995) 
argued that i f the market or any other allocation system provides what is wanted, the presence or 
absence of choice in the form of alternatives is irrelevant. Choice may be experienced as risk. 
Choice may be threatening i f the individual lacks full information about options available and 
the implications of alternative decisions. Choice may be unwelcome i f the individual has had no 
influence over the range of options offered or input into the economic and political decisions 
that set the parameters of that range and has not had the opportunity to develop skills in 
choosing. In Fletcherford practitioners felt that many users had been dis-empowered by the 
withdrawal of the public services they trusted to meet their needs and preferences to an 
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acceptable, predictable standard. Offering people the choice of a range of alternatives, that were 
the outcome of decision making processes to which they had not contributed, was not perceived 
by practitioners to be a means to the end of increased user satisfaction. Many practitioners 
seemed to agree with the councillor who suggested that choice offered by community care to 
social service clients was 'tokenistic', because they did not have the control over budgeting and 
purchasing decisions enjoyed by people able to pay for their care from their own resources 
(Chair of the Scrutiny Committee, quoted in chapter five). Practitioners, like most of the local 
Labour politicians, were of the opinion that direct payments would give people a more genuine 
choice than that offered by a range of poor quality, unreliable independent agencies. However 
they believed it was a choice many service users would have preferred not to face. 
Choice however is also promoted in policy documents and advanced in the literature as an end 
in itself, associated philosophically with individual liberty and civil rights (Barton 1993, Morris 
1993, Oliver and Barnes 1998). Practitioners in Fletcherford suggested that giving users 
recognition as people who have choices could of itself be empowering. This is not just a matter 
of the psychological well being of the 'reflexive citizen' (Giddens 1998, 2000), or a return of 
the sense of personal dignity and emotional security that practitioners suggested users lost when 
they did not feel they had any control over their care arrangements. Choice has a social 
dimension, conferring a status on the disabled person. In the accounts of practitioners this status 
seemed to have the value of the 'symbolic capital' described in Greener's (2002) critique of the 
assumptions made about agency in New Labour's social policy (discussed in chapter two). The 
habitus of the user may elicit a more responsive service in interactions with welfare agencies, 
where her status (social capital) is recognised. However practitioners demonstrated an 
awareness of the relevance of cultural capital (information) and economic capital (control over 
spending) to users' ability to get full benefit from the community care system as both consumers 
and citizens. 
Lack of information about direct payments was identified by practitioners as potentially the 
major obstacle to their spread in Fletcherford. Nevertheless, as the next chapter will reveal, 
those leading the implementation of direct payments deliberately opted for a 'low key' approach 
to publicising and launching the scheme. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Participation in planning and policy development 
'Progress will be obstructed by some ... who openly disagree with the principle of self-
determination, or with the idea that people should be the purchasers of their own 
support services But, I predict, the main and most effective threat to progress will 
come from the 'the service system' the professionals will make themselves more expert 
on self-determination than the people who originally demanded it People with 
disabilities won't be allowed and enabled to achieve self-determination; they '11 have it 
delivered to them.' Dowson (2000) 
7.0 Introduction 
An account of Fletcherford council's interpretation of the government's advice to involve 
disabled people in the development of direct payments follows. Its implications for the design of 
the local scheme are explored. During the planning process, the intermediate objectives (policy 
means) of both particpation and direct payments displaced the ultimate objectives (policy ends) 
of promoting independence, as power and status proved to be more influential than relevant 
knowledge and experience. The chapter begins 'at the top' with the government's approach to 
involving disabled people in policy development and implementation. An explanation of the 
organisational environment for the implementation of direct payments in Fletcherford follows. 
Next, a description of the two planning groups established by the council, involving service 
users and voluntary sector representatives alongside 'professionals', is presented together with 
an analysis of the progress and outcome of their deliberations. This account shows how the 
obstacles to effective policy action through participation included the potential problems 
identified by practitioners earlier and also the government's own emphasis on performance 
management and measurable results. 
7.1 Central government and participation 
Participation was central to New Labour's approach to improving policy effectiveness and drew 
on Giddens' (1998, 2000) concepts of the modern 'reflexive society' and the 'active citizen'. 
The government encouraged the participation of users in the planning and development of local 
direct payment schemes (Dept of Health 2000a). At the national level, the Department of Health 
led by example in funding an organisation run by disabled people (the National Centre for 
Independent Living) to assist. Disabled people were consulted on the proposals to extend the 
initiative and involved in the drafting of new guidance: 
' They recognised all the expertise was in the disability movement: direct payments 
developed in the disability movement. ' (Co-director of NCIL, June 2001) 
Andrew Holman, a campaigner for direct payments for people with learning difficulties, 
supported a group of users who were invited by the Department of Health to participate in the 
development of the government's National Learning Disability Strategy. Users helped produce 
131 
an accessible 'Easy Guide to Direct Payments'. Holman (2000) summarised New Labour's 
attitude in the phrase 'the listening government'. Leaders in the disability rights movement 
therefore believed that the government's efforts to ensure participation were genuine. 
'The best direct payments schemes have been developed by local authorities and users 
working together to draw up a scheme that meets local needs: (Dept of Health 2000, 11 
para. 3) 
The following account is based on: 
Table 7.1 Data Sources and Collection methods 
Method Source 
Documentary 
analysis 
Department of health policy guidance, chief officers' reports to the elected 
members on Fletcherford council and minutes of planning group meetings. 
Participant 
observation 
The 'Reference Group' responsible for key decisions on the 
implementation of direct payments; 
The 'Working Group' responsible for the development of a local support 
service; 
Meetings of senior, operational, contracts and planning managers; 
Meeting between the Planning manager (1) and the internal auditor. 
Day to day activities and discussions/ reflections on practice and policy 
issues within social services offices. 
Interviews The co-director of the National Centre for Independent Living; 
The strategic manager with lead responsibilities for policy implementation; 
The first and second planning managers with 'portfolio' responsibility for 
the implementation of direct payments; 
Senior operational managers for care management teams; 
Care management team managers including the representative on the 
Reference and Working groups; 
Local authority internal auditor, responsible for advice on policy 
development and implementation issues on the Reference Group; 
The Contracts Manager; 
Service development manager, responsible for joint health and social care 
policy issues; 
Health service managers responsible for developing policy and practice on 
joint health and social care issues; 
Practitioner representatives on the groups responsible for the introduction 
of direct payments; 
Four user and two carer representatives on the 'Working group'; 
Committee members of the local umbrella organisation for voluntary 
groups of disabled people (disabled people who were 'active citizens' in 
their community); 
The co-ordinator of the local umbrella organisation for voluntary groups of 
disabled people; 
The co-ordinator of the local voluntary organisation supporting carers; 
The manager of the local voluntary sector development agency. 
7.2 The organisational context 
As predicted in the policy studies literature discussed in chapter 3, the organisational context 
proved to be relevant to the process of implementing direct payments. 
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My impression, from observations of day-to-day activities and relationships within Fletcherford 
social services and interviews with staff, was that it was a supportive working environment. 
Power struggles and conflict between different teams or interest groups were not apparent and 
there were no general complaints of low morale within 'care management'. There was no 
obvious animosity to management or resistance to the changes promoted by central government. 
Most staff said that they supported the proposals in 'Modernising Social Services' and believed 
that they were consistent with the values, aims and practice of the local authority. Nevertheless 
three factors interacted to affect the operation of social services and had an impact on the policy 
implementation process. 
7.2.1 'Implementation overload' 
Team managers said in interview that they had difficulty managing the current demands for 
services properly, while preparing for change. They were therefore obliged to 'choose' what to 
focus on according to their own priorities. They all mentioned the following pressures. 
The move to greater integration with health services: 
'At the moment there is so much going on with integration and the National Service 
Framework that I am just not giving direct payments much thought.' (Team manager 2) 
The higher levels of dependency of social service clients with the move from hospital care to 
supporting people at home: 
'The government says we have too many people in residential care, we are told to 
reduce the numbers. We have a history of heavy industry, asbestosis, chronic chest 
problems. We have a lot of very poorly people and we are told we must maintain them 
in the community.' (Team manager 4) 
The pressure to demonstrate the achievement of performance targets: 
'Nothing is set up properly to begin with. It is done quickly for expediency, but I am 
being asked to produce figures all the time.' (Team manager 1) 
Direct payments were seen by some managers as just one of a series of policy initiatives with 
laudable goals: 
' Generally the underlying aims are better services, more flexibility, more options.' 
(Team manager 7) 
Managers felt that requests for direct payments should be referred to more skilled staff, but they 
all described a shortage of experienced practitioners to whom they could allocate the more 
complex work: 
'If staff do not sound confident it will put people off.' (Team manager 1) 
They also described the difficulties in keeping staff updated on developments, for example. 
7've got [the information team manager] coming to the team meeting to talk about 
how we get the new assessments and care plans onto the computer. [The director] 
wants to come to the next one to talk about re-organisation. I do not know when we will 
have a chance to hear about direct payments' (Team manager 1) 
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One manager summed up the tensions all his peers had identified: 
7 feel we are at a watershed. Social work practice has moved towards technical, 'tick 
box' responses over the last ten years. With community care there has been a loss of 
long term planning and relationships, the short-term focus on immediate needs means it 
is a revolving door for referrals. We are now moving idealistically in the right 
direction, but I am worried we are setting ourselves up for failure with grand designs 
and unrealistic time scales. If we have not got the resources to match the ideals, it is 
just rhetoric.' 
(Team manager 6) 
7.2.2 Re-organisation and personnel changes 
An internal re-organisation of care management and 'commissioning' functions, took place 
between April 2000 and 2002. This was explained as follows: 
'Local strategies and national policy requirements demand an 
increasingly sophisticated approach to commissioning, both to 
assess need and ensure that services are meeting the policy 
objectives of the personal social services and particular policy initiatives.... 
Central government over recently years has frequently imposed very tight 
time scales for social/ health care initiatives .' 
(Chief Officers' Report to Social Services Board, March 2000) 
Senior posts were usually filled through internal promotion. Staff working for shrinking 'in-
house' services were redeployed to vacant care management posts and the department recruited 
new practitioners from social work students on placement. However re-organisation in response 
to policy change contributed to recruitment and retention problems and increasing demands for 
training and information. 
Policy changes created new opportunities in the implementation of the government's 
'modernisation' programme nationally; many staff moved for promotion. Posts not filled by 
internal applicants sometimes remained vacant for months. Many care management 
practitioners were inexperienced. Managers needed to ensure a through-flow of clients to be 
able to respond to emergencies. Referrals were 'juggled', balancing pressure to meet 
performance targets and fulfill statutory duties against the imperative to develop skills in new 
staff. 
Changes in key personnel had implications for continuity in the planning and implementation of 
direct payments, during these two years. The resignation of the planning manager, with lead 
responsibilities for direct payments, in August 2000 was critical. Her post remained unfilled 
until September 2001. Other changes in key personnel included the director of social services, 
both heads of operations, four (of six) team managers in care management and the contracts 
manager responsible for direct payments. There was also turnover in the practitioner teams. In 
learning disability services only one of the original care managers remained in post in April 
2002 and the mental health team struggled to recruit and retain staff to carry out statutory duties. 
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A problem that was exacerbated during this period was the loss of skill and experience reported 
elsewhere with local authority re-organisation (Craig and Manthorpe 1999). Fletcherford, as a 
new unitary authority, had begun to deliver social services with staff re-deployed from other 
council departments. Managers with social work backgrounds commented that those leading the 
planning and policy implementation processes had little awareness of community care users' 
needs and the complexities of the social work/ care management role. 
'On the planning side I am worried about the lack of people with a social work 
background... .or 'people' knowledge and skills. Lack of user focus in planning is one of 
the reasons I'm leaving.' (Planning manager 1, in interview, August 2000) 
The planning manager's resignation meant that the strategic manager was the only social service 
officer with continuous responsibilities for direct payments throughout the planning and 
implementation period. 
7.2.3. The pressure to perform 
In the autumn of 1999, the Social Service Inspectorate's basic 'position statement' (performance 
report) had revealed that Fletcherford was not making direct payments. New government 
guidance instructed councils to consider requests for direct payments, whether or not they had a 
'scheme' already (Dept. of Health 2000a). A survey commissioned by the Association of 
Directors of Social Services (Jones 2000) revealed that Fletcherford would be one of the last 
nine of 171 local authorities in England and Wales to introduce direct payments. The strategic 
manager felt that the pressure was mounting; ' we are going to be criticised if we do not get a 
basic direct payments scheme up and running' (July 2000). She was given responsibility for the 
introduction of direct payments. She had hoped gradually to delegate responsibilities for leading 
the process to the planning manager, who had a particular interest in disability rights issues but 
the latter's resignation in August 2000 would prevent this. 
7.3 Planning Groups- Membership and Terms of Reference 
In April 2000 the director of social services won political approval, to establish two planning 
groups to develop a direct payments scheme. The tasks involved were split between them. 
The Re ference Group was composed of a core and peripheral membership. The core members 
were senior strategic, planning, contracts and operational managers from the social services 
department. A service user and two voluntary sector managers, as well managers from the 
community health and primary care trusts, represented views from outside the authority. 
The intention was that the core group would draw on the specialist advice of professionals from 
other council departments who could also represent 'corporate' concerns. These 'peripheral' 
members included the principal solicitor, the head of internal audit and the social services 
principal finance manager. The 'Cabinet' was asked to nominate a councillor to join the 
Reference Group, but none attended (Director's Reports to Cabinet, April and August 2000). 
The responsibilities of the reference group were: 
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'Developing internal systems, overseeing the contracting process, establishing the 
scheme, reporting to Departmental Management Team and to elected members' 
(Director's Reports to Cabinet, April 2000). 
The Working Group was composed of community care users and carers; two voluntary sector 
managers; the strategic manager, the planning manager, a care management team leader and two 
care managers. The responsibilities of the Working Group were: 
'Researching and developing an appropriate direct payments model, researching and 
developing the preferred model of support scheme, overseeing wider consultation, 
commenting on the development of internal systems, reporting regularly to the 
reference group. '(Director's Reports to Cabinet, April 2000). 
The rationale for the separation of tasks between two groups was to make effective use of 
management resources needed for the whole policy implementation programme. Senior 
operational managers were too busy with wider 'modernisation'' responsibilities to commit time 
to the detailed implementation of one initiative: 
'Having a reference group was suggested by the assistant director, because senior 
officers are involved in so many meetings they should not have to get involved in 'nitty 
grittty' stuff (Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
The strategic manager said that she hoped to encourage wider ownership of the responsibility 
for introducing direct payments, by involving senior operational managers in key decisions. She 
did not want direct payments to be seen as just another initiative that could be left to policy and 
planning staff to implement. 
'At the end of the day, it is going to be their staff (care managers) that sell direct 
payments to users and their budgets that pay for them. ' (Strategic manager, Resources 
and Planning, March 2000) 
It was also intended to spare users and carers from the tedium of discussions about the 
development of the internal procedures and systems required to introduce direct payments. 
Examples of 'internal' issues included: the procedures for arranging direct payments, the 
method of calculating the rate, and the wording of documentation. 
7 think dividing the groups the way we have is logical, in that there is a lot of dry 
internal stuff that service users do not really want to get bogged down in.' (Planning 
manager 1, June 2000) 
The Planning manager hoped that users and carers would get the opportunity to comment on the 
proposals for developing internal systems. 
' There are going to be some crucial decisions made in the reference group that service 
users need to be able to comment on. I have hoped all along that even though the 
reference group will work up the technicalities they do not see it as a rigid divide. There 
should be dialogue and people should be very much involved in the contracting 
process.' (Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
It was also recognised that senior officers might feel uncomfortable about discussing the 
implications of alternative approaches to implementing direct payments, in the presence of 
people who could be personally affected by their deliberations. 
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' / think that it is a pragmatic approach to some extent in that if it was just one big 
group it would be difficult and officers would feel more threatened' [by the presence of 
service users]. (Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
Nevertheless the rationale for splitting the implementation tasks between two groups was not 
clear to everyone. The manager of one of the two local voluntary organisations who regularly 
attended the both groups, said that she thought that all those involved could have been sharing 
their concerns and developing the local response together. 
' Why two groups talking about the same things?' (Users Voluntary Organisation 
manager, in interview May 2001) 
7.4 The Reference Group 
The group met nine times between June 2000 and September 2001. 
The first meeting was planned to inform a broad group of 'stakeholders' of the council's 
intention to introduce direct payments and was the best attended with ten people from an invited 
membership of sixteen. Attendance fell subsequently and the average number of people at each 
meeting was six. Excluding the strategic manager, who chaired all nine meetings, each member 
attended three times on average. When senior operational managers from social services failed 
to attend early Reference Group meetings the membership was extended to more 'junior' staff, a 
team manager and social worker, who were also members of the Working Group. Attendance 
still fell and the Reference Group was eventually amalgamated with the Working Group 
following an aborted meeting in September 2001 when only two people attended. 
7.4.1.Data from observations and interviews with participants 
At the outset the planning manager had anticipated two problems with the operation of the 
Reference Group. The first was that senior operational managers, would be too pre-occupied 
with 'bigger issues' to prioritise attendance, despite their knowledge of community care locally 
and awareness of users' experiences. Her fears were realised in their regular absence from 
meetings. The senior operational managers explained their poor attendance by reference to the 
demands on their time from the large number of policy initiatives generated by 'Modernising 
Social Services' (Dept. of Health 1998a) and subsequent legislation. These managers, who 
voiced broad agreement with the principals of direct payments, seemed to decide that the 
initiative was not central enough to the overall policy programme to merit priority over 
competing work pressures. The planning manager did not expect that senior operational 
managers would deliberately obstruct the process of introducing direct payments: 
'Amongst senior management I have not picked up any hostility to it, I think people are 
still finding their way through it, but I do not hear anybody particularly championing 
it... I get a sense of "I suppose we have to do this".' (Planning manager, August 2000) 
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Poor attendance at the Reference Group was a continual source of concern for the strategic 
manager, particularly as those who did attend most consistently were also members of the 
Working Group. She was the only member of the social services management team who 
regularly attended direct payments planning group meetings and so kept aware of developments 
and issues raised. Therefore when there was conflict with other senior managers, who were 
resistant to the introduction of direct payments, she could not call on much support from her 
peers in operational management. Although they were in favour of the principles of direct 
payments, they were not sufficiently informed to address counter arguments. Health service 
managers attended more frequently but not regularly enough to contribute an inter-agency 
perspective to the planning deliberations. Most of the people who attended Reference Group 
meetings appeared to be there to give token support to the initiative and to be updated on 
progress, rather than to play an active part in planning. 
The planning manager's second concern was that there were senior officers in the authority who 
had ideological objections to the government's policy, and who would use the decision making 
processes to obstruct progress or to dilute the effects. 
7 think the solicitor is going to be like a dog with a stick. I think she is going to be a 
pain in the neck, because she is so down on it so she is looking for problems.' (Planning 
manager 1, August 2000) 
The director and assistant director agreed that the contributions of two senior professionals, the 
principal solicitor and the head of internal audit, were crucial to the successful implementation 
of direct payments because of their influence on councillors. At the beginning of first Reference 
Group meeting the solicitor asserted that the extension of direct payments was being imposed 
inappropriately on the council by central government. She referred to the 1997 'consultation'; 
'the good people of Fletcherford were consulted and have very wisely said no thanks'. The 
solicitor also suggested that criminals would be attracted to the town by direct payments. Her 
opposition set the tone for this and subsequent meetings she attended, placing the strategic and 
planning manager on the defensive, having continually to justify the decision to introduce direct 
payments rather than to focus on the practical issues of implementation. 
This planning manager's approach to resistance was similar to that of her director, who had 
'sold' the initiative to local politicians with the assurance that 'zr will not have much impact' 
(see chapter 5). She similarly tried to defuse opposition, but with reservations: 
7 do not like selling it that way: "don't worry take up is usually low ". That is generally 
how it is, but it's not what I hope for. I hope there is a very high take-up and I hope it is 
going to have an impact on services. It may affect people's jobs, but my view is at the 
end of the day we are here to protect service users, we are not about protecting 
people's jobs. I know that is a simplistic view but that is where I stand with it.' 
(Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
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The planning manager also expected covert resistance from the contract team in social services, 
because their manager had repeatedly queried why the department was introducing direct 
payments when the council had 'a power, not a duty'. She suggested that this resistance was due 
to lack of understanding of the needs, preferences and situations of community care service 
users amongst contracting staff. The strategic manager seemed committed to the principles of 
direct payments. She was however concerned to avoid any conflict in the Reference Group that 
could lead to the withdrawal of the (however luke-warm) support of powerful colleagues: 
'She (the strategic manager) tries to appease the solicitor to keep her on board and I do 
not think she is going to be kept to her role, [the solicitor] confuses her role with her 
opinion about a whole range of things she is not qualified to have an opinion on and 
there is other expertise in the room that is not used. ' 
(Planning manager 1, August 2000) 
The strategic manager however offered an alternative explanation for her response to the 
solicitor. ' [the solicitor] just wants to protect people. She is worried about leaving people 
vulnerable." (Strategic manager, September 2000). Another manager suggested that the 
solicitor's behaviour reflected a 'risk aversion' typical of social actors in similar roles: 'Local 
authority solicitors are not risk takers. If they were they would be in private practice, making 
loads of money.' (Operational lead manager, September 2000) 
The auditor also had reservations about the wisdom of passing public money to service users to 
arrange their own services. He expressed the support for collectivist principles that the council 
should be directly providing services of the quality and type that people prefer, rather than 
abandoning users to the community care market. He was concerned that users with extra money 
could be vulnerable to exploitation. 
'We may no longer have the legal responsibility [for direct payment users] but we are 
morally and ethically responsible for making sure people are properly cared for.... ' 
(Head of Internal Audit, Reference Group meeting, June 2000) 
Nevertheless the planning manager was able to alleviate the auditor's anxieties, by providing 
him with the relevant guidance (CIPFA 1997). She met him separately to address his concerns 
with explanations of how other councils had dealt with potential risks. The auditor accepted 
these 'appeals to reason' and evidence that conflicted with his original views, suggesting that 
his own objections were not ideological. He continued however to be cynical about the 
usefulness of most central government guidance in policy implementation: 
'It is basically 'coveryour back' legislation by this and the last government. Laying it 
down but virtually impossible to do anything with it.' [Auditor ]* 
The auditor explained that while he would have preferred to see effort going into improving the 
council's own services for all, he could appreciate the potential benefits for some individuals. 
The auditor's 'paternalistic' attitude to service users did not seem to be based on pre-judgements 
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about the capacity and probity of social services clients, but rather about the general public who 
are not trained accountants and who he referred to as 'civilians'. 
1 appreciate the philosophy, but whenever civilians are involved in handling 
money it is a nightmare. We audit voluntary and community groups as a favour. 
From my experience of civilians, to expect them to do monthly reconciliation, 
filling in time sheets etc is quite daunting. Most do not even reconcile their 
bank statements.' [Auditor]* 
The auditor reassured the planning manager that despite his personal reservations his 
department would not be deliberately obstructive or demand rigorous monitoring procedures 
that might deter people from using direct payments: 
'We are not trying to put barriers, we are not going to stop you, we are not going to be 
over critical... I am in favour of keeping it simple. It would be a shame to put people off' 
because of the paperwork' [Auditor]* 
The planning manager was less successful in eliciting the co-operation of the solicitor, whose 
unwavering attachment to her original objections to direct payments appeared to be based on a 
'care discourse' (Morris 1993). The strategic and planning manager tried to allay her concerns 
with examples of successful practice in other areas, however her response was always that she 
was not interested in what happened anywhere else, and that her role was to protect the 
Fletcherford interests. The solicitor, despite being a 'peripheral member', attended more 
Reference Group meetings than senior operational managers. Her presence ensured that her 
particular interests dominated the meeting. However low attendance by key decision- makers 
meant that proposals for local policies and procedures for direct payments were developed 
outside the group and brought forward for ratification. While the Reference Group appeared to 
have decreasing significance, it was still attended by community representatives from the 
Working Group. The strategic manager tried to make all members of the group feel comfortable 
and to encourage them to contribute to discussions. However the service user, who usually 
spoke confidently in the Working Group, rarely spoke. He explained: 
T felt most of the discussion was over my head, I did not know what the solicitor was 
talking about most of the time. I am sure she knows her stuff but it meant nothing to me, 
but I hung on in there.' (User representative, in interview, December 2001) 
Ironically this man, as the co-ordinator of an Information Service for the local disabled 
community, was one of the people on the Reference Group with the most knowledge of direct 
payments. He also had several years' experience of using community care services and therefore 
had the ability to judge the practical implications of the 'implementation issues' the group was 
intended to address. Furthermore he was identified in interviews by many council staff as their 
main source of information on direct payments. 
* 9k 
Observation of meeting between Planning manager and Auditor July 2000. 
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The planning groups combined to hear a presentation by the Support Service (to be discussed 
below). Despite the presence of several service users the solicitor explained her concerns about 
passing on responsibility for the management of public money to individuals through direct 
payments: 
' We can assume these people are not used to having a lot of money; 
if they were they would not be coming to us for services' (Solicitor, January 2001) 
For this council 'expert', the selective/ residual principles on which social services had been 
founded continued to stigmatise their users and support a 'care discourse'. 
7.5. The Working Group 
One of the major tasks allocated to the Working Group was; 
'Researching and developing the preferred model of support scheme,'' (Director's 
Report to Cabinet, April 2000). 
The original planning manager had hoped that Working Group members would have an active 
part in developing a support service in partnership with a local voluntary group: 
7 mean inviting a few people on to the working group is one thing, but that is not 
enough. We need capacity building with a local organisation to possibly take on the 
support service' (Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
However before the group first met, senior managers in social services had begun discussions 
about commissioning an organisation based in a neighbouring authority (Macville) to support 
direct payment users in Fletcherford. The Head of Contracting recommended this in preference 
to going through the process of developing a direct payment scheme in partnership with local 
people as recommended in government guidance (Dept. of Health 2000a). 
7.5.1. Participation 
There were six users and two carers invited to join the Working Group, out of a total 
membership of sixteen. There were two voluntary sector representatives, the managers of the 
Users' Voluntary Organisation and the Carers' Group, and six social services employees: the 
strategic manager, the planning manager, a contracts manager, a social work team manager and 
two social workers. The eight paid staff and one of the users were members of both planning 
groups. Because more senior council staff were members of the Reference Group only, it was 
local people and senior officers who were separated by the division of tasks between the two 
groups. 
Representatives of users of services for people with physical disabilities, sensory impairments, 
learning disabilities and mental health problems, volunteered to participate. The Carers' Group 
nominated a carer and one user brought her husband. There was no older person on the group. 
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However the carer of two older people, who were waiting for direct payments, eventually 
attended two meetings. The planning manager explained how she was able to capitalise on 'top-
down' pressure for user participation. 
' With direct payments, it could have been a fight, getting so many users and carers on 
the working group, but I have been able to back it up with so many government 
initiatives it makes it easier to give that legitimacy to working that way.' [Planning 
manager 1, June 2000] 
The planning manager visited each person at home before the first meeting and identified any 
special needs. She set up a 'buddy system', which meant that each user and carer had the 
individual support of a paid worker. Travelling expenses, were reimbursed. Users were also 
encouraged to bring their own support workers. They were given background information on 
direct payments through a variety of media, and they heard about experiences of direct 
payments from disabled people from other areas. The extent of the efforts made to facilitate 
participation was recognised as unusual by the representative of the Users' Voluntary 
Organisation: 
'It is hard work including disabled people, arranging transport, access, assistance etc. 
They usually hold big one- off consultation events but the agenda is set by social 
services.' (Interview, May 2001) 
The strategic manager supported the planning manager's efforts to ensure that user participation 
was meaningful. However by the first meeting of the Working Group in August 2000, the 
planning manager had given notice that she was leaving. She was concerned that without her 
contribution, senior management would choose to buy in a support service developed by another 
authority. While this would relieve the pressure to demonstrate progress in introducing direct 
payments, it would effectively deprive local people of the opportunity to be involved in the 
development of their own scheme. 
' / am worried that [Fletcherford] may just go in with another authority for convenience 
sake rather than because it is the right thing to do. I see it as part of the development of 
a whole range of things in terms of capacity building in communities and individuals, 
but nobody else seems to be looking at it in that way. It is just "lets have a scheme... 
pay someone to do that and forget it" ' (Planning manager, August 2000) 
The first planning manager thus saw user participation as more than an end in itself, but as a 
learning and confidence building opportunity. Participation could give local people the skills 
and knowledge to develop their roles as the 'active citizens' of the third way ideal. As she had 
explained in an earlier interview: 
' Direct payments are an excellent example of people doing things for themselves It 
can develop all kinds of skills in people that can be transferable to jobs, that sort of 
thing. I do not think people have twigged to that whole, very important by- product.' 
(Planning manager 1, June 2000) 
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7.5.2 Attendance 
The Working Group met fifteen times between August 2000 and May 2002. Meetings were 
always better attended than those of the Reference Group, with 100% attendance at the first 
meeting and over half at five others. This was due to the regular presence of social services 
staff and voluntary sector representatives. Their average attendance was 8.5 meetings each. The 
voluntary sector representatives were the best attenders at both planning groups. The attendance 
of users and carers fell steadily and most significantly after the introduction of the support 
service. Only one user attended from March 2001, and no users attended from November 2001. 
The rest of the users and carers attended an average of 2.5 meetings each. After the two groups 
merged there was no further representation from the local community. Support service staff 
began to report to meetings from March 2001. 
The atmosphere was very relaxed at the early meetings. People were given the opportunity to 
ask questions and to explore their concerns and preferences for a support scheme and seemed 
comfortable exchanging views. Payment rates were an issue of particular concern to users from 
the beginning. At the fourth meeting the Strategic Manager advised the group that the council 
was considering bringing an organisation based in another area to provide the support service in 
Fletcherford, but that they would be invited to hear a presentation before the contract was 
awarded. The Macville based support service made its presentation at the following meeting. I 
will discuss the conduct and content of this meeting to illustrate how it represented a critical 
point in the implementation process, in that the nature of community 'participation' in the 
development of the direct payments scheme changed. 
7.5.3. Enter the 'Experts' 
The manager of the Macville based support service gave a presentation to the Direct Payments 
Planning Groups. Her objective was to 'sell' her expertise in the hope of winning the contract 
from the council to support direct payment users in Fletcherford. She therefore needed to 
convince potential flinders that direct payments were sufficiently complex to warrant buying in 
expertise from an outside agency and that her organisation had the technical knowledge 
required. It was therefore understandable that her presentation was focused on what were the 
usual concerns of council managers and couched in technical language or jargon. 
The solicitor was present and dominated this meeting, interrupting the flow of the presentation 
with questions usually on legal points, her own area of expertise. For example her first question 
was about the liability of direct payment users as employers. The support service manager 
responded that a standard condition of receiving a direct payment was that users obtained 
'employers' liability insurance'. The solicitor seemed to disregard this response, announcing to 
the group that: 
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'It is most unfair to employees. A contract of employment is based on mutual trust, you 
expect them to be honest and loyal, they expect you to protect them' 
(Solicitor, meeting, January 2001) 
The implication of this statement seemed to be that she was not convinced that direct payment 
users could be trusted to be responsible employers. 
The solicitor continued to dominate the subsequent discussion with legal issues around capacity 
that clearly did not engage the rest of the group. The support service manager ultimately seemed 
to satisfy the solicitor. She gave assurances that her organisation would ensure that only people 
who were 'capable' would receive a direct payment, although restricting access had not been 
discussed as one of the duties of the support service. Only two other members of the group 
asked a question: the social worker who asked about the procedures for arranging a direct 
payment and a senior health service manager. The latter asked how health and social care needs 
were distinguished elsewhere, in the light of the reviews of 'continuing care' responsibilities 
happening nationally. The manager replied that people with health care needs were excluded 
from direct payments in Macville, and acknowledged that this was the only other authority she 
knew. This brief response from the 'expert' on direct payments was assumed to have 
implications for potential users in Fletcherford and influenced senior managers' expectations of 
the limitations on their use. It would be an obstacle to be overcome by practitioners arranging 
direct payments for people with complex needs. 
The interaction between the support service manager and the solicitor set the tone for 
subsequent meetings. Although the solicitor's role was advisory, she dominated the discussion 
with questions that seemed intended to test the 'expertise' of the support service. The reason 
given to the planning groups that Fletcherford contracted in a ready made scheme, was to short 
cut some of the development work and avoid having to design their own information materials. 
The manager produced a file of guidance notes her service had produced on direct payments 
that had passed muster in the other area. However the solicitor was not prepared to accept that 
materials produced for another authority would be adequate and seemed determined to ensure 
that her own 'expertise' controlled the development of the scheme in Fletcherford, as the 
following discussion illustrated: 
Solicitor 'You've got the information wrong on Enduring Powers of Attorney." 
Support service manager ' We spent four weeks checking it out with the lawyers, but if 
you want us to say something else, you tell us what you want us to say.' 
Solicitor ' / would like to see the information you give on employment. But I want to see 
a balance, all the disadvantages of being an employer. The responsibilities spelled out.' 
Strategic manager 'There is an advantage in having a common approach across the 
two authorities, using the same material' 
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Support service manager We can provide whatever material you want.' 
(Reference Group Meeting 6, March 2001) 
This exchange demonstrated how the solicitor sought opportunities to deter people from 
requesting direct payments by making them appear very onerous to manage. It is also an 
example of how the support service manager deferred to the solicitor, even when she believed 
she was wrong, despite the offer of support from the strategic manager. It was recognised by 
social services staff that the solicitor was opposed to direct payments and would do whatever 
she could to obstruct their development and to limit their impact. Like social service managers, 
the support service manager's approach was to try to 'appease' this powerful opponent. 
I do not know what the support service manager's approach to introducing her organisation to 
users and carers would have been had she not been subjected to the barrage of hostile questions 
by the solicitor at the first meeting. However in subsequent meetings with the Working Group 
she continued to use technical jargon to which the users and carer present did not respond. For 
example she promised that her Support Service would provide 'capacity building', 'signposting' 
and 'additionality', and nobody asked questions. The use of terms that were meaningless to 
members of the public clearly acted as barriers to their participation. 
When the Working Group was given the opportunity to comment on the presentation made by 
the Macville based support service,18 they did not do so. Conversations with participants 
afterwards revealed that they accepted that the decision to commission support from this 
organisation was a 'fait accompli'. The discussion focused on two concerns shared by users and 
practitioners. The first was that direct payments could be subject to 'ceilings', that is pre-
determined limits on the amount to be spent on a care package. The second was that re-
assessments against revised 'continuing care' criteria could exclude people from getting direct 
payments. Users and carers understood the practical implications of these issues, just as they did 
with the issue of the direct payment 'rate', and felt qualified to comment. 
In March 2001 the strategic manager presented a draft report to the group she had prepared for 
the approval of councillors. Her report recommended that Fletcherford council contract with the 
Macville based support service and introduce a direct payment scheme using the model 
developed in the other authority, buying in two days of a support worker's time. The strategic 
manager explained that the proposal was to contract through a neighbouring authority for a year 
'just to get a fairly modest scheme up and running'. She maintained that the work would be put 
Although the Support Service did not have the name of the town in its title, it was generally referred to 
as the 'Macville scheme' and its manager as the 'Macville woman'. 
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out to tender after a year and local organisations would then have the opportunity to apply for 
the contract. 
'It gives us a year to see how it goes, to sort out teething problems. It means that 
support will be there for the first few brave users.' Strategic manager, Working Group 
meeting February 2001. 
At this meeting it was also announced that a support service worker had been appointed without 
the involvement of the Fletcherford planning group members. There was no dissent but there 
was never more than one service user at subsequent meetings. It was apparent that the real 
decision making processes were occurring outside of the planning groups. 
Once the council accepted the proposals in the strategic manager's report in April 2001, the 
Working Group was invited to plan an event to publicise the introduction of the scheme. The 
strategic manager said that a 'low key' launch would be appropriate so the only matters left for 
discussion were the invitation list and venue. The minutes recorded: 
'It was agreed that it was not appropriate to have a high profile 
launch as the scheme could be flooded with referrals which could 
potentially cause a bottle neck.' ( May 2001) 
The 'launch' of the Fletcherford direct payment scheme was held at a pleasant, accessible 
venue, and was well attended by a small invited audience of service users and carers, 
representatives of voluntary organisations and care managers. It was reported by a paragraph on 
page four of the council's own free quarterly newsletter. There was no press release to the local 
paper or other publicity. 
From the introduction of the support service to the Working Group, the discussion at meetings 
was led by its manager. The small number who attended addressed their questions and concerns 
to her. She was perceived as the expert on direct payments who had been given the 
responsibility for developing the local scheme, although the decisions on key issues were made 
outside of the Working Group, usually within the social services senior management team. Her 
contributions were always couched in technical language. The focus of discussion was on the 
issues of contention (discussed below). These were issues on which members of the Working 
Group were in broad agreement and which they considered were obstructing the successful 
implementation of direct payments. 
'There are small pockets ofpeople going off making changes without coming to this 
group. The strategic manager and I are completely by-passed How can we explain this 
to service users, like J who put so much work in to the group?' Planning Manager 2, 
Working Group meeting, February 2002 
Nevertheless even within the reduced Working Group the role and status of community 
representatives as full participants was not fully accepted. As the Support Service manager 
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commented to the Planning manager (2) at one meeting, which was attended by no users, carers 
or voluntary sector representatives: 
'It's very useful discussing things without users and the voluntary sector. Can we meet 
outside the Working Group in future to be discuss things which could be quite 
inflamatory?' (Working Group meeting, December 2001) 
This apparent denial of the 'expertise' and the value of the contribution of people who actually 
used community care services went unchallenged and presented a stark contrast to the 
experiences of disabled people 'participating' in policy -action at the national level (described 
under 7.1). 
The Macville based service was awarded the contract to provide support to direct payment users 
in Fletcherford for another year from April 2002. At the final meeting of the Working Group in 
May 2002 it was agreed that the support service would take forward the responsibilities of 
developing direct payments in Fletcherford, although the support worker was still funded for 
just two days a week. Local organisations would not have the opportunity to compete in a 
tendering process for the contract for another year. At that meeting the planning manager 2 
described how a nearby authority had been criticised by an S.S.I./ Audit Commission Joint 
Review because it had not involved users in the development of its direct payment scheme. 
Lack of user involvement was recognised as an issue in the minutes: 
'[Planning manager 2] discussed with the group how to involve users and carers in 
direct payments. Initially service users and carers had attended the Working Group, 
however attendance has declined. 
[The support service worker informed the meeting about ]a group that had been 
established [in another town, to give] ... users, carers and personal assistants the 
opportunity to discuss issues regarding direct payments, and to meet with other people 
using this service.... This would be a way to involve service users and empower them to 
make choices and decisions.' (Minutes of Working Group meeting, May 2002) 
The part time support service worker was therefore left with the task of 'involving users' in 
future by facilitating a 'peer support' group focused on individual problems. 
7.5.4. Working Group members' accounts 
7.5.4. J. 'Professionals' 
Paid members of the Working Group (from social services and the voluntary sector) 
expressed disappointment at how little local people had been allowed to participate in the 
decision-making processes in the introduction of direct payments. 
'The opportunity for users and voluntary sector to have an input at an early stage has 
been missed. It seems to miss the point of direct payments being about choice and 
control. ' (U.V.O. representative May 2001) 
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'Decisions are made outside the Working Group, and disabled people are not involved 
in the private meetings. People do not see the point in coming. They think it is better to 
meet separately than be dominated by the professionals'' (Carers' group representative) 
The 'professional' participants had expected the group to be involved in the design of a support 
service to be developed locally and eventually to be involved in the appointment of the staff. 
They thought that local voluntary groups would be interested in running a direct payments 
support service. 
'It is not just about the involvement of local people in developing or selecting a scheme, 
but the whole question of ownership. You know what Fletcherford people are like, if it is 
not local, they will not want it.' (Practitioner representative to the Working Group) 
The Users' Voluntary Organisation representative was also disappointed that no attempt had 
been made to recruit a local disabled person as a direct payments support worker. The 
'expertise' of disabled people appeared to merit their inclusion in consultations and as 
volunteers but not paid employment. 
' There are plenty of very able disabled people who work for us on a voluntary basis. 
People with qualifications and experience, they are reliable, enthusiastic, committed.., 
What did for me was when I mentioned the shortage of disabled parking at [the town 
hall] and I was told it was not necessary. Don't they have disabled people working 
there? There are fourteen thousand people with disabilities in the town..' ( August 
2001) 
All the members of the Working Group said that the strategic manager, in her role as chair, had 
tried to keep the meetings relaxed and informal and to encourage users to participate. 
Nevertheless it seemed that not all users felt comfortable in the meetings held in the council 
chambers, for the convenience of town hall based staff. 
T noticed that one service user had a problem at the meeting and his personal assistant 
did not feel comfortable enough to take him out.' ( U.V.O. representative, August 2001) 
Working Group members appreciated that the early meetings had been introduced as a shared 
learning experience for all concerned. They had heard accounts from direct payment schemes in 
other areas and all had been able to ask questions. However they commented that the dynamics 
of the group had changed once the support service manager had begun to attend as the outside 
'expert': 
'Involving users and carers was well thought through to begin with. Suddenly she took 
over the process, she started talking over peoples' heads, too technical... The 
philosophy is good, getting people involved. It has got to be consistent and not just 
tokenism.' (Practitioner representative, August 2001) 
'The language used is inappropriate when they talk about disabled people, 'weeding 
out' and 'cherry picking'. They seem to want a portfolio of 'perfect cases'. Most people 
will think they can not live up to that ideal.' (U.V.O. manager, August 2001) 
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7.5.4.2. Users and Carers 
Users and carers gave their individual reasons why they had stopped attending the Working 
Group. They were unclear about the purpose of their participation and did not express opinions 
about how successful the group had been. They all said that they had come along to meetings at 
first without being clear what they could contribute but were keen to help. All had overcome 
practical obstacles to do so, either because of their own illness or disability or the needs of the 
person they cared for. Most users and carers had been interested in direct payments as a possible 
alternative to direct services for themselves and did not see themselves as representing a peer 
group. However they had eventually been 'put off by the focus of discussion on procedural 
issues, internal to social services. The use of technical language by the support service manager 
had impressed them (most referred to how 'clever' she was) but made them feel that managing a 
direct payment would be too complicated. As individual users and carers came to the conclusion 
that direct payments were not an option they would choose, they could see no point in 
continuing to come to meetings. All but one thought that the Working Group was a forum for 
keeping them informed of decisions being made by the council, like the one day consultation 
events they had previously attended. They did not think that they had any input to the decision 
making process. 
Only one user continued to attend the Working Group. He considered that he had wider 
responsibilities, both to comment on the detailed proposals for the scheme and to share 
information with day service users and staff. He was one of the first people in Fletcherford to 
request a direct payment and had initially hoped to collaborate with others, service users, staff 
and voluntary groups, to develop and run a support service. However as the meetings progressed 
he became increasingly worried about the responsibilities involved in getting a direct payment, 
the lack of flexibility in the systems discussed and the technical language used. 7 felt I was on 
the edge of a precipice' (Interview, July 2001). He was also concerned to hear that a request for 
a direct payment would automatically require a re-assessment. He stressed that this would be an 
unwelcome ordeal: ' Why would I need another assessment? My needs have not changed.' 
(Working Group meeting, February 2001). He therefore withdrew his own request for a direct 
payment in May 2001, but continued to attend Working Group meetings to represent day 
services, until November 2001. 
Ironically some disabled people were unable to attend Working Group because of the 
inflexibility of their personal assistance and transport arrangements, the very reasons why they 
recognised the potential of direct payments to facilitate their 'inclusion' in normal life. 
'Getting to the working group meeting is very difficult. I cannot just 
have a lift off anyone because my wheelchair has to be folded. / need someone to 
come to the door to collect me. Taxis just wait outside' [User, who attended two 
Working Group meetings] 
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'I think direct payments are a good thing. I would like to be on the committee. 
I have got so much experience of services. I am sorry I have missed so many 
meetings.... it is difficult fitting in with my care hours. I do not often go out but when I 
do something goes wrong. The yellow taxis are not really wide enough for my sort of 
chair.' (User, who attended two Working Group meetings) 
Another user dropped out of the Working Group for a mixture of reasons; 
7 used to be vice chair of the 'Users' [voluntary organisation], but I gave it up after I 
was mugged twice in my chair. I am nervous going out. Not everybody understands the 
way I speak if they do not know me. I am not sure it is worth the effort if they are not 
going to listen to what I say. ...I am not sure what the meetings are for' (User who 
attended one Working Group meeting.) 
7.6. Perspectives on the selection of the support service 
The Principal Contracts Manager explained, in interview, the decision to commission a service 
from another area, instead of developing a local scheme or contracting with a local organisation. 
It was to save time and money on specifying (designing) and tendering for the service, although 
the council was not obliged to use a competitive process. He also explained that the Working 
Group could not be consulted on the appointment of a support worker because he was recruited 
before the council had given its official approval to the proposal. The manager had confidence 
to appoint before 'official ' confirmation that the contract would be awarded; this demonstrated 
that it was senior officers' rather than politicians who were making key decisions at the time. 
The Principal Contract Manager did not join the authority until November 2000 and had limited 
local knowledge. However he advised me with confidence that there was not a local voluntary 
organisation that would have been interested in providing the support service to direct payment 
users in Fletcherford. Others on the Working Group did not share his opinion; 
'Local voluntary organisations would be interested in running the scheme. A lot of us 
are gearing up for contracting. We want more involvement and we are a friendly face 
people can relate to. ... Funding is important, we want to secure our future.' (Users 
Voluntary Organisation representative May 2001) 
The practitioner representative agreed: 
7 do not know why they thought the voluntary sector would not be interested, they came to 
nearly every meeting and everyone knows them.' (August, 2001) 
The Voluntary Sector Development Agency, funded by Fletcherford council, had not been 
approached by social services with a view to establishing whether there was potential for the 
development of a local support service. He explained that social services was dominated by a 
culture of contracting for services to meet measurable performance objectives and not 
concerned with wider policy objectives of community development and participation. 
' The government is promoting participation and inclusion but... social services look in 
terms of contracts... they have no concept of capacity building. There is no-one in there 
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with a community development focus... .social services are preoccupied with their own 
agenda and what they have to do for performance measurement....' (Senior manager in 
the local voluntary sector development agency) 
This was one of several examples of the use of centralised performance management devices by 
the government, intended to secure compliance with its policy reforms, that instead diverted 
attention from ultimate policy objectives or outcomes to short term intermediate 'outputs'. 
7.7. Obstruction and Delaying Tactics in the Planning Stage of Implementation 
Contracts staff in social services and the council's principal solicitor were opposed to direct 
payments. They were unable to resist the 'top down' pressure from central government to 
implement the initiative in Fletcherford. However they were able to influence key decisions in 
the planning process that would restrict the potential benefits of getting direct payments, and 
ensure they were unattractive to many users. The efforts of those opposed to direct payments 
threatened to undermine the ultimate objectives of government policy on direct payments, 
because those with the potential power and knowledge to overcome this opposition (senior 
operational managers) were pre-occupied with other work demands. 
Two contentious issues that were decided outside of the planning groups were presented in the 
director's report to the council, on April 2 n d 2001. They were the amount users' would receive 
as a direct payment, in lieu of services, and the services for which direct payments could be 
made as an alternative. Other contentious issues were the Letter of Agreement and Capacity. 
7.7.1 The hourly rate 
Working Group members, apart from contracts officers, had consistently argued that users 
should receive direct payments at an equivalent or higher rate to the prices the council paid 
independent sector agencies. They also maintained that direct payment rates should be index 
linked to the 'agency rate', to reassure users that they would not be eroded by inflation. The 
practitioners surveyed in 2000 had identified that an inadequate rate would deter people from 
requesting direct payments. Most Working Group members argued that users as individual 
employers would be unable to recruit skilled and motivated staff unless they could offer 
competitive rates. They also asserted that users should have the option of using agencies rather 
than employing their own staff i f they chose. There was general agreement that many potential 
users would be reassured i f they could afford to buy agency relief staff in an emergency. 
Individual users also said that they wanted to pay their personal assistants a 'fair wage'. 
The strategic manager, who chaired the meetings, encouraged members to air their opinions and 
said in interview that she understood their concerns. Operational managers generally disagreed 
with the idea that the council should save money through paying users less than the 'market 
prices' they paid agencies. Nevertheless the decision was made outside the planning groups to 
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make direct payments at a lower rate than agency contract prices. The strategic manager 
explained that the head of contracting had successfully argued in the social services 
management team that users did not have the same expenses as agencies. 
This user's view was different: 
'My aim is to make the payment rate attractive for people I am going to employ. I need 
people with administrative and care skills. Users will have to pay the rate to get the 
staff (User representative, December 2000) 
A year later this issue was still not resolved despite the continued efforts of the second planning 
manager to influence the senior management team. When the agency rate was increased with 
inflation the following April (2002) a further struggle ensued. The strategic manager's 
arguments secured an increase in the direct payment rate but not automatic index- linked 
increases in future years. Resistance continued from the contract team, whose influence seemed 
to be bolstered by their alliance with the solicitor and by their technical knowledge, which was 
not shared by managers with social work backgrounds (including the director). The contracts 
manager had virtually no experience of working with community care service users or 
knowledge of the disability rights/ independent living movement. However he felt able to 
explain confidently why direct payment users should not be empowered to buy services from 
agencies in the local community care market. 
'Direct payments are supposed to be about users employing their own staff, not buying 
from agencies. ' (Contracts manager, April 2001) 
This comment was an example of how actors defined or prioritised policy objectives to suit their 
particular interests or ideological positions. 
7.7.2. Approval only for personal care 
The report that was approved by the council in April 2001 proposed the introduction of direct 
payments for personal assistance only at a single hourly rate. The Strategic Manager explained 
that she wanted to keep the scheme simple to start with, to avoid deterring staff, users or 
politicians with complicated financial formulae. ' We need to start small and develop 
slowly'. (February 2001) She responded to questions from operational managers about the 
potential problems for users with greater needs who require a complex package of services. 
'This a very simple basic scheme, we want to get a few people through. I do not want to 
say guinea pigs, brave people. Trail blazers' Strategic manager 
'You mean you are going to cherry pick?' Joint planning manager 
(Observation of meeting of the Care Management Unit Management Team, February 
2001) 
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However this meant that there was no approval of direct payments for service users who wanted 
to change their arrangements for day care or respite, or for carers who wanted cash instead of 
the 'sitter service'. The system was therefore set up to facilitate the employment of personal 
assistants, not alternatives potentially more attractive to users worried about the responsibilities 
of being an employer. The latest available guidance said: 
'Councils should ensure that commissioning arrangements are consistent with the 
objective ofpromoting direct payments... Moreover, councils should prevent inflexible 
internal budget management procedures from hindering the commencement of a direct 
payments package.' (Fair Access to Care Guidance, draft published in 2001,page 6, 
paragraph 27) 
Irrespective of this, the influence of the contracting staff meant that individuals were not given 
the purchasing power to make choices consistent with market theory. The pragmatic use of the 
market advocated in the 'third way' (Dept. of Health 1998a) was thus obstructed for direct 
payment users. 
7.7.3. The Letter of Agreement 
The solicitor's official role in implementation was to approve the wording of the 'Letter of 
Agreement', the contract between the council and individuals receiving direct payments. The 
process of producing this document began with a draft, developed on the advice of the National 
Centre for Independent Living. This document was then passed between senior managers in 
social services and the solicitor until a 'final' version was agreed. It was presented to the 
amalgamated planning group for 'approval' in September 2001, six months after the target start 
date for the scheme. The document was subsequently revised twice more on the initiative of 
both the director of social services and the solicitor. Each time the conditions attached to 
receiving a direct payment became more specific. Each time the agreement was altered no new 
direct payments could be made until the revisions had the solicitor's approval. 
The government's intention was that direct payments should be an alternative method of 
arranging care packages, based on a care manager's assessment of need and a care plan agreed 
with the user. 
'Direct payments are a different way of fulfilling existing community care 
responsibilities...' (Dept. of Health 2000, 3, para. 3) 
The usual process for arranging a community care package in Fletcherford required the 
practitioner to write the care plan and obtain the approval/ signature of her own manager (two 
steps). The process agreed for approving a care plan involving a direct payment had eight steps 
and included the signature of the director of social services on the Letter of Agreement. This 
was the source of frustration to the Planning and Team Managers, who found it hard to justify to 
practitioners. The (depleted) Working Group members were also aware that these complications 
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would obstruct the growth of the scheme but were told by senior management that it was 'not 
negotiable'. 
' Any straightforward case will probably find its way through the system. But anything 
unusual will get blocked because of lack of understanding at each point.' Support 
Service Manager, December 2001 
As early as May 2001 the representative of the Users' Voluntary Organisation expressed her 
own concerns that i f the process of accessing direct payments was made too tortuous many 
potential users would be deterred: 
'If people are having problems with their current care they will put up with the hassle, 
but otherwise they see it as too difficult to get onto direct payments.' (U.V.O. 
representative, in interview May 2001) 
By December 2001, three people were receiving direct payments but approval of new payments 
was suspended, until the solicitor agreed the latest amendments to the Letter of Agreement. The 
director also required the inclusion of a detailed care plan before she would authorise the first 
payment. This did not seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the latest guidance: 
'Local authorities should seek to leave as much choice as possible in the hands of the 
individual, and allow people to address their own needs in innovative ways, whilst 
satisfying themselves that the person's needs are being met...' (Dept. of Health 2000, 4, 
para. 6) 
Working Group members could not understand why the director wanted highly specified care 
plans: 
' / thought the idea was to give user control, flexibility choices over how they use the 
hours. If they are not getting the choice and control, why go for the hassle of direct 
payments?' ( U.V.O. representative May 2001) 
The quote above from the 'Fair Access to Care' guidance suggests that the government sought 
to use this policy initiative to support the development of direct payments. However the issue of 
'equity' as presented in the draft guidance was also used to explain how direct payment users 
choices had to be restricted to ensure that they could not enjoy an advantage over direct service 
users. 
'It is not fair if people who get direct payments can get things that other users can not' 
Strategic manager (May 2001) 
This was another example of how within a complex policy programme, actors can select 
particular objectives to suit their own personal or ideological perspectives. Here the manager 
prioritised the policy objective of equality of outcomes over equality of opportunity, cost 
effective use of resources or user control. Thus the strategic manager was amongst those who 
seemed to expect that users would be willing to endure a lengthy process to access direct 
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payments and accept the additional responsibilities involved, without enjoying any practical 
advantage. 
7.7.4 Capacity 
The common law in England and Wales presumes capacity. The New Labour government's 
guidance said that local authorities were not to 'fetter their discretion' by making assumptions 
about the appropriateness of direct payments for whole groups of service users (Dept of Health 
2000a). Individual applications were to be judged on their merits. 
Community care assessments were usually carried out by practitioners and automatically 
endorsed by the council. The 2000 guidance also said that councils should assess whether users 
were capable of managing direct payments 'with assistance'. (Dept of Health 2000a). This was 
intended to stop councils raising capacity issues to prevent people with intellectual impairments 
from getting direct payments. The government had shown its commitment to enabling people 
with learning disabilities to get direct payments by producing the 'Easy Guide' in collaboration 
with a group of service users, with picture based and audio materials. The government also 
published a White Paper 'Valuing People' (Dept of Health 2001) which proposed a national 
strategy for learning disability services. The aims were to promote choice, control and 
independence for people with learning disabilities. Performance targets for local authorities 
were included and embraced enthusiastically in Fletcherford by care management staff and the 
multi agency planning group (a forum including users, carers, health and the voluntary sector). 
A target of enabling three people with learning disabilities to access direct payments in the 
following year, was quickly included in Fletcherford's 'Valuing People' Implementation Plan. 
One young man requested a direct payment in June 2001. His social worker successfully 
progressed an application for a direct payment from the Independent Living fund. Unfortunately 
he could not sign his name (his father normally signed on his behalf) and so could not sign the 
'Letter of Agreement' to receive a direct payment from social services. The contract team 
therefore referred the matter to the solicitor, who refused to allow a direct payment. Six months 
later the matter was not resolved and practitioners working with people with learning disabilities 
were reluctant to raise the expectations of their clients by offering direct payments. The 
influence of a 'care discourse' (Morris 1993) over the actions of key council staff and their 
interpretation of policy guidance was evident. Thus as the social services staff explained at the 
Working Group meeting of December 2001: 
'The current state of play in (Fletcherford) is that no-one with a capacity issue can get a 
direct payments' Contracts manager 
'[the solicitor] said "would you allow a six year old child to be an employer", She is 
determined no-one with a learning disability will get a direct payment' Planning manager 
2 
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The minutes of this meeting recorded; 
'2.2 The legal department... has refused to allow individuals who do not understand the 
full implications of a direct payment i.e. employment law, insurance, employer 
responsibilities and the full implications of the legal agreement, to access direct 
payments. 
2.3 Social services has made the commitment to challenge this decision, on the basis 
that people who access direct payments do not need to have a full understanding of 
employment law, insurance etc as there is a support service that will support and assist 
people in managing their their direct payment.' December 2001 
Nevertheless by the Working Group meeting of May 2002, the minutes addressed the issues of 
people with learning disabilities accessing direct payments under Any Other Business; 
'Atpresent there has been no change, and the issue continues to be a challenge' 
The solicitor could not prevent disabled people generally from getting a direct payment in 
Fletcherford, in the face of strong support for the initiative from central government. However 
she interpreted the guidance (Dept of Health 2000a) to obstruct access for people with learning 
disabilities. She chose to prioritise the council's obligation to assess capacity over the 
government's later policy statements in 'Valuing People', which included the objective of 
increasing the numbers of people with learning disabilities receiving direct payments (Dept of 
Health 200Id). 
7.8. Discussion 
The first planning manager's aspirations for user participation in the implementation of this 
particular initiative began at the level of the second top rung of Arnstein's ladder of power-
sharing19, with community representatives on the Working Group being given 'delegated 
power' to develop a local support service. She hoped participation in the development of the 
scheme as a whole would be at the level of 'partnership' with dialogue between the Reference 
and the Working groups on the development of internal systems required for direct payments. 
Two years later at the end of the 'planning process', the second planning manager's aspirations 
for user participation were far more modest than her predecessor's had been. Outside 'experts' 
contracted in to Fletcherford to provide support to users were left to take forward the task of 
developing the direct payment scheme. The part time support worker was given responsibility 
for facilitating a 'peer support' group. In terms of Arnstein's (1971) ladder of power sharing, the 
aims of involvement had sunk to the second bottom rung, to the level of 'therapy'. 
In 2000 the first planning manager recognised that direct payments were not only a means to the 
ends of enhancing user choice and control; i f users were involved in their implementation they 
19 The rungs on the ladder descend from citizen control through delegated power, partnership, placalion, 
consultation information and therapy to manipulation 
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had the potential to contribute to the achievement of other policy objectives. She thus 
demonstrated the 'joined up thinking' advocated by the Blair government in its policy 
directives. However once she left, the pressure to demonstrate progress in the achievement of 
centralised performance indicators supported a focus by social service senior management on 
the narrow, intermediate objective of having a 'simple, basic' direct payment scheme in place. 
This narrow focus was to the detriment of the ultimate objectives of the central government's 
policy reform including promoting 'independence' in its widest sense. 
Access, transport problems and inflexible support were obstacles to the involvement of some 
users in policy implementation processes in Fletcherford. These were anticipated by the first 
planning manager whose efforts initially encouraged users to struggle to overcome these 
barriers to contribute to the introduction of an initiative with potential benefits they recognised. 
Most users who volunteered to participate believed they had knowledge from their experience 
of using services but did not know how it could be used to contribute to the development of 
direct payments. The introduction of the professional expertise of the support service left users 
and carers feeling intimidated by the use of technical terminology and superfluous. It 
undermined the official remit of the Working Group, which was to research and develop an 
appropriate model of support. As the purpose of the meetings became increasingly unclear, the 
practical barriers to participation became insurmountable for most users. 
A danger in the movement for greater user involvement was identified by Brandon (2002. 17) as 
the drift towards the 'dictatorship of the articulate'. One user representative on the planning 
groups fitted the perception of the 'ideal' disabled participant. He was white, with a professional 
background (Ali and colleagues 2001) used a wheelchair and had no labelled mental illness or 
impairment (Brandon and Brandon 2002). His 'expertise' was widely respected in the local 
'care' community, amongst users, carers and public and independent sector practitioners. 
Nevertheless in the planning forums, supposedly established to 'involve' users in the 
development of the scheme, the superior authority of the solicitor was 'taken for granted' 
(Schutz 1972), while the well informed opinions of users and carers barely influenced the 
content of meetings nor ultimately the outcomes of decision making process. Greener's (2002) 
use of the concept of 'habitus' to explain the barriers to service users acting as 'reflexive' or 
'active' citizens is relevant here, particularly to the power of the solicitor as the holder of the 
'social capital' of her professional status. Experience in this case study suggested that the 
barriers to meaningful participation by those service users Brandon (2002,18) argued were 
vulnerable, marginalised and often forgotten within the disability rights movement itself, 
including 'mental health survivors and people with learning difficulties'' were even greater. 
This case study also revealed how lack of coherence in the crafting of policy can, as Meier and 
Mc Farlane (1996) asserted, undermine the objectives of policy making through lack of clear 
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direction in implementation. Key actors who were opposed to the introduction of direct 
payments in Fletcherford were able to exploit ambiguities in policy guidance with the aim of 
diluting or negating the effectiveness of the initiative. The solicitor had been open in her 
opposition to the principle of giving individuals care budgets and control over purchasing 
decisions. Her objections had been framed in terms of users' vulnerability to exploitation, their 
inexperience in managing money, their unsuitability to be good employers and that local people 
were against the proposal. She failed to produce any evidence to support her contentions, 
however as the senior 'expert' involved in implementation the onus was not on her do so. In 
contrast others with more relevant expertise were continually challenged and were required to 
produce evidence in support of any argument they made to improve the direct payment scheme, 
in terms of access and benefits for users. 
The contracts managers did not overtly oppose the idea of direct payments in principle, but 
instead questioned why the council was investing any resources into an initiative that it was not 
statutorily obliged to implement. They colluded with the solicitor to obstruct progress on the 
issues of Capacity and the Letter of Agreement. They were also able to exploit the interest of 
some senior managers in keeping the scheme 'simple' and easy to contain, by endeavouring to 
ensure direct payments were made conditional upon the users' willingness to take on the 
responsibilities of being an employer. Other managers who were broadly in favour of direct 
payments did not have the time to give the initiative their full attention and support during the 
planning stage, because of the pressures of the wider policy reform programme, re-organisation 
and staff turnover. The complexity and scope of the whole 'modernisation' programme and its 
interaction with the continuing development of community care, meant that individual actors 
could prioritise particular policy objectives to suit their own professional, personal or 
ideological ends. 
The findings presented next will demonstrate how issues that were unresolved during the 
planning stage, together with the potential obstacles to the success of direct payments identified 
in the practitioners' survey in 2000, affected the experiences of individual users, carers and 
practitioners during implementation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Direct Payments: Potential and Performance 
'Direct payments are a means to an end and that end is independent living. We need to 
hang on to that. Direct payments are not a good thing or a bad thing in themselves. 
Direct payments are just a way of getting to independent living' Hasler (1999, 6) 
8.0 Introduction 
The accounts of the actors involved in the early implementation of direct payments in 
Fletcherford, and the observations of those who advised them, are discussed next. They reveal 
that decisions made in developing the local scheme, against the opinions expressed by the 
practitioners' surveyed and most planning group members, limited the benefits and 'take up' of 
direct payments. They also suggest that many people wanted choice, control and flexibility in 
their care arrangements without additional responsibility, because of their personal 
circumstances and past experiences. The actions of community care service users were 
influenced by social justice considerations, rather than simple self-interest or 'instrumental 
rationality'. The initial enthusiasm of practitioners for direct payments expressed in 2000 had 
waned a little by 2002, along with their support for New Labour's approach to policy 
implementation. The importance of the role of care managers as 'street level bureaucrats' was 
confirmed. 
The annual review of the social services performance for 2001 to 2002, suggested that the 
introduction of direct payments in Fletcherford was regarded as an example of achievement in 
the pursuit of policy objectives: 
'Strengths and Improvements during the year Activity on direct payments has 
improved with 30 enquiries leading to 6 people actively benefiting at the time of our 
meeting.' Letter to director, 4 t h April 2002 from Regional Inspector (Performance) 
Compared to other authorities, the direct payment scheme in Fletcherford was successful, i f 
measured by the number of users recruited in the first year of implementation. However the 
findings presented next show that much of the potential of the initiative, advanced by the 
disability rights movement, promoted by the government and reflected in the early expectations 
of practitioners, was not realised. Where positive outcomes were secured this was due to the 
courage and tenacity of a few community care users and the determination of some practitioners 
to use their relationships and discretion to improve the care arrangements and quality of life of 
their clients. 
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8.1 Data 
The findings presented here are based on the following: 
Table 8.1. Data sources and relevance to policy-action process 
Source Contribution Method 
Dept. of Health civil 
servants 
Guidance on 
implementation issues 
Telephone conversations between 
February 2000 and June 2001 
32 Care managers Community care 
assessments + care plans 
Survey : semi-structured interviews, 
October to December 2001 
22 community care 
users + carers 
Expressed an interest in 
direct payments 
Interviews, June 2000 to January 2002 
[see tables 8.2 to 8.5 below] 
Social workers Received requests for 
direct payments 
Interviews, observations and 
conversations June 2000 to Feb.2002 
Team managers Supervised practitioners Interviews, conversations and 
observations. Sept. 2000 to Feb.2002 
Strategic manager Chaired planning groups. Interviews, conversations and 
observations .Feb. 2000 to 2002 
Lead operational 
manager 
Supported practitioners in 
the implementation of 
direct payments 
Interviews, conversations + 
observations . 
October 2000 to February 02 
The support service 
manager 
Represented the support 
service to council leaders 
and managers. 
Conversations and observations at 
meetings. January 2001 to May 02 
The support service 
worker 
Supported individuals 
requesting direct 
payments. 
Interviews, conversations and 
observations . 
June 2001 to May 2002 
Age Concern 
regional manager 
Represented + advocated 
for older people 
Interview. 
May 2001 
Sheltered Housing 
Wardens 
Supported tenants and 
liased with health + social 
care services 
Group discussions. 
February 2001 
Performance 
measures and Dept. 
of Health monitoring 
returns 
Official indicators of 
achievement of national 
policy objectives 
Analysis of figures and discussion with 
management information team. 
April to August 2001 
8.1.1. Practitioners' survey 
Care management practitioners shared their impressions and experiences of the introduction of 
direct payments. They were also invited to comment on their experiences of policy change and 
in particular the implementation of 'Modernising Social Services' (Dept.of Health 1998a). 
8.1.2 Interviews with community care service users 
Between April 2000 and February 2002 twenty-five enquiries about direct payments were 
recorded, including one that was inappropriate. Six came from households with two service 
users, so a total of nineteen families made an enquiry. I interviewed representatives of seventeen 
of the households. I was asked by the respective care managers not to contact the other two 
people, one was in hospital and the other had been refused a direct payment on legal advice. 
Eight enquiries were made in the first year of implementation (before April 2001). I interviewed 
five people twice about their expectations and experiences of direct payment and one person 
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three times (see tables 8.2 to 8.5). The first enquiry came from an older couple in March 2000.1 
interviewed them first with their daughter. The husband died in November 2001 and, at the 
family's request, I interviewed their daughter only in January 2002. 
All the users and carers I contacted contributed to my research because they hoped that sharing 
their knowledge and experiences could help other people somehow, whether or not they decided 
to pursue the direct payment 'option'. Those who contributed included people who had been 
recently bereaved, who were ill and in pain, in unhappy social circumstances and one lady who 
was terminally i l l , who talked to me just weeks before her death. In terms of their willingness to 
give their time and expertise to the benefit of the wider community, they were fulfilling their 
civic duties in the Aristotilean sense, as distinguished by Jordan (1999). 
8.2 Progress and 'Performance' 
In the year to 2001 Fletcherford council provided non-residential social care services to 6706 
adults. In reporting performance against policy objectives, people provided only with disability 
aids were included to boost the numbers of people 'helped to live at home' from 1999. The 
manipulation of information by senior managers, to demonstrate satisfactory performance, and 
by practitioners to improve care arrangements for their clients, was a recurring theme and other 
examples will follow. Nevertheless all 6706 social care users were potentially eligible to ask for 
a direct payment. 
The 'success' of Fletcherford council in recruiting six people to its direct payment scheme 
might be re-considered in this context. 
8.2.1 .Interest from Users 
Fletcherford council made the first direct payments in October 2001 to two people. By February 
2002 five people had received a direct payment, including one who had also begun to receive 
payments through the Independent Living Fund. Four had waited over a year from their first 
enquiry. Another five of the original twenty-four had successfully applied for ILF payments and 
ten people had withdrawn their interest. Therefore of twenty-five enquiries to Fletcherford 
council, only five had resulted in a direct payment by February 2002. However six enquiries 
resulted in a successful application, by the care manager, for a 'direct payment' from the 
Independent Living Fund, even though the eligibility criteria were in principle much stricter 
than for a council direct payment. Twelve households did not have a user who met the eligibility 
criteria for an ILF payment20. The other person was already receiving ILF. 
20Under 65 and in receipt of the Disability Living Allowance for care at the highest rate 
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8.2.2. Carers 
From the nineteen households, I identified nine carers eligible to apply for direct payments in their 
own right and interviewed three of them. Their concerns were about securing a direct payment to 
meet the user's needs and they did not distinguish their own needs for support in caring. The care 
managers realised that these carers were entitled to support, but their efforts were concentrated on 
achieving direct payments for users because the council had not yet agreed a system for making 
payments to carers. 
The named clients cared for each other in three of the two user households. In two cases the second 
user (an elderly spouse) was in reality the main carer but had been assessed as a user by their care 
manager. Interviews revealed that this was a common practice amongst care managers to 
circumvent the 'ceilings' placed on the cost of care packages for older people, set at the net cost of 
residential care. In contrast care managers were encouraged to 'cost up' care packages funded by 
the council for under 65s to the £200 weekly threshold, for eligibility to additional funding from the 
Independent Living Fund. Therefore in households with two users where one person met the criteria 
for extra funding from the ILF, the social services contribution to the care package was loaded 
towards the eligible person. Amongst those enquiring about direct payments, this was achieved for 
two of the two user households (8 and 9). 
8.2.3 .Discussion 
The 100% success rate achieved in securing ILF payments, where potentially available, suggests 
that the failure of most of the initial enquiries to lead to a direct payment was not due to a lack of 
interest or effort from care managers in Fletcherford. The manipulation of information on service 
costs and individual needs revealed that practitioners used their discretionary power and privileged 
insight into the circumstances of individuals and households to achieve the outcomes their citizen/ 
clients desired. 
8.3 Expectations from the 2000 Practitioners' Survey 
In the 2000 survey fifty-four practitioners' said that they had known people who could have 
benefited from direct payments and forty-six said that direct payments would benefit more than 'a 
few' service users. The Fletcherford scheme gained the council's approval in April 2001 by which 
time eight requests for direct payments had already been recorded. Nevertheless by February 2002 
only twenty -five enquiries were recorded and by April only thirty. Most practitioners surveyed in 
2000 suggested that lack of general awareness about direct payments would be the major obstacle to 
the expansion of the scheme beyond a few well-informed users in Fletcherford (6.4 and 6.5). This 
reason was also often given by practitioners for the lack of 'bottom up' pressure for the introduction 
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of the initiative locally. The 2000 survey data was circulated to the planning groups and managers 
responsible for the implementation of direct payments. Nevertheless those leading the process 
deliberately opted for a 'low key' approach to publicising and launching the scheme, which may 
explain the low level of expressions of interest. 
The accounts discussed in this chapter reveal that three other issues identified by the practitioners in 
the 2000 survey proved to be relevant to the apparently high 'drop out' rate amongst users enquiring 
about direct payments (table 6.32). 'Uncertainty', was realised in lack of reassuring answers to 
users' questions and lack of clear procedures for practitioners to follow. Uncertainty delayed users' 
access to direct payments and made practitioners reluctant to promote them. 'Fear of change' was 
identified and usually related to 'uncertainty'. 'Worries about being an employer' were also 
correctly foreseen. Practitioners suggested that some users would prefer direct payments at rates 
commensurate with market prices to enable them to buy directly from agencies or pay for services 
other than just personal care. This was borne out in experience. However the payment rate was one 
of the contentious issues that the planning group responsible for the implementation of direct 
payments in Fletcherford had not resolved. 
8.4 Practitioners and the Policy and Organisational Context 
Experiences of the introduction of direct payments can be understood in the context of the care 
managers' whole situation. Practitioners were engaged in the process of implementing New 
Labour's policy programme through interactions with managers, colleagues in other agencies and 
individual citizens, along with responding to the routine demands of community care. They were 
invited to elaborate on their experiences of community care, Modernising Social Services as well as 
direct payments. In 2001, they were generally more critical of the impact on users of New Labour's 
policy programme. Practitioners described an acceleration of the move away from relationships 
with users because of the pressure to achieve a 'turnover' of cases in pursuit of performance 
indicators, they often perceived as irrelevant. They described frustration with the impact of policy 
changes on their workload and their ability to provide a good service. 
'Modernising Social Services has created loads of work for senior managers and they try 
to pass it on. The government is setting the agenda and we are told to implement it, but we 
are the ones trying to put the theory into practice.' PR. 11 
'The paper work is increasing. We have little time to spend with people, little job 
satisfaction.. We hear National Service Framework, but what we hear on the ground is that 
people are not happy.' PR. 14 
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'. [There is] less time with service users, more forms, more deadlines, more 
accountability.... but no more money. There are tick boxes for when we get inspected but 
people themselves are getting pushed to the back of the queue.' PR.25 
Only one practitioner in discussing his frustrations mentioned his personal interests, explaining why 
he dare not protest about poor services. He identified possible benefits for himself and service users 
in the move to integration with health services: 
/ swallow my frustration because of my career... I would rather go to the Care Trust, 
better perks and better support, managers are willing to get involved and to see users. 
There is a better public perception of health staff PR. 11 
One practitioner (PR. 16) described herself as a 'fatalistic subversive', explaining how she felt 
obliged to accept the broad parameters and direction of policy change, but worked within them to 
get the best arrangements she could for her clients. 
8.5. Motivation. Why People Were Interested in Direct Payments 
All informants emphasised the importance of relationships and reciprocity between users and care 
workers. Resistance to the 'commodification' of care through the mixed economy, identified by 
Dwyer (1998), was a significant aspect of the general support for direct payments. 
Users and carers complained about the failure of agencies to ensure continuity in staff, 
compatibility with individuals and competence to meet their particular needs. 
'Before my parents got a direct payment, social services contracted for care from an 
independent agency. They had five different carers in one week. People turned up that my 
mother had never met. They were often unreliable Too much variation in competence 
and attitude.' Carer 2 
The trust that develops in relationships was vital to users who saw themselves as vulnerable: 
lIt is very important for a blind person to have a regular worker... Now they send anybody, 
that is no good, you could be robbed. It is no good saying that they are vetted.' User 6 
'lam thinking about employing a girl who used to come to me through the agency. She does 
not work for them anymore but she still visits me and helps me. I trust her and I know she is 
reliable. I am eighty three and poorly with cancer.' User 4 
Practitioners also talked about 'trust', for example. 
'The biggest thing people complain about [agencies] is changes in home care staff, they 
are unreliable... they are expected to entrust their physical care to these people. We also 
seem to be getting an increase in allegations of petty theft.' PR. 32 
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This was significant given that one of the reservations some senior council staff had about direct 
payments was that they could leave people vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. 
Practitioners echoed the criticisms made in 2000 about the effect on the quality of care of 
'privatisation'. They were disillusioned that the raised standards promised by New Labour (Dept of 
Health 1998a) had yet to materialise: 
'. There is still too much difference between social services home care standards and the 
independent sector, that is the feedback from health, district nurses and service users... 
There are still agency girls turning up without protective clothing, basic hygiene around 
food preparation and personal care is lacking. PR. 26 
However blame was not confined to the legacy of past Conservative governments. Practitioners in 
2001 criticised the poor training and supervision of agency staff, which they attributed to 
inadequate public funding as well as the profit motives of private providers. 
'There are problems with independent sector home care. ... They can not offer enough to 
retain staff or to get them qualified.' PR. 18 
'Policy changes are making life more difficult for managers but not necessarily improving 
the service for users. The quality of staff is the issue, sometimes you think that they are just 
dragging them in off the street. But the department does not pay enough money for them to 
attract the right people. PR. 27 
'It is all about money and profit and keeping costs down. Social services decision makers 
are not effected by services being so poor, it is the users who suffer while the local 
authority saves money.' PR.28 
Concern about the working conditions of people employed outside the public sector was common 
and was remarked upon by the co-director of the NCIL who led seminars promoting direct 
payments in the north (June 2001). However this interest in the welfare of others was not limited to 
practitioners. Next to being able to choose their personal assistants, the most common reason 
expressed by users for their interest in direct payments was their desire to make life better for their 
staff: 
7r was me going into hospital that did it. My personal assistants were just laid off by the 
agency. That would not have happened if I had been their employer.' User 2 
7 would love to change mainly because the girls do not get enough money... I am happy 
with the people, the girls, but not the money they get.' User 5 
This was ironic given that one of the council solicitor's arguments against direct payments was that 
social care users would not be good employers. Senior officers had also been doubtful about the 
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ability of service users to recruit 'suitable' staff. However all but one user (U13) identified 
prospective employees they had met through agencies under contract to social services. 
Users considering direct payments were primarily interested in a relationship with staff. All of the 
community care users interviewed rejected market principles and the commodification of care, 
whether or not they ultimately decided to move to a direct payment. 
'I am confident that if we are allowed to get on and organise things for ourselves we will 
manage okay. The staff are more loyal to me than they would be with the agency... 
I want to treat them properly. It is practical not philosophical, mutual respect; it works for 
us'. User 2 
The emphasis on reciprocity extended to both the 'public' and 'private' aspects of the relationship. 
Users sought to achieve just treatment for care workers through taking over employment 
responsibilities to ensure they received a fair proportion of the public money spent to secure their 
labour. 
'Money is wasted on management costs.... It is wrong for them to rake off a profit. Their 
staffshould get higher pay and the money should be going to help disabled people. 'User 3 
'She would be better o f f , as they say 'cut out the middle- man '. If there is not agency getting 
a rake off there would be more money to pay her' Carer 1 
They also talked about reciprocity at a personal level, through mutual respect and understanding, 
sharing experiences: 
'It's got to a stage when personal assistants are so heavily involved in my life, they are 
colleagues and friends. Partnerships, user and personal assistant aware of each other's 
needs, not a consumer and a provider of a service, not a boss - employee relationship. 
... Even Paul who works just 4 hours a week, is a friend as well as a worker. Little Becky, a 
kid who had had a hard life, had never been to the theatre, ballet or opera. She got a 
chance to do that with me. It enhanced her life, it works both ways.' User 2 
'My wife has a lady she is happy with, they are on the same wave-length.' Carer 1 
Practitioners recognised the importance of relationships between users and personal assistants: 
'One chap on ILF has now transferred to the independent sector. ...His home carer has 
transferred to the agency to continue the relationship with him, but still works for us part 
time. Everybody is happy with that.' PR.8 
'A few people I have talked to resent control being taken from them, they are made to feel 
belittled and de-skilled, encouraging disablement. .... Direct payments could help that 
because it allows a relationship between the user and carer that would break down formal 
barriers: PR.32 
170 
One independent observer appreciated the potential of direct payments for overcoming some of the 
problems she was aware people experienced in their care arrangements: 
Home care services do not do what people want. They can sometimes just manage their 
own personal care but not housework, they are depressed because their net curtains are 
dirty... ' Manager, Age Concern 
However she objected to individual users/ citizens being left with responsibility for remedying the 
defective outcomes of community care policy. 
' I am concerned that older people want to use direct payments to improve the working 
conditions of their care workers. It worries me that individual members of the community 
are tackling social justice issues that should be dealt with at a political level' 
Most users also said that they wanted to be able to choose what tasks were carried out and when, 
and to have the flexibility to change their care arrangements to suit themselves and their staff, 
without having to consult anyone else. Their hopes for achieving more say and greater flexibility 
were based on their expectations of a relationship, rather than a shift in power from the provider to 
the user. 'Empowerment' meant lack of outside interference in that relationship. 
'I will not have to go 'cap in hand' to the agency wondering what they will allow. There 
was a 'Who- ha' when I asked for a change after three years The staff were happy to 
change their shift patterns, but the agency and social services said no'. User 2 
One user described how she realised this aspiration: 
'My personal assistant is brilliant. She needs the hours to fit around her kids, so we 
negotiate to suit us both'. User 3 
Some users suggested that being 'in control' would have psychological as well as practical benefits: 
'It's going to be an individual thing but anybody who takes it up is going to feel more 
independent. Your own dignity and self esteem are enhanced because you are felt to be 
responsible enough to manage.' User 2 
In 2002 people receiving direct payments in Fletcherford were positive about the outcomes and 
prepared to recommend the initiative to others: 
I would advise anyone to go for it, it is wonderful. If you have any problems the support 
worker is there. Direct payments are there to help you so you do not have to rely on social 
services.' U14 
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The daughter of the first two people to receive a direct payment acknowledged the benefits for her 
family, although not without reservation: 
'It has made a real impact on my mam's quality of life. She sleeps better and is better in 
herself despite having lost my dad... We chose the people so she gets continuity..She likes 
and trusts them. But I have found that direct payments are nowhere near as flexible as the 
literature suggests ...' Carer 2 
Nevertheless by 2002 relatively few people had enquired about direct payments and even fewer 
were receiving them. 
8.6 Obstacles to Success 
Users' and practitioners' accounts of their experiences show that the issues identified in the 
planning process, discussed earlier, deterred most community care users from receiving direct 
payments, and limited the choice and control enjoyed by those who did. 
8.6.1 Promotion and Take up 
The decision was made at the planning stage to adopt a 'low key' approach to publicity and 
promotion. The first planning manager (1) had advocated that the council adopt a 'marketing' 
approach to direct payments. However the solicitor had warned: 
'It would be immoral to promote or market direct payments, you must just make 
information available... you can not empower them by leading them in directions they do 
not want to go. I am a great believer in empowerment but not at the cost of mental health, 
stress and strain.' Reference group meeting, June 2000 
Promotion was 'low key' despite the opinions expressed by practitioners in 2000 that lack of 
general awareness about direct payments would be the major obstacle to their successful 
implementation. Practitioners said that most people in Fletcherford had still not heard about direct 
payments by late 2001. 
'It needs more publicity and leaflets, there are none here.... We need more training for 
social workers." PR. 10 
'For mental health services we need a lot more information for us and service users, 
regular contact from the scheme, posters, general awareness raising.' PR16 
Only one practitioner from each team could attend an 'awareness day' organised by the support 
service, because of the many demands for training on policy changes. Practitioners did not feel they 
had enough knowledge of direct payments to share with users: 
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'lam not much farther on what it is about. I would want to know where to direct the service 
user. When 1 have mentioned it, I have not known enough to relieve their concerns that 'it is 
too much hassle'PR.29 
7 am not very comfortable with direct payments at all, I do not feel as if I have enough 
information to discuss it with potential users, not detailed practical knowledge 'PR. 3 2 
Some practitioners suggested that they needed positive role models of satisfied direct payments 
users to share with clients: 
' It is difficult to sell them when I have not felt confident and comfortable.... We are all a bit 
unfamiliar with it, waiting and seeing how it goes., hearing people talk about their 
experiences. It is getting the first ones to do it.' PR. 21 
Users who opted to 'wait and see' shared this attitude: 
' / think direct payments sound like a good idea but it is up to my wife. I will watch and see 
what happens. ...In a year's time if everyone is happy who has gone on to direct payments I 
can say to my wife "there is the proof... ' Carer 1 
One user was suspicious about the council's iow key' approach to the initiative: 
' The council's attitude is 'don't tell anyone and they won't ask'. They do not like the idea 
of direct payments meaning users can take control and make decisions.... If the council are 
playing it down as much as possible, then people will not ask for it.' User 15 
However practitioners were usually the key source of information for community care service users 
and they did not see themselves as deliberately withholding information. Instead most practitioners, 
who had not dealt with a request for direct payments were, by the end of 2001, simply preoccupied 
with other work demands and policy changes: 
'They are not at the forefront of my mind, I do not think about them automatically.' PR. 15 
'Hands on people are not involved enough to understand what is happening. It seems there 
are lots of disjointed changes. We get started on one new thing and then something new 
comes along and impacts on it and we get confused about which initiative it is we are 
implementing' PR. 19 
One practitioner had tried to generate interest: 
'I did a trawl of all of my caseload. One was interested but then said no. There was too 
much hassle and not enough money.' PR12 
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She suggested that the authority and the support service needed to be much more pro-active i f they 
genuinely wanted to promote direct payments: 
7? depends how serious they are about direct payments. There should be more promotion in 
the local press, advertising, posters in the Civic Centre reception, the support service 
worker should hold surgeries in the day centres, they should get experienced users to talk 
about it. It should be heavily promoted to generate interest and confidence'. PR 12 
Despite the decisions to take a 'low key' approach to promotion and to select only suitable users to 
demonstrate success, the impression many council staff had was that the conclusions of the 1997 
consultation were correct, there was little local interest in direct payments. This vindicated the 
stance of senior officers who had argued that the initiative merited a minimal resource commitment. 
8.6.2. The contract for the support service 
The contract between Fletcherford council and the support service gave the latter responsibility for 
publicising and promoting direct payments, as well as training users and practitioners. However the 
support service manager was concerned to control the flow of referrals to the part time support 
worker. She therefore supported the 'low key ' approach favoured by council managers. When the 
support worker was appointed there was already a waiting list of people who had enquired about 
direct payments. He also had to develop links with established local voluntary organisations as well 
as find his way round an unfamiliar community. Although he was aware that his performance would 
be judged by the amount of interest he generated in the scheme, he felt his first obligation was to 
advise those who had already enquired about direct payments. 
Before the support worker's appointment his manager was asked to visit people who had enquired 
about direct payments. The care managers who accompanied her considered that she deliberately 
tried to dissuade some clients from pursuing the option, by making direct payments sound too 
complicated or inflexible: 
'The initial discussions did not go well because of the support service manager. She made 
it seem too technical and difficult, as if she was deliberately trying to put them o f f . People 
need someone reassuring saying do not worry, they want issues minimised PR 9 
Economic theory predicts this approach to the management of resources by service providers in a 
market situation ('cream skimming') where agencies receive a fixed fee, irrespective of the needs 
of individuals, and are therefore motivated to select potential users likely to be least costly to 
provide for, those with basic care needs requiring low levels of advice and support. The Social 
service managers supported this approach using the expression 'cherry picking', to describe the 
process of selecting the users that were perceived as least likely to experience problems in 
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managing their care budgets and packages and so most likely to demonstrate the advantages of 
direct payments to other disabled people. 
The secretary of the local umbrella organisation for disabled peoples' groups suggested that the 
council would have had more success in generating interest in direct payments i f they had used 
established local networks: 
'Bringing a support scheme in from Macville was a mistake. They are perceived as not 
understanding local people... Our group is the official voice for disabled people.. I have not 
been consulted on the development of the local scheme or asked to participate, despite 
being a disabled person and the secretary of the U. V.O. I would have thought we would be 
the ideal organisation to channel communication, we have a mixture of disabilities and 
impairment and a mailing list of 1300 disabled people. They certainly have not come 
through us to get in touch with all the local groups in one fell swoop... to let us circulate the 
information'. 
User 15 (also secretary of the Users' Voluntary Organisation) 
8.6.3. The direct payment rate 
Planning group members were unable to press the case for direct payments to be index linked to 
market prices. As they predicted, worries about recruitment affected all users considering 
employing staff through direct payments. However it was anxiety about having enough resources to 
cover emergencies that ultimately deterred some users. Practitioners in both surveys said that some 
people would like to have a direct payment without the responsibilities of being an employer. 
Market rates were needed to enable users to purchase services rather than employ staff: 
'They should increase the direct payment rate to the agency rate to give people a choice. 
They should be helping us to find ways ofgetting a direct payment without employing 
someone. 'Carer3 
People were deterred from even expressing an interest in direct payments: 
'They do not see the hourly rate is enough to cover all they have to do. It is not worth it for 
the extra responsibility of hiring and firing. They would rather complain through a third 
party, stand one step back.... The only question I have ever been asked is 'how much is it?' 
and then they are not interested.' PR. 12 
Even those who pursued an application, did so recognising that they might need to subsidise care 
costs from their own income, as well as making means tested contributions: 
'The direct payment rate is too low... If you cannot pay enough you cannot recruit and 
retain quality staff. Also there is not enough to buy in holiday cover from an agency ... 
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/ will use an agency for back up. I will have to make up the difference' U14 
The first direct payment users were convinced that another way they were being expected to 'pay' 
for managing their own care budgets was by sharing their own 'exploitation' with their staff: 
'Social services pay general agencies £7.75 an hour but we still only get £7 an hour. We 
should be able to offer competitive rates. 1 feel that direct payment users are being treated 
as second class citizens, we do all our own administration... social services are trying to get 
care on the cheap' Carer 2 
' We are doing social services' dirty work for them, paying low wages.' User 2 
A mother and daughter were interested in using direct payments from both the council and the ILF, 
to enable their care worker to leave the employment of an agency providing poor pay and working 
conditions. However they withdrew when they realised care staff could get more pay than the direct 
payment rate afforded i f employed by one of the specialist agencies. The preferred agency was 
persuaded to employ staff for them: 
' We had to negotiate with Goodcare to get them to pay over £5 per hour. They pay £5.20 
per hour out of the £11 they get, but with a direct payment we would have only got £7 an 
hour to cover everything' User 8 a 
This improved life for the staff but did not prove to be an easy option for the users: 
'The package is already very complicated because they charge different rates for public 
holidays. I have been tearing my hair out. There were two holidays last month I had to sort 
out and then the agency lost the time sheets. They have no communication and that is the 
heart of management.' User 8b 
8.6.4 Delays and complications 
The process of approval for direct payments had eight steps and included obtaining the signature of 
the director. At the end of 2001 twenty of the thirty-two practitioners interviewed said that they did 
not understand the procedures and so could not explain them to users. Even practitioners who were 
actually helping individuals through the process felt confused and frustrated: 
'My problem has been that policies and procedures are not yet sorted out; there is no 
format for me to follow. If I go and do an assessment and somebody wants home care I 
know what paper work to complete and where it needs to go These were big issues to 
them and me, how to kick start the process..' PR 2 (Care manager for the first two people to 
get direct payments) 
The daughter of the couple concerned also described the experience: 
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'We approached social services soon after February 2000 because I had heard that direct 
payments were being extended to over sixty- Jives. My parents would not have wanted to 
change if the package they got had been satisfactory.... Social services did not really know 
about direct payments. I was passed from one person to another. The planning manager 
was keen and helpful, but she left.... They dragged out the process for too long. There were 
other models Fletcherford could have adopted instead of inventing their own. I felt they 
were just paying lip service to the ideals of direct payment.' C2 
The care manager of the only person with a learning disability to request a direct payment 
explained: 
' We need a step by step guide but not produced by people who do not wan t them to have 
direct payments... It is the first one I have done and I am learning the procedures as I go 
along. There is natural apprehension through lack of experience but I feel that nobody 
knows what they are doing in this local authority. They do not understand the issues 
relating to learning disability...' PR31 
By May 2002 her client had still not overcome the obstacle (the 'capacity' issue, discussed in 
chapter 7) to getting a direct payment. 
It was not until six months after direct payments in Fletcherford had won political approval that the 
council solicitor and senior managers settled on the wording of a 'Letter of Agreement' for users to 
sign. Repeated revisions to the document caused delays for subsequent applicants that neither they 
nor their care managers could justify. 
' The idea of a direct payment was to make our lives easier to give us what we want that 
social services could not provide but now it is causing me more stress They should not 
leave people not knowing what is happening. That is why they get anxious and change their 
minds like I did. .... It is all taking too long. I am worn out and worried.' Carer 3 
The lengthy, complicated process of accessing direct payments reinforced the view that was 
developing amongst practitioners and users that direct payments were difficult to arrange and 
manage. Practitioners were unable to explain or expedite the process. They were increasingly 
reluctant to even suggest direct payments to people they did not think could cope with the stress of 
uncertainty and delays, whether or not they felt they could ultimately benefit. While people waited 
for direct payments some prospective employees found other jobs. 
T waited over a year. I was going to employ a friend but she got another job.. It takes them 
so long to make a decision. Too many meetings, too many people involved instead of just 
one person saying yes or no. It really should be a simple and straightforward process if 
social services would get their act together. 'User 3 
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The most determined (or desperate) service users were not deterred despite the obstacles. However 
two of the first four people to request a direct payment died within two weeks and two months of 
receiving their first payment, having waited eighteen months and a year from their initial enquiry. 
Some of the users who expressed an interest in direct payments decided to 'wait and see' how other 
people fared because the process seemed so complex. 
'The whole experience of trying to get a direct payment undermined my confidence.' 
User 2 
Others 'dropped out' altogether. Users were sometimes helped by their care managers to resolve 
problems with their care arrangements in another way, like the six who obtained ILF. 
The director (2) would not approve a direct payment unless a detailed care plan accompanied the 
'Letter of Agreement'. The explanation given was her accountability for pub he money. She could 
not justify, to councillors and corporate colleagues, handing cash to service users unless conditions 
were attached to how it could be spent. Users experienced this as undermining the flexibility they 
expected in return for the extra responsibility involved in managing their own care arrangements. 
'We would like more control and flexibility. Despite our contribution in terms of time, 
skills, knowledge and money to the package, social services are still prescriptive over what 
we use the money for... We are still stuck with a rigid care plan.' Carer 2 
8.6.5 Approval for Personal Care Only 
The decision to obtain political approval for direct payments for personal care only soon presented 
problems for practitioners when users asked for cash to replace other services. The strategic 
manager explained that she wanted to keep the scheme 'simple' initially. However practitioners 
consulted in 2000 had predicted that users, who would not necessarily want to be employers, might 
want to buy alternatives to the limited range of day and respite services available through social 
services contracts. They were correct: 
7 thought about it in connection with respite lean not go for a hip replacement because 
I will not leave him. He has been ill for four years and as bad as this for 12 months, after 
respite in a nursing home made him much worse.' U5 a 
'I need a direct payment to pay someone to come in the house and stay with dad while I go 
into hospital. We are entitled to respite... 60 nights a year in a nursing home but we are not 
using any. My social worker is trying to get us the money but she is having a struggle... 
I want to arrange respite in the house because dad does not want to go into a home. He is 
old and he is ill... My social worker said 1 was the first person to ask for a direct payment 
for respite so the delay was while they sorted it out.' C3 
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The social worker involved was aware that respite was not covered by the 'very basic' local 
scheme. However she was determined to find a way to convert this man's eligibility for 'respite' 
into a direct payment, with the support of her team manager. She justified her intention to 
circumvent the obstacles in the local system by reference to wider policy objectives. 
'We are planning for a carer to go into hospital. Her father is an older man who has 
always refused services. We are still waiting to get direct payments for respite. We are 
trying to get it sorted out to suit them, to get round the rules and systems that do not fit. 
There is a need there and we are trying to meet it and give them what they want. That is 
what it is supposed to be about, choice, keeping people at home and supporting carers. My 
manager is not the problem. He will do everything he can to make it work. If it was a 
normal care package I wouldjust go through him but because it is a direct payment 
everybody has to be involved. 'PR13 
Users had more ideas: 
7 think that it would be better if you could get direct payments for equipment. We have to 
use aids that are not suitable or buy our own .... I was provided with a table to use in bed 
but it will not fit. Also they gave me a spinner to help me onto the commode, but the spinner 
is too fast and I am afraid of falling.' User 3 
'One thing that would be better as a direct payment is transport to the day centre. My 
mother gets on the bus at 9 '30 and does not arrive there till 10 '45. She gets very cold 
because of the opening and shutting of the doors as people get on with the chair lift.. 'Carer 
2 
7 would rather turn the Sitter Service into a direct payment. I do not see why they should 
get the money and not the girls.' User 5a 
'Younger people would rather have a direct payment than go to day care, they want to go 
out and about and do normal things.' PR.31 
By February 2002 there were no procedures in place for converting any of these services into direct 
payments. 
8 .6.6. Assessment: ascribed and self defined needs 
The assessment of need is a separate process from agreeing a care plan that sets out how needs are 
to be met, according to community care guidance (D.H.S.S. 1991). The decision whether the user 
gets a direct service or cash in lieu is clearly part of the care planning process. Nevertheless it was 
decided during the planning stage that users requesting a direct payment to replace services, would 
be subject to a re-assessment. This offered reassurance to senior officers who opposed direct 
payments that public money would not be handed over to individuals without the mediation of 
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'professional judgement'. However users and carers on the planning group questioned why this was 
necessary and the first people to request a direct payment said they felt they were being punished 
with a re-assessment. Some practitioners in the 2000 survey expressed discomfort at the prospect of 
'gate keeping' direct payments. 
Users explained that a community care assessment required them to discuss issues of a deeply 
personal and intimate nature, often matters they have not shared with close family. Assessment 
meant focusing on their own 'weaknesses' and those in their informal network of support. Often 
they were expected to confide in virtual strangers, having just met the care manager who visited for 
the first time in order to carry out the assessment: 
'My mother had to have two assessments because of the time interval between her asking 
for a direct payment and getting one.... She was very distressed by the assessment process. 
It was very intimate and intrusive asking in great detail about her personal assistance 
needs. I did not realise how much it upset her, made her feel useless. It was traumatic: 
Carer 2 
The assessment usually includes a 'means test' (to ensure that the individual does not have enough 
money to be disqualified from the council's assistance), which people also found degrading. One 
person decided not to pursue a direct payment when she realised a 'financial assessment' would be 
required. Care managers were disinclined to pursue the issue of charge avoidance: 
'They said they did not have more than £8k each in savings. I did not look any further'. PR 
32 
Some practitioners objected to means testing on principle believing that social care should be 
universally available. Others felt that it introduced yet another unwelcome complication. Ten of the 
users I interviewed were using 'private' resources to pay for care (from relatives or personal 
benefits) as well paying the council's means tested charges. 
Disability rights campaigners have argued that users should define their own care needs and that the 
importance of the user's insight is particularly crucial to the success of a direct payment (Oliver and 
Barnes 1998). Planning manager (1) described how senior managers worried that direct payments 
would generate extra demand for community care resources: 
''The fear was that direct payments would somehow bring disabled people out of the 
woodwork.... we tried hard to say, if these people need services they are likely to be in the 
system. With something like personal care, if people need it they need it.... Yet it was 
constantly reinforced, " if you give people an inch they will take a mile, they will just want 
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more and more ".... I was very aware that people found a lot of care intrusive and want to 
minimise it' (June 2000). 
'Care providers' in the 2000 survey maintained that 'care managers' tended to over-estimate the 
needs of users. The accounts of disabled people in Fletcherford confirmed that users and carers 
were more likely to deny than exaggerate their needs. The 'community', families, friends and 
charities were providing care that the statutory services might otherwise fund. 
iIfmy husband could not do my hair and my feet and turn me at night, I would need help 
but I would prefer to be as independent as possible. My husband worries about what would 
happen if he was not there, so we have talked about it. I would use my benefits to pay 
someone and I would only ask for a direct payment if I really could not manage. I would 
ask the day centre staff to do my hair and give me a bath. I am sure my family and friends 
would see to the housework.' User 10 
'My friends are all retired and they are great. One is seventy and we go on holiday 
together. Ijust take a hoist and she looks after me...' User 12 
People just wanted a 'normal' life: 
'At the moment my husband and twelve year old son do it, or I would have to stay in the 
house and wait for the agency to come. I need to be part of the world, lhave not altered 
inside because I am disabled. It is as if you become a person who can be told when to be in, 
when to get up or have a bath. My twelve-year-old son is brilliant. Iam the only mother he 
has ever known so he is used to helping me in the shower' User 15 
For community care users, the aspiration of 'independence' encompassed the New Labour ideal of 
self- reliance along with the disability rights movement's ideal of self-determination. It was a matter 
of social conscience as well as personal pride. People did not want to use resources that were 
required by others in greater need. 
7 would not like to take a service if other people need it more.' User 10 
7just plod on because I can see that there are people in greater need. I have got my 
husband, my daughter and all my mental faculties. Some people do not know what to do 
and they live alone' User 11 
Individuals also tried to avoid the delays and perceived stigma of going through official channels to 
obtain non -rights based services. 
'The social worker needed notice to order an ambulance from the Red Cross to move me 
into this bungalow. My husband rang the NHS ambulance service and paid £50, so we were 
able to co-ordinate moving me with removals... 'User 3 
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One lady who had carried out her 'civic duty' through military service found that it was not the state 
that reciprocated when she needed help. 
' We go together for respite to a RAF home, it was donated by a family who lost sons in the 
war. The RAF Benevolent Fund also pays the airfare and taxi fare... I was in the Royal Air 
Force, I was a sergeant for the whole of the war.' User 5 
Care managers were conscious of their roles as 'gatekeepers' of community care resources. 
Through their assessments they committed public money to finance care, whether provided directly 
by services or through direct payments. The opinion widely expressed in both practitioner surveys, 
was that resource rationing was due to inadequate funding of community care rather than the 
expectations of users, who were generally undemanding: 
'People are generally satisfied.... They are practical independent people, they see asking 
for more help as their own failure. Users choose to have less rather than more.' PR.23 
Users were encouraged to accept help from families and neighbours. Care managers explained this 
approach: 
'Keepingpeople at home involves working within a limited budget. We have got to think 
laterally, drawing on everything and everybody including relatives, state and independent 
sector. Anything you can do to keep them at home, or make the best quality of life you can 
with money available' PR. 4 
' We try to be creative and use free voluntary sector resources. When people want to live 
independently there is a capped limit on what you provide. It is difficult if they do not have 
other resources or networks for back up.' PR.23 
The revival of charitable endeavours to reduce reliance on the welfare state was an ideal of New 
Right (De Jasay 1992, Green 1999/ However this combining of public and private resources 
appeared to be a New Labour strategy intended to counter the effects of the 'dependency culture', to 
recognise the role of the 'community' in supporting its members (Dept of Health 1998a) and the 
importance of the lnew contract between citizen and state' (DSS 1998, 80) 
Some users accepted services because they were concerned to relieve the 'burden' of responsibility 
they felt they placed on their families: 
'Mam would have been happy with two days at the centre, she only goes on a Saturday for 
our sake.' Carer 2 
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'I have always been determined to speak up for myself and to not be a burden on my family. 
It is me that has the disability. I did not agree that my family should be handicapped by it.' 
User 2 
Practitioners described using the assessment process to define, quantify and present care needs in a 
way that suited the council's eligibility criteria, 'ceilings' and approval procedures for direct 
payments. 
' With direct payments I can call gardening 'domestic work' to get the hours. It is no good 
having personal assistance if she cannot get her wheelchair down the path for weeds' 
(PR.9 in conversation about an assessment for direct payment) 
For older people, social workers struggled to get enough care hours to meet even basic physical 
needs. Some users recognised the efforts care managers made in battling through the system to get 
them the best package they could: 
'We get two separate packages to get more hours. The social worker is going through the 
NHS to try and get us more because it takes two to lift my husband.... He gave me another 
six hours, but the manager stopped it. The social worker was very upset. .... I get two 
workers at night but only one on a morning. I help the morning girl... I fell yesterday so 
now I have asked the agency how much I would have to pay privately for a second girl. We 
get two at night because one is supposed to be here to help rm bathe, that was the social 
worker's idea ' User 5 
7 also have had a very good social worker who is as cheeky and awkward as me. She does 
not give up.' User 2 
8.6.7. Health and Social Care 
The 1999 Health Act 'dismantled' the National Health Service internal market created by the 
Conservatives in government. 'Primary Care Trusts' were introduced with responsibilities for both 
providing and securing services to meet local health needs. These policy developments influenced 
the work of Fletcherford social services between 2000 and 2002, encouraging more collaborative 
working between health and social care professionals, single 'joint' assessments and pooled 
resources to fund community care packages. The Health and Social Care Act of 2001 obliged 
councils to offer direct payments to a wider user population. It also threatened that, where local 
agencies were unable to develop satisfactory partnership arrangements, 'Care Trusts' could be 
imposed, taking social care services out of local democratic control. 
In Fletcherford, as in many areas, mental health and learning disability services had already begun 
to move towards integration. Mental health practitioners worked in multi-disciplinary teams from a 
health centre base, and the health trust provided community support and day services. For people 
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with learning disabilities there was already some pooling of budgets, through the transfer of funds 
released from hospital closures to councils to develop community services. For older people and 
people with physical and sensory impairments efforts were still concentrated on developing a 
shared data base and a single assessment framework, to overcome fragmentation and duplication in 
community care interventions. 
Practitioners felt they worked well together; any 'seams' in their services appeared at the political/ 
senior management and budget allocation level. Amongst practitioners there was a general view that 
the government would eventually impose Care Trusts to run community care services, whatever the 
experience of the 'pilot' areas. The care management teams that had travelled least distance down 
the road to integration with health (for older and disabled people), were the most optimistic about 
the prospect: 
7 think that joint working can only be good for services users. We are supposed to be 
working to the same ends.' PR. 17 
Some thought that Fletcherford would be quick to grasp the opportunities offered as it had with the 
whole 'modernising' agenda: 
'Once we move to a Care Trust andjoint working, it should improve things. 
This council is in advance of other local authorities, a front runner.' PR 11. 
Learning disability practitioners had mixed feelings, comparing the possible advantages of a being 
part of a 'universal' and popular public service with those of cohesion, responsiveness and 
accountability to the local community: 
' / sometimes think that there may be more funds available because people are prepared to 
pay more for health services. But as a local authority service we can respond to local 
needs'.PR6 
'I think Care Trusts will happen eventually but I am concerned that health will dominate. 
GP attachment might improve relationships with particular practices but will it lead to 
fragmentation within social services?' PR. 13 
The mental health team social workers were most pessimistic, predicting that integration would 
destroy traditional relationships with users concerned with empowerment and advocacy, replacing 
them with a focus on social control. The social model of mental illness was in demise along with 
their job satisfaction. 
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'We are overwhelmed as social workers by health dominance. The only role we do maintain 
is the Approved Social Worker. We are demoralised. ... Our traditional role of advocacy 
has been eroded... "PR. 14 
'Integration means our little bit compared with the huge health service. Different 
backgrounds and different values, if you have come up through nursing you will do what 
the consultant says without questioning... We question more, advocate. Some health staff do 
question but the culture is "say yes and go along with it". We look more holistically at the 
person their family and the environment than in health. There are good theoretical models 
in social work. We look beyond individual pathology in mental health.' PR. 15 
'What seems to happen is government says so health does. Because health are so powerful 
we look awkward when we want to take things more slowly with a sense of purpose ... but 
once in health we will have no say. Health professionals, nurses, are dictated to they just do 
as they are told. In social services there is room for negotiation'. PR 29 
In this context mental health social workers were still enthusiastic about the liberating potential of 
direct payments for service 'survivors' but were daunted by the problems of most care plans being 
dominated by services provided under the auspices of health and therefore not convertible into a 
direct payment. 
Meanwhile the guidance21 that followed the 'Coughlan Judgement'22 intervened. This required the 
re-assessment of people receiving intensive community care services (particularly in nursing 
homes) and, where their care needs were deemed complex enough, health taking over funding 
responsibilities. There was general support for this development in Fletcherford. Managers and 
practitioners argued that the National Health Service had for many years 'offloaded' responsibilities 
for supporting those with chronic illness and disability to social services. Also people re-classified 
as needing 'continuing health care' were no longer liable to pay charges as New Labour maintained 
that health services must remain free at the point of use. However for the small number of people in 
Fletcherford who requested direct payments, re-assessment in this wider policy context threatened 
to deny this choice to those with high or complex needs. 
The 2000 guidance said that direct payments could not be made for health care and this seemed to 
welcomed by those in Fletcherford who wanted a 'basic' scheme only. Senior managers in both 
social services and the support service favoured selecting people with 'simple' care plans. The 
threat that the choice would be removed for people with complex needs worried social workers and 
their line managers, as they suspected that senior managers would favour outcomes that made 
expensive packages the responsibility of health: 
2 1 HSC 2001/015:LAC (2001)18 
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1 What if they come up as continuing care when I reassess them? Health will pay but they 
will not get direct payments It is how you intepret it. If health pick up the cost they will 
not be able to employ who they like. We have built up the hopes of people who want direct 
payments..' Social worker 
'Nobody wants to know about these problems ' Team manager 
(Excerpt from conversation 14-2-01) 
The introduction of direct payments in Fletcherford from April 2001 happened before the 
circulation of new guidance on the further extension of direct payments in the Health and Social 
Care Bi l l . 2 3 The advice provided by department of health civil servants was that new guidance 
would be developed on the basis of 'street level' experience: 
'It is too blunt a statement of the position to say no direct payments for health care. Users 
like to get services in as joined up and seamless a way as possible. We are keen for people 
to explore locally the freedoms that are available. That is not to say direct payments are 
appropriate for all health care needs. With direct payments it is not as clear as it might be 
about how much they can be used for health care needs because we want to see people 
using them flexibly. We want to see how the users get on. We may develop guidance based 
on practice.' 
Advice from head of 'social care group', in the Department of Health, 21-5-01 
However this did not provide practitioners with the 'top down' pressure that they needed to 
overcome local resistance to flexibility. Another civil servant included a comment on the political 
dimension in her advice. 
'The guidance suggests a way of getting round the problem. Health can transfer money into 
a pool. The legal position is that direct payments can be used only on the social care 
element, but research shows that people are using the money for personal assistants to 
carry out basic health care. At the moment transferred money cannot be used for health 
functions legally. Money transferred from health is to be used on social care, we are 
politically not ready for more than that yet.' 
Civil servant in the Department of Health 'health care group', June 2001 
The social workers of people requesting direct payments used the re-assessment opportunity 
creatively to get approval for the care plans their clients wanted: 
'When they talked about me having a re-assessment against the continuing care criteria I 
was worried because the managers would see how my care package had built up over the 
years as my condition got worse. But my social worker made sure they did not cut my 
hours. She got money in from health and now she has appliedfor the ILF, so this is going to 
save the council money.' User 2 
July 19m 1999, 
Draft guidance issued in August 2002 
186 
Practitioners in carrying out 'single' assessments of individuals were expected to continue to 
distinguish 'health' from 'social' care needs and ensure that in care plans direct payments from 
social services only paid for the latter. They often used discretion in their efforts to allow their 
clients' choice and control in their care packages. 
7 assessed her as needing help to get up but she has got an exerciser she uses herself and 
wants a personal assistant to help. If a physiotherapist had done an exercise regime and 
trained the personal assistant, we could have put it in the care plan but she will probably 
do it anyway Whether that is health or social care, I would not like to begin to worry 
about'. PR2 
Despite the government's promotion of 'seamless' services practitioners confronted inter-agency 
boundaries to be circumvented to meet even basic needs. 
'We can ask for joint funding but we have got to get health to agree on a case-by-case 
basis. I am working with a lady whose legs are swollen. She needs more care, to bathe and 
cream the legs. I have asked the district nurse to go in but she says it is not a health issue 
until the skin is broken... But the lady is benefiting from having her legs creamed 
unofficially once a day. She needs it twice daily. They are officially just doing personal 
hygiene. We are asking health to share the costs and monitor skin care. Prevention is the 
policy but not in practice... Another lady is incontinent in urine. Her bedding is wet 
everyday. The washing machine is broken temporarily. I rang the continence nurse to ask 
for the emergency laundry service, but they will only provide and launder single sheets and 
she has a double bed.' PR23 
Practitioners did not always overcome these obstacles. One user found that her most pressing need 
for pain relief could not be met through a direct payment because of seemingly insurmountable 
barriers to 'joined up' working: 
Social services will notfund the personal assistant to put on mylbuleve cream, they say 
it should be health provision but the district nurse will not do it. The biggest need I have is 
for pain relief.' User 14 
8.7. Pioneers or Bold Adventurers? 
It is risky to try to generalise from the experiences of such a small group of people about what sort 
of people request and receive direct payments. However most direct payment schemes seem to start 
with a 'handful' of determined people and grow slowly (Dept of Health returns 1998 to 2002). I 
therefore reviewed the characteristics of the first people to express an interest in direct payments to 
consider how 'typical' they were of the potential population. Because of the limited publicity in 
Fletcherford, those who enquired about direct parents were amongst the better-informed community 
care users. All had links to an organised users' group or advocate, or had a friend or relative 
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working in social or health care services. They had also been sufficiently interested in change, or 
sufficiently dis-satisfied with their existing provision, to explore alternative arrangements. 
Nevertheless amongst these better-informed users a distinction emerged between those for whom 
getting more involved in decision making and taking more control represented an opportunity and 
those for whom the prospect of more responsibility generated anxiety. 
There was no obligation on social services to inform all potentially eligible users about direct 
payments by 2002. It may have been that the individuals whose interest was recorded were those 
who had not been diverted at the first hurdle by council staff who did not think that they were 
'suitable' candidates. It was in the Support Service's interest to record as many enquiries as possible 
(therefore counting two members of the same household separately). It was in the interest of 
practitioners who felt that helping particular individuals to get direct payments would be difficult 
and time consuming (because of the complexity of their circumstances) to deter them rather than 
encourage further discussion. However this was probably not deliberate. It seems, from the accounts 
of the majority of practitioners who had not yet successfully supported a client through the process 
of getting a direct payment, that they could have unintentionally deterred people. When their 
responses to questions about receiving direct payments were hesitant this may have been enough to 
undermine the confidence of users in the feasibility of the option for them. 
None of the first group of people to enquire about direct payments was in paid employment, 
although several were very active in voluntary organisations. They were 'socially included' in a 
relational but not an economic sense (Wessells 1999). Al l but one was eligible for 'selective' 
community -care services; therefore they had limited personal means. They could not be described 
as 'well o f f or privileged. However those who survived the application and approval process had, 
personally or within their family, knowledge and experience relevant to managing staff and budgets 
(see table 8.2). 
'The feedback is anxiety about being the employer and responsibilities for the whole thing. 
If people have never been in that situation, it is quite daunting. Some people would thrive 
on the challenge and opportunity'... PR 21. 
Practitioners suggested that some users were more assertive and confident than others. Users drew 
similar distinctions in the context of direct payments. 
Tgot what I wanted by speaking up... But some people, especially the older ones, do not 
have the confidence to fight. They worked hard all their lives and they accept what they are 
given. Some of them do not even see a social worker until they have to go into hospital. The 
idea of getting money from the council scares them...' User 2 (Interview 3) 
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Fletcherford's approach made the responsibilities involved in direct payments more threatening and 
onerous than necessary. For some users the expectation of empowerment from direct payments is 
associated with the role of employer and the opportunity to wrest power from council and agency 
managers to be shared with staff, along with improving their pay and conditions. However for 
others the idea of being an employer was a threat: 
'I pulled out the last time because I did not want to go down the route of employing 
somebody. It sounded too complicated. Then my friend said I could use an agency and get 
less hours.' Carer 3 
Being an employer did not appeal to this user who had years of experience managing a care budget 
from the ILF: 
7 am happy with ILF but I do not want to switch completely to a direct payment. I would be 
responsible for paying for all the services and managing them. I am not saying that it would 
notbe better but I do not want the hassle' User 12 
Practitioners had predicted in 2000 that many users would be deterred from seeking direct payments 
by 'uncertainties' about the implications switching from services. I f care managers had been able to 
answer questions more confidently and had more accessible information to share, there may have 
been more interest expressed by those who had heard about direct payments. A more 
straightforward approval process, a higher profile support service, higher payment rates, less 
restrictions and conditions attached to use, a more inclusive approach to 'capacity' and better 
arrangements for combined health and social care packages would have made direct payments more 
attractive to more people. There were some users and practitioners who were following the progress 
of the 'early pioneers' before deciding to act. 
'It takes a certain sort of person, a go -getter, to go for it to start with, or a nutter, go on 
say it' Carer 1 
Informants generally were of the opinion, nevertheless, that direct payments would not be 
everybody's choice. The following excerpt from a discussion by wardens of'sheltered housing' 
reveals that people who were able to witness the day to day experiences of an important 
demographic group of community care service users appreciated that individuals would respond 
differently to the opportunities offered by direct payments. They said that some older people would 
enjoy the responsibilities involved in managing their own care, but others would be intimidated by 
the prospect: 
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'They [residents] are interested in anything that will keep their independence and enable 
them to stay in their own homes' 
' There are lots of ours who will not admit to needing community care, they might want to 
know about it. ' 
'They want their privacy and their independence' 
'Yes, for those with carers because they might want some help with the money. Lots of ours 
have families coming in.' 
'It would scare some.' 
'Some just want other people to sort things out for them, like us. They are happy for us or 
their social worker to make the decisions if they do not have families.' 
(Notes from a group discussion of Sheltered Housing Wardens, February 2001) 
The Age Concern manager in her role as an independent advocate for older people had received a 
complaint from the son of an elderly couple who had heard about direct payments and were worried 
that this was a prelude to social services 'abandoning them'. She recognised the problems with 
poor, unreliable, services (particularly private home care agencies) but she argued that the solution 
was not to expect users to take on the role of service commissioners and managers. Amongst the 
small number of users and carers I spoke to although they all sought quality services, choice, 
control, flexibility and independence (the official policy objectives), some would have preferred 
these outcomes without more responsibility. Some had learned from experience that a policy change 
with apparentiy laudable aims could result in a cut in quality and availability of services. 
One enthusiastic user recognised that not everyone shared his confidence: 
'I still want to be involved and active in old age. lean express myself assertively and get 
listened to... I have already had an excellent service from social services but others have 
not been as fortunate. Everyone should get the same entitlement, not just across councils, 
within them'. User 2 
One practitioner summed it up: 
'The benefits are there, control over their lives, choice of care worker, but it is trying to 
convince people, feeling they are stepping off a cliff in leaving go of the support ofSSD.. 
They are not confident about long-term support or emergencies... The elderly fear losing 
the continuity of social services involvement. They do not see it as a benefit. It is a threat. * 
PR12 
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8.8. Concluding Discussion 
Decision- makers with responsibility for planning the implementation of direct payments in 
Fletcherford had access to the conclusions of the 2000 practitioners survey. However the potential 
obstacles that practitioners had identified from their experience of working with community care 
users, were not addressed in the development of the local scheme. Decisions made during the 
planning stage, against the advice of most working group members, proved to be serious obstacles 
to individuals requesting direct payments and deterred others completely. 
For expediency the council contracted for support for direct payment users through another 
authority. The worker was only available to local users two days a week and was not established in 
local voluntary and informal networks. No attempt was made to recruit a local disabled person to 
the post. Because the support service was a voluntary organisation funded by the council on an 
annual contract, the manager's concern was to secure the continued funding of her service. 
Therefore, despite her 'independent' status, she was disinclined to challenge social service decision-
makers. 
Lack of publicity and promotion, meant few community-care users had heard of or asked about 
direct payments by 2002. Direct payments therefore slipped from the consciousness of practitioners 
generally because they were preoccupied with excess demand, the pressures of implementing the 
wider policy programme and being 're-organised'. Cynicism about the value of policy changes and 
performance measurement increased amongst practitioners, who generally supported the principles 
and objectives of New Labour's policy. 
The process of accessing direct payments and the repeated revisions of the Letter of Agreement 
created the impression that direct payments were inherently 'difficult'. Practitioners were unable to 
explain the process of accessing direct payments and many of the users who expressed an initial 
interest withdrew. This reinforced the impression held by some managers and politicians, and 
actively promoted by others, that there was little interest in direct payments locally. Thus a low 
level of investment into awareness raising, staff training and funding support could continue to be 
justified. 
Individuals pursuing direct payments sought to achieve the ideals of choice, control and flexibility 
through a personal relationship rather than a market transaction. Jordan's (1999) distinction 
between the code of reciprocity in informal relationships and the market place rules of fair exchange 
was evident here. Users were also motivated by more abstract 'social justice' considerations, in 
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seeking fair treatment for their care staff and considering the needs of other disabled people when 
using community care resources. 
Decisions made during the planning stage of the implementation process not only limited the 
numbers of people to pursue the direct payments option, but also restricted the potential benefits for 
users seeking the official policy objectives. Where users who enquired about direct payments 
eventually experienced an improvement in their care arrangements, whether through a direct 
payment from the council or the Independent Living Fund, this was achieved through creativity and 
the exercise of 'discretion' by care managers. Practitioners used their experience of community care 
to lead users through a maze of bureaucratic procedures, rooted in local 'ideological' resistance and 
ambiguous central government policy directives, to reach the objectives of direct payments. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Comparing Experiences : 'Bigtown' 
'It ain't what you do it's the way that you do it' 
Fun Boy Three and Bananarama (1982) 
9.0 Introduction 
Experiences of direct payments in another authority are compared with those in Fletcherford, 
through the accounts of the actors involved. Bigtown is another Northern council traditionally led 
by the Labour party. The contextual similarities and differences between the two areas are identified 
and their relevance to the actors' experiences and the outcomes of the policy initiative are 
discussed. By providing a contrast to the Fletcherford situation, the findings from Bigtown illustrate 
and support Pawson and Tilley's (1997, xv) thesis that in policy action 'mechanism + context = 
outcome'. Experiences in another authority illustrate that the course and outcomes of policy 
implementation vary with interactions between historical, social, organisational and political 
influences and that the last are more complex than party allegiances. They also confirm that central 
government requires the contribution of public servants and citizens at the point of service delivery 
to secure the achievement of its policy objectives, irrespective of 'top-down' approaches to 
performance management and compliance. 
9.1. Data 
I interviewed the social services strategic planning manager with lead responsibilities for the 
introduction of direct payments in Bigtown, in February 2000 and he updated me on developments 
over the next two years. In the summer of 2001, he sent out letters inviting participation in my 
research to all twenty- eight direct payment users in Bigtown and to the twelve practitioners 
involved. Six users responded, but I was only able to meet four users and three carers. I do not have 
any information on the people who did not respond. The breakdown of direct payment users in 
Bigtown by source of disability (see Table 9.1. below) suggests that the people I interviewed 
represented the largest user group (white people, under sixty-five with physical or sensory 
impairments). I could not contact community care users who had not requested direct payments or 
people who had withdrawn, having expressed an interest. I therefore relied on the accounts of 
practitioners to compare experiences with those who had decided to stay with direct services in 
Fletcherford. 
Six care managers responded to my letters, four were senior practitioners and all had some 
experience of direct payments. I interviewed another seven care managers I met while visiting 
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social services offices. They were aware of the local scheme and the principles of direct payments 
and had attended introductory training, but they had no direct experience. However one had had 
experience of the Independent Living Fund direct payments. These interviews with users, carers and 
practitioners all took place in September 2001. 
Table 9.1 Practitioner respondents identified by primary client group focus 
Primary client group With Experience Without experience 
All adults 3 (senior case workers) 
Older people 1 4 
People with physical/ 1 (senior case worker) 1 
sensory impairments 
Learning difficulty 1 1 
Mental health 1 
I also interviewed the support service co-ordinator at the Bigtown Resource Centre for Independent 
Living in February 2002. The data used in this chapter includes the interview and conversations 
with the strategic planning officer between February 2000 and 2002. 
Al l the people I interviewed to obtain data for this chapter were 'expert witnesses' because of their 
first hand experience of social policy implementation and the opportunities they have had to reflect 
on that experience. 
9.2 Bigtown and Fletcherford : Similarities and Differences 
Based on the accounts of the above informants, I will describe the similarities and differences in the 
contextual conditions for and experiences of the development of direct payments in the two local 
authority areas. 
9.2.1. Consultation in Bigtown 
Word spread about the powers granted to local authorities to make direct payments amongst 
networks of disabled people's organizations after 1997 and reached Bigtown. The user-led 
management committee of a resource centre in Bigtown approached local politicians, and one carer 
wrote to the social services director, requesting a local scheme. In 1998 the council commissioned a 
group of disabled people from a nearby university to research local interest in direct payments. 
Community-care service users received letters and consultation meetings were held. People were 
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asked their opinions on the principle of introducing direct payments rather than on the practical 
details. The report suggested that there was 'some interest' in direct payments but that people were 
concerned about the extra responsibilities involved. Consequently the decision was made to develop 
a support service alongside a direct payment scheme to alleviate some of the worries expressed by 
potential users. 
It seems that Bigtown's consultation was a genuine effort to establish the opinions and concerns of 
local community care users about direct payments. It was led by an independent organisation, which 
could reasonably have been assumed to have the requisite knowledge and skills to win the trust of 
local disabled people. The people consulted used services, could have potentially benefited from the 
initiative and therefore had an interest in the outcome. There was nothing to suggest that people in 
Bigtown suspected that the council had ulterior motives in raising the issue of direct payments with 
them. Unlike people consulted in Fletcherford in 1997, users had not observed the council 
significantly reducing its role as a service provider through the development of community care 
policy. 
9.2.2. Direct Payments and Community Care Politics and Practice 
Bigtown is a well-established unitary authority led by a majority Labour council. The population 
was over 700,000, seven per cent were from an ethnic minority. In 2001 the council remained a 
large provider of residential care and the major provider of domiciliary and day care. Following the 
consultation, strategic planning staff encountered no resistance from the leading Labour politicians 
to the proposal to introduce direct payments. Councillors were concerned that the pay for personal 
assistants should match the rate paid to the council's home care staff. This was not only for social 
justice reasons but also to ensure that the council's own service was not subject to unfair 
competition through the government's best value initiative (DETR 1998). This meant that direct 
payment users could 'poach' the council's well-trained staff, recruiting individuals they had an 
established relationship with, an option that the direct payment rate did not afford service users in 
Fletcherford. 
Direct payments were not seen by politicians or staff as a threat to the council services that 
dominated local community care provision and were the first choice of most users. The strategic 
planning manager said that the chair of social services strongly supported the proposal to introduce 
direct payments, reasoning that they would provide an alternative to independent sector provision 
for users who did not receive the council's own services. Support for the initiative from the users' 
management committee of a high profile council run Resources Centre helped convince politicians 
that direct payments were a 'rights' issue for disabled people. 
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The development of the 'mixed economy' in Bigtown meant that the council had 'block' (cost and 
volume) contracts for domiciliary care with two independent agencies. The demand for the 
council's services exceeded supply and practitioners were expected to use pre-purchased 
alternatives only when council provision was not available. This was unlike Fletcherford, where 
council services were generally 'closed' to new referrals and practitioners were expected to 'spot 
purchase' from a list of private agencies on rotation. Fletcherford practitioners could not show 
preference based on their opinions of the performance of particular providers. The community care 
market was therefore not truly competitive in either authority in the sense of obliging providers to 
respond to the price and quality preferences of their principal (users) or agent (care manager) 
customers. In Bigtown in 2001, many private residential homes were closing, so vacancies in the 
council's homes were reserved for people requiring relocation. Best value did not seem to threaten 
the council's direct services, possibly because as much larger authority Bigtown could achieve 
economies of scale that Fletcherford could not. Also the smaller council, as a new unitary, had 
inherited responsibilities to run existing services without commensurate revenue support from 
central government. In keeping with the national trends (Audit Commission 2000) Bigtown council, 
like Fletcherford, already had a policy of charging for non-residential services through means 
testing. Direct services were changing their focus to supporting people at home and integrating 
people into their communities in both authorities. However Bigtown care managers, particularly 
those working with older and disabled people, were dealing with people in crisis situations and had 
little time to focus on enabling and preventative work. As in Fletcherford, the council's home care 
service was generally highly regarded by users, practitioners and politicians. 
9.2.3. Characteristics of direct payment users and carers 
I interviewed two male and two female direct payment users in Bigtown. Two had physical 
impairments, one had a visual impairment and one had Huntington's disease. Like most of the users 
I met in Fletcherford, they turned to the state for only the help that families and friends could not 
provide: 
'I have been in a wheelchair for 22 years. I never had any outside help until the wife 
became ill. She now has cancer of the spine. I do not get meals. Either my wife cooks or 
when she is ill neighbours and friends. I have got a 14 year old son. He will do messages 
and help with meals.' User 
The three 'carers' were middle aged white women; two were married to the direct payment user. 
One carer was seriously ill and received care and support from the user. One user received a direct 
payment for her own needs, supported her disabled sister and worked as a volunteer at a luncheon 
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club for older people. This evidence of mutual dependency, between disabled people and their 
informal carers, mirrored the situation in Fletcherford. 
By September 2001, when I began my interviews in Bigtown, there were 34 people using direct 
payments, one was over 65. Fifteen users had been receiving direct payments for more than a year. 
Twenty-eight direct payment users were identified by the support service as white; thirteen were 
male and 21 female. 
Table 9.2 Direct payment users in Bigtown. identified by source of disability 
Physical Visual Terminal illness Sensory +physical Learning 
impairment Impairment impairment difficulty 
25 3 4 1 1 
Between September 2001 and February 2002 the number of people receiving direct payments 
increased to 54, including three with learning disabilities, one older person and two with mental 
health problems, suggesting widening access. 
9.2.4. The community care 'grapevine' 
One obvious difference between the situations in the two areas was that in Bigtown care managers 
and services were spread over a large geographical area. In Fletcherford practitioner teams were 
located together in office bases focussed on three client 'specialisms'. In Bigtown specialist teams 
were located in six different 'patches'. In Fletcherford all the practitioners I interviewed knew the 
names of people who had expressed an interest in direct payments, and were observing the progress 
of their applications. In Bigtown practitioners did not have routine contact with colleagues in other 
areas, they were therefore limited in their opportunities to observe and discuss their experiences. 
This meant that practitioners did not follow the progress of applications for direct payments by 
people not on their own case-loads. They hear about the outcomes for individuals in other areas 
informally and so they did not have the opportunity to appreciate the practical implications of 
efforts to simplify and improve the scheme. 
9.2.5. The planning phase of implementation 
A small working group of key decision makers were involved in developing the Bigtown direct 
payments scheme, and initiating changes in response to recommendations from operational staff 
and users. This group was set up before New Labour's guidance (Dept of Health 2000a) strongly 
recommended the involvement of local users. It was composed of an assistant director, a finance 
officer, a council solicitor and the strategic planning manager. There was no user representation. 
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However in practice users had little influence over decision-making in the development of the direct 
payment scheme in Fletcherford. 
I was only able to interview the strategic planning manager from this group. His account and those 
of the practitioners suggested that the 'corporate' experts and senior managers were enthusiastic 
about the initiative as a means of passing control to services users and recognising their expertise 
and insight. This was in contrast to the situation in Fletcherford. There, it seemed that the greater 
the distance that council officers were from users, in terms of both the organisational hierarchy and 
opportunities for personal contact, the more they were convinced that they were the best people to 
make decisions on their behalf. 
Bigtown has a population more than seven times that of Fletcherford. The financial investment 
made by the smaller council into the development of the direct payment scheme was in relative 
terms not significantly disproportionate (£25,000 rather than £200,000), given the respective sizes 
of the two populations. However Bigtown social services made a much bigger commitment to staff 
training and raising public awareness. The scheme was regularly promoted in the local press. 
Posters and leaflets advertising the scheme were prominent in social services buildings. All care 
management staff received basic training on direct payments and quarterly bulletins advising them 
of the development of the scheme. Furthermore a senior practitioner from each area had additional 
training and was available to support individual practitioners and service users through the process 
of arranging direct payments. 
The two lead officers from the strategic planning section remained involved in the introduction of 
direct payments in Bigtown, from the planning stage through the ongoing development and reviews 
of the scheme. They tried to resolve any problems practitioners experienced. These strategic staff 
were perceived as available and approachable and they remained in post long enough to win the 
confidence of those involved in the implementation of direct payments. They were supported by the 
consistent leadership of an assistant director. 
Care managers and users praised the contributions of the senior staff involved in planning and 
facilitating the implementation and development of the direct payment scheme in Bigtown: 
Key people in the department have been very supportive, planning staff and an Assistant 
Director.' Senior Practitioner 
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This was in contrast to Fletcherford, where re-organisation and personnel changes meant a lack of 
consistency in leadership in the implementation of direct payments. 
The initial procedures for arranging direct payments in Bigtown were changed in response to 
feedback from users, care managers and the support service. 
'I got in touch with our planning department... they got their heads together to sort it out.' 
Senior Practitioner 
The support service co-ordinator felt that this explained the growth of the scheme after the first 
year, when only one person received a direct payment: 
'Increased take up, the scheme itself has improved through feedback ... there is less 
bureaucracy." Support service co-ordinator, February 2002 
Care managers in Fletcherford however often commented that there was nobody in a planning role 
who understood practice issues and was capable of responding to their concerns, for example by 
changing procedures that proved cumbersome and obstructive. In Bigtown the extra training given 
to senior practitioners, to enable them to support inexperienced colleagues, was also appreciated. 
Practitioners did not feel that they had been left to implement another policy change without 
sufficient support and advice. 
'One of the best things that happened in this area was having a principal case worker in 
each area as a focus and having planning staffstaying involved with development at the 
centre. They are very helpful in dealing with issues.' Practitioner 
9.2.6. Users as employers 
Users in Bigtown who expressed an interest in direct payments were worried about becoming 
employers. They wanted to secure a relationship with a person they trusted. 
9.2.6.1 The significance of the responsibilities of being an employer 
Direct payments were calculated on the basis of hours of support in Bigtown. However they could 
be used to meet any need identified in the care plan so were not restricted to personal care only. The 
direct payment rate was based on the hourly pay for the council's home care staff, with employment 
costs added. This meant users were able to offer competitive wages in a way that they could not in 
Fletcherford. 
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Many users did not pursue their applications for direct payments, after an initial expression of 
interest. Practitioners largely attributed their withdrawal to concerns about being an employer. As in 
Fletcherford, users were said to be concerned about the responsibilities in the role, the extra work 
involved in the keeping records, dealing with tax and covering emergencies: 
'They are worried about what being an employer means and making their own 
arrangements for cover. Filling in time sheets, paying bank holiday enhancements, it is 
daunting if you have never employed anyone before' Senior Practitioner 
11 have had about twelve to fifteen expressions of interest, but few go forward. 
People were not prepared to take on the responsibility of appointing and employing 
someone. People are frightened despite the support service.' Senior Practitioner 
However the strategic planning manager who monitored the development of direct payments 
centrally suggested that 'abortive' enquiries did not necessarily indicate a negative outcome. Of the 
one hundred people to enquire about the Bigtown scheme in the first two years, only twenty-eight 
ultimately switched to a direct payment. This senior manager observed that most of the others 
achieved what they regarded as improvements in their care plan, through discussing their needs and 
care packages with a care manager, without having to opt out of direct services provided by the 
local authority. 
In Fletcherford the reduction in the council's own domiciliary services reinforced the conviction, 
held by many staff and service users, that disabled people and care workers were being abandoned 
to the mercies of a market dominated by profit motivated agencies through the implementation of 
community care policy. This encouraged some practitioners and disabled people to overcome their 
reluctance to pursue direct payments, although they implied extra work or responsibility. In 
Bigtown users and practitioners in home care felt the service was 'safe' and there was no suggestion 
that the council was reducing its commitment to be the major provider of social care. Practitioners 
cited high levels of satisfaction with current service arrangements as the reason that most users were 
not interested in direct payments. 
'A lot feel safer with social services staff. There is still a big in-house service, people trust 
it.' Practitioner 
Council services were also seen as an easy, safe choice for care managers in Bigtown. 
We would have to do it if it was the dominant model of care. Instead we still have a high 
percentage of in house services. Our homes and services are very popular.' Practitioner 
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However, as in Fletcherford, Bigtown users and staff expressed dissatisfaction about rigidities and 
priorities set in care plans by council service managers. One user had moved to direct payments 
having used in house home care for years. He had been happy with the staff but found the 
management practices and procedures they were obliged to work with were becoming increasingly 
inflexible. As practitioners explained, the council's concern to protect its workforce took priority 
over users' fairly modest aspirations for a 'normal' life: 
'They have a lot of restrictions around health and safety, for example they cannot clean 
windows. We try to meet needs but not preferences. Also our staff can not bath people, they 
can only give a strip wash.' Practitioner 
It seemed to some respondents that it was fear of change rather than faith in Bigtown council's 
services that deterred people from asking for direct payments. The council's services were reliable 
and their staff were trustworthy: 
'Services are not brilliant but people fear breakdown if they make their own arrangements.' 
Practitioner 
9.2.6.2 Relationships between direct payment users and personal assistants 
As in Fletcherford, most disabled people who decided to pursue a direct payment in Bigtown did 
not do so because they want the power, responsibility and status implied in being an employer. 
Users wanted to protect a relationship with a care worker they trusted or to pay someone who 
already helped them voluntarily. 
'People do not choose to be employers, they will only go on direct payments as a way of 
getting the other things, choice and control, but most drop out. People usually have 
someone in mind.' Practitioner 
'My husband has been disabled since he was quite young, so we do not want strangers 
coming in. When the home carer is on holiday we do not know who we will get..' Carer 
'I had the minister's wife working as my personal assistant... She was a friend who already 
helped me.' User 
As in Fletcherford informal networks remained part of the package. Some people met and 
developed a relationship with their personal assistants when they worked for direct services. Unlike 
service users in Fletcherford they were able to offer a competitive hourly rate. However they were 
also concerned about the working conditions and security of their staff. 
'I still worry about her giving up her job and think-what if something happened to meV 
User 
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Recruitment and retention of care staff was a problem nationally in both the independent and public 
sector during the period of this case study (Henwood 2001). Senior managers in Fletcherford were 
dubious about the ability of community care clients to employ suitable staff (chapter 7). However 
unlike the independent agencies that were criticised so heavily in Fletcherford for employing 
inexperienced and unskilled staff (chapters 6 and 8), direct payment users in both Bigtown and 
Fletcherford recruited personal assistants who had already demonstrated their suitability as either 
volunteers or employees. 
9.2.7.Support for direct payment users 
The support service in Bigtown was provided by council staff employed in a Resource Centre for 
Independent Living and was accountable to a management committee of disabled people. Two full 
time workers were initially employed to provide support to direct payment users. The Fletcherford 
support worker's fifteen hours were not proportionately less, relative to the respective sizes of the 
populations of the two communities. However the Bigtown support workers had the on site 
supervision of the Resource Centre manager and the support of administrative staff and others 
working alongside them in complementary roles. The part time support service worker in 
Fletcherford was not involved in an established network of services for local disabled people. 
One user appreciated the efforts of the Bigtown centre to recruit from the local disabled community 
and to address needs holistically: 
'At the resource centre there is a disabled people's help line and the direct payment support 
service. Most people who work there have disabilities. They also give welfare rights 
advice.' User 
Additional support work time was purchased flexibly in Bigtown as the numbers of direct payment 
users increased. Users, carers and practitioners reported favourably on the support provided by the 
Resource Centre: 
'Once he applied, the support service took over and were brilliant.' Practitioner 
'If we need any help we can phone the support service co-ordinator, she is very good.' User 
Being employed by the local authority and therefore not reliant on an annual round of contracting 
decisions was said by the manager to enable the support service staff to concentrate on supporting 
and advocating for users. Practitioners and users seemed to recognise that the 'permanence' of the 
support service implied that direct payments were a permanent addition to the local community care 
landscape, rather than short term experiment or 'another initiative'. 
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'Bigtown have made a commitment to support people who take on direct payments. There is 
a pay roll system, help with recruitment, advertising, and selection.' Practitioner 
The Bigtown support service manager felt the security of being employed directly by the council 
made her more independent and more willing to challenge decisions on behalf of disabled people, 
than i f she had been employed by a voluntary organisation. She suggested, from her experiences 
within the direct payments' regional and national networks, that in independent sector support 
schemes staff were often preoccupied with justifying their existence through numbers of referrals. 
Uncertainty over funding also made recruitment and retention difficult for voluntary sector 
schemes: 
'There are lots of good people working hard, who want to provide a good service but they 
are always struggling to get money to survive. They do not want to get people relying on 
their services in case the funding stops.' Support service co-ordinator, February 2002 
According to both the strategic planning manager and the support service co-ordinator, the users' 
management committee of the resource centre had considered becoming a charitable trust to receive 
grant aid from the council rather than mainstream funding for their services. However they had yet 
to be convinced of the advantages that 'independence' had over being part of the local authority's 
infrastructure, with the benefits of security, support and access to internal channels of 
communication. 
Bigtown social services attempted to relieve direct payment users of one of the worries they 
commonly associated with becoming employers, by funding a voluntary sector payroll service, 
which all the users I met appreciated. Although the advice from the N.C.I.L. was that a payroll 
service was the type of assistance that direct payment users appreciated most, Fletcherford council 
did not include payroll support in its 'basic' direct payment scheme. 
Care managers were encouraged to close cases following a review of the care package after six 
weeks in Fletcherford. In Bigtown practitioners working with older people said that they also 
needed to achieve a turnover in their case- loads in order to take new referrals. In both authorities 
the process of actually setting up a direct payment funded care package took months. In Bigtown 
where users had established relationships with practitioners, they tended to go to them first with 
problems with their packages. Two care managers reported that the support scheme helped set up 
direct payment packages and dealt with queries around finance, but that users turned to them with 
staffing and more personal problems. 
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'I get calls from people I never saw when they had a domiciliary package. They need 
ongoing support; there can be relationship difficulties with employees or even disciplinary 
matters. They could do with discussing how they handle them with other users.' Practitioner 
I do not know i f this was a subject of concern generally in Bigtown. However some practitioners 
when considering whether or not to suggest direct payments to particular individuals, in both towns, 
worried about acquiring additional responsibilities in supporting users in their roles as employers. 
When I completed my fieldwork in Fletcherford in 2002 the support scheme worker had been left 
with the task of re-engaging local disabled people in the scheme, through setting up a 'peer support 
group'. As I argued in chapter 7, the aspiration for citizen participation had descended to the level 
of'therapy', in terms of Arnstein's (1971) ladder of power sharing. Practitioners in Bigtown had 
hoped that a peer support group would enable direct payment users to discuss the problems they 
experienced (both emotional and practical) with other people in similar situations. They felt that 
there was a need to replace the 'therapeutic' aspects of their relationships with users that the 
demands of care management had largely removed from their practice. However no users responded 
to attempts to establish a peer support group, apparently preferring to seek individual assistance 
from either the support service or their social workers. 
' We are not involved in any groups. I have enough going on in my own home and fighting 
my own corner... 
I speak to the social worker by phone most weeks and she visits fortnightly. Not lots of 
problems it's just nice to see her.' Carer 
"Ido not need any peer support I just ring the resource centre or I can just go down..' User 
The users and carers I met in Bigtown did not have contact with other people using direct payments 
or community care services. The 'grapevine' of communication amongst informal networks was 
much stronger in Fletcherford. Notwithstanding the difficulties disabled people and carers often had 
in attending meetings and the additional transport problems in the larger town, it was hard to see 
that direct payment users would be any more interested in a peer support group in in Fletcherford 
than they were in Bigtown. 
Despite the help provided through the support and payroll services, Bigtown strategic planners were 
considering setting up a 'personal assistance' scheme, using staff employed directly by the council. 
This was in response to suggestions from practitioners that many users wanted to manage their own 
care without employing staff directly. Bigtown social services recognised that direct payments were 
not the only way that users could gain more control over their care arrangements and lifestyles. The 
larger authority probably had more capacity for running two schemes than Fletcherford. It is 
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noteworthy that this traditional Labour authority planned to employ personal assistants directly, 
rather than commissioning an independent organisation to run a scheme. 
9.3. Who gets direct payments? 
There were similarities and differences in the characteristics of the people who used direct 
payments in Bigtown and Fletcherford. 
9.3.1. Capacity and Consent 
In keeping with the national trends in 2001 (Dept of Health Autumn returns, 2001) the relative take 
up for some populations in Bigtown (people with physical and sensory impairments) was higher 
than for others (mental health service users, older people, people with learning difficulties and 
people from the ethnic minority). I did not have access to a representative sample of community 
care users or practitioners from various 'client specialisms', however I was able to uncover some 
contrasts with the treatment of people with intellectual impairments in Fletcherford. 
Bigtown introduced direct payments before the New Labour government's revised guidance (Dept. 
of Health 2000a) relaxed the 'able and willing' criteria, that had allowed councils to exclude people 
who could not demonstrate the capacity to manage and to consent to receiving cash in lieu of care. 
However capacity and consent issues were not identified as obstacles to some people getting direct 
payments, unlike in Fletcherford. It seemed that they arose occasionally in Bigtown but were 
addressed through tailoring the assistance offered to meet individual needs for support as 
recommended in the 2000 guidance. This was an example of local policy and practice developing 
through implementation. It was then supported by changes in central government's guidance, in 
response to experience 'at the bottom'. 
'We have had capacity and consent issues, we recognised people go at different speeds and 
need different sorts of support. All our work is with individuals.' Support service co-
ordinator, February 2002 
Use of direct payments by people with learning difficulties in Bigtown increased, as social services 
began to implement the Valuing People White Paper (Dept of Health 2001). 
'In the first two years we had only one person with a learning disability, now we have 
six... including three in process.' Support service co-ordinator, February 2002 
There were other potential reasons for impaired capacity 
'His lack of co-ordination and rapid deterioration because of his condition (Huntingdon's 
disease) were not a problem with Bigtown Social Services, there was no argument over his 
ability to manage direct payments.' Carer 
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In Bigtown it appeared that the assessment of the individual's capacity to manage and consent to 
receiving a direct payment was left with the care manager. She could draw on the clinical expertise 
of other practitioners where she judged it was necessary, just like in situations where direct services 
were arranged for a person who could not clearly express their preferences. I found no example of 
managers referring the issue of an individual's capacity to the council's legal department for 
'advice'. 
In dealing with capacity issues practitioners assessed the individual's needs and circumstances 
holistically, taking into account whether the person could manage direct payments with support and 
whether this support would be available, from both formal services and informal networks. A man 
whose capacity was impaired by Huntingdon's disease was assessed as able to manage a direct 
payment with the support of his (nurse) wife. A young man with learning difficulties was assessed 
as able to manage a direct payment with the support of his (social worker) father. In each case the 
preparation and assistance provided by the support scheme was tailored to the needs of the 
individual in the family situation. 
In contrast the first and only person with learning difficulties to request a direct payment in 
Fletcherford, was refused on the advice of the council's solicitor. This decision conflicted with the 
social worker's assessment that took into account that the young man's father was already helping 
him to manage his benefits and his direct payment from the Independent Living Fund. However the 
carer's employment status did not afford him the cultural or symbolic capital of a nurse or social 
worker. Greener's (2002) analysis would suggest that differences in knowledge and professional 
status might affect the treatment individuals receive from public service actors and might counter or 
reinforce the influence of a 'care discourse' (Morris 1993). 
9.3.2. Reflexivity and Risk Aversion 
In Bigtown the direct payment scheme was publicised regularly, while in the smaller town a 'low 
key' approach was preferred. Nevertheless practitioners in Bigtown suggested that information 
about the community care system was not equitably distributed within communities and that 
knowledge itself empowered some people to pursue direct payments as an option: 
'The father was a social worker, so he has insider connections and knowledge that helped 
the.' Practitioner 
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Links with and the support of disabled peoples' organisations were also identified as significant but 
it was not possible to conclude whether this involvement was a cause or an effect of individuals 
being confident and well informed: 
7 have one lady on direct payments. She was on the committee involved in introducing it. 
Active in disability rights, uses a computer to get information.' Practitioner 
Users, carers and practitioners, like their peers in Fletcherford, argued that some people were more 
assertive, and so were more able to get what they wanted from the community care system. Others 
were told what they were 'allowed'. This in turn seems to have influenced whether they expected 
direct payments to improve their situation or just give them more stress without necessarily giving 
them more control. Experiences in both towns thus lend support to Barron's (2001) conclusions that 
the move towards individually empowering initiatives benefits some disabled people but 
disadvantages others. 
'It is quite self-selecting. It is people who feel they can cope, not everyone thinks they can.' 
Practitioner 
'People I know find it very difficult to make a choice because they have never been given 
the opportunity. With 'shared care \ some organise their own respite directly, others need 
their social workers to organise it for them. 
Other ways to empower people would be improving social skills, assertiveness and 
confidence.' Practitioner 
9.4. Bigtown : an Alternative Approach? 
There were issues identified as obstacles to the success of direct payments in Fletcherford, in terms 
of both numbers and experiences of users, which did not seem to be of major concern in Bigtown. 
Users and carers in Fletcherford who had managed to get a direct payment said they had benefited, 
although they would have preferred more flexibility in their care plans. They were critical of the 
bureaucracy they had to deal with both to get direct payments initially and to account for their use. 
Payment rates, unexplained delays in processing applications and inflexible rules about which 
services could be converted to a direct payment were all sources of frustration to the few direct 
payment users who had managed to survive the system in Fletcherford and the reason many had 
withdrawn. 
9.4.1 Payment system 
The system for making direct payments in Bigtown was designed to simplify budget management 
for users. The regular payments covered hourly wages and National Insurance contributions. 
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However additional costs were reimbursed separately when expenditure was incurred. In contrast 
the Fletcherford scheme used a single 'rolled up price' formula (a set rate per hour of care needed), 
requiring users to plan and budget for holidays, sickness and emergency cover. The negative aspect 
of the simpler approach for users in Bigtown was that care managers were responsible for 
calculating how much individuals should receive. Senior practitioners suggested that some found 
this flexibility in building up the budget threatening: 
' The sticking point is often grasping how you translate a statement of need into a sum of 
money, people can not cope with and understand that.' Senior practitioner, September 2001 
One experienced worker suggested that the responsiveness shown by strategic managers responsible 
for introducing the scheme was itself a problem in Bigtown because practitioners could not keep up 
with changes. 
9.4.2 Arranging direct payments in Bigtown 
The users and carers I interviewed in Bigtown all said that they would recommend the direct 
payments option to other people. However like their Fletcherford peers, the early applicants 
suggested that it had taken too long to arrange their first payment. They blamed 'teething troubles' 
with the new scheme. Care managers also felt that as the scheme became established, arranging 
direct payments would become a matter of routine and good practice. 
T was the first from our team. I hit barriers they may have sorted out by now' 
Practitioner 
Those responsible for developing the Bigtown scheme had, as in Fletcherford, been concerned at 
first that it would be overwhelmed with applicants and had focussed on 'getting it right' for the first 
few applicants. Procedures were changed as problems were identified through the experiences of 
the first users. When it became apparent that people were waiting too long and that this was causing 
frustration the process was accelerated. 
"The scheme wanted people processed one at a time, it was very slow, only one through in 
the first year. We recognised that people take different times, to reach a decision, to 
understand.'' Support service co-ordinator, February 2002 
Unfortunately by 2001 many practitioners had only indirect experience of direct payments in 
Bigtown and they remembered the negative accounts of colleagues involved in the initial stage of 
the scheme, when problems causing delays had still to be resolved. 
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9.4.3 Monitoring 
Monitoring documentation and procedures have been criticised as an extra source of stress and 
confusion for people who receive direct payments (Pearson, 2000). In Bigtown no one complained 
about monitoring arrangements or systems for accounting for the use of care funds. Users were 
asked to keep records but the council carried out periodic audits of a sample only. 
In Fletcherford direct payment users complained that they were being asked for staff time sheets as 
well as providing monthly returns of expenditure, evidenced by bank statements. This was not only 
an extra responsibility for users but created an extra demand on the limited time of the support 
service worker. 
Practitioners in Bigtown supported the general view of their peers in Fletcherford that direct 
payments offered no more opportunities for abuse than other care arrangements. They were 
therefore not in favour of either rigorous monitoring or highly specified care plans: 
' We have got to take risks if we are giving them choice. We should not be telling them what 
is right. There is a risk of abuse for older people but we have that now. There is not a 
greater risk with direct payments.' Practitioner 
9.5. The Opinions and Influence of Practitioners 
Practitioners played a key role in the implementation of community care policy in both towns. 
9.5.1. Practitioners' perception of direct payments as difficult and time consuming 
Despite the investment in training and support, the general impression I was given by practitioners 
in Bigtown was that arranging a direct payment package for a community care user was a very 
difficult and time consuming process. This was partly because direct payments were new and 
practitioners were unfamiliar with the process, but also because of the experiences of early pioneers 
amongst care managers. Some admitted that they were sometimes reluctant to pursue this option 
with their clients because they felt their own lack of confidence and knowledge would deter people 
worried about assuming additional responsibilities. This hesitance did not seem to reflect any lack 
of commitment to the principles of direct payments: 
'My only worry is that it is not easy to set up. The idea is brilliant but not easy. Because it 
appears to be complicated to us and users, it takes a lot of work to get it off the ground.' 
Practitioner 
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This negative perception was not shared by the users and carers who were already receiving direct 
payments, or by the support service in Bigtown. However the opinion that arranging a direct 
payment was onerous for care managers, echoed that expressed by practitioners in Fletcherford, 
including those who had no experience of dealing with an application. Similarly, some Bigtown 
practitioners also said that the issue of direct payments had slipped from their consciousness after 
the initial training and publicity. That was because they were too pre-occupied with what they 
understood as the core care management tasks: 
'With care management we had to get our heads around contracting et cetera. With this it 
is an optional extra.' Practitioner 
People with experience of direct payments in Bigtown commented that the process of arranging a 
direct payment had been simplified as strategic planners became aware of the difficulties 
experienced implementing new procedures. However many practitioners with no first hand 
experience, had the impression that the process was still complicated and laborious. This may have 
made them reluctant to promote direct payments or to respond with confidence and enthusiasm to 
individual enquiries. This boded ill for Fletcherford, where in 2002 there was no indication that 
council decision makers were inclined to simplify the process for arranging direct payments. 
9.5.2. Community care policy and New Labour's modernisation plans. 
Practitioners' understanding of the values underpinning and the philosophical objectives of policy 
initiatives usually affected the way they interpreted guidance and exercised judgement in the 
implementation process. 
Like their peers in Fletcherford, Bigtown care managers believed that the community care policy 
introduced by Conservative governments had been ideologically motivated. Any benefits to social 
care users had been incidental to the objective of undermining public services and saving money. 
Feelings were more mixed about New Labour's modernisation plans and the government's 
promotion of direct payments. Practitioners in Bigtown were apparently more aware of the role 
played by the disability rights movement in the introduction of direct payments. 
'It was not their idea, it was the disability movement. lean see how the Tories would latch 
onto it to reduce public services.' Practitioner 
Some were cynical about policy initiatives that were politically motivated and questioned whether 
Bigtown council had responded to 'top down' pressure rather than the wishes of more than a small 
number of local people in introducing direct payments. In Fletcherford practitioners felt that while 
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there would be a local interest in direct payments, lack of awareness of the possibility amongst local 
disabled people meant that it had been left to the government to promote the initiative. One very 
experienced social worker in Bigtown suggested that the objectives of policy makers usually proved 
to be irrelevant to the outcomes of policy implementation 
'I do not know whether policy makers thought it through, over twenty years I have found 
they usually have not. ....I do not worry about policy change because so much can happen 
before it trickles down to the front line.' Senior Practitioner 
9.5.3. 'Street level bureaucracy' in interactions between practitioners and citizens 
As in Fletcherford, the accounts of disabled people and practitioners in Bigtown confirmed that the 
latter exercised discretion in their implementation of community care policy. This was particularly 
in the areas of resource rationing and eligibility criteria that they felt undermined the principles and 
objectives of independent living. The more skilled and confident practitioners were able to 
circumvent rules and restrictions in the interpretation of need in assessments. Practitioners 
described how funding issues highlighted the conflict for them in their roles as advocates for 
individuals and gate-keepers for council resources. Users were sometimes aware of the struggles 
between practitioners and managers over resource rationing: 
7 was offered five hours at first by my social worker but then it was cut to four by the 
manager.' User 
It was not only care management staff who exercised discretion to help meet 'need' not officially 
recognised by the council's eligibility criteria: 
'....because I have a direct payments package I am not officially supposed to go to the day 
centre but the staff let me use it as a drop in ...' User 
Like their peers in Fletcherford practitioners suggested that where budgets are rationed, direct 
payments can enable users to get better value from the funds available by choosing priorities and 
buying services of an appropriate quality. 
' If someone is in control, it is their choice... We are restricted by budget holders' control. 
We are on the front line, in a difficult position. People tend to think social workers have not 
done their jobs well enough, but we have.' Practitioner 
In both areas, practitioners sometimes assessed needs the user had not identified 
'They said I can get more if I need it. Originally it was social services that said half an 
hour each morning. It takes them that to get me ready because of my quadriplegia.... The 
social worker said I needed an hour at night or it was not worth them coming down.' User 
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Practitioners in Bigtown, like their Fletcherford peers, felt ethical dilemmas in implementing 
eligibility criteria and charging policies. They resented being involved in charges and resource 
rationing: 
'The welfare state was devised to help people who have not got money. It goes against the 
grain to ration. You would not do the job if you did not want them to have what they need. I 
am torn as to whether people who have the money should pay. I do not like it, I feel they are 
entitled.' Practitioner 
One practitioner described how even more assertive clients are subject to the social worker's 
attitude, understanding and confidence: 
Thave got two very politicised disabled women. They raised issues for me as the assessor 
in how to respond, balancing their rights and SSD resources. Users are very dependent on 
the social worker and her attitude. We have control. We can really limit what they get in the 
way we write the care plan.' Senior Practitioner 
As in Fletcherford, practitioners exaggerated need in assessments in anticipation of resistance from 
budget managers: 
'The whole thing is difficult. It is like playing God. What I do every time is ask for more 
than they need and end up with less. It depends how you fill in the form.' Practitioner 
The ability and willingness of council officers to use their judgement in the interpretation of policy 
seemed crucial to the success of direct payments in Bigtown. Senior managers used discretion in 
allowing a direct payment user to employ his wife, when the social worker argued that she could 
meet his needs most appropriately. Most practitioners chose not to question the competence and 
motivation of people requesting direct payments or to challenge their plans. One person had 
complex needs of an order that merited regular admissions to a health facility; however his social 
worker did not attempt to distinguish his health care from his social care needs for the purpose of 
calculating a direct payment. 
The view of the support service co-ordinator confirmed the central role of practitioners in enabling 
people to access and fully benefit from direct payments. 
'No matter what we think about social workers, they are the key people in doing care plans. 
A lot of very good social workers, put forward very creative ideas. Occasionally an 
individual social worker or a team always finds problems. Social workers' confidence 
varies...' Support service co-ordinator 
In Bigtown three of the users and two of the carers I spoke to were keen to give credit to the role 
played by practitioners in helping them to get and make full use of their direct payments. 
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' / would die if the social worker left, she has fought for us tooth and nail.' 
Carer 
However one person's experience lent support to Barron's (2001) thesis about alternative 
approaches to the exercise of power over disabled people: 
' They come in and try to tell him what is best for him. They do not look at things from a 
disabled person's point of view.' Carer 
9.5 .4. Direct payments and health 
In Bigtown only one practitioner interviewed was in favour of direct payments being made 
available to meet health care needs, because it would give social services clients the privilege 
enjoyed by the well off: 
' It is already there for people with money, why should our people not have the choice?' 
Practitioner 
One had mixed feelings 
'Ifitgetsyou what you want at an appropriate time like more physiotherapy it sounds okay. 
But I worry about a two tier system being immoral.' Senior Practitioner, 
The other eleven clearly put collective interests and social justice before individual rights. Like the 
majority practitioners in Fletcherford, who opposed the use of direct payments for health needs, 
they felt that the introduction of money into the delivery of health care to individuals would 
somehow undermine or corrupt the system. 
'It is dangerous to blur the boundaries between health and social care, politically and 
practically.' S enior Practitioner 
' If it is part of the NHS, it should stay with the NHS. Money should not come into it.' 
Practitioner 
Despite their strong expression of principles, I found no evidence in either town that care managers 
in practice let the apparently hallowed 'boundary' between health and social services prevent 
individuals from getting the care arrangements they preferred. One of the Bigtown direct payment 
users appeared to have both health and social care needs. His social worker used this to argue the 
case for allowing him to employ his wife, a qualified nurse, to provide care. However there 
appeared to be no attempt to reduce the funding contribution from the council's community care 
budget to account for the health care elements of his care package. Instead of cost shunting between 
the statutory Hinders, it seemed that health and social work practitioners collaborated to use the 
complexity of this person's needs to meet the family's preferences despite the scarcity of resources: 
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'He still goes into a health bed for respite. Officially he is admitted with 'chest 
infections. They have only so many beds and they are in such demand.' Carer 
9.6. Concluding Discussion 
Bigtown was a 'traditional' Labour council that showed its preference for public sector provision by 
continuing to dominate the 'mixed economy' in community care, by providing support for direct 
payment users directly and by planning to set up an 'in-house' personal assistance scheme. The 
authority nevertheless used an independent organisation for the initial consultation on direct 
payments and acted on its recommendations. Bigtown council attempted to engage the whole 
potential user population in an impartial consultation exercise before the New Labour guidance 
recommended user involvement so strongly. It probably achieved more meaningful participation 
than Fletcherford's very limited and selective consultation and its tokenistic involvement of users in 
the development of the scheme. 
Direct services were popular in Bigtown and there seems to have been no suspicion when strategic 
planners in social services broached the subject of direct payments, that this was an attempt at back-
door privatisation. A small group of users and staff at the local resource centre, provided 'bottom -
up' pressure in support of the initiative and one carer wrote to the director of social services 
requesting a direct payment. This may have helped convince councillors that direct payments were a 
rights issue for disabled people and not another 'consumerist strategy'. I f this was the case, the 
actions of about seven people from a population of over 700,000 were enough to persuade council 
leaders to commission an independent consultation. In Fletcherford practitioners' reports of requests 
for direct payments from individual service users appear not to have been relayed by managers to 
politicians before February 2000. 
Strong support at the senior management and political level, including from the council's legal and 
financial services, seems to have empowered those leading the implementation process to respond 
flexibly to issues identified through practice. They were not required to go through the process of 
presenting the case for every revision of local policy and procedures to senior managers and 
councillors. In contrast, in Fletcherford planning staff had convinced councillors at the outset that 
there was little interest from local people in direct payments. They therefore invested little 
commitment to introducing the initiative in response to what they thought was 'top-down' pressure 
from a central government determined to secure co-operation in pursuit of its own policy objectives 
irrespective of local opinion. 
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From May 2000 there was no single party running Fletcherford with its own policy programme. 
Therefore the only political leadership and interest in direct payments came from central 
government filtered through a system of inspection and performance monitoring. New councillors 
in key roles in Fletcherford had little knowledge of community care or disability rights issues and 
did not have time to develop their awareness of direct payments to influence their development 
during the implementation period. 
In Bigtown, the support service staff and management committee felt empowered rather than 
compromised by their position within the local authority's service infrastructure. They challenged 
procedures they perceived as obstructive and contributed to the development of the scheme. The 
security of their public sector status and funding seemed to offer reassurance to practitioners and 
potential users that the council intended that direct payments should become a permanent feature of 
the community care landscape. In Fletcherford however the support service manager was aware that 
continued funding for her service, from year to year, relied on satisfying the priorities of those in 
the council with power and influence over contracting decisions. Also as an 'outside' agency, the 
organisation providing support did not have the backing of the local voluntary sector and the 
disabled community. This may explain why the manager was reluctant to openly challenge key 
decision makers, although she agreed with the planning manager and operational staff that the local 
policies and procedures deterred many people from requesting direct payments and restricted their 
potential benefits for those who did. 
Officers in influential positions, who wanted to limit the impact of direct payments in Fletcherford, 
could prevent those involved in implementation from revising local policies and procedures in the 
light of experience. Development was left to practitioners using their knowledge of people's needs, 
preferences and circumstances and their discretionary power as 'street level bureaucrats'. Senior 
managers in Bigtown seemed not to be swayed by a 'care discourse' (Morris 1993) that portrayed 
service users as unable to manage their own care arrangements, despite its fairly unbroken tradition 
of municipal paternalism and the campaigning activities of local disabled people using the resource 
centre were probably influential. In Fletcherford, key actors resisted the challenge to their own 
expertise presented by a policy programme that demanded responsible action from care recipients, 
in contrast to their traditional treatment as passive-'pawns' (Le Grand 1997). It seemed senior 
officers and corporate experts could wield more power in an authority run by a relatively 
inexperienced coalition of minority party councillors than one run by an established and 
experienced party group with a large majority. This might have been the case whichever party held 
overall control. 
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Practitioners in Bigtown found that senior managers and politicians were more receptive to 
suggestions for increasing the potential impact of direct payments. They sometimes found the extent 
of their delegated power and responsibility in implementation intimidating, mainly because they felt 
they lacked financial expertise. 
Experience in Bigtown suggests that even i f the system for arranging and accessing direct payments 
in Fletcherford is eventually streamlined, the impression that the direct payments involve extra 
work and frustration for practitioners and stress, and delays for potential users, will have entered the 
local community care culture. 
Despite the greater investment in publicity and promotion in Bigtown, practitioners were also gate 
keepers to information about direct payments for most potential users who did not have links with 
disability rights or community care networks. They seemed no less willing than their peers in 
Fletcherford to use their position and discretion on the frontline of service delivery, to interpret 
community care policies and procedures to prioritise the interests of their clients over political or 
economic considerations. Practitioners in both authorities justified their deliberate manipulation of 
national and local guidance by reference to the ultimate objectives of contemporary social policy 
and the values and principles that underpinned their practice. 
In both areas there were some service users who appreciated the opportunity offered by direct 
payments to achieve more control and flexibility in their care arrangements. They wanted to choose 
who provided care for them, at what times and in what manner. The tasks involved were of an 
intimate and essential nature and the individuals were vulnerable, given that they were expected to 
entrust their physical care and access to their homes to care staff. Their aspirations were therefore 
fairly modest and concerned with meeting their basic human needs for survival, safety and dignity 
(Doyal and Gough 1993). Disabled people in Bigtown and Fletcherford did not seek a direct 
payment because they wanted the status of being employers or to exercise power over the staff who 
provided their care. Instead they wanted to secure a relationship with people they could trust and to 
share 'power' with them, in the form of control and flexibility in working arrangements. 
In Bigtown users were less motivated than people in Fletcherford by the desire to improve the lot of 
their staff. However secure, reasonably well paid employment in the council's own services was 
still available for staff who chose it, unlike in Fletcherford where independent sector agencies 
offering the minimum wage dominated. While there was not the same motivation to remedy the 
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social injustices of the community care labour market, disabled people in Bigtown were still 
concerned about staff conditions and security. 
Users in both Bigtown and Fletcherford sought help to f i l l the gaps in their care arrangements that 
family and friends could not cover. They tended to underplay rather than exaggerate their needs and 
valued the 'independence' of the self-sufficiency promoted by New Labour's policies (Dept of 
Health 1998a, Vernon and Qureshi 2000), as well as the 'independence' of self-determination 
promoted by the disability rights movement (Morris, 1993). Direct payments enabled Bigtown users 
to pay people who were providing support voluntarily. As in Fletcherford, users were usually at 
least as successful as statutory and independent care providers in recruiting and retaining suitable 
staff, even though they could not offer the career progression, professional supervision and peer 
support that big organisations could. Familiarity, mutual respect and trust were the most important 
resources available to disabled people in both towns. Community -care policies and practices that 
nurtured relationships and reciprocity promised to combine public and private resources cost 
effectively and to meet the needs and preferences of both users and staff. 
It was not possible to generalise about the majority of community care service users in both towns 
who did not request a direct payment. It seems likely that significant numbers of people requiring 
care did not know about direct payments so could not express interest i f the option was not offered 
by care managers. Perceptions of the adequacy and appropriateness of the support on offer affected 
individuals' attitude to direct payments. However, notwithstanding the differences in the approach 
to promotion and support between the two authorities, it seems that in both towns there were 
disabled people who did not relish the 'risks' and the responsibilities involved in managing their 
own care packages. As the literature suggested (Greener 2002, Hogget 2001 Taylor-Gooby 2001), 
past experience, as well as their social and economic situation, influenced people's expectations and 
provided the 'context' in which ideas and opportunities were introduced to them. This included 
their experience of their relationship with the council and its staff. In Fletcherford people had 
experienced the implementation of 'policy initiatives' associated with community care as leading to 
a reduction in the availability and quality of services overall and the withdrawal of council own 
services. In Bigtown, service users generally appreciated the major role played by council services 
in community care provision and trusted that they would be there to serve them. In both situations it 
seems that many people were reluctant to risk giving up their familiar care arrangements to become 
employers and /or to buy and budget for their own care. 
Findings from Bigtown show that the behaviour, motivation and expectations of disabled people 
and social work practitioners in Fletcherford were not 'untypical' but had outcomes specific to the 
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particular conditions and circumstances. They support Pawson and Tilley's (1997) thesis that policy 
actors have 'powers and liabilities' which allow them to accept or resist change and that policy 
programs are embedded within a wider set of 'macro' and 'micro' forces, so that the impact of 
policy change is contingent upon the context. Experiences in both Fletcherford and Bigtown 
therefore have wider relevance to understanding the implementation of the community care policy 
of the Conservative governments and New Labour's efforts to achieve greater success in the 
achievement of policy objectives, as exemplified through the extension of direct payments. 
218 
CHAPTER TEN 
Conclusions : Still 'Muddling Through' 
'Deliberate, orderly steps therefore are not an adequate portrayal of how the policy 
process actually works. Policy- making is instead a complexly interactive process without 
beginning or end.' Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993,11) 
10.0 Introduction 
The case study of the policy action process began with an exploration of the relationship between 
the national policy programme and the wider social, political and economic context, as presented by 
the actors responsible for its formulation. That is the Blair government. To follow the 
implementation process through the policy -action chain required an understanding of the national 
and local context for the initiative and the meanings the various actors gave to their expectations 
and experiences. The research showed how actions were taken on the basis of decisions people 
made from the choices they perceived were available to them. Those choices were contingent upon 
both the context, and what Pawson and Tilley (1997, 50) called the 'powers and liabilities' of 
individuals: 
"Socialprograms are the product of volition, skilled action and negotiation by human 
agents and are not reducible to the facticity of a given event.' 
First the findings from this case study are discussed in relation to the research questions posed and 
the literature reviewed earlier. The interaction between contexts and mechanisms in the two 
authorities are presented next and the outcomes compared. The lessons from the case study are then 
identified. I conclude the chapter by specifying the contribution of my study with reference to the 
main sources and theories tested through my research. 
10.1 The Research Questions 
I. Was the central government's approach to policy making clear and coherent within its 
modernisation programme and what were the implications for implementation? 
There was evidence of consistency across government policy documents with the reasons given for 
the policy initiative (theories) and the objectives (ends) identified. However weaknesses in 'joined 
up thinking' at central government level were reflected in the guidance on how policy objectives 
were to be achieved (means) that had negative implications for the implementation of direct 
payments in Fletcherford. This lends support to the 'statutory coherence thesis' of Meier and Mc 
Farlane (1996). They asserted that successful policy initiatives require coherent statutes, with 
precise goals supported by an adequate causal theory, and clear rules and responsibilities for 
implementation assigned to committed agencies. 
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The New Labour government chose to develop direct payments from the starting point of the 
Conservative government's community care arrangements, supporting the 'unfinished business' 
thesis of Clarke and colleagues (2000), that Blair's government's modernisation programme was 
intended to remedy design flaws in its predecessor's policy. Despite the minister's evident interest 
in promoting the rights of disabled people (5.3.1) and the government's concern to extend the use of 
direct payments (Dept of Health 2000a), the obligation to implement direct payments was 
introduced gradually, within the selective, residualist model of community care policy. Councils 
were delegated responsibility for policy decisions in implementation and left with considerable 
discretion in designing local schemes and in promoting or restricting access. Practitioners were left 
to negotiate and interpret local eligibility criteria to the detriment or advantage of particular users. 
New Labour's approach to direct payments, within a programme of targeting welfare selectively, 
did not conflict with the analysis that overall their social policy programme represented a 
'fundamental shift further towards a residual safety net model'. (Lister 2001,434) Blair's 
government did not promote or recognise collective or universal approaches. Consistent with its 
'supply side' economic strategies (Jessop 1994, Jordan 1999, Levitas 2001, Lister 1998) only 
income from earnings was exempted from means testing. 
Fundamental issues were left to be resolved at the local level in implementation. Values interfered 
with pragmatism at both the government and 'street level'. Tensions, between the collectivism 
associated with traditional 'old' Labour values and the individualism of the 'New Right' reforms of 
public services that the Blair government inherited, were not easily resolved through New Labour 
pragmatism. The account provided by the minister and a leading civil servant (5.3.5.) illustrated that 
there was reluctance at the political level to undermine the collective nature of the 'health service'. 
Most practitioners (9.5 .4.) were also reluctant to accept the potential break up of this valued 
collective provision by the 'commodification' of health care and the introduction of commercial 
considerations to practitioner-patient relationships. Practitioners were also conscious of the 
principles of universal access to health care that they perceived were threatened by increased 
charging in the selective provision of the personal social services. 
Experiences of actors in the case study (8.6.7 and 9.5.4) confirmed what research (Glendinning 
1998, Rummery and Glendinning 1999) and case law (R v North Devon Health Authority ex parte 
Coughlan, 1999) suggested. The distinction between health and social care is a social construct. 
Thus the boundary between them has been repeatedly redrawn since the separation of the two types 
of public sector provision in the 1948 National Health Service and National Assistance Acts. The 
imperatives for moving this boundary have been political rather than clinical and have meant that 
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'health care' has remained universally available and free at the point of use, based on accountability 
to a national electorate. In contrast 'social care' has been been provided on an increasingly selective 
basis (Dept. of Health 1998a, 2.6) with the free services of informal carers (Dept. of Health 1998a, 
2.2) and means tested charges of growing significance (Audit Commission, 1999,2000). Some 
activities that were once recognised as health provision in community care has become the 
responsibility of social services, subject to local accountability, rather than a right of citizenship as 
Rummery and Gledinning (1999) found. Nevertheless it seemed that for many policy actors in this 
study, from politicians and civil servants to practitioners and citizens, the National Health Service 
was revered as the embodiment of the collective values on which the welfare sate was founded. 
Political decision- makers wanted to preserve the cultural icon of the N.H.S. and to support the 
'universal altruism' it symbolised. It was left to practitioners, users and carers to try and fill the 
gaps between 'health' and 'social care' provision in the community. Health and social care were 
therefore also re-defined in interactions between street level bureaucrats and citizens. Practitioners 
were concerned to get the service arrangements most suited to the needs, preferences and 
circumstances of individuals including, direct payments, irrespective of the funding responsibilities 
and eligibility criteria of the respective agencies. They assessed needs as 'health' or 'social' care 
accordingly. 
Lack of clear direction allowed decision- making in implementation that was inconsistent with the 
government's acceptance of market theory as a guide to pragmatic action (Dept. of health 1998a). 
The pay and conditions of care staff were another aspect of the minister's continuing concern with 
social justice, the traditional end of social policy that the New Labour government was seeking to 
achieve by 'modern means' (5 .3.1.). He recognised the threat posed by the move from collective to 
individualised services in community care. Nevertheless he prioritised the rights of individuals over 
the interests of their staff, extending user choice over protecting social care services (5.3.1.) The 
expectation was that direct payments would enable users to manage budgets cost effectively based 
on their own preferences (Dept of Health 2000a, 3: 2) and to negotiate terms and conditions with 
their employees. However the policy guidance did not address this clearly and only said that direct 
payment arrangements should be tested for 'best value'. There were ambiguities in the 'Fair Access 
to Care' Guidance (Dept of Health 2001) about whether the government was promoting equality in 
access or outcomes. This confusion about the means and ends of this policy allowed local 
authorities to set rates for and attach conditions to direct payments, based on their own preferred 
interpretation of the criteria of 'best value' and 'fair access' (7.7.1, 7.7.2. and 9.4.1). The impact on 
implementation was to limit the choices available to service users in Fletcherford, to undermine the 
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principles of market theory and the pragmatic use of the market (Smith 1961, Le Grand 1993, 
Barlett 1998). 
2. What were the implications of central government approach to achieving of its policy objectives 
by delegating responsibility for implementation to local authorities? 
There was a deliberate strategy by the civil servants developing the direct payments guidance to 
allow practice to inform further policy development. This was exemplified by the rather 
ambiguous early guidance (Dept of Health 2000a) on the use of direct payments for health care, 
which the above discussion suggests was a matter of ideological conflict that could not be 
resolved initially at the national political level. It allowed local schemes, practitioners and users to 
identify problems that were addressed by later guidance (Dept of Health 2002a) as part of the 
government's 'gradualist' approach to securing the compliance of the lower tier of government. 
Policy was thus developed through the implementation process. The accounts of civil servants 
(5.3.5. and 8.6.7.) indicated that gaps were left to be filled by 'bottom up' influence. These 
accounts were consistent with Hjern and Porter's (1997) analysis of 'policy sub-systems', through 
which lower level actors make and develop policy through conflict and negotiation during 
implementation. 
The Blair government sought compliance through the use of centralised performance management 
systems (Dept of Health 1998, 2.34). They had a counter-productive effect on the implementation 
of the initiative in Fletcherford, in terms of wider policy objectives. Senior managers felt under 
pressure to produce a 'direct payment scheme' to show progress to the Department of Health. In 
their eagerness to get a 'basic scheme up and running' (7.2.3.) they neglected the opportunities to 
use the processes of planning and developing direct payments locally in pursuit of other goals, in 
particular the building of capacity in individuals and communities through genuine participation. 
Similarly the focus on demonstrating the achievement of the performance target of offering direct 
payments meant that attention was diverted from the ultimate policy objectives: promoting 
independence, choice and control for disabled people. Therefore the 'means' to that end were 
developed in such away that limited the choice and control offered to disabled people. The 
empowering potential of direct payments was undermined by the government's approach to 
performance management and the use of crude output indicators. 
This evidence of the impact of centralised performance management in promoting a narrow and 
short -term focus on measurable, intermediate objectives in this study supports Hunter's (2001) 
critique, the conclusions of Newman's (2001) review of the research and McKevitt and Lawton's 
(1996) findings. There was also evidence (8.4. and 8.6.6.) to support Lawton's contention that 
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there are opportunities in the conflict between professional and managerial goals in public 
services, to protect and promote the interests of users through the alliances of weaker 
stakeholders. As Newman (2001) predicted, it proved possible for managers, professionals and 
user groups to appropriate parts of New Labour's own 'modernising' discourse in their pursuit of 
other interests and agendas. 
3. How did political ideology, interests and alliances shape policy formulation and 
implementation at the local authority level and how were tensions between policy objectives 
reconciled? 
Comparision between the attitudes and actions of politicians in the two authorities provided a 
contrast, even though when direct payments were introduced as a local policy issue both had Labour 
councils. In Priestley's (1999) research, the imposition of a competitive 'contract culture' on a 
Labour authority had threatened the collective nature of an 'indirect payments' scheme that had 
been developed by local disabled people working co-operatively with council support. Pearson 
(2000) described how a Labour authority had constrained the development of its direct payments 
scheme to protect council jobs. 
In Fletcherford the councillors had been obliged to embrace the market pragmatically in response 
to economic pressures that threatened the loss of jobs and services. The ideological conflict implied 
was played out in political conflict within the Labour group. Service users and representatives of 
voluntary groups regarded direct payments suspiciously when presented as a Conservative 
government policy, because their recent experience of the impact of community care had been so 
negative (5.2). Councillors perceived no genuine local interest in direct payments and invested little 
financial and political support in implementation (5.3). Officers who had little insight into users' 
experiences and preferences in community care colluded with those who remained ideologically 
opposed to direct payments as a New Labour initiative. They exploited political and historical 
contextual conditions to prevent direct payments having a major impact on community care 
arrangements in Fletcherford (7.7.). 
In Bigtown however, the council had managed to maintain its role as the major provider of 
community care services and neither politicians nor users automatically saw any Conservative 
government policy with a 'consumerist' focus as a threat. Bigtown councillors believed that direct 
payments had the support of the local disabled community and invested funding and political 
support in developing and promoting the initiative (9.2.). Officers in leading roles supported the 
initiative and remained in post long enough for that support to be translated into practical help for 
practitioners and users in resolving early problems in implementation (9.2.5 ). Politicians in both 
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towns hoped that direct payments would give service users opportunities to raise the quality of their 
own care arrangements above the low standards provided through the community care market 
(5.3.3. and 9.2.2.). 
In Fletcherford operational managers were fully occupied in both running existing services and in 
implementing the whole 'modernisation' programme. The workload overall meant that they were 
unable to devote equal effort to everything demanded of them. They therefore chose their own 
priorities when rationing their own and their staffs' resources and thus resolved tensions between 
policy objectives. The intermediate objective of achieving 'turnover' in referrals through processing 
'cases' quickly, for example, was prioritised over the ultimate objective of developing care 
arrangements that would promote the independence of individuals. Therefore because direct 
payments were perceived as complex, requiring the longer term involvement of scarce, skilled and 
experienced staff, they were not prioritised as 'core business' by some team managers (7.2.1). There 
appeared to be an absence of both leadership from local politicians and a ground swell of support 
from the local disabled community (5.2 and 5.3.). This, together with openly expressed objections 
by powerful interest groups within the authority (7.4 and 7.7.), made operational managers reluctant 
to take risks. Therefore they referred matters up the chain of command rather than exercising their 
usual discretion in community-care decision-making. They in turn did not provide support to the 
strategic and planning managers who were trying to promote the initiative. Senior social services 
managers did not resolve tensions and conflicts in the local policy-making and implementation 
process. 
4. How did practitioners understand central government policy objectives and what were the 
influences on their actions in policy implementation? 
Practitioners shared the commitment espoused by their political masters, in central and local 
government, to the values of social justice (policy ends). In 2000 practitioners in Fletcherford were 
generally in support of New Labour's policy programme (chapter 6). They were persuaded by its 
proposals to use the market pragmatically (policy theories and means) to achieve value based 
community care objectives (ends) and to promote 'joined up tJiinking and action' (policy theories 
and means). Over the next two years practitioners became disillusioned with the government's 
approach to policy effectiveness and less convinced that its objectives for modernising social 
services were based on the same values that underpinned social work practice (chapter 8). In 
particular, they perceived no improvement in services delivered in the independent sector. 
Practitioners felt that centralised performance measurement systems were developing into a 
counter-productive diversion of resource, from making real improvements to cosmetic and short-
term service strategies. They were also frustrated by the obstacles to developing and delivering 
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seamless services to individuals, created by the apparent lack of'joined up thinking' at the central 
government policy making level. Individuals' fairly basic needs were still falling into the gaps 
between health and social care provision. Practitioners remained committed to collective values and 
service models but were willing to use individualist devices (as distinguished by Priestley 1999) to 
meet the needs and preferences of users. 
Practitioners struggled to achieve community care objectives and to ameliorate the negative effects 
of the failings of the market. In their interactions with service users they prioritised the latters' 
interests and preferences over ideological considerations. Practitioners supported 'third way' 
objectives for individuals and used them in identifying potential benefits of direct payments (table 
6.30). However they did not accept the tenets of the risk society thesis of Giddens (1998,2000) or 
believe that social problems could be addressed by changing the behaviour and attitudes of 
individuals. They were not 'small c conservatives'. As Taylor -Gooby (2000) suggested, 'Blair's 
scars' marked resistance to social policy solutions that ignored structural divisions in society. 
Practitioners reconciled tensions between community care policies and social work and collective 
values by getting the best they could from the system for individuals, similar to Hoggett's (2001) 
idea of 'first order agency'. There was therefore some evidence of the counter movement of 
resistance to 'top-down' social engineering approaches to social intervention that Jordan (2000) 
described. 
There was reciprocity and interdependence between users and carers in both towns. The giving and 
receiving of 'care' are regular aspects of intimate relationships, including those where one person 
relies on the physical assistance of a loved one. Caring relationships are about mutual benefit and 
interdependence. Walmsley (1993) found that it was sometimes impossible to distinguish between 
the care-giver and cared- for in informal relationships and this was the case in both Fletcherford 
(8.2.2.) and Bigtown (9.2.3).The 'ideology of caring' postulated Morris (1993) was exposed in 
national policies (Dept. Health 1998a, 2.22) and local responses. Carers were constructed as a client 
group rather than co-workers and they were assessed and charged for services. However this 
construction was manipulated by practitioners, to get improved care arrangements and to break 
through budget ceilings. 
Practitioners clearly had more opportunities to understand users' needs and experiences of service 
delivery than central contracting staff. However they did not have the authority to exercise market 
power as the 'agents' of service users in either town. Despite New Labour's professed 
determination to use markets pragmatically rather than ideologically (Dept. of Health 1998a, DETR 
1998) the market weaknesses identified by Le Grand (1993) and Bartlett et al (1998) remained. The 
225 
restrictions on the roles of care managers as market actors, revealed by the research discussed 
earlier (3.1.1.), were evident in both authorities. 
The literature reviewed earlier suggested that as 'street level bureaucrats' practitioners are left to 
resolve tensions in policy making and make the unpalatable decisions their managers and political 
masters wish to avoid (3.1.2 ). There was evidence of this, both in relation to direct payments and in 
the wider context of community care practice. The research (3.2) also identified the crucial role of 
care managers as ambassadors and gatekeepers for direct payments. There was no evidence of 
practitioners consciously putting their personal or professional interests before those of the people 
they served, nor in the case of direct payments, having an ideologically driven resistance to dealing 
with finance or consumerist service models. However most acknowledged that they both struggled 
with the 'system' on a daily basis and were forced to compromise their values to get the work done. 
They were obliged to ration the time they spent working on behalf of individuals as well as the 
funds available for services, which meant that all those who needed their help got a share of the 
inadequate resources. The apparently complicated procedures to be followed meant that arranging 
direct payments seemed to be a time-consuming and onerous process. These very practical 
considerations, meant that only the most confident and experienced care managers in both 
authorities promoted direct payments with individual users and sustained enough enthusiasm to 
guide them through that process. 
The importance of care managers in promoting take up of direct payments (Carmichael and Brown 
2002, Dawson 2000) was confirmed and explained within complexity of particular political and 
historical situations and within a larger policy programme. The SSI's (2000) research found an 
association between care management staff ambivalence and lack of knowledge with low take up. 
This study shows how 'ambivalence' developed from an initial enthusiasm but that it was not 
present at the outset (6.6 ). 
5. What part did service users/ citizens play in the policy implementation process and how did they 
understand their participation? 
The government led by example in involving disabled people and their organisations in policy 
development at the national level. The contribution of interest groups to the clrafting of guidance 
and the funding of the N.C.I.L. suggests evidence of the 'clientelistic tendencies in the fragmented 
state' identified by Maloney and colleagues (1994). They found that these tendencies allowed some 
groups representing particular interests to exercise influence, through sharing political and technical 
knowledge with civil servants. However policy guidance left councils with ultimate discretion in 
deciding what form participation in the development of local schemes would take. 
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Arnstein's (1971) theoretical 'ladder of participation' showed symbolically that what passes for user 
participation can mean considerable variation in the nature and degree to which users have power in 
decision making. Croft and Beresford's (1993) distinction between two broad models of democratic 
and consumerist participation was relevant to the alternative approaches of the two councils to 
'consultation'. The vagueness of central government direction on the form that user involvement 
should take in the development of local direct payments schemes (Dept. of Health 2000a, 11:3, 
12:7) meant that aspirations in Fletcherford for participation were at the lower rungs of Arnstein's 
ladder. 
New Labour's policy recognised the 'expertise' of users and their potential contribution to the cost 
effective management of resources and the development of high quality services (DETR 1998, Dept 
of Health 1998a 2.55). Past experience of consultation gave disabled people in Fletcherford low 
expectations of their potential involvement in the development of a direct payment scheme, which 
experiences of the planning process reinforced. Community representatives were unable to exercise 
any influence over key decisions, which made direct payments less attractive and gradually deterred 
service users from further involvement in the planning process. Martin and Boaz (2002) asserted 
that appetites for participation vary between communities and individuals. This case study shows 
how those appetites may be influenced by past experiences of both the process and the outcomes of 
'participation' (7.5). 
Users exerted control in individual assessment and care planning processes through their 
interactions with practitioners (7.6.6., 8.6.7., 9.5), supporting Shaw's (1997) assertion that the 
participation and involvement of users is often restricted to the 'micro-level' of individual influence 
on the actions of front line workers. The effective exclusion of users from the design and 
development of the direct payment scheme and support arrangements in Fletcherford meant that 
their influence was also kept to the level of Hoggett's (2001) 'first order' agency. 
6. Why do some community care service users want to manage their care arrangements through 
direct payments and how does the implementation process assist or obstruct them in realising their 
personal objectives? 
Users' accounts of their experiences and aspirations suggested that they shared the government's 
objectives of making community care policy more effective. People interested in direct payments in 
Fletcherford wanted to counter the impact of the competitive individualism, market weaknesses and 
resource constraint that had been the outcomes of the Conservative governments' approach. They 
were also motivated by social justice considerations in their attempts to defend collective services, 
to protect the conditions of care staff and to apply rationing criteria to their own needs, using no 
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more public resources than necessary. Because of the lack of clarity and firmness in policy 
directives, where others wanted to obstruct or chminish the empowering potential of direct payments 
they could exploit their superior power in the policy 'sub- systems' to do so. For most users, direct 
payments were second best to good public services and well paid, well trained, trustworthy staff. 
The availability of a high quality, appropriate, reliable service was more important than an abstract 
notion of'choice', as Barnes and Prior (1995) predicted. 
Users and practitioners in Fletcherford used direct payments pragmatically, to ameliorate the effects 
of community care policy on the quality of their service and the lives of care staff. That this would 
happen was indicated by the 1997 consultation and users' aspirations to protect the 'collective' day 
provision. Users and practitioners were more committed to the principles of 'partnership' between 
those who provide and receive services than some senior managers in Fletcherford. There was no 
evidence in either authority that users saw themselves as 'consumers' of services seeking 
purchasing power to 'shop around'. Instead they sought mutually satisfying relationships with care 
staff (8.5 and 9.2.6.2). 
Doyal and Gough (1991) postulated that it is possible to develop a 'universalisable' definition of 
human need. Their definition recognised issues of cultural appropriateness, along with physical 
survival, and so can be applied in the context of every society's expectation of what is an acceptable 
standard of living and lifestyle.. The accounts of service users and practitioners, in this study, 
suggested that the community care contracting arrangements were failing to meet the basic needs of 
disabled people, for security and dignity (8.5.). Evidence of the costs of 'excessive privatisation' 
reflected experience revealed by research nationally (Henwood 2001) and was predicted by 
Dunleavy's (1986) 'bureau shaping' model of the behaviour of senior bureaucrats. There was 
evidence of 'principal/ agent' conflict in the community care market in Fletcherford (Le Grand and 
Bartlett 1993), where politicians (5.3.3) and bureaucratic purchasers/contract staff, prioritised cost 
over quality considerations (6.2.). This explained why some service users were interested in direct 
payments (8.5.). 
7. How does a study of the policy- action process help explain the lack of 'success' of this initiative 
in engaging most disabled people in the management of their own care arrangements through 
direct payments? 
In the 2000 survey practitioners in Fletcherford predicted that general lack of awareness and 
uncertainty or fear of change would deter most people from seeking a direct payment (6.5). This 
was borne out in experience over the next two years (Chapter 8). In both authorities the majority of 
community care service users relied on practitioners for information about policy changes (8.4. and 
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9.5 ). Practitioners felt that the quality of their work had already been diminished by the 'client 
processing' demands on their role in the implementation of community care and the loss of the 
traditional casework relationship. Many were wary of promoting an initiative they feared would 
imply extra work for themselves, when the demand for care management services exceeded supply. 
Others tried to promote direct payments but found that their own lack of confidence and knowledge 
reinforced the 'risk aversion' of most of their clients, who were already in vulnerable and 
disadvantaged situations (8.6.1.). This evidence of'risk aversion' amongst service users who 
already felt dis-empowered by the impact of community care policy on their service arrangements 
supported the findings of Taylor-Gooby's (2001) research. In Bigtown much more attention was 
given to publicising the availability of direct payments (9.2.5.) than in Fletcherford where 
information was another source of power that key actors were reluctant to share (8.6.1.). However 
in the smaller town, informal networks were stronger and most people who enquired about direct 
payments heard about them through friends, relatives or voluntary groups rather than official 
channels (Tables 8.2 to 8.5). 
The influence of some powerful officers in Fletcherford, who felt they were being forced by 
government to introduce direct payments, ensured that onerous conditions were attached to 
receiving them. (7.7. and 8.6.). Most service users therefore felt that the potential benefits did not 
merit accepting the extra responsibilities and risks implied. The service users who ultimately found 
the terms on which they were awarded direct payments acceptable, i f not ideal, were those who had 
'social' and 'cultural' capital, consistent with Greener's (2002) analysis. This capital included their 
own professional status or that of close relatives, involvement in a rights focused voluntary group or 
knowledge and experience of managing staff and budgets. The concepts of'habitus' and symbolic 
and cultural capital, discussed by Greener (2002), seemed relevant to the ability of some individuals 
both to assert their interests and elicit a favourable response from service agencies. This could 
explain why 'capacity' issues were not an obstacle to direct payments in Bigtown for users with 
'professional' carers. 
In this study, policy making in action owed much to the efforts and initiative of practitioners and 
end users in testing the boundaries of local schemes and challenging or circumventing obstacles, as 
well as to the influence of the national disability rights movement. Unfortunately for the contextual 
and individual reasons discussed above, it was a minority of users and practitioners who found the 
reason and resources to adopt this pioneering approach (8.7., tables 8.2 to 8.5, 9.3 and table 9.2). 
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10.2 The interaction between context and mechanism in policy implementation 
Experiences of the introduction of direct payments in two local authorities supported Pawson and 
Tilley's (1997,57) assertion that the outcomes of policy interventions depend on the interaction 
between context and mechanisms in policy implementation. Policy interventions succeed only in as 
far as they introduce the appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to the appropriate 
political, social and historical conditions (contexts). 
In the following table Pawson and Tilley's model (1997) is used to summarise the relationships 
between contexts, mechanisms and outcomes identified in the two areas. 
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10.2.1. Key Similarities and Differences between Fletcherford and Bigtown 
There was an apparent political commitment to collectivist values and services in Bigtown, 
where the independent sector supplemented rather than competed with public services. 
Nevertheless Bigtown was a more receptive context, politically, to the ideas and opportunities 
presented by direct payments, because support for the initiative seemed to come from local 
people as well central government. A core group of active, well informed disabled people had 
heard about direct payments, through their national organizations, and recognized their 
empowering potential. The community-care 'culture' however, characterised by the values, 
attitudes and expectations of most users and practitioners, was less receptive than in 
Fletcherford. In Bigtown council services were generally perceived as the safe, straightforward 
option for practitioners and users, whereas direct payments implied more responsibilities and 
greater risk. In Bigtown a minority of those service users who were aware of direct payments 
and expressed an interest in them, ultimately decided to accept cash instead of services. Those 
who did were motivated by a desire to secure a relationship with particular individuals and by 
frustration with inflexible local authority management practices (9.2.6 ). In Bigtown, 
practitioners and users contributed to policy development in practice, by both the exercise of 
discretion and by communicating their concerns and suggestions for improving the scheme to 
senior decision makers in the council. 
In contrast, in Fletcherford, private agencies dominated local social care provision. Past 
experience of community-care and policy change meant that users expected that the 
implementation of initiatives would have a detrimental effect on their care arrangements. They 
suspected the motives of senior managers from social services when the possibility of further 
policy change was introduced. Lack of active support from councillors, who perceived little 
interest in direct payments from users, and lack of real involvement of local people in the 
planning and development of the Fletcherford scheme, meant that officers opposed to their 
introduction could make arranging and managing direct payments unnecessarily onerous. 
Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of the independent sector services, the 
personal experiences and situation of most service users in Fletcherford made them 'risk-
averse'. They were deterred from direct payments by both complicated procedures and concerns 
about taking on more responsibilities. A minority ultimately received direct payments in 
Fletcherford. They did so to secure a relationship with someone they trusted as competent and 
reliable, to improve the wages and working conditions of the latter and to improve the flexibility 
of their care arrangements to suit them both (8 .5). In Fletcherford, practitioners and users 
contributed to policy development in practice through the exercise of discretion and the 
subversion and manipulation of rules and procedures. Bourdieu's concepts of'habitus' and 
'capital', discussed by Greener (2002), proved relevant to the differential access and attitudes of 
disabled people to direct payments in both areas. 
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The findings summarised in Tables 10.1 to 10.5.3. demonstrate that the New Labour 
government's attempt to achieve policy effectiveness was limited by its failure to take into 
account the effect of past experience, political values and expectations on policy actors' 
responses to the ideas and opportunities offered by the initiative. Its approach neglected the 
ideological, psychological and social dimensions of organisational, professional and community 
cultures and also the attitude to risk and participation of individual service users based on their 
personal histories, circumstances and resources. The government's approach also failed to 
resolve the practical problems in including this initiative in a whole programme of policy 
reform delegated to councils, already beleaguered by staff shortages. 
10.3. Lessons from the direct payments case study in policy action 
10.3.1 Policy making during implementation 
Issues identified as obstacles to the successful extension of direct payments in Fletcherford 
between 2000 and 2002 were addressed by changes in central government guidance (Dept of 
Health, 2002a). Developments in policy making during implementation suggested that 
experiences in Fletcherford were not unusual. The increasing firmness of central government 
directives, 'top down' pressure, reflected the influence of 'bottom up' demands for change, from 
local and national citizen/user groups who identified blocks to progress. This supported 
Sabatier's (1986) contention that policy studies should combine both 'top down' and 'bottom 
up' analyses. 
It was not possible to distinguish the policy making from the implementation process as policy 
continued to develop through the policy action 'chain'. However the government's responses to 
developments in practice were always contained within the parameters of the prevailing policy 
framework and an individualist model of direct payments. Policy developments heralded 
included: guidance on 'indirect payments' to resolve capacity issues; the requirement that direct 
payments match the usual cost of arranging services; the rescinding of the power of individual 
councils to determine which services could be converted to cash; extra funding for support 
services and the power to make direct payments for joint health and social care packages (Dept 
of Health, 2002a). Developments in national policy were intended to overcome the reluctance of 
councils to give disabled people a genuine choice about whether to opt out of direct services 
(Introduction to draft consultation, Dept of Health, 2002a). However uncertainty, frustration and 
conflict over these issues provided negative experiences for users, carers and practitioners in 
Fletcherford, which experience in Bigtown suggested, would leave a lasting impression on the 
service community. This illustrated how the efforts of actors responsible for providing guidance 
on implementation, to allow opportunities for lower level actors to develop policy in response to 
local needs and conditions (mechanisms) had mixed outcomes in particular contexts. 
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10.3.2. The significance of context 
The historical and political contexts and the local community cultures proved relevant. The 
principle of giving disabled people budgets to make their own care arrangements seems no more 
radical than giving people reliant on state benefits cash to buy their own food. However the split 
between income replacement benefits and services in kind, created by the 1948 National 
Assistance Act, meant that the recognition of user insight and expertise implied by direct 
payments threatened the power base and 'authority' of bureaucratic experts in local authorities. 
There were officers in Fletcherford who wanted to minimise the impact of direct payments. This 
may have been simply to protect their own vested interests as 'experts', because they believed 
that collective resources should remain in collective services, or because they were not 
persuaded that community-care users were capable of managing budgets and staff. Whether for 
any or all of these reasons, some officers colluded to make direct payments unappealing to most 
individuals using services. The influence of a 'care discourse' (Morris 1993), suspicion of the 
motives of service users and providers (Le Grand 1997) and differences in the 'habitus' of 
individuals (Greener 2000) were all evident in these attempts to limit the impact and 
effectiveness of direct payments. Lack of strong leadership from councillors in Fletcherford 
meant that those who resisted or embraced direct payments did so without political surveillance 
or interference. Experience of community-care and the impact of past policy change affected 
expectations of and attitudes to direct payments in both local communities. 
The organisational context and professional culture for implementation through local 
authority social services influenced the progress of this initiative. Most social work practitioners 
and team managers recognised the potential benefits for users of direct payments. Their 
professional values supported the principle of self- determination from which the policy had 
developed in the disability rights movement. Their activities and motivation in care 
management generally fitted Barron's (2001) model of'professional support' focused on 
empowering rather than controlling welfare 'subjects'. They were keen to share power with 
service users, just as users expressing an interest in direct payments wanted to share power with, 
rather than wield power over, their staff. In implementing community-care policy, practitioners 
assessed and interpreted users' needs to circumvent local eligibility criteria and budget 
constraints. In implementing direct payments, they re-interpreted local policies and procedures 
to meet users' needs and preferences. They were unofficially empowered to do this by senior 
managers who had risen up through the social work ranks and chose to 'look the other way' 
when practitioners were manipulating the rules (policy means) to achieve positive outcomes 
(policy ends). Their efforts provided evidence of the exercise of power in policy action by 
'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky 1980, Hudson 1989, Myers and McDonald 1996, Wells 1997) 
and what Bradley (2000) called 'administrative justice'. 
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Conflict between the Conservative government's 'New Public Management' and social work 
values identified by Flynn (1999) continued in New Labour's 'modern management' approach 
as Newman (2000) suggested. Practitioners became increasingly disillusioned with central 
government strategies (policy theories and means) but supported the official objectives (policy 
ends) and independent living principles. They resolved tensions between professional values 
and personal interests by 'covert' subversion. Practitioners thus resolved the classical dilemma 
that has always faced social work in Jordan's (2000) analysis, between reformism and 
resistance. In this regard, the motivation of practitioners was more knightly than knave-like (Le 
Grand 1997, Taylor-Gooby 2002). This was despite their experience of government's attempts 
to control their behaviour, discussed by Jordan (2000), and the experience of role conflict 
identified by Brandon and Brandon (2002). Practitioners were very aware of the discourse of 
failure, described by Langan (2000), shrouding the work of personal social services and the 
stigma associated with residual services. However they rejected both, along with the 
individualisation of social problems in New Labour's policies, identified by Lister (1998). 
10.3.3. The use of 'modern means' or mechanisms 
Failings in the government's approach to policy effectiveness were revealed in the four areas 
identified in its policy statements and documents: 'joined -up' thinking and action; 'third way' 
pragmatism; participation and centralised performance management. Problems in 
implementation arose from conflict between objectives, or an apparent lack of 'joined-up 
thinking'. Pragmatism met ideological resistance amongst those who held power in local 
authorities and tensions between collectivist and individualist values were evident at the 
national level. Participation without any tradition of capacity building and power sharing meant 
little more than tokenistic consultation in Fletcherford. Performance management systems led to 
the manipulation of crude output measures, so that the 'means' promoted to increase 
empowerment, introducing local direct payment schemes, were substituted for the 'ends' of 
giving users choice and control in service strategies and their own care arrangements. 'Street 
level bureaucrats' were left to fill the gaps and reconcile the conflicts through their interactions 
with and actions on behalf of individual citizens. 
When the state and its many vested interests give power with one hand it appears to take it away 
with the other. For example, the extension of direct payments gave less than 8000 disabled 
people direct purchasing power to arrange their own care during the case study period. At the 
same time the 'Supporting People' initiative wrested direct purchasing power from almost 
800,000 tenants of supported housing, including community-care users, and passed it back to 
local authority purchasers (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003). Social services staff had 
a key role in implementing both these initiatives between 2000 and 2002. Tensions in New 
Labour's wider programme, masked by its 'modernising' language, were thus revealed in its 
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ambivalent and inconsistent application of market theory, in different policy and service 
contexts. 
10.4. Conclusions 
The new guidance and legislation on direct payments, to become effective in 2003, would 
address some of the obstacles identified in this case study. However those changes occurred in 
response to progress and problems in implementation, supporting Lindblom's (1959) 'muddling 
through' account of the policy action process. The case study demonstrated how motivation, 
values and beliefs of individual actors should not be assumed outside of the context of their own 
experiences and social situations. Models of human behaviour based on an assumption of 
instrumental rationality and the 'risk society' thesis of Giddens (1998) proved to be inadequate 
to the complexity of the policy problem, as predicted by the work of Greener (2002), Hoggett 
(2001), Martin and Boaz (2000) and Taylor-Gooby (1999, 2001). 
The importance of the role of practitioners in developing policy through implementation, based 
on their knowledge of the needs and preferences of individuals in their particular social 
situations, was also illustrated. It is at the level of practitioner- citizen relationships that most 
community- care users participate in the decision-making that affects their lives, as the work of 
Lipsky (1980) and Shaw (1997) suggested. This means, however, that the experiences of many 
individual users are subject to the situation, skill and motivation of individual practitioners as 
well as their own circumstances or characteristics. These are issues that performance 
management tools, focusing on local accountability for aggregate numbers and outcome targets, 
are too blunt to address. In the policy context of community-care, central government will only 
achieve the objective of 'promoting independence' through extending choice and control to 
most service users, in as far as, and when and where, it succeeds in engaging and empowering 
people at the level of citizen-practitioner interaction. 
Social work has always lived with the 'classical dilemma' identified by Jordan (2000) between 
reformism and resistance. Social workers as care managers are left to make unpalatable 
decisions on matters of social justice that policy makers seem unwilling or unable to address. 
These include the rationing of scarce resources amongst the many legitimate demands on public 
funds (gate keeping) and challenging the distribution of power and decision making authority in 
the face of opposition from those with vested interests in the status quo (advocacy). 
Practitioners will continue to have that crucial role in the implementation and continuing 
development of policy while particular initiatives are contained within the parameters of 
community-care policy and based on the selective/ residual model of welfare on which the 
personal social services were founded. They require recognition and resources, in terms of time, 
support and training, to carry out that role effectively. 
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That direct payments ever became a national policy issue was a great achievement of the 
disabled people's rights movement, but that achievement was tempered by implementation 
responsibilities being delegated to local authorities within their responsibilities for community-
care. The Blair government used its policy programme to communicate its vision: of ethics 
(rights and responsibilities), economic efficiency and social cohesion. It was determined to 
bridge the 'implementation gap' (Dunsire 1976, Dept of Health 1998a). However it was 
constrained by history: the legacy of the 19th century Poor Law, the division between universal 
and selective welfare institutionalised in the 1948 legislation, as well as the changed landscape 
left by the Conservative government's reforms. New Labour's convictions about what the 
electorate would not countenance also limited the policy choices it perceived were available, in 
particular income tax increases and any evidence of intentions to 'privatise' health care. The 
government's response to the latter was not just a matter of political expediency or populism. 
The privileging of the National Health Service as a 'collective good' extended from the minister 
to practitioners and users. In practice, however health and social care have been re-defined by 
politicians, public service managers, practitioners and citizens alike to achieve desired 
objectives. 
The case study illustrated the complexity of the policy- action process and the many and varied 
influences on the progress and outcomes of particular initiatives. It looked inside the 'black box' 
of implementation to examine how policy initiatives can in some circumstances achieve their 
identified outcomes, but in others have unintended or counter-productive consequences. 
Therefore, as Pawson and Tilley (1997) asserted, evaluations of policy changes should look 
further than outcomes and include an investigation of how far the working of such mechanisms 
are contingent and conditional. 
The continuing relevance of Lindblom and Woodhouse's (1993, 10) description of policy 
development: 'with action occurring fitfully as problems become matched with policy ideas 
considered to be in the political interests of a working majority ofpartisans with influence over 
the policy domain'' was illustrated. However the influence of morality, values and ideological 
conviction on human agency was also confirmed. The case study followed the process through 
the actions and intentions of the multiplicity of policy actors involved in the development of a 
particular initiative. It demonstrated problems with New Labour's approach to implementation 
in seeking compliance with its policy programme through centralised performance management 
systems, focusing on narrowly defined intermediate objectives to the detriment of ultimate 
policy goals. Pragmatism based on 'what works' will not guarantee success i f it does not specify 
how particular initiatives work. Attempts to generalise from the 'success' of particular 
initiatives will not necessarily achieve the intended outcomes i f the relevance of contextual 
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conditions - history, politics, organisational, professional and community cultures are not 
addressed. 
10.5 Contribution 
My study was original in its approach to researching the social policy implementation process, 
through using a case study of one initiative to explore the actions, motivations, convictions and 
theories of actors at each link in the policy action chain. Its contribution to knowledge is at three 
levels. 
10.5.1. Policy Studies 
The work confirms that policy action is a complex, non-linear process and supports a generative 
model of causation. In exploring the policy action process, my key source was Pawson and 
Tilley (1997). They argued that policy research should not simply examine whether or not the 
objectives of particular initiatives are achieved but recognise that policy programmes are 
embedded within a wider set of 'macro' and 'micro' forces. I followed their advice that the 
researcher should investigate the implementation process to explore how the ideas and 
opportunities offered by initiatives interact with the conditions of the local environment, and the 
experiences and expectations of policy actors, who have 'powers and liabilities' which allow 
them to accept or resist change. I used Pawson and Tilley's framework, of context + mechanism 
+ outcome, to analyse and present my findings (tables 10.1. to 10.5.3.). I also drew on 
Sanderson's (2000) insights into the cumulative impact of policy change in exploring the 
interaction between context and mechanism in each area. 
10.5.2. Social Policy 
Social policies and welfare strategies are based on theories about human behaviour and 
motivation. My contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that welfare actors are not simply 
instrumentally motivated. They act on the basis of values and convictions, as well as perceived 
personal interests, and they are concerned with social justice. Taylor-Gooby's (1999, 2000 and 
2001) critique of New Labour's assumptions about the motivation and behaviour of welfare 
actors (service providers and users) provided the foundation for my exploration of the concept 
of 'agency' and its relevance to social policy. 
10.5.3. New Labour's Social Policy and its Approach to Implementation 
My key source here was Driver and Martell (1998). Their work provided the framework for my 
review of the various critiques of recent policy developments and New Labour's programme of 
proposed reforms. The Who, How and Why? questions enabled me to analyse the theoretical 
reasoning on which the assumptions underpinning New Labour's policies were based. By 
exploring New Labour's approach through a case study of a 'third way' initiative, I 
demonstrated that the modernising programme does not combine economic and social 
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objectives as was claimed (Blair, 1996). Instead, the tensions between them, that previous 
Labour government s struggled to reconcile, are disguised by a modernising discourse. 
Newman's (2001) critique of New Labour's efforts to establish its own dominant narrative, 
through new political ideas and representations of society, was the major source for my analysis 
of the use and appropriation of 'modernising discourse' by policy actors. My thesis reveals how 
welfare actors did, in practice, use New Labour language and concepts to guide and explain the 
decisions they made, and to justify their prioritising of contradictory policy objectives. 
Examples of the alternative, often contradictory meanings of New Labour language in this case 
study included: 'independence'' (self sufficiency or self determination); "choice' (as a means or 
an end, as consumerism or empowerment); 'fairness 7 'social justice' (equality of opportunity or 
outcome); inclusion (relational or economic); contributions/ citizenship duties (recognising 
public/ community/ military service or current employment only); partnership (co-ordinated 
planning and service delivery or the covert but gradual erosion of collective values and service 
models and the 'privatisation' of welfare through the move from universal to selective 
provision) and participation (citizen control/ delegated power or tokenistic consultation and 
manipulation). 
My work showed that policy actors do not act on the basis of perceived self interest alone, nor 
do they all fi t the model of the reflexive actor as subject, on which the 'risk society' thesis and 
the third way ideal of the active citizen seems to depend. People make decisions and act on the 
basis of the choices they believe are available, from politicians to practitioners and service 
users. I also highlighted how access to and control over various forms of capital was crucial to 
the exercise of choice and self-determination by welfare actors. I confirmed the significance the 
various forms of capital identified by Greener (2001) in the social policy field. They were 
symbolic (status), political (power and influence over decision -makers), cultural (knowledge) 
and economic (control over budgets and personal resources). I also found that 'social capital' 
was crucial to individual welfare subjects. Service users who were involved in community or 
voluntary sector networks, or who had relatives or friends working in the community-care field, 
were most likely to realise their own objectives (ends) from policy changes. 
Finally, my contribution has been to reveal how New Labour's approach to securing policy 
effectiveness has often been counter-productive. The use of centralised performance 
management techniques led to a narrow focus on crude performance measures, a short- term 
perspective in planning and decision-making and the displacement of policy ends by policy 
means. In its efforts to 'modernise' community-care services, central government 'overloaded' 
council leaders, managers and practitioners with initiatives and implementation responsibilities. 
The consequence has been that the ultimate objectives of policy change have often been 
obscured, or lost altogether, in the quantity and confusion of implementation imperatives. 
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Appendix 1 
Survey o f Practitioners 2000 : Interview Schedule 
1. Personal information 
Name 
Team 
Current role 
Background / Experience 
2 .Have you heard of direct payments, i f so how? 
3. Can you see any potential benefits from the introduction of direct payments in this town ? 
4. What would worry you about direct payments? 
5. Do you know anybody who might benefit from direct payments? 
6. Have any of your clients expressed an interest in direct payments? 
7. Why do you think there has been a slow take up of direct payments? 
8. Are there any particular issues need to be taken into account in this town? 
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Opinion Statements 
I Direct payments are about giving money to people and leaving them to get on with it.* 
2. Direct payments are about giving users control over the services they get. 
3. Direct payments are about enabling users to become employers.* 
4. Direct payments have come from a policy of the last Conservative government * 
5. Direct payments are about turning clients into consumers. 
6.1 have known people who would have benefited from direct payments. 
7. Direct payments are not very different from other schemes that have been around for years. 
8. Many service users would be worried about the responsibility of getting a direct payment.** 
9. Third party schemes employing personal assistants on behalf of service users would do the 
same as direct payments * 
10. People in this town won't be interested in direct payments.* 
I I .Direct payments will probably be best for younger people.** 
12. Direct payments are for people who are dissatisfied with the services we offer.** 
13. Direct payments should be about people getting together to run their own services. 
14.Service users might use direct payments for the wrong things* 
15. Direct payments are a threat to in house services. 
16. People who get direct payments will probably use agencies. 
17. Most people will need a lot of support i f they are going to get direct payments. 
18. Direct payments could mean a lot of work for social workers. 
19. People should get direct payments through the normal assessment processes. 
20. There's a risk that people will be exploited i f they are given the money to buy their own 
care. * 
21.If our services were good enough people would not want direct payments.* 
22. There are other ways of empowering users without giving them cash. 
23. People should be able to use direct payments for more than just personal care. 
24 . People already have a lot of choice over services in this town 
25.People should be allowed to use direct payments to buy community health services. 
26.If I needed community-care services I would want a direct payment. 
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27. There's not enough money to pay for all the services people want. Direct payments mean 
users must decide what to do without 
28. Direct payments will only work for people who do not need a lot of care.** 
29. Its difficult to get good care staff in this town 
30. Direct payments could have a big impact on community-care in this town in the future 
31 .We are only talking about introducing direct payments in this town because the government 
says we must. 
3 2. People in this town are generally happy with the services on offer 
3 3 .The cash to buy their own care is what users have wanted for years 
3 4. For me, direct payments are about ... 
* Statements are quotes from politicians, senior managers and professional adviser during 
discussions about direct payments in Fletcherford between February and April 2000. 
** Statements are taken from the records of the 1997 consultation. 
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Appendix 2 : Interview Guides 
2a. Interview Guide SSI Business Link 
Role of the SSI and business link 
North East authorities and Direct Payments 
New Labour government and direct payments 
Performance Assessment 
Learning Disability White Paper. 
Issues and obstacles 
The development of community-care policy and practice. 
The particular experience of Fletcherford : reasons for resistance, 
What will help, what will hinder? 
Take up and Third Party Schemes 
Contrast New Labour and Tory approaches 
Health and Social Care, Health and Continuing Care issues 
Pooled budgets and integration 
Health Act flexibilities 
Costs and ceilings 
Charges 
Eligibility criteria 
Assessment 
Universal versus selective service models, implications in practice 
Accountability 
Other implementation issues 
New Labour Government and the market 
Control and empowerment 
Different sorts of people 
Collective models, 
Support schemes 
Relationship between direct payments and other policy initiatives : Supporting People, 
Best Value 
Worries and concerns, outstanding issues and obstacles to expansion 
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2b. Interview guide NCIL 
The history of the N C I L ? Relationship with governments. 
Relationship with the development of direct payments? 
Role and contribution of the disability rights movement? 
Role and attitude of politicians. Who were the key people, what has their contribution 
been? 
Tory versus New Labour approach, any differences? 
Why the early restrictions (18 to 65)? 
What the government could do to help more? 
User Involvement? Levels and types. Outcomes and Obstacles 
Support schemes. 
Role of Care managers? 
Experience and views on Monitoring 
Experience and views on Ceilings 
Health and integration issues 
Liability, Health and Safety and Oppression 
Centralised Performance Management 
Charging 
Information. 
Guidance from central government 
Control and empowerment [ including role of council solicitors] 
Agencies v Direct Payments 
I L F 
Self assessment 
Eligibility criteria 
The role and responsibilities of users as employers 
Recruitment of personal assistants [pay, conditions, relationships et cetera] 
Collective versus individual control 
Seminars with local authorities in the North East 
Capacity and 'suitability' 
Carers' Direct Payments 
Direct Payments for children 
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2c. Interview guide themes for John Hutton 
Government's policy on direct payments and implementation approach 
Why did you decide to promote and extend direct payments? [Relationship with wider policy 
programme]. 
Why has the govt taken the approach to implementation it has, very gradual policy development 
towards obliging councils to provide direct payments and still lots of areas for local discretion? 
Local authorities have to provide direct payments now but it's down to them to decide and 
individual cases and there's no obligation to provide a support service or to involve users in the 
scheme. So it varies between authorities. What do you think about that? 
What do you think the obstacles were before the changes in guidance? 
What has the government done to remove them? 
Why do you think there has not been the take up? 
Why the variation? 
What would be your criteria forjudging the success of the government's policy on direct 
payments? 
How would you assess the performance in implementation of individual local authorities? 
Health and Social Care Issues 
Do you think that people should eventually be able to get direct payments for community health 
services? [Examples of problems in individual packages for comment] 
What do you think about the issue in the wider policy context of working towards pooled 
budgets and arguments around responsibilities for individuals.] 
I know you have a particular interest in people with learning disabilities, there's been a lot more 
co-operation between health and social services on funding community packages, than for other 
groups. What do you think about that? 
How is the issue about two tier services with health, different from the argument people make 
against people getting direct payments for social care? [It's not fair i f some people end up better 
off, with better 'outcomes'] 
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Capacity and consent 
Issues of capacity and consent for people with dementia, people in terminal stages of motor 
neurone disease, Huntingdon's disease, but particularly for people with learning disabilities. 
You've been active yourself involving people with learning disabilities in your Valuing People 
Advisory group. What do you think? 
Practitioners are running in to capacity and consent issues within their own authorities [hence 
variation in take up of some groups]. Do you have any ideas as to how these issues can be 
resolved, to avoid excluding some people in some council areas? 
Equity 
Fair Access to Care Guidance. What do you hope to achieve? 
Equality of opportunity or outcomes? 
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2d Interview Guide Department of health lead officers 
History of direct payments as a policy initiative under New Labour. 
How and why? 
Background to Roles in department of health and development of direct payments 
Third Party Schemes? 
Employment issues and self-employment 
I L F 
Charges 
Costs and ceilings 
Carers 
N C I L and the role of the disability rights movement 
User involvement, expectations and experience 
Seminars to promote direct payments in the North 
Monitoring Performance of Local Authorities 
Health and social care issues 
Funding 
Guidance from government 
Capacity and consent 
Support schemes 
Dumping and discrimination, suitable and unsuitable clients 
Best Value 
Fair Access 
The relationship between direct payments and the wider policy programme 
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